我国公共企业基金透明度问题研究

公共企业基金是政府财政性资金的重要组成部分,是财政透明度考察的重要内容之一。在对公共企业基金界定信息产权的基础上,本文从财务指标、业绩、风险度等方面来构建公共企业基金透明度的分析框架,进而对增进其透明度提出相应的政策建议。     

政府对公共产品的管理与财政供给范围

公共产品论是公共财政论的基础与核心,建立与市场经济相适应的公共财政基本框架是我国财政体制改革的目标。因此,考察公共产品论演进历史,分析财政理论中政府职责的变迁,对于合理界定我国财政供给范围有借鉴意义。     

出租车市场分析与政府管制--以郑州市为例

本文介绍了现今郑州市出租车行业的现状和管制模式,应用公共选择理论中的寻租理论分析了出租车行业中所涉及的寻租活动,明确了政府管制的弊端,并认为必须正确认识政府和市场的关系,虽然政府管制有种种弊端,但目前政府管制还是有必要的,只是要探索改革方案。     

集团控制、融资优势与投资效率

本文在企业组织理论与投融资理论相融合的统一分析框架下,从集团融资及其对投资效率的影响这一路径考察了集团控制及其内部资本市场运作对成员企业资源配置效率的影响。以A股上市公司2007—2010年的数据为样本,我们发现:集团化运作能通过多种途径放松成员企业的融资约束;而集团控制所带来的融资优势对成员企业投资效率的影响具有两面性。一方面会因资金来源的增加而缓解投资不足,另一方面却因整体融资能力的增强而加剧过度投资。进一步分析显示,产权异质性对集团资源配置效率有重要的影响。集团化运作的融资优势在私有产权控制的集团公司中得到最大发挥,具体表现为缓解投资不足;而地方政府控制的集团公司则容易利用低成本融资进行过度投资;中央政府控制的集团公司融资优势不明显,过度投资程度也较轻。上述研究结论将有助于我们全面深入的理解企业集团的"光明面"与"黑暗面"。     

创业团队的动态演化机制——基于人力资本产权周期视角的多案例研究

“共患难易,同富贵难”寓意着,初期创业团队在面临高风险性、模糊性与不确定性的情况下仍保持较好的合作和协调,而当业务步入正轨后更易于产生冲突。在创业团队快速发展过程中,此类冲突现象较为常见。遗憾的是,现有创业理论对该现象,尤其背后蕴含的产权冲突缺乏应有重视,本文试图弥补这一不足。基于人力资本产权视角,本文通过对4家案例企业进行分析,第一阶段研究发现,创业团队的人力资本产权包含“转化期—界定期—动荡期—治理期”4个演化阶段,不同阶段承载创业团队租金获取、产权界定与明晰等功能。本文第二阶段研究发现,人力资本产权演化本质在于企业资产价值提升过程所带来的“公共领域”难以被有效界定,因而产生人力资本产权再界定动力并引发新企业创业团队的冲突。综上,由于人力资本初始禀赋及增长的差异,新企业资产价值增长带来难以界定的“公共领域”,将导致创业者付出的人力资本与其产权难以匹配,给团队的协调与稳定带来破坏性冲突,表现为价值折损或团队解散。本文有助于深化对人力资本产权理论的认识,对创业团队研究也是重要的补充。     

传媒管制与传媒集团公司治理模式的构建

传媒集团的公司治理是一个十分复杂的问题,中国经济制度和政治制度的特殊性决定了我国传媒集团公司治理的特殊性,本文从中国传媒的政府管制入手,分析了传媒产业的政府管制需求及管制产生的弊端,提出建构公司治理机制可以实现对政府管制的部分替代。在此基础上,客观剖析了目前中国传媒集团公司治理的现状及存在的问题。针对我国传媒集团存在的产权残缺、委托人残缺及管理者激励机制欠缺等问题,提出了中国传媒集团“三级治理”的公司治理模型,特别强调政府治理、外部治理、内部治理三者的有机结合。     

基于行为金融实验的非线性证券价格动态模型

为了研究交易者资产结构与股价波动之间的关系,设计并实施了10场内容相同的行为金融实验。根据实验现象以及交易者持仓状态反映其对市场的投资态度,构建了描述市场平均投资态度和股票价格的数学模型。首先利用离散动力系统的相关理论研究了模型的稳定性,然后根据金融市场稳定与否对传染效应进行界定。数值模拟发现,在理性传染效应区间内,存在最优传染效应。在此基础上,进一步探讨了资产结构与股价波动之间的关系。具体而言,在理性传染效应的作用下,当市场中满仓交易者数量与空仓交易者数量相当时,股价呈现小幅水平趋势波动;当满仓交易者数量远高于(低于)空仓交易者数量,股价呈现大幅下跌(上涨)趋势波动。     

资本市场财务呈报管制:理论及其对中国实践的解释

考察中国证券市场的发展历程 ,会发现一个令人困惑的现象 ,一方面 ,中国证券市场的相关制度建设正不断完善;另一方面 ,一系列上市公司会计信息欺诈案件却频繁爆发。本文试图对此做出解释。为此 ,本文构建了一个理论分析框架 ,解释内生财务呈报管制的形成以及构建有效财务呈报管制的前提条件;在此框架内对中国上市公司财务呈报管制无效的根本原因进行深入考察 ,并提出了一些政策建议。     

转型时期公用产品定价中的多重委托—代理关系研究

本文以公用产品价格不断上涨引起的争论为起点 ,根据新管制经济学的基本模型 ,分析基于信息不对称的条件下 ,政府、管制机构和被管制企业在公用产品价格博弈中的行为选择 ,指出在转型时期政府无法形成一个价格均衡的机制 ,能够兼顾政府、管制机构、被管制的企业与享受公共产品的市民和企事业单位等各个利益集团的利益。所以必须改变原有的管制路径 ,将市场竞争、价格的形成与公共产品经营权的拍卖相结合 ,将原有公用产品经营中事后补贴总成本差额的机制 ,转化为事前最低补贴或最高的上缴利润竞标机制。     

光滑暧昧模型下的不透明交易和管制措施研究

本文假定透明交易者对额外投资机会回报率的标准差(方差,投资风险)存在暧昧,这种认知暧昧性抑制了透明交易者的投资行为,会导致风险资产溢价过高及社会福利损失.透明交易者是暧昧厌恶的投资者,其投资决策依据光滑暧昧厌恶模型,需求函数呈现连续且光滑的特征.而不透明交易者,通过支付一定的信息获取成本获得私有信息而具有信息优势,他们是标准的风险厌恶的投资者.通过构建理性预期均衡,本文的研究发现:初始资产严格为正的透明交易者将获得严格为正的超额收益;提高信息获取成本将减少不透明交易者的比例,从而增加风险资产溢价,降低福利水平,因而不是一项好的管制措施;而旨在提高市场透明度降低交易者暧昧性的举措总有利于提高福利水平.     

Internalities and Their Applicability for Organizational Practices

The economic concept of externalities was introduced to the field of behavior analysis (BA) by Biglan (2009). Since then, practitioners of BA have been able to apply this economic concept to behavior analytic theory, and create strategies to improve organizational practices. A similar economic concept to the externality is the internality, a cost imposed on an individual that is not taken into account when the person consumes the good or service. This paper will introduce the concept of internalities and discuss how it can be integrated into existing behavior analytic literature. Practices that produce “organizational internalities” will be analyzed using meta and macrocontingencies, with a discussion on how positive internalities can be promoted by an organization’s leadership. It will conclude with a discussion on how strategies regarding Organizational Behavior Management and Behavioral Systems Analysis can use the concept of organizational internalities to mitigate the negative outcomes of internalities, while simultaneously promoting positive outcomes of internalities.     

Ownership Strategy and Foreign Affiliate Performance in Multinational Family Business Groups: A Double-edged Sword

We argue that ownership strategies can be a double edged sword for multinational family business groups from emerging economies and the performance of their affiliates located abroad. We test an integrated framework based on internalization and agency theory on a longitudinal dataset of multinational family business groups from Taiwan. We find evidence for the contingent impact of cultural differences and family management on the association between ownership strategy and affiliate performance. While direct ownership is seen as offering more control over the affiliate, we show that this comes at a performance cost for affiliates in culturally different host countries and affiliates under family management. Indirect ownership seems to be one way to positively influence affiliate performance in culturally distant countries, but seems not to be contingent on family management utilization.     

The effect of public involvement on firm inefficiency: evidence using Japanese private firms

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of public involvement on firm inefficiency. Public involvement is defined as the actions taken by governments to control firm management, as expressed in regulation and public ownership. We make the following three contributions. First, we show public involvement is an important determinant of the inefficiency of private firms. Although public involvement has been shown to influence firm behavior in public or regulated sectors, existing studies in the private sector tend to ignore its effects. Second, we analyze firm inefficiency rather than firm performance by focusing on cost factors. Previous work tends to use performance measures such as return on assets or return on equity rather than inefficiency measures to judge a firm’s management level. Performance measures are problematic, however, in that they are affected by not only cost factors but also demand factors. Therefore, we must separate these factors when we analyze a firm’s management. Third, we use a stochastic cost frontier model for the estimation. Although this is a suitable approach for estimating firm inefficiency, it is rarely used for private firms. Our results suggest that public ownership increases firm inefficiency while regulation decreases firm inefficiency. It is also clear that the effect of public ownership is not significant in the manufacturing industry, while it is strongly significant in the nonmanufacturing industry. This shows the importance of studying the effect of public involvement in the private sector.     

PLATFORM OWNERSHIP

We develop a theoretical framework of trade on a platform on which buyers and sellers interact, and compare the impact of different platform ownership structures. If two‐sided network effects are strong, monopoly ownership induces more trade than dispersed ownership and is therefore socially preferable. Independent of the strength of network effects, monopoly ownership dominates a club‐like ownership structure where incumbent owners can exclude potential entrants. Under dispersed ownership, vertical integration tends to increase welfare as it allows the internalization of demand externalities. Allowing incumbent platform owners to exclude potential entrants hurts buyers but can raise welfare. (JEL: L10, D40)     

土地制度的供求冲突与其改革的框架性安排

中国农村社会和农业经济向城市社会和工商业经济转型,计划经济向市场经济转轨,以及可持续发展和西部大开发,对土地制度的供给及其功能提出了特殊的需求。就目前来看,两种公有、高度集中和行政色彩较浓的土地所有和配置制度与结构转型和市场经济的要求发生了尖锐的冲突,特别是土地集体所有的虚无性衍生出一系列的经济社会问题。据此,本文提出了中国土地制度改革的框架性安排:土地的两种公有制并轨,国家拥有所有土地的终极所有权,分解国家所有的占有、使用、处置等权力,实行较长的使用年期财产权制度,农民和一部分国有企业的土地使用年期财产与社会保障挂钩,发挥市场配置土地资源的基础性作用,政府管理主要用来弥补市场配置土地资源的缺陷。     

Equity Ownership in Cross‐border Mergers and Acquisitions by British Firms: An Analysis of Real Options and Transaction Cost Factors

The authors investigate the factors influencing the share of equity ownership sought in cross‐border mergers and acquisitions (CBM&As). Drawing on real options theory and transaction cost economics (TCE), they address and hypothesize key factors linked to commitment under exogenous uncertainty and the separation of desired and non‐desired assets’ influence on share of equity sought by acquiring firms in CBM&As. Empirical analysis based on 1872 CBM&As undertaken by British firms in both developed and emerging economies shows that British MNEs are more likely to pursue a partial acquisition in a target foreign firm when those foreign firms are from culturally distant countries. Further, findings support the view that the high cost of separating desired assets from non‐desired assets motivates firms to make a partial acquisition rather than acquire the target completely. This is one of the first studies to use real options theory to address the cost of commitment under exogenous uncertainty, as well as TCE logic to address the separation of desired and non‐desired assets in the target firm while analysing equity ownership sought in CBM&As. Empirically, this paper contributes by examining CBM&As by British firms in both developed and emerging markets.     

A WORLD OF CITIES: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF URBANIZATION IN POORER COUNTRIES

Historically, urban growth required enough development to grow and transport significant agricultural surpluses or a government effective enough to build an empire. But there has been an explosion of poor mega‐cities over the last 30 years. A simple urban model illustrates that in closed economies, agricultural prosperity leads to more urbanization, but that in an open economy, urbanization increases with agricultural desperation. The challenge of developing world mega‐cities is that poverty and weak governance reduce the ability to address the negative externalities that come with density. This paper models the connection between urban size and institutional failure, and shows that urban anonymity causes institutions to break down. For large cities with weak governments, draconian policies may be the only way to curb negative externalities, suggesting a painful trade‐off between dictatorship and disorder. A simple model suggests that private provision of infrastructure to reduce negative externalities is less costly when city populations are low or institutions are strong, but that public provision can cost less in bigger cities.     

DISTRIBUTIONAL INCENTIVES IN AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF DOMESTIC SOVEREIGN DEFAULT

Europe's debt crisis resembles historical episodes of outright default on domestic public debt about which little research exists. This paper proposes a theory of domestic sovereign default based on distributional incentives affecting the welfare of risk‐averse debt and nondebtholders. A utilitarian government cannot sustain debt if default is costless. If default is costly, debt with default risk is sustainable, and debt falls as the concentration of debt ownership rises. A government favoring bond holders can also sustain debt, with debt rising as ownership becomes more concentrated. These results are robust to adding foreign investors, redistributive taxes, or a second asset.     

交易、风险与所有权——解释中国经济转轨路径及其绩效的一种新视角

本文试图为解释中国经济转轨过程提供一个新的视角 ,并通过强调有效交易和所有权的重要性来恢复与修补一些经典理论对经济转轨过程的解释力 ,以便将其最终整合到日见丰富和成熟的转轨经济理论的一般框架之中。本文的理论贡献可以归纳为:第一 ,阐发有效交易理论 ,认为经典理论所坚守的互利信条只是达成有效交易的必要条件 ,所有权的完整性才是充分条件。在所有权存在缺陷时 ,一种对当事人双方有利的交易极有可能伤及社会。第二 ,提出内生风险命题 ,经典资产选择理论所关注的外生风险主要源自宏观经济政策及企业经营层面 ,而内生风险则与微观经济基础尤其是所有权制度密切相关。第三 ,揭示出所有权、交易与产权之间的逻辑联系 ,并阐明所有权不一定是有效的但必须是完整的和神圣不可侵犯的观点。第四 ,指出内生贸易模型的隐含条件 ,发现在主管政府充当贸易者的场合 ,交易效率条件完全可以被超越 ,国际贸易就不一定非要以国内贸易为前提 ,而这种贸易也就极有可能成为贸易双方合谋算计国家和社会的博弈。本文的政策含义是 ,中国经济转轨的实际绩效与有效交易的规模和市场份额直接相关 ,而有效交易的成长既不依赖于政府推进市场化的决心 ,也不仰仗于法律与行政部门对交易主体的监督和惩罚力度 ,而最终取决于完     

Ownership and control in local public utilities: the Italian case

The paper discusses the ownership and control structures of local public utilities by showing evidence from the Italian case. In this discussion, the focus is on three main aspects: the ownership structure, the board composition and independence, and citizens’ involvement (service charters). The main results from this study reveal that there are controversial aspects, which need further investigation. The existence of a principal–principal conflict is clearly arising from an in-depth analysis of the ownership structures. In addition, the board of directors, because of the lack of actual independence, does not seem to be a useful arena to manage and solve these conflicts. Other governance mechanisms are thus needed, to increase accountability to citizens. Within this, service charters seem to be a useful tool to protect the “public interest”. However, service charters content analysis suggests that further implementation actions are due. The paper contributes to the debate on conflicts of interests and governance mechanisms in local public utilities suggesting possible developments of agency theory and discussing implications for further research.