Risk attitudes in a social context

Many experiments have demonstrated that when evaluating payoffs, people take not only their own payoffs into account, but also the payoffs of others in their social environment. Most of this evidence is found in settings where payoffs are riskless. It is plausible that if people care about the payoffs of others, they do so not only in a riskless context, but also in a risky one. This suggests that an individual’s decision making under risk depends on the risks others in his or her environment face. This paper is the first to test whether individuals’ risk attitudes are affected by the risks others face. The results show that risk attitudes appear to be less affected by others’ risks than expected, even though the same subjects do show concerns for inequality in a riskless setting. Interestingly, we find that people prefer risks to be independent across individuals in society rather than correlated.     

Learning strategic environments: an experimental study of strategy formation and transfer

I present an experiment on learning about a game in an initially unknown environment. Subjects play repeatedly simple 2 × 2 normal-form coordination games. I compare behavioral learning algorithms for different feedback information. Minimal feedback only informs about own payoffs, while additional feedback informs about own payoffs and the opponent’s choice. Results show that minimal feedback information leads to a myopic learning algorithm, while additional feedback induces non-myopic learning and increases the impulse with which players respond to payoff differences. Finally, there is evidence for a strategy transfer across games which differ only according to the relabel of actions, but not according to permutation in the payoff matrix.     

Implementing and testing risk-preference-induction mechanisms in experimental sealed-bid auctions

Risk-preference-inducing lottery procedures can serve as valuable tools for experimental economists. However, questioning their effectiveness, experimenters may avoid them even when predictions and conclusions depend crucially on risk preferences. Here, I review risk-preference-induction attempts in sealed-bid auctions, discussing factors that promote or hinder success. Making the procedure very transparent and having subjects learn about it in simple environments promote success. Hysteresis resulting from switching between monetary payoffs and lottery procedures in one environment hinders success. Thus, lottery procedures appear sensitive to the implementation. However, implemented carefully, they can generate behavior consistent with the intended preferences.     

It is Whether You Win or Lose: The Importance of the Overall Probabilities of Winning or Losing in Risky Choice

Imagine that you own a five-outcome gamble with the following payoffs and probabilities: ($100, .20; $50, .20; Imagine that you own a five-outcome gamble with the following payoffs and probabilities: ($100, .20; $50, .20; $0, .20; –$25, .20; –$50, .20). What happens when the opportunity to improve such a gamble is provided by a manipulation that adds value to one outcome versus another outcome, particularly when the opportunity to add value to one outcome versus another outcome changes the overall probability of a gain or the overall probability of a loss? Such a choice provides a simple test of the expected utility model (EU), original prospect theory (OPT), and cumulative prospect theory (CPT). A study of risky choices involving 375 respondents indicates that respondents were most sensitive to changes in outcome values that either increased the overall probability of a strict gain or decreased the overall probability of a strict loss. These results indicate more support for OPT rather than CPT and EU under various assumptions about the shape of the utility and value and weighting functions. Most importantly, the main difference between the various expectation models of risky choice occurs for outcomes near the reference value. A second study of risky choice involving 151 respondents again demonstrated the sensitivity of subjects to reducing the probability of a strict loss even at the cost of reduced expected value. Consequently, we argue that theories of how people choose among gambles that involve three or more consequences with both gains and losses need to include measures of the overall probabilities of a gain and of a loss.JEL Classification  D81     

Risk aversion over finite domains

We investigate risk attitudes when the underlying domain of payoffs is finite and the payoffs are, in general, not numerical. In such cases, the traditional notions of absolute risk attitudes, that are designed for convex domains of numerical payoffs, are not applicable. We introduce comparative notions of weak and strong risk attitudes that remain applicable. We examine how they are characterized within the rank-dependent utility model, thus including expected utility as a special case. In particular, we characterize strong comparative risk aversion under rank-dependent utility. This is our main result. From this and other findings, we draw two novel conclusions. First, under expected utility, weak and strong comparative risk aversion are characterized by the same condition over finite domains. By contrast, such is not the case under non-expected utility. Second, under expected utility, weak (respectively: strong) comparative risk aversion is characterized by the same condition when the utility functions have finite range and when they have convex range (alternatively, when the payoffs are numerical and their domain is finite or convex, respectively). By contrast, such is not the case under non-expected utility. Thus, considering comparative risk aversion over finite domains leads to a better understanding of the divide between expected and non-expected utility, more generally, the structural properties of the main models of decision-making under risk.

     

Using the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ) to Predict Emotional and Behavioral Difficulties on Positive and Negative Affect Among Adolescents in Disadvantaged Communities

The Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ) was used to predict the positive and negative affects of emotional and behavioral difficulties among adolescent boys and girls aged between 14 and 21 years living in disadvantaged communities. A total of 316 adolescents—181 boys and 135 girls—living in the Seri Pantai and Pantai Ria Public Housing Projects in Kuala Lumpur were invited to complete the questionnaire. The results showed that conduct and peer problems were the most prevalent emotional and behavioral difficulties experienced by these adolescents. As expected, the emotional symptoms were more common among the girls than the boys. A further analysis showed that emotional symptoms, peer problems, and low prosocial behavior were predictors of the negative affect of emotional and behavioral difficulties while negative emotional symptoms and high hyperactivity were predictors of a positive affect. The findings suggested that three subscales of SDQ are required to produce a negative affect, and two subscales of SDQ for a positive affect.     

Information transparency and equilibrium selection in coordination games: an experimental study

We experimentally investigate the role of information transparency for equilibrium selection in stag hunt coordination games. These games can be transformed from a prisoner’s dilemma game by introducing a centralized reward or punishment scheme. We aim to explore the impact of the disclosure of information on how final payoffs are derived on players’ incentive to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium. We find that such information disclosure significantly increases the tendency of players to play the payoff-dominant strategy and reduces the occurrence of coordination failure. The mechanism works directly through the positive impact of disclosure on the saliency of the payoff-dominant equilibrium, and indirectly through the positive influence of disclosure on players’ belief about the likelihood of cooperation by the opponent.     

Allais for all: Revisiting the paradox in a large representative sample

We administer the Allais paradox questions to both a representative sample of the Dutch population and to student subjects. Three treatments are implemented: one with the original high hypothetical payoffs, one with low hypothetical payoffs and a third with low real payoffs. Our key findings are: (i) violations in the non-lab sample are systematic and a large bulk of violations is likely to stem from non-familiarity with large payoffs, (ii) we can identify groups of the general population that have much higher than average violation rates; this concerns mainly the lowly educated and unemployed, and (iii) the relative treatment differences in the population at large are accurately predicted by the lab sample, but violation rates in all lab treatments are about 15 percentage points lower than in the corresponding non-lab treatments.     

Endogenizing the order of moves in matrix games

Players often have flexibility in when they move and thus whether a game is played simultaneously or sequentially may be endogenously determined. For 2 × 2 games, we analyze this using an extended game. In a stage prior to actual play, players choose in which of two periods to move. A player moving at the first opportunity knows when his opponent will move. A player moving at the second turn learns the first mover's action. If both select the same turn, they play a simultaneous move subgame.If both players have dominant strategies in the basic game, equilibrium payoffs in the basic and extended games are identical. If only one player has a dominant strategy or if the unique equilibrium in the basic game is in mixed strategies, then the extended game equilibrium payoffs differ if and only if some pair of pure strategies Pareto dominates the basic game simultaneous play payoffs. If so, sequential play attains the Pareto dominating payoffs. The mixed strategy equilibrium occurs only when it is not Pareto dominated by some pair of pure strategies.In an alternative extended game, players cannot observe delay by opponents at the first turn. Results for 2×2 games are essentially the same as with observable delay, differing only when only one player has a dominant strategy.     

Digital Distinction: Status‐Specific Types of Internet Usage*

Objective. Sociologists of technology propose that not only a technological artifact, as such, but also patterns of usage should be considered when studying the social implications of technologies. Accordingly, we explore how people's online activities are influenced by users' socioeconomic status and context of use. Methods. We analyze data from the Allensbacher Computer and Technology Analysis (ACTA) 2004 survey with uniquely detailed information about people's Internet uses and context of usage to explore this relationship. Results. Findings suggest that high‐status and low‐status individuals cultivate different forms of “Internet‐in‐practice.” High‐status users are much more likely to engage in so‐called capital‐enhancing activities online than are their less privileged counterparts. Conclusion. Results suggest differential payoffs from Internet use depending on a user's socioeconomic background. Digital inequalities might be mitigated by improving people's Internet equipment and digital experience, but they do not account for all the status differential in use.     

Risk aversion in bargaining: An experimental study

This paper reports the results of three experiments designed to test the predictions of the principal game-theoretic models of bargaining concerning the influence of risk aversion on bargaining outcomes. These models predict that risk aversion will be disadvantageous in bargaining except in situations in which potential agreements are lotteries with a positive probability of being worse than disagreement. The experimental results support the models' predictions. However, in the range of payoffs studied here, the effects due to risk aversion may be smaller than some of the focal point effects observed in previous experiments. Implications for further theoretical and experimental work are considered.     

Minimax,information and ultrapessimism

Discussing the foundations of the minimax principle, Savage (1954) argued that it is utterly untenable for statistics because it is ultrapessimistic when applied to negative income, but claimed that such objection is not relevant when the principle is applied to regret. In this paper I rebut the latter claim. I first present an example where ultrapessimism, as Savage understood it, applies to minimax regret but not to minimax negative income. Then, for a sequential decision problems with two terminal acts and a finite number of states of nature, I give necessary and sufficient conditions for a decision rule to be ultrapessimistic, and show that for every payoff table with at least three states, be it in regret form or not, there exist an experiment such that the minimax rule is ultrapessimistic. I conclude with some more general remarks on information and the value of experimentation for a minimax agent.     

Integration of Behavioral Frequency and Intention Information in Young Children's Trait Attributions

Two experiments examined three‐ to six‐year‐olds' use of frequency and intention information to make trait attributions and behavioral predictions. In experiment 1, participants were told a story about an actor who behaved positively once or four times on purpose or incidentally. Children were most likely to make trait‐consistent behavioral predictions after hearing about several positive, intentional behaviors. Trait attributions were largely positive. Experiment 2 examined children's use of the same cues concerning negative behavioral outcomes. Participants tended to predict that actors who engaged in negative behavior would do so again, irrespective of intention, although younger children required more exemplars than older children. Participants were most likely to make negative trait attributions after hearing about multiple intentional behaviors; however, there was reluctance with age to describe actors as mean. Implications for children's ‘theory of personality’ are discussed.     

Emotional Reactivity and Regulation in Head Start Children: Links to Ecologically Valid Behaviors and Internalizing Problems

Children's emotional reactivity may interact with their regulatory behaviors to contribute to internalizing problems and social functioning even early in development. Ninety‐one preschool children participated in a longitudinal project examining children's reactivity and regulatory behaviors as predictors of internalizing problems, and positive and negative social behavior in the classroom. Children who paired negative emotion expression with disengagement during a laboratory task showed higher levels of internalizing problems and more negative social behavior in the classroom 6 months later. Positive emotion expression paired with engagement during a laboratory task predicted more positive social behavior in the classroom 6 months later. Physiological reactivity and regulation also predicted children's social behavior in the classroom. Findings suggest that preschool children with maladaptive reactivity and regulatory patterns may be at greater risk for internalizing problems even in early childhood.     

A test of the Core,Bargaining Set,Kernel and Shapley models in n-person quota games with one weak player

n-person (n – 1)-quota-games where the quotas are positive for certain n – 1 (strong) players and negative for the remaining (weak) player, are discussed. Normative solutions predicted by the Core,the Kernel, the Bargaining Set, the Competitive Bargaining Set, and by the Shapley Value are presented and exemplified.Each of twelve groups of subjects participated in a four-person and a five-person (n – 1)-quota games with one weak player. The weak player was always excluded from the ratified coalition. The division of payoffs among the strong players was more egalitarian than the Kernel solution but less egalitarian than the Shapley value. The Core and the Bargaining Sets were fully supported for the two strongest players, but less supported for the other players. Analyses of the bargaining process confirmed a dynamic interpretation of the Bargaining Set Theory.This research was performed while the author was at the University of North Carolina. The research was partially supported by a PHS Research Grant No. MH-10006 from the National Institute of Mental Health. The author thanks Professor Amnon Rapoport for helpful advice in the design of this study.     

Choice under complete uncertainty when outcome spaces are state dependent

One central objection to the maximin payoff criterion is that it focuses on the state that yields the lowest payoffs regardless of how low these are. We allow different states to have different sets of possible outcomes and show that the original axioms of Milnor (1954) continue to characterize the maximin payoff criterion, provided that the sets of payoffs achievable across states overlap. If instead payoffs in some states are always lower than in all others then ignoring the “bad” states is no longer inconsistent with these axioms. Similar dependence on overlap of outcome spaces across states holds for the minimax regret and maximin joy criteria.      

Socially Structured Games

We generalize the concept of a cooperative non-transferable utility game by introducing a socially structured game. In a socially structured game every coalition of players can organize themselves according to one or more internal organizations to generate payoffs. Each admissible internal organization on a coalition yields a set of payoffs attainable by the members of this coalition. The strengths of the players within an internal organization depend on the structure of the internal organization and are represented by an exogenously given power vector. More powerful players have the power to take away payoffs of the less powerful players as long as those latter players are not able to guarantee their payoffs by forming a different internal organization within some coalition in which they have more power. We introduce the socially stable core as a solution concept that contains those payoffs that are both stable in an economic sense, i.e., belong to the core of the underlying cooperative game, and stable in a social sense, i.e., payoffs are sustained by a collection of internal organizations of coalitions for which power is distributed over all players in a balanced way. The socially stable core is a subset and therefore a refinement of the core. We show by means of examples that in many cases the socially stable core is a very small subset of the core. We will state conditions for which the socially stable core is non-empty. In order to derive this result, we formulate a new intersection theorem that generalizes the KKMS intersection theorem. We also discuss the relationship between social stability and the wellknown concept of balancedness for NTU-games, a sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core. In particular we give an example of a socially structured game that satisfies social stability and therefore has a non-empty core, but whose induced NTU-game does not satisfy balancedness in the general sense of Billera.      

Informational Asymmetries and Observational Learning in Search

As economics modeling moves from super rational decision makers to considering boundedly rational agents, some economic problems deserve a second look. This paper studies the effects of learning on the efficiency of search. Once learning is taken into account, the structure of information flow becomes important. In particular, I highlight the truncated information structure in the search problem. Agents stop searching once a sufficiently attractive price is found. Therefore, they observe the performance of shorter searches, but do not directly observe the performance of longer searches. I design and conduct an experiment to test the hypothesis that this asymmetric flow of information leads agents to search too little. I find strong evidence in its favor. This suggests that in the presence of learning, the provision of a more symmetric information structure will make search more efficient.JEL Classification: C91, D83     

Parents' perceptions of contact with the Norwegian Child Welfare Services

Listening to the opinions of service users is important in research. This study explored how parents cognitively and emotionally perceive contact with the Norwegian Child Welfare Services (CWS). It also compared the reports of parents recently referred to the CWS with reports of more experienced users. A content analysis was conducted on open‐ended survey responses from parents (n = 697). This study fills a gap in the literature on how parents perceive contact with the CWS and what they see as important factors when judging this contact. The findings showed that 40.6% of the parents reported exclusively positive experiences, 30.7% of the parents reported solely negative experiences, while 24% of the parents described both positive and negative experiences. The content of the positive and negative experiences were related to characteristics of the child welfare workers, the quality of the relationship, the help offered and the parent's feelings of insecurity and fear. New CWS users tended to view the contact as more positive than the more experienced ones. Practical implications are presented.     

Costly and discrete communication: an experimental investigation

Language is an imperfect and coarse means of communicating information about a complex and nuanced world. We report on an experiment designed to capture this feature of communication. The messages available to the sender imperfectly describe the state of the world; however, the sender can improve communication, at a cost, by increasing the complexity or elaborateness of the message. Here the sender learns the state of the world, then sends a message to the receiver. The receiver observes the message and provides a best guess about the state. The incentives of the players are aligned in the sense that both sender and receiver are paid an amount which is increasing in the accuracy of the receiver’s guess. We find that the size of the language endogenously emerges as a function of the costs of communication. Specifically, we find that higher communication costs are associated with a smaller language. Although the equilibrium predictions do not perform well, this divergence occurs in a manner which is consistent with the experimental communication literature: overcommunication. We find that the sender’s payoffs, relative to equilibrium payoffs, are decreasing in the cost of communication. We also find that the receiver’s payoffs, relative to equilibrium payoffs, are increasing in the cost of communication. Finally, we find imperfections in coordination on the basis of the experimental labels.