消散式遏制：中国劳工政治的比较个案研究

中国激烈的劳工抗争为何未能得到持续的扩展而被国家逐步平息,笔者试图通过对正式国有工人和长期临时工人的比较研究来回答此问题。本文聚焦这两组工人具体的斗争过程和机制,考察他们如何通过在街头抗议、集体上访和法律仲裁等不同斗争路线之间的穿梭,从而实现与国家代理人的互动。研究发现,这两类工人在斗争过程中获得了不同的象征性满足而不是物质上的让步;他们的满足方式的差异是国家代理人依据两类工人各自不同的历史轨迹和社会身份所做出的有差别的策略性回应与引导的结果。与强调工人内部分化导致集体无行动的“工人分化论”不同,本文所谓的“消散式遏制”强调分化的工人同地方国家代理人之间的互动,正是在这个过程中,工人们未能实现抗争可能带来的阶级认同,而是丧失了最初的激进动力和挑战性,逐步屈从于国家的和平驯化过程 。     

集体谈判制度与我国收入分配格局调整——基于经济危机的思考

由于市场经济体制中遵循按生产要素分配的分配原则,劳动的价格相对于其他几种要素的价格要低得多,这必然造成劳动者的收入在国民收入总量中的比重偏低,导致劳动者收益普遍偏低,也必然导致市场有效需求不足,进而埋下经济危机的隐患.在我国,集体谈判制度的缺失是劳动者收入偏低的重要原因.由于新旧机制的交替,集体谈判和集体合同制度从认识到实践中还存在一些问题,如集体谈判主体资格不到住、集体谈判机制欠完善、集体谈判缺乏相应的法律保障.只有完善我国的集体谈判制度,才能保证劳动者在初次分配过程中获得更大份额.而保证工会的独立性是完善集体谈判制度的根本途径.只有当工会组织真正代表工人、相对独立于政府而与资方及其组织进行平等谈判时,集体谈判机制才算有效建立,职工或雇员的利益才可以得到最大化的保护.     

论市场经济建构中的集体谈判

在现代西方经济学中，谈判这个词并不生疏，经常被当作解决劳资矛盾和处理不同利益主体之间关系的一种手段。而在我国目前的经济理论研究中，使用谈判这个词还不多见。事实上，社会主义社会的物质利益关系也是多元的，也存在着各种矛盾。尤其在发展市场经济的条件下，不同市场主体使用集体谈判手段解决利益纷争．调适分配关系，将是不可避免的。一、实行集体谈判的客观依据在发展社会主义市场经济的今天，用集体谈判的方法处理不同利益主体之间的矛盾，尤其用来调节物质利益分配关系，是具有客观必然性的。现在，我们不能再忌讳谈论这个问题…     

社会记忆及其建构——一项关于知青集体记忆的研究,

任何个体化的叙述都不可避免地带有“社会文本”的痕迹,知青集体记忆正是通过知青个体化的充满张力的叙事而展开其逻辑的。通过叙事,知青“自我”意义和“群体”意义生成,在此基础上,知青通过对“代”的认同,使得自己与国家历史相联,以确定自我形象并在更宏大的社会结构中进行定位。知青对意义的定位和追寻反映了这一代人持续的和深刻的认同危机。“劫后辉煌”是知青对自己青春创伤的救赎。尽管知青集体记忆存在着复杂的分层,但是,意义已经在叙述和回忆中完成。知青文学作为一种传播广泛的刻写方式,知青聚会作为一种普遍参与的操演方式,它们对知青集体记忆的建构起到了不可忽视的作用。而“上山下乡”历史事件的特点为知青集体记忆的建构提供了空间和可能性。我们希望有关知青社会记忆研究能够在研究实践层面推进社会记忆研究这个领域。     

基于利益共享的非公企业和谐劳动关系的构建与优化

在强资本、弱劳工的格局下,社会成员不能公平地享有社会共同利益,非公企业中劳资利益失衡导致的矛盾和冲突日益凸显.因此,解决社会矛盾和冲突的根本方法是让社会成员共享社会共同利益,即利益共享.这就需要建立三方利益协调机制,建立企业合理的利益分配机制,加大工会力量和集体谈判功能,提升政府的调控力度.     

行政发包的组织边界:兼论“官吏分途”与“层级分流”现象

本文重新梳理了行政发包制理论中“行政”与“发包”的关系,将政治晋升机制正式引入行政发包关系,定义了行政内部发包与行政外部发包的组织边界。在此基础上,本文重新诠释了历史上的“官吏分途”以及当今的“层级分流”现象。本文认为,从秦汉到明清,中国经历了“官吏分途”和“吏役合一”的双重过程,这实际上代表了中国官僚体制组织边界的重大变化,即从“行政内包”到“行政外包”的过程,而推动整个过程的驱动力是帝国所面临的日益严重的财政压力。本文还对中国历史上国家与社会的关系特征进行了重新表述。相同的历史现象,不同的解析框架,本文与周雪光的帝国逻辑理论进行了一次深入的学术对话。     

世界工厂的“中国特色”：新时期工人状况的社会学鸟瞰

面对新时代的劳工问题,特别是“新生代农民工”问题,经典理论遭遇“中国特色”的诸多挑战。本文从社会结构性视角探讨权力、资本和劳工的关系与互动,讨论在中国特定的制度背景与转型过程中,工人阶级的形成与公民社会的生成有着怎样的关系。研究认为,对工人而言,公民的基本权利就体现为各项劳动权利的实现和保障、劳工的组织化权利的落实;公民权利是工人阶级形成的前提条件,劳工阶级的出路在于形成自主的社会力量。工人的公民化过程,劳工权利亦即公民权利的获得与保护是解决劳资矛盾和转型正义的根本途径。就劳工问题而言,以能动社会的建设为先导,同时推进公民社会的建设,也许更为可行。     

控制与抵抗:雇主与家政工在家务劳动过程中的博弈

本文以劳动过程理论为基础,在借用布雷弗曼的视角--“概念”与“执行”的同时,结合M.福柯、戈夫曼和霍奇斯柴德的理论,讨论家政工与雇主在家务劳动方面的博弈过程以及双方为争夺劳动过程控制权所采取的策略和行动,同时讨论意识形态在此博弈中发挥的作用。本文认为,在家务劳动过程中,雇主的身心是分离的。他们为了满足自己的需求,通过各种策略控制劳动过程,将家政工的身心进行分割。这些策略包括时间规训、全景监视和情感管理。而家政工为了避免身心被分割,也采取“跳槽”、讨价还价、搭建“前后台”等方式来夺回对劳动过程控制权。此外,家政工也可能受到意识形态的影响而主动放弃控制权。     

在“生人社会”中建立“熟人关系” ——对大学“同乡会”的社会心理学分析

本文以半结构化的访谈方法,通过分析在读大学生的同乡交往,试图探讨异地求学的大学生在进入“生人社会”后,如何通过同乡会这一特殊的、具有社团组织和关系网络双重特点的平台,适应学校生活,完成身份转换。研究发现,在这一过程中,“我们”概念的两种形成机制--“关系化”与“类别化”之间实际发生了相互缠绕、竞争与协商,导致了“关系化”的“我们”概念以新的形式--“关系的类别化”与“类别的关系化”--出现,而看似作为一个组织的同乡会,在性质上却仍然没有脱离差序格局所包含的“关系网”的含义。借此研究,可以窥见社会转型期由“熟人社会”向“生人社会”过渡的身份协商过程的基调。     

市场转型与“单位”变迁再论“单位”研究

改革开放三十年后，中国基本实现了向市场经济体制的转型，社会结构发生了巨大变化。中国城市社会的基层组织制度和社会秩序，尤其是“单位”和“单位体制”，也随之发生了深刻的改变。本文对在市场转型的制度背景下的“单位”变迁研究进行了系统的梳理。文章从概念辨析入手，分为“单位”体制及其变迁、单位内部的权力结构与行为方式、单位与社会分层三个方面展开具体论述。作者认为，采用细致的个案调查方法来研究不同类型“单位”的内部权力结构和行为方式，挖掘“单位”社会分层效应的具体微观机制，进而探讨“单位”和“单位体制”的变迁，并且，以此为参照来理解中国社会组织的新特点、新功能，将是“单位”研究的方向所在。     

集体协商：“民工荒”背景下农民工权益保障的现实路径

缓解当前的＂民工荒＂,首先需要加强对农民工合法权益的保护,笔者认为将集体协商制度的覆盖面落实到农民工群体是一条可行路径。为此,首先需要培育农民工劳动力市场,将市场调节作为集体协商运作的经济基础;其次加强政府对农民工集体协商的宏观指导,为农民工参与集体协商制度提供政策、法规保障;第三要培育规范的谈判主体,使谈判双方主体的地位对等。     

Pretrial Bargaining in the Face of a Random Court Decision: Evidence from Laboratory Games

If negotiation over ownership of an asset is unsuccessful, agents go to court to determine possession. Experiments examine how the presence of a stochastic court decision affects pretrial bargaining behavior. Two players have private information over the value of an asset, owned by one player. If there is no acceptable trade price, a random court decision assigns ownership. The impact of a second stage court decision on bargaining outcomes and the efficiency of trades is measured. Courts reduce the total earnings of players and the frequency of efficient trades. Relative earnings and bargaining behavior depend on which agent proposes the trade price.     

Collective bargaining levels,employment and wage inequality in Spain

After the increase in inequalities following the Great Recession, studies on wage bargaining systems have increasingly focused on wage inequality. This research examines wage inequality associated with collective bargaining levels in Spain, based on matched employer–employee microdata and quantile regression methods. These methods are applied across the wage distribution, following the method proposed by Firpo et al. (2011), to estimate wage premiums associated with agreement levels and to decompose the wage differentials observed at different points of the wage distribution. From the evidence obtained it can be concluded that, although the higher wages found in firm-level agreements are explained by the better observed characteristics of firms and workers covered by these collective agreements, there remains a positive wage premium. Although this premium is seen throughout the wage distribution, it favours mostly workers in the middle and upper-middle end. This slightly increases wage inequality in comparison with sectoral agreements. In contrast, workers without collective bargaining coverage generally suffer a wage penalty. This penalty is only observed on the left of the wage distribution. It becomes a significant wage premium in the upper end of the distribution, which implies a significant increase in wage inequality. In short, the evidence of this research suggests that reducing the coverage of collective bargaining could be associated with a significant increase in wage inequality. A better policy option for countries with a predominant sectoral model, such as Spain, would be to move towards an organized decentralization model. This would cause significant gains in employment as suggested by OECD (2019) and only a slight increase in wage inequality.     

Bargaining Solutions as Social Compromises

A bargaining solution is a social compromise if it is metrically rationalizable, i.e., if it has an optimum (depending on the situation, smallest or largest) distance from some reference point. We explore the workability and the limits of metric rationalization in bargaining theory where compromising is a core issue. We demonstrate that many well-known bargaining solutions are social compromises with respect to reasonable metrics. In the metric approach, bargaining solutions can be grounded in axioms on how society measures differences between utility allocations. Using this approach, we provide an axiomatic characterization for the class of social compromises that are based on p-norms and for the attending bargaining solutions. We further show that bargaining solutions which satisfy Pareto Optimality and Individual Rationality can always be metrically rationalized.     

Bargaining with reasonable aspirations

Consider bargaining situations with two persons, where both have a specific idea of what would be an equitable outcome. In case these ideas differ, a procedure is needed which leads to a compromise between the different views. In the present paper the axioms of restricted homogeneity and of relative monotonicity are introduced, each of which, together with other standard conditions, allows one to determine a solution for this class of bargaining problems. An extension of this solution to bargaining problems with more than two persons is formulated.     

Loss Aversion and Bargaining

We consider bargaining situations where two players evaluate outcomes with reference-dependent utility functions, analyzing the effect of differing levels of loss aversion on bargaining outcomes. We find that as with risk aversion, increasing loss aversion for a player leads to worse outcomes for that player in bargaining situations. An extension of Nash's axioms is used to define a solution for bargaining problems with exogenous reference points. Using this solution concept we endogenize the reference points into the model and find a unique solution giving reference points and outcomes that satisfy two reasonable properties, which we predict would be observed in a steady state. The resulting solution also emerges in two other approaches, a strategic (non-cooperative) approach using Rubinstein's (1982) alternating offers model and a dynamic approach in which we find that even under weak assumptions, outcomes and reference points converge to the steady state solution from any non-equilibrium state.     

Bargaining and Strategic Demand Commitment

On occasion, in multilateral negotiations, interested parties make unilateral demands. Certain agreements need unanimity. However, a lesser degree of consensus may be feasible. In this paper, an alternating demand bargaining game among n players is proposed, which envisages varying consensus requirements and commitment, both crucial in generating a unique and efficient outcome of the bargaining process.     

Alternating-Offer Bargaining and Common Knowledge of Rationality

This paper reconsiders Rubinstein's alternating-offer bargaining game with complete information. We define rationalizability and trembling- hand rationalizability (THR) for multi-stage games with observed actions. We show that rationalizability does not exclude perpetual disagreement or delay, but that THR implies a unique solution. Moreover, this unique solution is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). Also, we reconsider an extension of Rubinstein's game where a smallest money unit is introduced: THR rules out the non-uniqueness of SPE in some particular case. Finally, we investigate the assumption of boundedly rational players. Perpetual disagreement is excluded, but not delay. Furthermore, we cannot use the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as an approximation of the alternating-offer bargaining model once the players are boundedly rational ones.     

从职业病防治看我国集体合同制度的不足与完善

职业病防治法的规定已经较落后,应当对其进行修改,扩大职业病的范围,同时为集体合同约定职业病条款预留空间。改革职业病的管理体制,积极完善工会组织,充分利用行业集体合同、区域集体合同和专项集体合同等现有机制,通过集体协商,引导劳动者和用人单位通过集体合同解决职业病防治问题,无论对于合同双方主体还是对于整个社会都是有益的。     

Psychosocial Capacity Building in New York: Building Resiliency with Construction Workers Assigned to Ground Zero after 9/11

Construction workers who worked on “Ground Zero” after 9/11 in New York City were exposed to stressful and traumatic conditions. Clinicians, trade union leaders and the Cornell School of Industrial and Labor Relations designed a psychosocial capacity-building project which helped workers to recognize, understand and respond to their reactions through a series of interventions that included peer training, psychosocial workshops, brochures, and outreach and referral services. The project emphasized the use of mutual aid and social support through group interventions facilitated by clinicians and offered by trade unions. The article describes the planning and implementation of the project as well as the results of qualitative evaluations of the effectiveness of the project.