Does labor contract completeness drive unionization? Experimental evidence

Flynn (2005) proposes that the degree to which labor contracts are complete may be a major driving force behind the propensity of employees to unionize. We find behavior consistent with this hypothesis in an experimental production game in which subjects are assigned to playing either employers or employees. The rate at which employees opt for a proxy for unionization more than triples when the labor-contracting regime under which they are working shifts from incomplete to complete labor contracts. Complete labor contracts drive out positive reciprocity, anger workers, and increase their desire to unionize.     

Vocational Rehabilitation: Profession and Process. American Lecture Series,John G. Cull,Richard E. Hardy,Publication 831. Charles C. Thomas,Publisher, Springfield,Illinois. 1972. 547 Pages. $18.50, Hardbound

As unionization of professional social workers increases, so will the demand to better prepare social work students for their roles as managers and employees in the collective bargaining process. This paper explores labor relations developments as they apply to the unionization of social work personnel. Current research is reviewed, and labor contracts representing personnel in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Michigan are examined in order to identify typical contract clauses. Areas of needed research are outlined. Suggestions are made for introducing labor relations studies into the social work curriculum and a course taught at the University of Illinois is offered as an example.     

STICKY WAGES AND IMPLICIT CONTRACTS: A TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH

Sticky wages have been explained in the recent implicit contracts literature as a risk shifting device. Risk averse employees purchase insurance via an implicit contract from risk neutral firms. This paper offers an alternative explanation of the phenomenon. Various alternative organizational forms for labor markets are analyzed from a transactions cost viewpoint. Observed labor market institutions (including sticky wages) are seen as ways to economize on transactions costs. In fact, it is argued that sticky wages would be observed even if workers were risk neutral. Thus the emphasis on risk shifting in the implicit contracts literature seems misplaced.
A fall (in price) arising from temporary distress will be attended probably with no correspondent fall in the rate of wages: for the fall in price, and the distress, will be understood to be temporary, and the rate of wages, we know, is not so variable as the price of goods.     

Contested milieux: Small firms,unionization, and the provision of protective structures

Three trends in the workplace point to the importance of considering work relations as well as governance structures for the development of protective benefits such as pensions. The increasing concentration of employment growth in smaller firms, the general decline of unionization, and the changing composition of the work force constitute the new exigencies of worker-employer contracts. The 1983 Current Population Survey Pension Supplement is used in conjunction with certification data from the National Labor Relations Board to examine the interaction between firm size and the influence, as opposed to the prevalence, of unionization in the provision of pensions. Unionization is found to be more influential in the provision of pensions for workers in small firms despite the established prevalence of unionization in larger firms. The implications of these trends for labor market theory are discussed.This is a revised version of papers that were presented at the annual meetings of the Gerontological Society of America, November 1988, and the American Sociological Association, August 1989.     

Unionization decisions of members and nonmembers of an employee association

The determinants of intent to unionize were investigated using the responses of 405 employees of a large public university, 243 of whom were members of an employee association. Members and nonmembers indicated significantly different levels of union vote intent, general beliefs, specific beliefs, and normative pressures. They also used a different union vote decision model. General beliefs about unions appear to play a significantly greater role in unionization decision of nonmembers. On the other hand, while considering unionization, specific beliefs about unions were significantly more important for association members. Association members were less likely to vote for unionization.     

LABOR MARKET SHARE CONTRACTS WHEN THE FIRM HAS TWO VARIABLE INPUTS

This paper extends Weitzman's analysis of share contracts. Firstly, a second variable input is introduced into a firm's production technology. Some share contracts give the firm an incentive to reduce worker compensation by manipulating the second variable input. This implies that contracts which possess this property cannot support the same long-run equilibrium as would be achieved with a wage contract. Secondly, a positively sloped labor supply curve is introduced. It is shown that while share contracts reduce involuntary unemployment, they may not reduce total unemployment vis-a-vis wage contracts. The paper identifies the factors which determine relative employment variability.     

Contracts, Individual Revenue and Performance

In some jobs individual workers have control over revenue, effort and productivity. These jobs include professional firms for law, medicine and consulting. They include personal services in areas from hair styling to taxi driving. The firm offers contracts that allow for a sharing of risks and rewards. These incentives include a split of output between the firm and worker and employee ownership. For U.S. real estate agents, a choice is available between splitting revenue with the firm or retaining 100?% above a fixed prepaid minimum. These are equity and sequential debt contracts. Under the sequential debt contract, effort increases but output per hour declines. Separately, agents increase effort and productivity if offered ownership in the firm, effectively a claim on others?? performance.     

PLAYING FOR KEEPS: PAY AND PERFORMANCE IN THE NBA

This paper examines contract-related incentive effects using a unique dataset on individual performance and individual contracts. Evidence from professional basketball players in the 1980s and 1990s shows that individual performance improves significantly in the year before signing a multi-year contract but declines after the contract is signed. One interpretation is that workers strategically increase effort to obtain the most lucrative, multi-year contract but then reduce it once the contract is locked in. This highlights the double-edged nature of long-term contracts: good for employers when workers are fighting for them, but less so when workers have them. ( JEL J22, J3)     

Eigenverantwortung als Element eines neuen psychologischen Vertrages

As a result of work flexibilisation, employers increasingly demand from their employees to assume selfresponsibility. New psychological contracts, which emerge in the process of work flexbilisation, mirror this development. The present study analyses the relevance of self-responsibility in the employer perspective on psychological contracts in 14 companies in Switzerland. Each of the contracts corresponds to one of three contract types which drastically, moderately or conservatively diverge from the traditional contract offering employment security. With respect to the contents of self-responsibility, entrepreneurship and employee flexibility, the differences between the contracts are small. Within the companies these contract contents appear to be unbalanced, as high demands but few offers are made. In order to compensate this imbalance, psychological contracts should be actively managed and clearly communicated. Human resource measures should provide general conditions that employees can assume self-responsibility.     

A Note on Dual Internal Labor Markets and Wages of Temporary Workers: Evidence from Linked-Employer-Employee Data

I use linked employer-employee data from the German Federal Statistical Office to estimate within-firm wage differentials between temporary workers with fixed-term contracts and workers with permanent contracts in the context of dual internal labor markets. Wage-tenure profiles of permanent workers are estimated separately for each firm to obtain a proxy for the prevalence of internal labor markets. Temporary workers earn significantly lower wages in firms with steeper wage-tenure profiles. This finding is consistent with the segmentation in a primary permanent workforce with high wages and a secondary temporary workforce with low wages, if internal labor markets are more prevalent.     

Small employers and health benefits: findings from the 2000 Small Employer Health Benefits Survey

Many small employers (between two and 50 workers) are making decisions about whether to offer health benefits to their workers without being fully aware of the tax advantages that can make this benefit more affordable. Fifty-seven percent of small employers did not know that they can deduct 100 percent of their health insurance premiums. Nearly one-half of small employers are not aware that workers who purchase health insurance on their own generally cannot deduct 100 percent of their health insurance premiums. Small employers are largely unaware of the laws that have been enacted by nearly all states and the federal government with the intent of making health insurance more accessible and more affordable for many small employers. More than 60 percent did not know that insurers may not deny health insurance coverage to small employers even when the health status of their workers is poor. Most employers offer sound business reasons for offering health benefits to workers. Many have found that it helps with employee recruitment and retention, increases productivity, and reduces absenteeism. Nearly 50 percent of the employers offering dependent (family) coverage report that the workers do not take coverage for their dependents because the dependents have coverage from somewhere else. Twenty-seven percent report their employees decline dependent coverage because they cannot afford the premiums. Many small employers that do not offer health benefits are potential purchasers. Twelve percent are either extremely or very likely to start offering health benefits in the next two years, and 17 percent are somewhat likely to start offering health benefits. A number of factors would increase the likelihood that a small business would seriously consider offering a health benefits plan. Two-thirds of small-business owners said they would seriously consider offering health benefits if the government provided assistance with premiums. Almost one-half would consider doing so if insurance costs fell 10 percent. In addition, one-half would be more likely to seriously consider offering a health benefits plan if employees demand it. Many small employers with health benefits have recently switched health plans, and 34 percent report that they did so within the past year. Affordability for the employer and the worker is clearly a critical factor affecting the likelihood of switching health plans. Nearly all employers who have switched health plans within the past five years cite cost as the main reason. One-third of companies offering health benefits think they will change coverage, and 5 percent think they would drop coverage if the cost of health insurance were to increase by 5 percent.     

THE CONSEQUENCES OF (DE)REGULATION ON EMPLOYMENT DURATION AND EFFICIENCY: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

If the future market wage is uncertain, engaging in long‐term employment is risky, with the risk depending on how regulated the labor market is. In our experiment long‐term employment can result either from offering long‐term contracts or from repeatedly and mutually opting for rematching. Treatments differ in how regulations restrict the employer's flexibility in adapting the employment contract. All treatments allow for longer contract duration as well as for mutually opting to be rematched. Effort is chosen by employees after a contract is concluded. Treatments vary from no contract flexibility to no restriction at all. Will more (downward) flexibility be used in ongoing employment but reduce labor market efficiency? And will regulation crowd out long‐term employment, in the form of long‐term contracts or voluntary rematching? (JEL C72, C90, F16, J21, J24, L10)     

MANDATORY RETIREMENT AS A CLAUSE IN AN EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE CONTRACT

This paper postulates the existence of an "employment insurance contract" in which firms insure the employment of workers, at a predetermined wage, against potential, age related declines in productivity. To limit its liability the firm establishes an age limit to its promise ––– the mandatory retirement age. It is demonstrated that Pareto-efficient contracts exist which involve mandatory retirement at a specific age. The existence of these contracts, including mandatory retirement, increases workers' life-time utility and encourages the accumulation of human capital. Empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the model.     

Unionization and the cost of producing hospital services

Since the inclusion of nonprofit hospitals under the provisions of the NLRA in 1974, the extent of unionization among hospital workers has increased sharply. The implications of this trend for hospital costs are examined here by analyzing data from 617 short-term hospitals in the Northeast. It is estimated that unionization on average increases production costs by 5 to 9 percent, with the bulk of this increase resulting from factors other than wage increases. Cost impacts are also found to be greater for national unions and where cost-based payment is more prevalent, and smaller for RN’s and service employees. This research was supported by Grant HS 03016 from the National Center for Health Services Research.     

Intensity of management resistance: understanding the decline of unionization in the private sector

IX. Conclusions Although Lipset and Katchanovski present many of the major societal and structural causes that have influenced the decline of private sector unions, they have unfortunately omitted a factor that can account for as much as 40 percent of the decline in private sector union membership, i.e., intensity of management opposition. The managerial incentives to stop unionization are formidable because unions raise wages and reduce profits. Economic reasons for American managers to stop unionization have grown as the wage between union and nonunion workers has widened over the past 40 years especially relative to EU nations. In addition, as managerial accountability to shareholders has risen and pay related to performance has grown, top executives have attempted to raise productivity through high-performance workplace practices or lowering real wages. Since many of these practices rely on top-level executives being able to make decisions on personnel quickly without challenges from employees or due process, they have fought unions more vigorously in order to maintain this discretion over workplace decisions. Although this behavior by management may result in a more efficient allocation of resources from both a micro-and macroeconomic perspective, the losses to society occur in terms of greater income inequality and less employee voice at the workplace and in the political arena.     

Unions,seniority, and public choice

This paper examines the implications of granting a seniority-based system to a union whose behavior is determined by a median voter rule. It is shown that the union will negotiate a sequence of wages that will contract union employment in each period. The model then is extended to include an active role for the firm. It is shown that when the firm has the opportunity to resist unionization, the union will not allow union employment to fall below some lower bound. This lower bound is then a steady-state equilibrium.     

Befristete Beschäftigung: Chance oder Risiko?

The paper investigates whether increased labor market flexibility leads to a reinforcement of the existing segmentation of the labor market or whether it is dismantling the barriers in the labor market. Using spell data (employment and unemployment periods) from the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP, time period: 1984–1999) both determinants of fixed-term contracts and their consequences (renewed temporary employment, unemployment) are investigated with the help of random-effects logit-models. The results show that respondents’ characteristics (amount and type of human capital, formerly experienced periods of unemployment), structural variables (branch, firm size), and occupational characteristics (position, marginal employment) are influencing the risk of getting a temporary job. Furthermore it becomes evident that fixed-term contracts are increasing the risk of getting a temporary job again or of becoming unemployed after termination of the temporary job. These results show that fixed-term contracts above all are part of the secondary labor market, and that they especially have negative consequences for the employees in this segment. On the other hand fixed-term contracts can be seen as a chance in the way that they offer at least an alternative to unemployment. Hence, a too narrow evaluation of temporary employment would be too simplistic.     

The 2011 Industrial Relations Reform and Nominal Wage Adjustments in Greece

This study investigates nominal contractual base-wage adjustments in Greece associated with the 2011 industrial relations reform which re-defined the limits within which base wages could oscillate and allowed workers’ associations to negotiate for wages at the firm level. The assessment covers the period 2010–2013 and is based on information extracted from the universe of firm-level contracts signed in this period. We found that firm-level contracts increased dramatically shortly after the reform, now covering a larger pool of workers, especially in larger firms, and are associated with higher base-wage reductions in the post-reform period. At the firm level, wage reductions are higher when workers are represented by a workers’ association rather than a typical trade union. In addition, a heterogeneous effect is uncovered regarding the factors that shape base-wage adjustments (firm size, profitability, structure of bargaining body and aggregate unemployment) between new and traditional forms of workers’ representation in collective bargaining.     

Contracts,Labor Supply and Income Targeting

In many professions and personal services, a firm offers a contract with either proportional revenue sharing of the worker’s output or a contract with 100% revenue accruing to the worker in exchange for a fixed (debt) payment. Contingent on the contract, the worker chooses the mechanism to achieve the desired level of productivity. A higher revenue split induces the worker to be more productive in output per hour resulting in a higher wage. The relevant price of effort is the after-split, after-tax wage controlled for after-tax household income. Incentives through a higher split raise productivity and the return to effort. The sample is 1,559 U.S. real estate sales professionals paid on contract splits in 2007 and choosing their hours and effort. The compensated labor supply elasticity is positive and between approximately zero and 0.3 suggesting the absence of income targeting for these workers on split and 100% revenue contracts. But the inclusion of contractual income split provisions in the model substantially increases the labor supply elasticity.     

How temporary is temporary employment in Spain?

I use a multinomial logit model and the Spanish Active Population Survey (EPA) for the period 1987–1996 to study labor force transitions of temporary workers. These workers hold fixed-term employment contracts, which Spanish labor law distinguishes from indefinite contracts. Since the EPA questionnaire allows the identification of workers with either type of contract, I use matched EPA files to analyze transitions from temporary to permanent employment and explore the extent to which workers holding fixed-term employment contracts tend to be trapped in temporary employment relationships. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. Pedro Albarrán-Pérez provided excellent research assistance.