THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS ON SPATIAL COMPETITION

We present theoretical and experimental results on spatial competition between two firms. Firms choose locations simultaneously along a line representing a linear market. Identical consumers with non-increasing demand functions are uniformly distributed along this line. We solve for symmetric equilibrium payoffs in an infinitely repeated game for the case of linear demand and an arbitrary discount factor. The set of equilibriums found includes both competitive and collusive payoffs. In laboratory experiments in which the final period was unknown to the players in advance, we observed both competitive and collusive outcomes. Non-binding communication led to collusion.     

COLLUSION FACILITATING AND COLLUSION BREAKING POWER OF SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING AND DESCENDING PRICE AUCTIONS

This article demonstrates that a robust tacit collusion evolves quickly in a "collusion incubator" environment but is destroyed by the simultaneous descending price auction. Theories of collusion-producing behavior, along with the detail of the states on which strategies are conditioned, lead to a deeper understanding of how tacit collusion evolves and its necessary conditions. These theories explain how the descending price auction destroys the collusion. The experiments proceed by conducting simultaneous ascending price auctions in the collusion incubator. Then, once the tacit collusion developed, changing to the descending auction. The change moved prices from collusive levels to near-competitive levels. ( JEL C71, C92, D43, D44)     

MARKET POWER AND COLLUSION IN THE OCEAN SHIPPING INDUSTRY: IS A BIGGER CARTEL A BETTER CARTEL?

The regulatory structure of the ocean shipping industry allows carriers to enter into joint pricing agreements (conference agreements) that are free from antitrust scrutiny, and requires freight rates to be published and policed by a government agency. We test whether this regulatory structure leads to the exercise of market power, and identify whether that market power resides with conferences themselves or requires the participation of carriers outside the conference. The results suggest that liner conferences are not particularly effective cartels although some market power may exist in ocean shipping. Market concentration may be a contributing factor to this market power. (JEL L12, L43, L92, K21)     

Therapists' Collusion with the Resistance of Rape Survivors

Based mostly upon a qualitative study of nine rape survivors, but also upon intensive review of the literature devoted to countertransference, vicarious traumatization, compassion fatigue, and burnout, this article examines collusive resistance, a process whereby therapists join clients to avoid confronting painful issues. It offers guidelines for the therapist to follow in the therapeutic dance to avert such collusion, and thereby to intervene more effectively especially with traumatized clients to facilitate their recovery actively, and, ultimately, to contribute to their true survivorship.     

SOME EVIDENCE ON LATE BIDDING IN EBAY AUCTIONS

Bidding in the last seconds or minutes of an auction is a common strategy in Internet auctions with fixed end‐time. This paper examines the three explanations of late bidding in eBay auctions that survived the first scrutiny in Roth and Ockenfels (2002) . There is no indication that late bidding could lead to collusive gains for bidders. Late bidding is a strategic response to the presence of bidders placing multiple bids. Experts protecting their private information are typically the last to bid, while collectors are often the first. As bidders gain familiarity with eBay rules, they tend to bid slightly earlier. (JEL D44)     

COLLUSION IN PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS: AN EXPERIMENTAL EXAMINATION

Experimental methods are used to examine the existence and detectability of collusion in environments that exhibit critical parallels to procurement auctions. We find that given the opportunity sellers often raise prices considerably. Moreover, noncollusive Nash equilibrium predictions are insufficient to dismiss "suspicious" behavior as innocuous: in an environment where identical prices are predicted in a noncollusive Nash equilibrium, common prices are observed only when sellers communicate. In a second environment designed to parallel construction procurement contracting, market rotations are observed both with and without collusion, but collusion can often be detected from the pattern of losing bids.     

THE FAILURE OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED CARTELS AND DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL FARM POLICY

While economists recognize that private cartels are difficult to sustain, they are too sanguine about the prospects for government-assisted cartels. Although the state's coercive power would seem to make it an effective enforcer of cartel agreements, the political costs of enforcement can be high of segments of the industry resist. The government's solution lies in alternative strategies for raising prices. Examining government efforts to organize an orange cartel in the 1930s, we find that farmers' opposition to output cuts and quota assignments because of their distributional effects forced a policy she to purchases of "excess stocks."     

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE COMPOSITION OF LABOR MARKET TURNOVER

The composition of labor market turnover is shown to influence patterns of international trade. Job and worker turnover have opposing marginal effects on industry export intensity, highlighting the importance of relative turnover shares on either side of the labor market, as opposed to total volumes of labor mobility, in shaping economic outcomes. Industries with relatively greater shares of worker turnover export more of total production, and those with higher job turnover export less. Furthermore, relatively high job turnover hinders industry adjustment following trade liberalization. These predictions receive support for U.S. manufacturing industries using turnover data in the Quarterly Workforce Indicators available from the U.S. Census Bureau. (JEL F16)     

Failed individualism in community care: An example from elder abuse

Summary

Community care has been associated with a particular vision of interpersonal relations reflecting the demands of a market economy of welfare. It is argued that individualised notions of citizenship significantly effect how social actors respond to issues such as dependence, independence and interdependence, with consequences that locate unacceptable attributes within failed individuals'. This gives rise to a number of possibilities for collusion between workers, carers and older people who require services, and forms the basic triangle for interpersonal relations within community care policy. The parallel rise of elder abuse as a recognised social problem is considered in this light and three forms of collusive alliance, based on life-task, family solidarity and heroic defence are explored in greater detail. The paper concludes by examining the possibility of interdependence as a guiding principle which can be used to contain each actor's perspective, whilst contributing to the development of non-abusive relationships.     

COOPERATION SPILLOVERS AND PRICE COMPETITION IN EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS

Firms often cooperate explicitly through activities such as research joint ventures, while competing in other markets. Cooperation in research and development can allow firms to internalize the external benefits of knowledge creation and increase the returns from research and development (R&D) expenditures. Such cooperation may spill over to facilitate collusion in the market, however, potentially lowering welfare and efficiency. This paper uses a laboratory experiment to examine if sellers successfully coordinate to fund a joint research project to reduce their costs, and how this collaboration affects their pricing behavior. The experiment includes control treatments with separate R&D cooperation and markets. Our results show that although participants usually cooperate when given an opportunity, cooperation is observed less frequently when they also compete in the market. Communication improves cooperation in all environments, particularly when the market is present. Nevertheless, the data provide no evidence of seller collusion in the market. (JEL D43, D71, H40, O3)     

POTENTIAL COMPETITION AND POSSIBLE COLLUSION IN FOREST SERVICE TIMBER AUCTIONS

Potential competition significantly affects the size of winning bids in Forest Service sealed-bid timber auctions and has little effect on winning bids in oral auctions. Winning sealed bids depend even more, however, on actual competition, a result suggesting collusion. This explanation is supported using an index representing the likelihood an auction was rigged. Preclusive bidding (a type of collusion) in oral auctions is indicated by a positive relationship between hauling distances and the size of winning sealed bids. Comparisons of winning-bid variances, overbids, and numbers of bidders across auction type support this explanation of oral auction prices.     

Spatial inequality of rural industrial development in China, 1989–1994

Rural industry, having benefited from market oriented reforms, has surpassed state owned industry and become the largest industrial sector in China since 1993. Using multiple indicators, this study reveals a highly unbalanced spatial distribution and an increase in inequality of rural industrial development. It also classifies the level of development at the provincial level from 1989 to 1994. The relationship between rural industrial development and internal and regional characteristics is analyzed by multiple regression analysis. A very high correlation between rural industrial development and regional market indicators resulted in the conclusion that rural industry is a market economic sector and its development is driven by market forces in China's dual economy. The spatial patterns of rural industrial development reflect the viable, even optimum, location patterns created by the experience of the market economy. Although government policies attempted to reduce the inequality of rural industrial development among regions, the widened gap between rich and poor in the period 1989–1994 demonstrated the strong impacts of the concentrating effects of market forces.     

OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT OF NONCOMPETE COVENANTS

Noncompete covenants or covenant not to compete (CNC) are clauses in employment contracts in which the employee agrees not to gain employment with a competitor firm. In this article, we study the efficiency aspects of such contracts by incorporating the effect of labor mobility restrictions on knowledge transfer across firms, investment decisions by firms, and investment by workers. Following research that shows state‐wise variations in the degree of CNC enforcement, we allow the strength of CNC enforcement to vary as a matter of regulatory policy and derive the optimal strength of enforcement. We also look at how regulations around CNCs should be optimally designed when employers can use collusive agreements, such as “no poaching” agreements, as an alternative to noncompete clauses. Given recent allegations of employer collusion among large Silicon Valley firms, we argue for a cautious approach in designing policies on CNC enforcement. (JEL J24, J41, J63, K31)     

AN ANALYTIC HISTORY OF DELIVERED PRICE LITIGATION: DO COURTS PROPERLY DISTINGUISH RIVALROUS FROM COLLUSIVE INSTANCES?

The federal judiciary's present, cautious approach to delivered pricing is appropriate. Using court records and recent contributions to the economic literature, this article evaluates the antitrust history of those practices. Delivered pricing can replace mill pricing naturally in some rivalrous settings, but under special circumstances could be collusive. Thus, delivered pricing has sometimes been adjudged a Sherman Act violation, but only given other evidence of collusion. For a time, however, the legal system threatened to treat delivered pricing as a per se violation of the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts. That reflected poor economic understanding.     

EMISSION TAXES,CLEAN TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION,AND PRODUCT MARKET COLLUSION: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

We use a laboratory experiment to study the link between cooperative research and development (R&D) in clean technology and collusion in a downstream product market in the presence of a time‐consistent emissions tax. Such a tax creates additional interconnections between firms, in addition to the standard technological spillovers. Our results show a strong link between R&D cooperation and market collusion under symmetric R&D spillovers in a duopoly, but when the spillovers are asymmetric, R&D cooperation does not necessarily result in collusion. With symmetric spillovers, the link between R&D cooperation and collusion remains strong even in three‐ and four‐firm industries. (JEL C90, L5, O30, Q55)     

AN EXPERIMENT ON INNOVATION AND COLLUSION

This paper examines the relationship between product innovation and the success of price collusion using novel laboratory experiments. Average market prices in low innovation (LO) experiments are significantly higher than those in high innovation, but otherwise identical experiments. This price difference is attributed to LO experimental subjects' greater common market experience. The data illustrate how collusion can be perceived as the “only way to make it” in LO markets where product innovation is not a viable strategy for increasing profits. They suggest that product homogeneity can be a proximate cause, and product innovation an ultimate cause, of collusion. (JEL L41, L10, C92)     

Limits to expansion: transnational corporations and territorial embeddedness in the Japanese temporary staffing market

Recent changes to employment legislation have combined with shifting macro‐economic conditions to drive dramatic growth in Japan's temporary staffing industry. Leading transnational staffing agencies have sought to capitalize on this growth as part of their wider globalization strategies but have faced substantial challenges both in entering the market and in their subsequent attempts at expansion. In this article, we explore the ways in which the particularities of the Japanese host market regulatory and institutional environment combine with the inherent characteristics of the temporary staffing business model to challenge the expansionary strategies of these firms. We argue that while transnational firms have sought to adapt their business practices and strategies to the Japanese case, the attributes of the Japanese staffing market mean they have been unable to make significant inroads into the dominant market shares held by their domestic rivals.     

THE DYNAMICS OF A STABLE CARTEL: THE RAILROAD EXPRESS 1851–1913

The railroad express was probably the most successful cartel in U.S. business history. The key to its stability lay in the fact that collusion was largely an effort to create a cost-reducing distribution network. Because cost was dependent on collusion, the five cartel members could both underprice entrants and punish defectors. It is shown that in a Bertrand-type price war, colluding firms could effectively drive a defector into bankruptcy. As a result, the express controlled its market and remained a stable organization for more than half a century.     

INDUSTRIAL DYNAMICS AND THE NEOCLASSICAL GROWTH MODEL

This paper studies industry-level dynamics and demonstrates the ability of a modified neoclassical growth model to capture a range of empirical facts. The paper begins by using U.S. data to document skilled and unskilled labor trends within industry sector classifications as well as industry sector output trends. Using Current Population Survey data from 1968 to 2004, it is shown that the ratio of skilled workers to unskilled workers employed has risen in all industries. The absolute increase in this ratio was larger in the more skilled industries, while the growth rate was larger in the less skilled industries. Furthermore, using national income account data, it is shown that relatively high-skilled industries have accounted for an increasing share of output over time. A version of the neoclassical growth model is then constructed to match these observations. One important feature of this model is a structure that introduces new goods into the economy at each moment of time. The model is able to capture a rich set of labor market movements between sectors and between skill levels as well as changes in the relative output shares across industries, yet preserves many nice features of the neoclassical growth model. ( JEL E13, J20, 030)     

TACIT COLLUSION IN AUCTIONS AND CONDITIONS FOR ITS FACILITATION AND PREVENTION: EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN LABORATORY EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS

The paper studies bidder behavior in simultaneous, continuous, ascending price auctions. We design and implement a "collusion incubator" environment based on a type of public, symmetrically "folded" and "item-aligned" preferences. Tacit collusion develops quickly and reliably within the environment. Once tacit collusion developed, it proved remarkably robust to institutional changes that weakened it as an equilibrium of a game-theoretic model. The only successful remedy was a non-public change in the preference of participants that destroyed the symmetrically, "folded" and "item aligned" patterns of preferences, creating head-to-head competition between two agents reminiscent of the concept of a "maverick." ( JEL L50, L94, D43)