Capital‐skill Complementarity and Inequality: A Macroeconomic Analysis

The supply and price of skilled labor relative to unskilled labor have changed dramatically over the postwar period. The relative quantity of skilled labor has increased substantially, and the skill premium, which is the wage of skilled labor relative to that of unskilled labor, has grown significantly since 1980. Many studies have found that accounting for the increase in the skill premium on the basis of observable variables is difficult and have concluded implicitly that latent skill‐biased technological change must be the main factor responsible. This paper examines that view systematically. We develop a framework that provides a simple, explicit economic mechanism for understanding skill‐biased technological change in terms of observable variables, and we use the framework to evaluate the fraction of variation in the skill premium that can be accounted for by changes in observed factor quantities. We find that with capital‐skill complementarity, changes in observed inputs alone can account for most of the variations in the skill premium over the last 30 years.     

Job Matching and the Wage Distribution

This paper brings together the microeconomic‐labor and the macroeconomic‐equilibrium views of matching in labor markets. We nest a job matching model à la Jovanovic (1984) into a Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)‐type equilibrium search environment. The resulting framework preserves the implications of job matching theory for worker turnover and wage dynamics, and it also allows for aggregation and general equilibrium analysis. We obtain two new equilibrium implications of job matching and search frictions for wage inequality. First, learning about match quality and worker turnover map Gaussian output noise into an ergodic wage distribution of empirically accurate shape: unimodal, skewed, with a Paretian right tail. Second, high idiosyncratic productivity risk hinders learning and sorting, and reduces wage inequality. The equilibrium solutions for the wage distribution and for the aggregate worker flows—quits to unemployment and to other jobs, displacements, hires—provide the likelihood function of the model in closed form.     

On the Dynamics of Unemployment and Wage Distributions

Postel‐Vinay and Robin's (2002) sequential auction model is extended to allow for aggregate productivity shocks. Workers exhibit permanent differences in ability while firms are identical. Negative aggregate productivity shocks induce job destruction by driving the surplus of matches with low ability workers to negative values. Endogenous job destruction coupled with worker heterogeneity thus provides a mechanism for amplifying productivity shocks that offers an original solution to the unemployment volatility puzzle (Shimer (2005)). Moreover, positive or negative shocks may lead employers and employees to renegotiate low wages up and high wages down when agents' individual surpluses become negative. The model delivers rich business cycle dynamics of wage distributions and explains why both low wages and high wages are more procyclical than wages in the middle of the distribution.     

The benefit of market-based governance devices: Reflections on the issue of growing economic inequality as a corporate concern

Growing economic inequality in advanced economies is explained by a variety of conditions and mechanisms, but a growing literature emphasises how corporate governance decisions serve to transfer wealth from labour to capital owners, including shareholders. The article introduces the term governance devices to examine how a consistent annual real wage growth (calculated to 1.20 percent) over the period 1997–2017 has been negotiated in Sweden, based on a bilateral market-based industrial agreement between the employer organisation and a confederation of trade unions. The article stresses the importance of governance decisions in counteracting secular stagnation of real wage growth, which reduces the purchasing power in an economy and incurs other externalities. Corporate governance is, therefore, a key mechanism in resolving the issue of how to allocate the residual cash being generated in the corporate production activities so that it benefits all constituencies and balances short-term returns to shareholders and medium-to long-term economic growth and stability.     

The Structure of Wages in the Netherlands, 1986–98

Abstract. For many OECD countries an increase in wage inequality has been documented since the early 1980s. This is often attributed to a general rise in the demand for skilled workers resulting from recent technological change. Using the Organization for Strategic Labour Market Research (OSA) Labour Supply data, this paper studies the wage structure in the Netherlands over the period 1986–98 and demonstrates that wage inequality did not increase to any significant extent in the Netherlands. Using the accounting framework proposed by Juhn et al. (Journal of Political Economy 101: 410–442, 1993), it is shown that the relatively stable wage structure until at least the late 1990s can be attributed mainly to returns to observable components, such as education and experience, while residual wage inequality is found to be of minor importance in explaining the Dutch wage structure. These estimates suggest that the demand for skill in the Netherlands is likely not to have been rising to the extent it did in many other countries over this period.     

Equilibrium Wage‐Tenure Contracts

In this study we consider a labor market matching model where firms post wage‐tenure contracts and workers, both employed and unemployed, search for new job opportunities. Given workers are risk averse, we establish there is a unique equilibrium in the environment considered. Although firms in the market make different offers in equilibrium, all post a wage‐tenure contract that implies a worker's wage increases smoothly with tenure at the firm. As firms make different offers, there is job turnover, as employed workers move jobs as the opportunity arises. This implies the increase in a worker's wage can be due to job‐to‐job movements as well as wage‐tenure effects. Further, there is a nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of initial wage offers that is differentiable on its support except for a mass point at the lowest initial wage. We also show that relevant characteristics of the equilibrium can be written as explicit functions of preferences and the other market parameters.     

The Impact on Inequality of Raising the Minimum Wage: Gap‐narrowing and Reranking Effects

Raising the minimum wage may reduce inequality by increasing the wages of low‐skill workers, but it may also increase inequality due to negative impacts on employment that produce wage losses. Using previous estimates of the elasticities of wages and employment to changes in the minimum wage in Colombia and Brazil, we show that the net impact on inequality of increasing the minimum wage may depend on the distributional weights used for inequality measurement. The results are obtained by decomposing the Gini index into reranking and gap‐narrowing effects. Inequality‐increasing reranking effects, which are associated with job losses, may dominate inequality‐decreasing gap‐narrowing effects, which are associated with wage gains, when high weights are placed on workers with low earnings. For standard distributional weights, however, the likely net impact is a reduction in wage inequality.     

Quantile Regression under Misspecification,with an Application to the U.S. Wage Structure

Quantile regression (QR) fits a linear model for conditional quantiles just as ordinary least squares (OLS) fits a linear model for conditional means. An attractive feature of OLS is that it gives the minimum mean‐squared error linear approximation to the conditional expectation function even when the linear model is misspecified. Empirical research using quantile regression with discrete covariates suggests that QR may have a similar property, but the exact nature of the linear approximation has remained elusive. In this paper, we show that QR minimizes a weighted mean‐squared error loss function for specification error. The weighting function is an average density of the dependent variable near the true conditional quantile. The weighted least squares interpretation of QR is used to derive an omitted variables bias formula and a partial quantile regression concept, similar to the relationship between partial regression and OLS. We also present asymptotic theory for the QR process under misspecification of the conditional quantile function. The approximation properties of QR are illustrated using wage data from the U.S. census. These results point to major changes in inequality from 1990 to 2000.     

Inequality and Unemployment in a Global Economy

This paper develops a new framework for examining the determinants of wage distributions that emphasizes within‐industry reallocation, labor market frictions, and differences in workforce composition across firms. More productive firms pay higher wages and exporting increases the wage paid by a firm with a given productivity. The opening of trade enhances wage inequality and can either raise or reduce unemployment. While wage inequality is higher in a trade equilibrium than in autarky, gradual trade liberalization first increases and later decreases inequality.     

Educational Attainment and Wage Inequality in Turkey

This paper analyses the relationship between wage distribution and educational attainment of the workforce. Wage inequality in Turkey decreased over 2002–10; a period over which it also saw an increase in the supply of educated workers. Our findings suggest that decreasing inequality in the bottom half of the distribution was largely due to decreasing returns to education and experience; whereas the moderate decline in inequality in the upper tail of the wage distribution is explained by a fall in returns to the ‘routine’ occupational tasks. The effect of changes in the composition of workers was found to be moderate.     

The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: Is Wage Stickiness the Answer?

I discuss the failure of the canonical search and matching model to match the cyclical volatility in the job finding rate. I show that job creation in the model is influenced by wages in new matches. I summarize microeconometric evidence and find that wages in new matches are volatile and consistent with the model's key predictions. Therefore, explanations of the unemployment volatility puzzle have to preserve the cyclical volatility of wages. I discuss a modification of the model, based on fixed matching costs, that can increase cyclical unemployment volatility and is consistent with wage flexibility in new matches.     

SOCIAL COMPARISON AND EFFORT PROVISION: EVIDENCE FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT

Social comparison has potentially far reaching consequences in many economic domains. We conducted a field experiment to examine how social comparison affects workers' effort provision if their own wage or that of a co‐worker is cut. Workers were assigned to groups of two, performed identical individual tasks, and received the same performance‐independent hourly wage. Cutting both group members' wages caused a decrease in performance. But when only one group member's wage was cut, the affected workers decreased their performance more than twice as much as when both workers' wages were cut. This finding indicates that social comparison among workers affects effort provision because the only difference between the two wage‐cut treatments is the other group member's wage level. In contrast, workers whose wage was not cut but who witnessed their group member's pay being cut displayed no change in performance relative to the baseline treatment in which both workers' wages remained unchanged. This indicates that social comparison exerts asymmetric effects on effort.     

A Parsimonious Macroeconomic Model for Asset Pricing

I study asset prices in a two‐agent macroeconomic model with two key features: limited stock market participation and heterogeneity in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption (EIS). The model is consistent with some prominent features of asset prices, such as a high equity premium, relatively smooth interest rates, procyclical stock prices, and countercyclical variation in the equity premium, its volatility, and in the Sharpe ratio. In this model, the risk‐free asset market plays a central role by allowing non‐stockholders (with low EIS) to smooth the fluctuations in their labor income. This process concentrates non‐stockholders' labor income risk among a small group of stockholders, who then demand a high premium for bearing the aggregate equity risk. Furthermore, this mechanism is consistent with the very small share of aggregate wealth held by non‐stockholders in the U.S. data, which has proved problematic for previous models with limited participation. I show that this large wealth inequality is also important for the model's ability to generate a countercyclical equity premium. When it comes to business cycle performance, the model's progress has been more limited: consumption is still too volatile compared to the data, whereas investment is still too smooth. These are important areas for potential improvement in this framework.     

Wage Inequality of US Truck Drivers

Using CPS data for the period 1979–2009, the wage dispersion of truck drivers (and subsets of the truck driving sample) is compared with the trends in wage dispersion of males economy‐wide. We find that truckers' wages experienced a decrease in inequality post‐deregulation, as expected given the literature on regulation's impact on the labor market. We also find that the wage dispersion for truckers is markedly different from males economy‐wide, providing evidence that the wage distribution of truck drivers has been dominated by the changing structure of the occupation post‐deregulation and largely immune to the factors that increased inequality for the aggregate labor market.     

Equilibrium Wage Dispersion with Worker and Employer Heterogeneity

We construct and estimate an equilibrium search model with on–the–job–search. Firms make take–it–or–leave–it wage offers to workers conditional on their characteristics and they can respond to the outside job offers received by their employees. Unobserved worker productive heterogeneity is introduced in the form of cross–worker differences in a “competence” parameter. On the other side of the market, firms also are heterogeneous with respect to their marginal productivity of labor. The model delivers a theory of steady–state wage dispersion driven by heterogenous worker abilities and firm productivities, as well as by matching frictions. The structural model is estimated using matched employer and employee French panel data. The exogenous distributions of worker and firm heterogeneity components are nonparametrically estimated. We use this structural estimation to provide a decomposition of cross–employee wage variance. We find that the share of the cross–sectional wage variance that is explained by person effects varies across skill groups. Specifically, this share lies close to 40% for high–skilled white collars, and quickly decreases to 0% as the observed skill level decreases. The contribution of market imperfections to wage dispersion is typically around 50%.     

Impossibility Results for Nondifferentiable Functionals

We examine challenges to estimation and inference when the objects of interest are nondifferentiable functionals of the underlying data distribution. This situation arises in a number of applications of bounds analysis and moment inequality models, and in recent work on estimating optimal dynamic treatment regimes. Drawing on earlier work relating differentiability to the existence of unbiased and regular estimators, we show that if the target object is not differentiable in the parameters of the data distribution, there exist no estimator sequences that are locally asymptotically unbiased or α‐quantile unbiased. This places strong limits on estimators, bias correction methods, and inference procedures, and provides motivation for considering other criteria for evaluating estimators and inference procedures, such as local asymptotic minimaxity and one‐sided quantile unbiasedness.     

UK Wage Inequality: An Industry and Regional Perspective

Abstract. This paper looks at male wage inequality in the UK across industries and regions over a 15 year period. After controlling for the heterogeneity of productivity characteristics across the population, that part of wage inequality which cannot be explained by observable worker characteristics is examined. This is undertaken at both the industry and regional level to assess the key themes dominant in the literature capable of explaining within‐group wage inequality, namely: technology; globalization; female participation; immigration; shifts in the supply of relative education across cohorts; and falling unionization.     

Residual Wage Inequality and Immigration in the USA and the UK

This paper assesses the effects of immigration on the increasing residual wage inequality in the USA and UK from 1994 to 2008. It does so by using an extension of the Lemieux (2006) methodology, whereby counterfactual residual variances are constructed to account not only for composition effects (changes in education‐experience of the workforce), but also for increasing immigration in the labour force. The empirical analysis reveals that residual wage inequality is higher among immigrants than among natives. However, increase in immigration does not seem to represent the major force behind the increase in residual wage inequality for the USA and for the UK.     

Solving the Feldstein–Horioka Puzzle With Financial Frictions

Unlike the prediction of a frictionless open economy model, long‐term average savings and investment rates are highly correlated across countries—a puzzle first identified by Feldstein and Horioka (1980). We quantitatively investigate the impact of two types of financial frictions on this correlation. One is limited enforcement, where contracts are enforced by the threat of default penalties. The other is limited spanning, where the only asset available is noncontingent bonds. We find that the calibrated model with both frictions produces a savings–investment correlation and a volume of capital flows close to the data. To solve the puzzle, the limited enforcement friction needs low default penalties under which capital flows are much lower than those in the data, and the limited spanning friction needs to exogenously restrict capital flows to the observed level. When combined, the two frictions interact to endogenously restrict capital flows and thereby solve the Feldstein–Horioka puzzle.