供应链中纵向信息获取和横向信息共享策略研究

研究由一个制造商和两个零售商组成的二级供应链中,零售商之间的横向信息共享策略和制造商的信息获取以及最优定价问题。在模型中,制造商同时为两家零售商提供等价商品,零售商向消费者销售商品且进行价格竞争。以Bertrand博弈为研究手段,求解了零售商的均衡销售价格、订货量决策和信息共享策略,制造商的最大利润和最优批发价格,以及供应链利润。分析比较了在制造商不同的信息获取策略下,零售商、制造商和供应链的利润。研究表明,零售商之间完全信息共享始终为占优策略。但制造商获取下游信息时会使得自身利润增加,零售商利润减少,因此零售商不会主动把信息共享给制造商。考虑到下游的边界均衡解,供应链的利润变化还与市场的不确定性和产品的替代性有关。当产品替代性较高或产品替代率较低且市场的不确定性处于中间水平时,制造商获取信息后供应链利润增加,此时制造商可以用部分增加的利润成功购买零售商信息。该模型为上游制造商提供了最优定价和信息获取策略,也为下游零售商提供了求解自身最优销售价格、订货量和信息共享决策的方法。     

Differential Pricing for Information Sharing Under Competition

We consider a two‐echelon supply chain with a manufacturer supplying to multiple downstream retailers engaged in differentiated Cournot competition. Each retailer has private information about uncertain demand. The manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader who sets the contract terms with the retailers, and benefits from retailers sharing their private information. When all retailers are given the same wholesale price, truthful information sharing is not an equilibrium outcome. We propose two variants of differential pricing mechanisms that induce truthful information sharing by all retailers. The first variant rewards a retailer for providing optimistic information and achieves truthful information sharing as a unique equilibrium. The differential pricing mechanism is optimal in the class of linear‐price, incentive‐compatible, direct mechanisms. The second variant, which incorporates provision for a fixed payment in addition to wholesale prices, preserves all the equilibrium properties of the first variant and additionally “nearly coordinates” the supply chain. Our analysis of differential pricing with a fixed payment provides interesting observations regarding the relationship between product substitutability, number of retailers, information precision, and market power. As products become closer substitutes and/or number of retailers increase, the manufacturer's market power increases, enabling her to extract a larger fraction of the supply chain surplus.     

Quick Response under Competition

We consider a manufacturer serving two competing retailers that sell their products over a single selling season. The retailers place their regular orders before the season starts. In addition to this initial order, quick response (QR) provides a retailer with an additional replenishment opportunity after demand uncertainty is resolved. The manufacturer determines the unit price for QR replenishment. We characterize the retailers’ ordering, and the manufacturer's pricing decisions in equilibrium when none, only one, and both of the retailers have QR ability. We study how the profitability of the manufacturer, the retailers, and the channel depend on QR and competition. We find it may be optimal for the manufacturer to offer QR to only one of the ex ante identical retailers when demand variability is sufficiently, but not overly high. The manufacturer may also find it optimal to offer QR to both or none of the retailers, depending on demand variability. Finally, while QR ability is always attractive for a retailer when competition is ignored, we find QR may prove detrimental when its impact on competition is taken into account.     

Manufacturer's pricing strategy for supply chain with warranty period-dependent demand

This article presents a review of the issues associated with a manufacturer's pricing strategies in a two-echelon supply chain that comprises one manufacturer and two competing retailers, with warranty period-dependent demands. The manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader, specifies wholesale prices to two competing retailers who face warranty period-dependent demand and have different sales costs. The manufacturer considers three pricing options: (1) setting the same price for both retailers, while disregarding their difference with regard to sales cost; (2) setting a different price to each retailer on the basis of their sales cost; and (3) setting the same price to both retailers according to the average sales cost of the industry. In this article, the retailers' optimal warranty periods and their optimal profit, manufacturer's optimal wholesale price, and his/her optimal profit associated with different pricing strategies have been derived using the game theory. Our analysis shows that the results for retailers are the same with Strategy 1 or Strategy 3. In addition, we compared the effects of different pricing strategies of the manufacturer on supply chain decisions and profit. We conclude from the results that the manufacturer should either adopt Strategy 2 with symmetrical sales cost information or Strategy 3 if retailers' sales costs are asymmetrical.     

Strategic Motive for Introducing Internet Channels in a Supply Chain

Rapid advances of information technology in recent years have enabled both the manufacturers and the retailers to operate their own Internet channels. In this study, we investigate the interaction between the capabilities of introducing the Internet channels, the pricing strategies, and the channel structure. We classify consumers into two segments: grocery shoppers attach a higher utility from purchasing through the physical channel, whereas a priori Internet shoppers prefer purchasing online. We find that when the Internet shoppers are either highly profitable or fairly unimportant, the manufacturer prefers to facilitate the channel separation either through his own Internet channel or the retailer's. In the intermediate region, however, the manufacturer encroaches the grocery shoppers and steals the demand from the retailer's physical channel. With horizontal competition between retailers, a priori symmetric retailers may adopt different channel strategies as a stable market equilibrium. The manufacturer may willingly give up his Internet channel and leverage on the retailer competition. When the manufacturer sells through an online e‐tailer, Internet shoppers may be induced to purchase through the physical channel. This reverse encroachment strategy emerges because selling through the e‐tailer leads to a more severe double marginalization problem.     

信息禀赋差异下制造商信息获取策略：“躺平”或“进取”

在市场需求信息不对称下，没有需求预测能力的制造商总是需要权衡实施“躺平”策略还是“进取”策略来获取下游零售商拥有的需求信息。本文考虑一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链，通过构建信息对称、信息推测和信息甄别三种情形下的博弈模型，分析了制造商的最优信息获取策略、不同策略和信息禀赋优势对制造商、零售商决策的影响。研究发现，无论零售商信息禀赋优势高或低，对于制造商来说，“躺平”策略为其最优信息获取策略，且在该策略下制造商更倾向于根据零售商的零售价对需求信息进行推测。而对于零售商来说，制造商选择“进取”策略时对其最有利。若制造商选择“躺平”策略，零售商则更倾向于主动披露信息，在该情形下零售商的信息禀赋优势越低对零售商越有利，越高则对制造商越有利。     

A Note on Optimal Selling to Asymmetric Retailers

I consider a channel with one manufacturer selling the same product to two retailers engaged in imperfect competition. The retailers are asymmetric because one has a lower marginal selling cost (or a higher demand potential) than the other. I design the manufacturer's optimal selling mechanism, whereby the manufacturer must offer the same contract options to both retailers. I fully characterize the manufacturer's optimal selling mechanism for varying degrees of retailer asymmetry and competition intensity. I find that under certain conditions, the manufacturer is better off selling a larger quantity through the high‐cost (or low‐demand potential) retailer. I also show how the optimal mechanism can be implemented using a menu of two‐part tariffs with quantity controls.     

网络外部性对双渠道供应链信息分享的影响

研究了网络外部性对双渠道供应链信息分享的影响。分别建立了存在网络外部性和不存在网络外部性下的双渠道供应链模型,通过比较零售商信息分享和不分享下其与制造商的期望利润。研究发现：当未考虑产品的网络外部性时,零售商不与制造商分享其市场需求信息,与已有研究一致。当考虑了产品网络外部性且网络外部性较小时,零售商仍不与制造商分享市场需求信息;然而,当网络外部性较大时,零售商与制造商分享其市场需求信息。此外,零售商与制造商共享其市场需求信息有助于增加制造商和供应链利润。     

Interorganizational Collaborative Forecasting and Replenishment Systems and Supply Chain Implications

Collaborative Forecasting and Replenishment (CFAR) is a new interorganizational system that enables retailers and manufacturers to forecast demand and schedule production jointly. The capabilities of CFAR exceed those of the traditional EDI because CFAR allows exchange of complex decision support models and manufacturer/retailer strategies. The proponents of CFAR claim that the fastest way for retailers and manufacturers to slash inventory costs and product shortages is by coordinating their decisions. The impact of CFAR on the supply chain using a model consisting of a manufacturer selling its product through two independent identical retailers is analyzed. The model assumes that the manufacturer doesn't face capacity constraints, the demand is stationary, and retailer prices are constant over time; the shortages are backordered at the manufacturer and retailers to isolate the effects of information sharing in CFAR. The most significant findings relate to the increase in the cost incurred by the nonparticipant in CFAR, the increase in the manufacturer's cost of serving the nonparticipant if the participant can obtain delivery guarantees in return for demand information sharing, and the incentives of the players to move towards universal retailer participation in CFAR. The findings are explained using the risk structure faced by the players in the supply chain. The managerial implications of the impact of CFAR on the supply chain structure are also discussed.     

基于策略性竞争博弈的供应链信息共享策略

在供应链成员的市场信息以及成本非对称的情形下,讨论两个终端企业（一个自产自销,一个从上游批发产品）,在供应链中信息共享策略的方案,包括：信息优势企业如何根据市场需求情况确定是否信息共享（若是,则如何共享）;信息劣势企业如何根据对方透露出的市场信息来决策订货量;上游供应链如何决策批发价,从而控制整个供应链的博弈态势,使下游销售商在竞争中更为主动。经过研究发现,低市场类型时,自产自销商乐于共享信息,使竞争对手摄于低迷的市场状况从而降低订货量;在高市场类型且市场波动较小时自产自销商依然选择共享,在乐观的市场条件下表明自己的竞争优势,从而一定程度上威摄入侵者;而市场波动较大时,由于信息共享的额外收益不足以抵消信息共享需付出的额外成本,从而选择不共享信息。     

Group Buying of Competing Retailers

Under group buying, quantity discounts are offered based on the buyers' aggregated purchasing quantity, instead of individual quantities. As the price decreases with the total quantity, buyers receive lower prices than they otherwise would be able to obtain individually. Previous studies on group buying focus on the benefit buyers receive in reduced acquisition costs or enhanced bargaining power. In this paper, we show that buyers can instead get hurt from such cooperation. Specifically, we consider a two‐level distribution channel with a single manufacturer and two retailers who compete for end customers. We show that, under linear demand curves, group buying is always preferable for symmetric (i.e., identical) retailers. For asymmetric retailers (i.e., differing in market base and/or efficiency), group buying is beneficial to the smaller (or less efficient) player. However, it can be detrimental to the larger (or more efficient) one. Despite the lower wholesale price under group buying, the manufacturer can receive a higher revenue. Interestingly, group buying is more likely to form when retailers are competitive in different dimensions. These insights are shown to be robust under general nonlinear demand curves, except for constant elastic demand with low demand elasticity.     

Online Manufacturer Referral to Heterogeneous Retailers

Since the development of the Internet, thousands of manufacturers have been referring consumers visiting their websites to some or all of their retailers. Through a model with one manufacturer and two heterogeneous retailers, we investigate whether it is an equilibrium for the manufacturer to refer consumers exclusively to a retailer or nonexclusively to both retailers. Our analysis indicates that nonexclusive referral is the manufacturer's equilibrium choice if the referral segment market size is sufficiently large; otherwise, exclusive referral is the equilibrium choice. In exclusive referral, the manufacturer would refer consumers to the more cost‐efficient and smaller retailer. In the presence of infomediary referral, it is less likely for both exclusive and nonexclusive referrals to be an equilibrium, as the infomediary referral segment grows. We also show our qualitative results are robust even if there were price discrimination among consumers, referral position disparity, local consumers, and asymmetric referral market sizes.     

Hierarchical Screening for Capacity Allocation in Supply Chains: The Role of Distributors

We consider a two‐stage principal–agent screening environment in a decentralized supply chain with retailers, distributors, and a supplier. The retailers possess private information regarding their local market profitabilities. The distributors can partially observe the retailers' profitabilities and are heterogeneous with regard to the precision of that information. The supplier determines the level of production, but knows neither the local market profitabilities nor the precision of the distributors' information. The supplier first allocates finished products to distributors, and the distributors then contract with local retailers with a capacity constraint. We find that due to the distributors' superior information, the quantity distortion on the retailers' side is mitigated, and the upstream information asymmetry subsequently affects the quantity allocation among the downstream retailers. The supplier may not benefit from contracting with the distributors. In addition, no distributor is excluded based on the heterogeneity of the information precision, even though some distributors do not have better information than the supplier. In the numerical examples, we further analyze how the local market heterogeneity and inventory costs affect the capacity allocation, the retailers' payoffs, and the supply chain profits. We document some counter‐intuitive quantity allocation rules that arise from the distributors' information advantage.     

Controlling Power Retailer's Gray Activities Through Contract Design

We develop a model that captures dynamic relationships of a supply chain populated by a dominant retailer and a number of fringe retailers. The two types of retailers are asymmetric in buying power, retailing cost, and the ability to service the manufacturer's product. The wholesale prices offered through a quantity discount (QD) schedule can coordinate such a supply chain, but invite channel flow diversion type of gray trading between the dominant retailer and the fringe retailers. Our analysis is focused on how such a channel can be coordinated and the gray market activities be prevented. We propose a dynamic QD contract or a revenue‐sharing contract that the manufacturer can use to fight the gray market activity. The performance of the supply chain and the manufacturer's profit under each of the two contract forms are compared and managerial guidelines are provided to help the manufacturer make a judicious choice.     

Value of Sharing Production Yield Information in a Serial Supply Chain

New developments in corporate information technology such as enterprise resource planning systems have significantly increased the flow of information among members of supply chains. However, the benefits of sharing information can vary depending on the supply chain structure and its operational characteristics. Most of the existing research has studied the impact of sharing downstream information (e.g., a manufacturer sharing information with its suppliers). We evaluate the benefits of sharing upstream yield information (e.g., a supplier sharing information with the manufacturer) in a two‐stage serial supply chain in which the supplier has multiple internal processes and is faced with uncertain output due to yield losses. We are interested in determining when the sharing of the supplier's information is most beneficial to the manufacturer. After proposing an order‐up‐to type heuristic policy, we perform a detailed computational study and observe that this information is most beneficial when the supplier's yield variance is high and when end‐customer demand variance is low. We also find that the manufacturer's backorder‐to‐holding cost ratio has little, if any, impact on the usefulness of information.     

Distributing a Product Line in a Decentralized Supply Chain

Although there is a rich literature on single product distribution in decentralized supply chains, the incentive problems that arise in distributing a product line have largely not been investigated. In practice, most manufacturers distribute a line of products with different features and qualities and not just a single product. Consider a manufacturer who distributes a product line through competing downstream retailers. In this setting, we investigate how and why the retailers' price and inventory decisions deviate from the centrally optimal decisions. Due to substitution between different product variants, as well as between different retailers, the incentive problems associated with distributing a product line are more complicated than that of distributing a single product. We characterize retailers' incentive distortions under a residual‐claimancy contract, and construct contracts that achieve channel coordination. We show that retail price floors or inventory buybacks, appropriately tailored to each product variant, are among the contracts that can achieve coordination. Using numerical simulations, we demonstrate how the optimal contract terms (such as wholesale prices and buyback prices) for each variant are influenced by the parameters of an underlying consumer choice model.     

The Effect of Delayed Incentives on Supply Chain Profits and Consumer Surplus

We examine the use of consumer cash mail‐in rebates offered by a manufacturer in a Stackelberg game where the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower. Our analysis indicates that rebates are profitable for manufacturers if consumers are inconsistent in the sense that their rebate valuation when they make purchase decisions is independent of their redemption probabilities when they make redemption decisions. If the manufacturer keeps the wholesale price unchanged, then the rebate increases the retailer's profit by a larger amount than the increase in the manufacturer's profit. If the manufacturer jointly optimizes the wholesale price and rebate, then the increase in the manufacturer's profit is twice the increase in the retailer's profit. The retailer responds to rebates by increasing the retail price, which increases the margin paid by consumers who do not redeem the rebate. On average, consumer surplus decreases when it is optimal for manufacturers to offer rebates. We suggest incentive schemes that make it worthwhile for retailers to limit the price increase. In these incentive schemes, the manufacturer imposes a negative relationship between the rebate value and the retail price. We show that such incentives increase supply chain profits.     

New Product Design under Channel Acceptance: Brick‐and‐Mortar,Online‐Exclusive,or Brick‐and‐Click

In recent years, an increasing number of brick‐and‐mortar retailers have entered into the new brick‐and‐click era. Within this context, when a manufacturer presents a new product offering to a retailer, the ultimate decision is often made by the retailer regarding (1) whether to carry the new product, and (2) the channel outlet the product will be carried in (i.e., in‐store only, online‐exclusive, or brick‐and‐click). In response to this trend, we examine how a manufacturer may use product design to influence a dual‐channel retailer's outlet designation decision. This is the first study to investigate a manufacturer's optimal product design strategy when a brick‐and‐mortar retailer expands online. We demonstrate that, to induce the retailer to carry a new product both offline and online, it may not always be optimal for the manufacturer to enhance product quality (compared with when the retailer only operates offline). With the online store addition, the retailer may also be incentivized to adjust his participation criterion to a level less than what is determined by his outside option.     

Pricing Policy in a Supply Chain: Negotiation or Posted Pricing

This article examines the choice of pricing policy (posted pricing or negotiation) toward end customers in a supply chain. Many retailers actively decide whether or not to encourage negotiation on the shop floor. Of course, the retailer's pricing policy influences not only the retailer's profit, but also the profits of the manufacturers who sell through the retailer. However, little is known about the forces that shape the pricing policy when two self‐interested parties interact in a supply chain. We consider two alternative models depending on who has the power to decide the pricing policy: the manufacturer or the retailer. We find that an increase in the wholesale price weakens the retailer's ability to price discriminate through negotiation. Therefore, the retailer prefers negotiation at lower wholesale prices and posted pricing at higher wholesale prices. We also find that whenever the retailer prefers negotiation, the manufacturer does too. Therefore, the retailer's discretion over the pricing policy causes friction only when the retailer wants to use posted pricing, while the manufacturer wishes the retailer to use negotiation. We show that such friction arises only when product availability or the cost of negotiation is moderate. In this case, we show that the manufacturer may offer a substantial discount to persuade the retailer to negotiate. Surprisingly, in this region of friction, a decrease in the supply chain's capacity or an increase in negotiation costs (both of which are typically considered as worsening the retailer's business environment) translates into higher profit for the retailer.     

不完全信息下再制造逆向供应链的定价与协调研究

本文探讨了回收量随机情况下的单一制造商和两个零售商组成的再制造逆向供应链系统的定价策略。在完全信息下,分别得到了Stackelberg博弈和联合博弈下的可行策略集合及可行解。在不完全信息下,运用信号甄别方法及激励相容约束得到了两个最优定价合同。研究表明:定价合同可以有效避免逆向选择问题,保证回收市场的稳定性;通过签订合同,制造商和零售商的利润均有所增加;制造商可通过零售商的履约表现控制其回收量,并对未完成任务的零售商进行惩罚;高运营成本零售商会不断降低运营成本以增加利润。