Long‐Term Debt and Optimal Policy in the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level

The fiscal theory says that the price level is determined by the ratio of nominal debt to the present value of real primary surpluses. I analyze long‐term debt and optimal policy in the fiscal theory. I find that the maturity structure of the debt matters. For example, it determines whether news of future deficits implies current inflation or future inflation. When long‐term debt is present, the government can trade current inflation for future inflation by debt operations; this tradeoff is not present if the government rolls over short‐term debt. The maturity structure of outstanding debt acts as a “budget constraint” determining which periods' price levels the government can affect by debt variation alone. In addition, debt policy—the expected pattern of future state‐contingent debt sales, repurchases and redemptions—matters crucially for the effects of a debt operation. I solve for optimal debt policies to minimize the variance of inflation. I find cases in which long‐term debt helps to stabilize inflation. I also find that the optimal policy produces time series that are similar to U.S. surplus and debt time series. To understand the data, I must assume that debt policy offsets the inflationary impact of cyclical surplus shocks, rather than causing price level disturbances by policy‐induced shocks. Shifting the objective from price level variance to inflation variance, the optimal policy produces much less volatile inflation at the cost of a unit root in the price level; this is consistent with the stabilization of U.S. inflation after the gold standard was abandoned.     

Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy?

Do political institutions shape economic policy? I argue that this question should naturally appeal to economists. Moreover, the answer is in the affirmative, both in theory and in practice. In particular, recent theoretical work predicts systematic effects of electoral rules and political regimes on the size and composition of government spending. Results from ongoing empirical work indicate that such effects are indeed present in the data. Some empirical results are consistent with theoretical predictions: presidential regimes have smaller governments and countries with majoritarian elections have smaller welfare‐state programs and less corruption. Other results present puzzles for future research: the adjustment to economic events appears highly institution‐dependent, as does the timing and nature of the electoral cycle.     

Efficiency and Equilibrium with Dynamic Increasing Aggregate Returns due to Demand Complementarities

When do dynamic nonconvexities at the disaggregate level translate into dynamic nonconvexities at the aggregate level? We address this question in a framework where the production of differentiated intermediate inputs is subject to dynamic nonconvexities, and we show that the answer depends on the degree of Hicks-Allen complementarity (substitutability) between differentiated inputs. In our simplest model, a generalization of Judd (1985) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) among many others, there are dynamic nonconvexities at the aggregate level if and only if differentiated inputs are Hicks-Allen complements. We also compare dynamic equilibrium and optimal allocations in the presence of aggregate dynamic nonconvexities due to Hicks-Allen complementarities between differentiated inputs.     

基于F2F的生鲜农产品C2B众筹预售定价

合理的产品定价是生鲜类农业众筹项目成功的关键。本文运用交易成本理论、供应链管理理论及互联网思维构建了生产者组织化联合和消费者社群化聚合、O2O场景产销对接模型和产品阶梯定价策略。研究表明,与传统开放式多级分销模式相比,生鲜农产品通过农场直达家庭的众筹预售在促进产销衔接、降低物流成本、保障质量安全方面优势明显,可让消费者获得更多顾客让渡价值并在阶梯价格吸引下“滚雪球”式地为生产者聚集批量订单进行定制化按需生产,进而实现生产者与消费者的帕累托改进。     

基于EWA博弈学习模型的股权分置改革对价均衡研究

本文以股权分置改革中以纯送股方式支付对价的936家A股上市公司为样本,从行为博弈的角度,用EWA学习模型研究了其对价均衡的形成机理,并对均衡的形成过程进行了模拟。模拟结果表明EWA学习模型成功捕捉了对价均衡的形成过程,说明股权分置改革对价博弈是一个基于策略学习的博弈过程。对模型参数的分析表明:博弈双方即非流通股股东和流通股股东具有极强的学习能力,但这种学习仅为对过去经验的纯策略学习;同时非流通股股东制定方案时对策略收益赋予较小的权重,说明决策双方博弈地位的不对等在很大程度上决定了不公平对价均衡的形成。     

负债企业控制权转移的时机和均衡价格

应用实物期权博弈论和一般均衡理论,推导出了负债企业在信息不完美条件下控制权转移最优时机和均衡价格的解析解, 并对最优时机和均衡价格的主要影响因素进行敏感性分析。研究结果表明: 在其他条件不变的前提下, 目标企业的规模越大、兼并双方购买沉没成本越小、控股比例越高、购买者期望协同效应越大、息票率越高,税率越高, 则均会导致控制权转移越快, 转移的均衡价格越低。目标企业所处的产业增长率和波动率越高, 则控制权转移越快, 转移的均衡价格越低,并具有双重效应。控制权转移的时机和转移均衡价格不是控制因子的单调函数。     

一次交易中的讨价还价策略及其博弈分析

对于市场中的一次性交易,定义了买者的讨价还价策略—“得寸进尺”战略,分两种情况建立了该策略下卖者之间的博弈模型,分别给出了处在信息不对称状态下的买卖双方交易的均衡价,相应地探讨了该均衡价对买卖双方的利与弊。