Online Customer Experience: A Review of the Business‐to‐Consumer Online Purchase Context

Customer interactions with an organization's website create opportunities for positive experiences that can lead to long‐term relationship building. The range of potential interactions is now quite diverse, including product information search, purchase transaction and/or service delivery. The domain of customer experience (CE) is well developed in the face‐to‐face context, but little attention has been paid to exploring the concept in the online context. The purpose of this paper is to provide a review of the online consumer literature in order to inform understanding of the antecedents and consequences of online customer experience (OCE) in the purchase context. The paper offers four important contributions for both academics and practitioners. First, it adds to understanding of OCE in the purchase context and, second, specifically recognizes and discusses the antecedents of OCE by drawing on existing literature relating to online consumer purchase. Third, it proposes the potential consequences of OCE and provides a framework for future testing. Finally, the paper addresses a problem of relevance to both academics and practitioners, and proposes future research and managerial implications.     

An Exploratory Study of Procurement Strategies for Multi‐Item RFQs in B2B Markets: Antecedents and Impact on Performance

This research explores procurement strategies for multi‐item requests for quotation (RFQs) in business‐to‐business (B2B) markets using responses from 825 purchasing professionals. The study first establishes procurement strategies that differ based on their level of strategic emphasis, i.e., the importance that is placed on the pursuit of four strategic objectives. Underlying objectives, which are obtained via factor analysis, include the focus on price, security of supply, internal procurement efficiencies, and bundle building. Next, cluster analysis is used to derive prototypical strategic approaches. The three cluster groups that emerge possess the same relative ranking of the four objectives, but differ based on the intensity with which these objectives are pursued. The clusters are labelled as the three strategic groups of strategists, opportunists, and responders. The research then explores, using an industrial buyer behavior lens, the impact of environmental antecedents in determining a particular strategy. Environmental variables include purchase importance, market uncertainty, supply base availability, buyer bargaining power, item experience, and supply base experience. Finally, the study tests the impact of procurement strategy on the buyer's perceived performance, suggesting that strategists, placing more emphasis on the pursuit of strategic sourcing objectives, achieve better performance than opportunists and responders.     

LONG‐TERM PERSISTENCE

We study whether a positive historical shock can generate long‐term persistence in development. We show that Italian cities that achieved self‐government in the Middle Ages have a higher level of civic capital today than similar cities in the same area that did not. The size of this effect increases with the length of the period of independence and its intensity. This effect persists even after accounting for the fact that cities did not become independent randomly. We conjecture that the Middle‐Age experience of self‐government fostered self‐efficacy beliefs—beliefs in one's own ability to complete tasks and reach goals—and this positive attitude, transmitted across generations, enhances civic capital today. Consistently, we find that fifth‐graders in former free city‐states exhibit stronger self‐efficacy beliefs and that these beliefs are correlated with a higher level of civic capital. (JEL: O43, P16, O10)     

Efficient Multi‐Attribute Multi‐Unit Auctions for B2B E‐Commerce Logistics

This study is the first proposing allocatively efficient multi‐attribute auctions for the procurement of multiple items. In the B2B e‐commerce logistics problem (ELP), the e‐commerce platform is the shipper generating a large number of online orders between product sellers and buyers, and third‐party logistics (3PL) providers are carriers that can deliver these online orders. This study focuses on the ELP with multiple attributes (ELP‐MA), which is generally the problem of matching the shipper's online orders and 3PL providers given that price and other attributes are jointly evaluated. We develop a one‐sided Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (O‐VCG) auction for the ELP‐MA. The O‐VCG auction leads to incentive compatibility (on the sell side), allocative efficiency, budget balance, and individual rationality. We next introduce the concept of universally unsatisfied set to construct a primal‐dual algorithm, also called the primal‐dual Vickrey (PDV) auction. We prove that the O‐VCG auction can be viewed as a single‐attribute multi‐unit forward Vickrey (SA‐MFV) auction. Both PDV and SA‐MFV auctions realize VCG payments and truthful bidding for general valuations. This result reveals the underlying link not only between single‐attribute and multi‐attribute auctions, but between static and dynamic auctions in a multi‐attribute setting.     

Split‐Award Procurement Auctions—Can Bayesian Equilibrium Strategies Predict Human Bidding Behavior in Multi‐Object Auctions?

We analyze if and when symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium predictions can explain human bidding behavior in multi‐object auctions. We focus on two sealed‐bid split‐award auctions with ex ante split decisions as they can be regularly found in procurement practice. These auction formats are straightforward multi‐object extensions of the first‐price sealed‐bid auction. We derive the risk‐neutral symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium strategies and find that, although the two auction mechanisms yield the same expected costs to the buyer, other aspects of the two models, including the equilibrium bidding strategies, differ significantly. The strategic considerations in these auction formats are more involved than in single‐lot first‐price sealed‐bid auctions, and it is questionable whether expected utility maximization can explain human bidding behavior in such multi‐object auctions. Therefore, we analyzed the predictive accuracy of our equilibrium strategies in the laboratory. In human subject experiments we found underbidding, which is in line with earlier experiments on single‐lot first‐price sealed‐bid auctions. To control for regret, we organize experiments against computerized bidders, who play the equilibrium strategy. In computerized experiments where bid functions are only used in a single auction, we found significant underbidding on low‐cost draws. In experiments where the bid function is reused in 100 auctions, we could also control effectively for risk aversion, and there is no significant difference of the average bidding behavior and the risk‐neutral Bayes Nash equilibrium bid function. The results suggest that strategic complexity does not serve as an explanation for underbidding in split‐award procurement auctions, but risk aversion does have a significant impact.     

New Product Design under Channel Acceptance: Brick‐and‐Mortar,Online‐Exclusive,or Brick‐and‐Click

In recent years, an increasing number of brick‐and‐mortar retailers have entered into the new brick‐and‐click era. Within this context, when a manufacturer presents a new product offering to a retailer, the ultimate decision is often made by the retailer regarding (1) whether to carry the new product, and (2) the channel outlet the product will be carried in (i.e., in‐store only, online‐exclusive, or brick‐and‐click). In response to this trend, we examine how a manufacturer may use product design to influence a dual‐channel retailer's outlet designation decision. This is the first study to investigate a manufacturer's optimal product design strategy when a brick‐and‐mortar retailer expands online. We demonstrate that, to induce the retailer to carry a new product both offline and online, it may not always be optimal for the manufacturer to enhance product quality (compared with when the retailer only operates offline). With the online store addition, the retailer may also be incentivized to adjust his participation criterion to a level less than what is determined by his outside option.     

搜索引擎关键字广告的竞争分析

搜索引擎关键字广告是一种新兴的获得巨大成功的在线营销方式.本文分析了搜索引擎广告位的拍卖规则,给出了在质量因子因素下,广告主的竞价行为.首先给出了广告主单阶段同时行动的竞价均衡,在该情况下,广告主单独竞价选择对自己最有利的策略;其次给出了多阶段情况下,给定一个广告主的最小加价策略,另外一个广告主的最优策略,并给出了相关的证明;最后用实际观测到的数据对该策略进行验证.另外还给出了三个相关的推论,该推论对于搜索引擎如何提高自己的收益有一定的指导意义.     

Regulatory Trade Risk and Supply Chain Strategy

Trade regulations are an important driver of supply chain strategy in many industries. For example, the textile, paper, chemical, and steel industries grapple with significant levels of non‐tariff barriers (NTBs) such as safeguard controls and countervailing duties. We explore three often observed supply chain strategies in industries subject to NTBs; direct procurement, split procurement, and outward processing arrangements (OPAs). We characterize the optimal procurement quantities for each of these three strategies, and examine how industry and country characteristics influence the firm's strategy preference. For example, we establish that the direct and split strategy profits increase in the NTB price variance but decrease in the mean price. These effects are sufficiently large that NTB price characteristics can dictate which supply chain strategy is preferred. Both the cost disadvantage and lead‐time advantage of domestic production are also significant influencers of the preferred strategy, as is the domestic‐country mandated production constraint associated with the OPA strategy.     

The Impact of E‐Replenishment Strategy on Make‐to‐Order Supply Chain Performance

This research investigates the impact of electronic replenishment strategy on the operational activities and performance of a two‐stage make‐to‐order supply chain. We develop simulation‐based rolling schedule procedures that link the replenishment processes of the channel members and apply them in an experimental analysis to study manual, semi‐automated, and fully automated e‐replenishment strategies in decentralized and coordinated decision‐making supply chain structures. The average operational cost reductions for moving from a manual‐based system to a fully automated system are 19.6, 29.5, and 12.5%, respectively, for traditional decentralized, decentralized with information sharing, and coordinated supply chain structures. The savings are neither equally distributed among participants, nor consistent across supply chain structures. As expected, for the fully coordinated system, total costs monotonically decrease with higher levels of automation. However, for the two decentralized structures, under which most firms operate today, counter‐intuitive findings reveal that the unilateral application of e‐procurement technology by the buyer may lower his purchasing costs, but increase the seller's and system's costs. The exact nature of the relationship is determined by the channel's operational flexibility. Broader results indicate that while the potential economic benefit of e‐replenishment in a decentralized system is substantial, greater operational improvements maybe possible through supply chain coordination.     

Browse‐and‐Switch: Retail‐Online Competition under Value Uncertainty

Although online shopping is becoming popular, consumers who are unsure about whether to buy a product may find it advantageous to visit a brick‐and‐mortar retail store to first examine the product before purchasing it. But, after browsing at the store, consumers have the option of switching to an e‐tailer to purchase the item at a cheaper price rather than buying at the store. Recent business press refers to this browse‐and‐switch behavior as “showrooming,” and attributes to it the declining profits of brick‐and‐mortar retailers. To study the effect of the browse‐and‐switch option on retail and online pricing strategies and profits, we analyze a stylized economic model that incorporates uncertainty in consumers' valuation of the product, captures the heterogeneity among consumers in their inclination to purchase online, and permits product returns. We consider various equilibrium scenarios for different combinations of consumer shopping behaviors, characterize the parameter ranges for each scenario, and demonstrate that browse‐and‐switch behavior can indeed occur under equilibrium. Our analysis further shows that the option for consumers to browse‐and‐switch intensifies competition, reducing the profits for both firms.     

Profitability of Service‐Level‐Based Price Differentiation with Inventory Rationing

In this paper, we study the profitability of service‐level‐based price differentiation (SLBPD) in an inventory‐rationing context. SLBPD implies that a company offers several combinations of prices and guaranteed service levels, from which customers self‐select; different customers choose different offerings because they incur different shortage costs if an order is not fulfilled immediately. We develop an analytical model for SLBPD and explore if and when such a service differentiation strategy yields higher profits than a single undifferentiated offering. The results of our analyses suggest that SLBPD is profitable only if a company faces pricing restrictions, e.g., because of competitive pressure or regulatory restrictions. We develop necessary and sufficient conditions under which a specific and relevant form of SLBPD (called “service‐level‐based upselling”) is profitable, and provide an algorithm to compute the optimal parameters of such a policy. Based on this algorithm we carry out numerical analyses that allow us to characterize the profit increment of service‐level‐based upselling. We derive managerial insights into the attractiveness of SLBPD and explain how our basic analytical framework can be extended to account for more complex practical features.     

Sourcing from Multiple Suppliers for Price‐Dependent Demands

We analyze a model that integrates demand shaping via dynamic pricing and risk mitigation via supply diversification. The firm under consideration replenishes a certain product from a set of capacitated suppliers for a price‐dependent demand in each period. Under deterministic capacities, we derive a multilevel base stock list price policy and establish the optimality of cost‐based supplier selection, that is, ordering from a cheaper source before more expensive ones. With general random capacities, however, neither result holds. While it is optimal to price low for a high inventory level, the optimal order quantities are not monotone with respect to the inventory level. In general, a near reorder‐point policy should be followed. Specifically, there is a reorder point for each supplier such that no order is issued to him when the inventory level is above this point and a positive order is placed almost everywhere when the inventory level is below this point. Under this policy, it may be profitable to order exclusively from the most expensive source. We characterize conditions under which a strict reorder‐point policy and a cost‐based supplier‐selection criterion become optimal. Moreover, we quantify the benefit from dynamic pricing, as opposed to static pricing, and the benefit from multiple sourcing, as opposed to single sourcing. We show that these two strategies exhibit a substitutable relationship. Dynamic pricing is less effective under multiple sourcing than under single sourcing, and supplier diversification is less valuable with price adjustments than without. Under limited supply, dynamic pricing yields a robust, long‐term profit improvement. The value of supply diversification, in contrast, mainly comes from added capacities and is most significant in the short run.     

Wage Bargaining with On‐the‐Job Search: Theory and Evidence

Most applications of Nash bargaining over wages ignore between‐employer competition for labor services and attribute all of the workers' rent to their bargaining power. In this paper, we write and estimate an equilibrium model with strategic wage bargaining and on‐the‐job search and use it to take another look at the determinants of wages in France. There are three essential determinants of wages in our model: productivity, competition between employers resulting from on‐the‐job search, and the workers' bargaining power. We find that between‐firm competition matters a lot in the determination of wages, because it is quantitatively more important than wage bargaining à la Nash in raising wages above the workers' “reservation wages,” defined as out‐of‐work income. In particular, we detect no significant bargaining power for intermediate‐ and low‐skilled workers, and a modestly positive bargaining power for high‐skilled workers.     

Drivers and Outcomes of Long‐term Orientation in Cooperative Relationships

We argue in this paper that a buyer may deliberately develop long‐term orientation as a governance mechanism to deal with risks arising from exchange hazards, and to reduce the opportunistic behaviour of a supplier. While the exchange hazards of asset specificity pose a safeguarding problem, those of market uncertainty pose an adaptation problem. We test our model on a sample of 221 procurement partnerships. Our results show that satisfactory prior history of a supplier, asset specificity of the buyer and market uncertainty are all positively related to a buyer's long‐term orientation towards a supplier. Consistent with the idea that asset specificity and market uncertainty pose different governance problems, we find that satisfactory prior history reduces the positive relationship between asset specificity and a buyer's long‐term orientation, but enhances the positive relationship between market uncertainty and a buyer's long‐term orientation. We also find that a buyer's long‐term orientation fully mediates the relationship between satisfactory prior history and a supplier's opportunistic behaviour. Finally, implications on the theory and the practices of relationship governance are discussed.     

Introduction to the Special Issue on E‐Auctions for Procurement Operations

We present nine papers on e‐auctions for procurement operations. The first of the issue's three sections is a foreword highlighting current trends and future research directions. The second section is composed of three commissioned survey papers, covering auctions within e‐sourcing events, electronic markets for truckload transportation, and games and mechanism design in machine scheduling. The final section consists of five research papers on the following topics: whether auction parameters affect buyer surplus in e‐auctions for procurement, collusion in second‐price auctions under minimax regret, the effect of timing on jump bidding in ascending auctions, market‐based allocation with indivisible bids, and ranked items auctions and online advertisement.     

Integrated Procurement Planning in Multi‐division Firms

For large multi‐division firms, coordinating procurement policies across multiple divisions to leverage volume discounts from suppliers based on firm‐wide purchasing power can yield millions of dollars of savings in procurement costs. Coordinated procurement entails deciding which suppliers to use to meet each division's purchasing needs and sourcing preferences so as to minimize overall purchasing, logistics, and operational costs. Motivated by this tactical procurement planning problem facing a large industrial products manufacturer, we propose an integrated optimization model that simultaneously considers both firm‐wide volume discounts and divisional ordering and inventory costs. To effectively solve this large‐scale integer program, we develop and apply a tailored solution approach that exploits the problem structure to generate tight bounds. We identify several classes of valid inequalities to strengthen the linear programming relaxation, establish polyhedral properties of these inequalities, and develop both a cutting‐plane method and a sequential rounding heuristic procedure. Extensive computational tests for realistic problems demonstrate that our integrated sourcing model and solution method are effective and can provide significant economic benefits. The integrated approach yields average savings of 7.5% in total procurement costs compared to autonomous divisional policies, and our algorithm generates near‐optimal solutions (within 0.75% of optimality) within reasonable computational time.     

Collusion in Second‐Price Auctions under Minimax Regret Criterion

Collusion in auctions, with different assumptions on distributions of bidders' private valuation, has been studied extensively over the years. With the recent development of on‐line markets, auctions are becoming an increasingly popular procurement method. The emergence of Internet marketplaces makes auction participation much easier and more convenient, since no physical presence of bidders is required. In addition, bidders in on‐line auctions can easily switch their identities. Thus, it may very well happen that the bidders in an auction have very little, if any, prior knowledge about the distributions of other bidders' valuations. We are proposing an efficient distribution of collusive profit for second‐price sealed bid auctions in such an environment. Unlike some known mechanism, which balance the budget only in expectation, our approach (which we call Random k) balances the budget ex‐post. While truth‐telling is not a dominant strategy for Random k, it is a minimax regret equilibrium.     

Integrating a Top‐Down and a Bottom‐Up Approach: Formal and Informal Risk‐Handling Strategies in a Utility Company

In this study, we bring together a top‐down and a bottom‐up approach of risk handling. We do so by conceptualizing and qualitatively and quantitatively measuring formal and informal risk‐handling strategies in a Dutch utility company. We conceive of formal risk handling as regulating, training, and educating safety and enforcing rule compliance, while we distinguish three different informal risk‐handling strategies: discretionary specialization, tacit knowledge, and taking personal responsibility. We show that the formal risk‐handling strategy and the three informal risk‐handling strategies can be measured separately. Hence, we have validated the measurement of all four strategies derived from two different risk‐handling approaches. Moreover, we have demonstrated that the perceived use of the four strategies has different effects on unsafe behavior: formal risk handling and tacit knowledge decrease it, discretion increases it, and taking personal responsibility has no effect on unsafe behavior.     

Coordinated Contract Decisions in a Make‐to‐Order Manufacturing Supply Chain: A Stochastic Programming Approach

One of the important objectives of supply chain S&OP (Sales and Operations Planning) is the profitable alignment of customer demand with supply chain capabilities through the coordinated planning of sales, production, distribution, and procurement. In the make‐to‐order manufacturing context considered in this paper, sales plans cover both contract and spot sales, and procurement plans require the selection of supplier contracts. S&OP decisions also involve the allocation of capacity to support sales plans. This article studies the coordinated contract selection and capacity allocation problem, in a three‐tier manufacturing supply chain, with the objective to maximize the manufacturer's profitability. Using a modeling approach based on stochastic programming with recourse, we show how these S&OP decisions can be made taking into account economic, market, supply, and system uncertainties. The research is based on a real business case in the Oriented Strand Board (OSB) industry. The computational results show that the proposed approach provides realistic and robust solutions. For the case considered, the planning method elaborated yields significant performance improvements over the solutions obtained from the mixed integer programming model previously suggested for S&OP.