Microeconomic Theory and Management Education: A Social Economics Perspective

A period of extraordinary change is pressuring schools of business to rethink their curricula and mission statements in order to adapt to new environments. The authors, both economists with many years of teaching experience, focus on the microeconomics course in the core curriculum and offer proposals which introduce alternative value bases to orient, motivate, and drive the firm in the economic environment. These include proposals from the frameworks of humanistic and social economics. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

金融挤兑的一种博弈论模型描述与贝叶斯纳什均衡的唯一性

本文通过在金融挤兑完全信息博弈论模型中引入噪声的方法成功地消除了纳什均衡的多重性,并获得一个可以预言大多数情形真实均衡状态的不完全信息博弈模型。该模型同时还能估计金融挤兑或金融危机发生的概率。本文获得的一个结果是"经济参数变更"是原因,"自我实现"的心理协动是机制,金融危机或挤兑是结果。     

连续竞价市场的交易策略研究综述

由于连续竞价交易机制的广泛应用和交易过程的随机性,其交易策略的研究一直是人们关注的热点和难点问题,经历了从简单到复杂、从脱离现实到逐渐贴近现实的过程。从博弈论和经济学的视角,把连续竞价市场交易策略的研究分为博弈分析学派、实验经济学派和计算经济学派3种理论,系统阐述了每个学派的研究特点和主要成果,并指出了今后的研究方向。     

Game Theory and Risk Analysis

Risk analysts often analyze adversarial risks from terrorists or other intelligent attackers without mentioning game theory. Why? One reason is that many adversarial situations—those that can be represented as attacker‐defender games, in which the defender first chooses an allocation of defensive resources to protect potential targets, and the attacker, knowing what the defender has done, then decides which targets to attack—can be modeled and analyzed successfully without using most of the concepts and terminology of game theory. However, risk analysis and game theory are also deeply complementary. Game‐theoretic analyses of conflicts require modeling the probable consequences of each choice of strategies by the players and assessing the expected utilities of these probable consequences. Decision and risk analysis methods are well suited to accomplish these tasks. Conversely, game‐theoretic formulations of attack‐defense conflicts (and other adversarial risks) can greatly improve upon some current risk analyses that attempt to model attacker decisions as random variables or uncertain attributes of targets (“threats”) and that seek to elicit their values from the defender's own experts. Game theory models that clarify the nature of the interacting decisions made by attackers and defenders and that distinguish clearly between strategic choices (decision nodes in a game tree) and random variables (chance nodes, not controlled by either attacker or defender) can produce more sensible and effective risk management recommendations for allocating defensive resources than current risk scoring models. Thus, risk analysis and game theory are (or should be) mutually reinforcing.     

Probabilistic Risk Analysis and Game Theory

The behavioral dimension matters in Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) since players throughout a system incur costs to increase system reliability interpreted as a public good. Individual strategies at the subsystem level generally conflict with collective desires at the system level. Game theory, the natural tool to analyze individual-collective conflicts that affect risk, is integrated into PRA. Conflicts arise in series, parallel, and summation systems over which player(s) prefer(s) to incur the cost of risk reduction. Frequently, the series, parallel, and summation systems correspond to the four most common games in game theory, i.e., the coordination game, the battle of the sexes and the chicken game, and prisoner's dilemma, respectively.     

发电侧电力市场竞价策略的演化博弈分析

本文应用演化博弈方法分析了发电企业竞价策略的自发演化模式,指出了政府对电力市场进行监管和调控的必要性与可能性,分析了我国制定电力市场竞价上网规则的思路。     

上市公司与审计机构信息披露的博弈模型与实证分析

本文依据博弈论原理,对上市公司和审计机构信息披露过程进行博弈分析,通过建立博弈模型,深入剖析上市公司信息披露的这两个主体在一定环境条件的约束下,从各自允许选择的行为策略中进行选择并加以实施的过程。本文还以琼民源为例进行实证分析,并对加大造假成本,加强监管提出治理对策。     

虚拟专用网和入侵检测系统最优配置策略的博弈分析

为研究阻止黑客入侵和降低信息安全技术配置成本的策略,利用博弈论建立虚拟专用网(VPN)和入侵检测系统(IDS)的信息安全技术组合模型,比较两种情况下公司和黑客博弈的纳什均衡混合策略,分析VPN对降低IDS误报率的影响.研究表明,配置两种技术组合的人工调查策略与单独配置IDS时相同,一定条件下配置两种技术组合阻止黑客入侵效果更好,但VPN修复故障成本很高或人工调查成本很低时,单独配置IDS为公司的最优策略.配置VPN对降低IDS的误报率并不总是正相关.数值模拟表明,当IDS检测率较高,用户数量较多时,配置两种技术组合为公司的最优策略.     

一次交易中的讨价还价策略及其博弈分析

对于市场中的一次性交易,定义了买者的讨价还价策略—“得寸进尺”战略,分两种情况建立了该策略下卖者之间的博弈模型,分别给出了处在信息不对称状态下的买卖双方交易的均衡价,相应地探讨了该均衡价对买卖双方的利与弊。     

Cross‐Milieu Terrorist Collaboration: Using Game Theory to Assess the Risk of a Novel Threat

This article uses a game‐theoretic approach to analyze the risk of cross‐milieu terrorist collaboration—the possibility that, despite marked ideological differences, extremist groups from very different milieus might align to a degree where operational collaboration against Western societies becomes possible. Based upon theoretical insights drawn from a variety of literatures, a bargaining model is constructed that reflects the various benefits and costs for terrorists’ collaboration across ideological milieus. Analyzed in both sequential and simultaneous decision‐making contexts and through numerical simulations, the model confirms several theoretical arguments. The most important of these is that although likely to be quite rare, successful collaboration across terrorist milieus is indeed feasible in certain circumstances. The model also highlights several structural elements that might play a larger role than previously recognized in the collaboration decision, including that the prospect of nonmaterial gains (amplification of terror and reputational boost) plays at least as important a role in the decision to collaborate as potential increased capabilities does. Numerical simulation further suggests that prospects for successful collaboration over most scenarios (including operational) increase when a large, effective Islamist terrorist organization initiates collaboration with a smaller right‐wing group, as compared with the other scenarios considered. Although the small number of historical cases precludes robust statistical validation, the simulation results are supported by existing empirical evidence of collaboration between Islamists and right‐ or left‐wing extremists. The game‐theoretic approach, therefore, provides guidance regarding the circumstances under which such an unholy alliance of violent actors is likely to succeed.     

基于Stackelberg博弈的变质物品分销网络设计模型

研究了一类短销售期的变质物品的分销网络设计问题.假定零售商的缺货成本依赖于分配给为其提供服务的分销中心的库存成本,供应商在销售期末给零售商提供第二次订货机会,供应商根据零售商的订货决策确定分销中心的最优选址和确定每个分销中心为哪些零售商提供服务,从而最小化总的运作成本(选址成本,运输成本,库存成本和变质成本),其中分销中心的运输成本和库存成本依赖于零售商确定的订货数量;而零售商则根据供应商的决策确定自身的最优订货决策,利用Stackelberg博弈分析的方法,建立了一类变质物品的分销网络设计模型,并使用拉格朗日松弛算法求解,最后通过数值算例分析了模型最优解对于参数的敏感性.     

制造商RFID策略与零售商窜货策略的动态博弈分析

考虑由单一制造商、单一零售商及两个独立市场(高端市场和低端市场)组成的供应链系统,针对零售商可能窜货的问题,建立了制造商RFID采纳和零售商窜货的动态博弈模型,分析了零售商窜货策略和制造商RFID采纳策略,研究了RFID双重效应(成本效应和惩罚效应)对灰色市场、企业收益及社会福利的影响。研究表明：1)RFID可以有效抑制零售商的窜货行为。当不存在RFID时,若市场差异较大,零售商窜货,若市场差异较小,零售商不窜货。而当存在RFID时,即使市场差异足够大,若RFID惩罚效应较强,零售商不窜货;2)RFID可能使得零售商窜货反而会增加制造商的收益。当不存在RFID时,零售商窜货总是降低制造商的收益。而当存在RFID时,若市场差异较小且RFID成本效应较强,零售商窜货增加了制造商的收益;3)制造商并非总是采纳RFID,其策略取决于市场差异的大小和RFID双重效应的强弱。     

Incentive Schemes for Semiconductor Capacity Allocation: A Game Theoretic Analysis

We study incentive issues that arise in semiconductor capacity planning and allocation. Motivated by our experience at a major U. S. semiconductor manufacturer, we model the capacity‐allocation problem in a game‐theoretic setting as follows: each product manager (PM) is responsible for a certain product line, while privately owning demand information through regular interaction with the customers. Capacity‐allocation is carried out by the corporate headquarters (HQ), which allocates manufacturing capacity to product lines based on demand information reported by the PMs. We show that PMs have an incentive to manipulate demand information to increase their expected allocation, and that a carefully designed coordination mechanism is essential for HQ to implement the optimal allocation. To this end, we design an incentive scheme through bonus payments and participation charges that elicits private demand information from the PMs. We show that the mechanism achieves budget‐balance and voluntary‐participation requirements simultaneously. The results provide important insights into the treatment of misaligned incentives in the context of semiconductor capacity‐allocation.     

基于演化博弈和优化理论的环境污染群体性事件处置机制

通过对环境污染群体性事件进行研究,以探寻环境污染群体性事件产生的原因并解决环境污染群体性事件引发的问题。首先,运用演化博弈理论研究环境污染引发群体性事件的博弈过程及相关的利益冲突,并考虑当群体间存在信息交互时,监管部门采用舆情引导的情况下环境污染群体性事件的演化特征。其次,运用优化理论探讨了监管部门从长远的角度考虑整体利益时应如何解决环境污染事件。研究表明监管部门加强舆情引导、避免发布错误信号、提高其公信力均有助于环境污染事件冲突的规避和解决;对于污染的治理问题则可以合理采用实物保护和警告处罚等方式。本文在综合考虑长远影响和整体利益的情况下,考虑信息交互并引入舆情引导,运用演化博弈和优化理论探讨监管部门应如何有效地处置环境污染群体事件这一问题。     

Toxics,Toyotas, and Terrorism: The Behavioral Economics of Fear and Stigma

Economists have traditionally viewed the behavioral response to risk as continuous and proportional. In contrast, psychologists have often contended that people have little control over their response to risk that is dichotomous, nonproportional, visceral, and fear based. In extreme cases, this automatic response results in the stigmatization of a product, technology, or choice, which seemingly cannot be eliminated or reduced. In resolving these contrasting perspectives, we review four recent studies that blend behavioral economics and psychology. Together, they provide evidence for a dual‐process decision model for risk that incorporates both reason and fear. They show consumers’ responses to perceived risk as a mix of proportional and dichotomous (safe/unsafe) responses that are relatively more continuous in situations where deliberation is possible, and more dichotomous in emotional or stressful circumstances. These findings reconcile mixed results in past studies, and, more importantly, the dual‐process model allows a clear definition of stigma, and suggests new ways to mitigate stigma and to help manage potentially damaging overreactions to it.     

间接网络效应下的产品扩散——基于复杂网络和计算经济学的研究

借鉴复杂性理论,基于个体交往关系的复杂网络结构,该文采用计算经济学建模方法和行为博弈学习算法对间接网络效应下的产品扩散现象进行建模.在该文模型中,间接网络效应下"软件"数量为厂商策略行动内生决定,并根据用户数量而变化,因此个体的决策和全局变量之间存在双向交互复杂作用.研究结果揭示了个体邻域结构在产品扩散中的影响,直接网络效应和间接网络效应在产品扩散中的区别和产品锁定发生的条件等.结果也较好地解释了产品扩散中的很多现象如不同产品的共存,产品扩散中的"涌现",产品扩散中的路径依赖,产品兼容性的选择以及新旧产品的更新换代等.     

上下游企业的横向兼并策略研究

本文研究同行业中上下游企业的横向兼并策略.研究结果表明:当上下游企业以横向兼并为唯一策略变量进行对策时,上下游企业分别横向兼并是子博弈精练Nash均衡.同时,本文讨论了政府、企业和消费者三方在兼并中的利益冲突.     

TOT项目融资中国有资产转让定价的博弈分析

本文以TOT项目融资方式为对象,运用博弈的方法,从合理分配国有资产经营期内增值收入的角度出发,得出这样的结论,在国有资产转让过程中,政府与私营资本之间的谈判是一系列复杂的博弈过程,在博弈中政府的最优行为是对国有资产转让进行招标,同时给予某一招标企业一定的中标优先权,这样政府能够较现行的国有资产转让方式获得更多的收益.     

透明度与市场效率——基于信息不对称的适应性学习研究

通过拓展Pouget模型,考察了当所有投资者采用适应性学习(有限理性)规则更新信念时,订单信息的透明度增加如何影响市场的价格发现效率和福利配置效率.结果表明,透明度增加后,市场效率大幅降低,价格发现和福利配置都难以收敛到理性预期均衡.进一步剖析投资者的策略选择可以发现,透明度增加后,拥有信息优势的知情者倾向于提交对自己更加有利的订单,而放弃均衡的交易策略;非知情者为了规避由此带来的逆向选择风险,也会放弃均衡策略而倾向于提交更加保守的订单,最终导致市场效率大幅下降.     

China's Railway Transportation Safety Regulation System Based on Evolutionary Game Theory and System Dynamics

China's railways were restructured in 2013. The number of regulatory practitioners has decreased significantly, making real-time regulation more difficult. Regulatory transfers from inside to outside the railway industry increases information risks. A more reasonable regulation mechanism is needed. The article considers introducing a public supervision mechanism into the railway transportation safety regulation system, which includes two regulators and one regulatee. As the government regulator, the State Railway Administration (SRA) regulates the safety of China Railway Corporation (CR) and encourages the public to act as supervisors to expose the CR's unsafe production information. To analyze the risks and effectiveness of the system, a multiplayer evolutionary game and system dynamics-based model for railway transportation safety regulation is established. The decision processes of players under different conditions are simulated. The results show that improving the public supervision ratio is conducive to improve the CR's safe production ratio. However, there is no evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the system. Strategies and evolutionary processes have large fluctuations, which represent high risk. Excessive penalty and reward coefficients can aggravate the amplitude and frequency of fluctuations, causing uncertainty in regulation and making it more difficult to control the actual problems. A dynamic reward and punishment mechanism is proposed to control these fluctuations. The system finally achieves an ESS that results in the lowest regulation investment for the SRA, a safe production ratio for the CR of 95%, and a public supervision ratio of 95.2%. Introducing public supervision and dynamic reward and punishment mechanisms help to stabilize and improve the CR's safe production ratio and to decrease the SRA's regulatory investment.