STICKY PRICES: A NEW MONETARIST APPROACH

Why do some sellers set nominal prices that apparently do not respond to changes in the aggregate price level? In many models, prices are sticky by assumption; here it is a result. We use search theory, with two consequences: prices are set in dollars, since money is the medium of exchange; and equilibrium implies a nondegenerate price distribution. When the money supply increases, some sellers may keep prices constant, earning less per unit but making it up on volume so profit stays constant. The calibrated model matches price‐change data well. But, in contrast to typical sticky‐price models, money is neutral.     

Underwriting and Calls of Convertible Bonds*

We model convertible bond calls under asymmetric information where, unlike Harris and Raviv (1985), we consider a nonzero call price and a call notice period. In the model, the use of underwriters conveys negative information. Consequently, the stock price decline is greater for underwritten calls than for nonunderwritten calls. Furthermore, underwritten calls are made earlier and when the conversion option is less deep in the money. Underwriting commissions and the stock price decline associated with a call are negatively related to the extent that the conversion option is in the money before the call. Empirical evidence in this paper and Singh, Cowan, and Nayar (1991) are consistent with the model's predictions.     

An Approach to Asset Pricing Under Incomplete and Diverse Perceptions

We model a dynamic, competitive market, where in every period, risk‐neutral traders trade a one‐period bond against an infinitely lived asset, with limited short‐selling of the long‐term asset. Traders lack structural knowledge and use different “incomplete theories,” all of which give statistically correct beliefs about next period's market price of the long‐term asset. The more theories there are in the market, the higher is the equilibrium price of the long‐term asset. Investors with more complete theories do not necessarily earn higher returns than those with less complete ones, who can earn above the risk‐free rate. We provide two necessary conditions for a trader to earn above the risk‐free rate.     

Optimal Reserve Prices in Name‐Your‐Own‐Price Auctions with Bidding and Channel Options

Few papers have explored the optimal reserve prices in the name‐your‐own‐price (NYOP) channel with bidding options in a multiple channel environment. In this paper, we investigate a double‐bid business model in which the consumers can bid twice in the NYOP channel, and compare it with the single‐bid case. We also study the impact of adding a retailer‐own list‐price channel on the optimal reserve prices. This paper focuses on achieving some basic understanding on the potential gain of adding a second bid option to a single‐bid system and on the potential benefits of adding a list‐price channel by the NYOP retailer. We show that a double‐bid scenario can outperform a single‐bid scenario in both single‐channel and dual‐channel situations. The optimal reserve price in the double‐bid scenario is no less than that in the single‐bid case. Furthermore, the addition of a retailer‐own list‐price channel could push up the reserve prices in both single‐bid and double‐bid scenarios.     

房地产价格的货币沉淀效应研究

把资产价格加入到标准的货币需求方程中,可以更好地为货币需求不稳定提供理论解释。协整检验得出:房价和货币需求之间存在长期稳定正向关系,而股价的长期影响不显著;误差修正模型分析得出:房价短期对货币需求产生显著的正向影响,而股价短期影响较小;对沉淀货币的进一步回归分析得出房价的货币沉淀效应非常明显,这可以解释"货币失踪之谜"。所以,房价与货币需求具有互补关系,房价上涨对货币需求的沉淀效应降低了货币流通速度。     

Transparency in Buyer‐Determined Auctions: Should Quality be Private or Public?

We study buyer‐determined procurement auctions where both price and non‐price characteristics of bidders matter for being awarded a contract. Although, in scoring auctions bidders perfectly know how price and non‐price attributes determine the awarding of the contract, this remains uncertain in buyer‐determined auctions where the buyer is free to choose once all bids have been submitted. We analyze the impact of information bidders have with respect to the buyer's awarding decision. As we show theoretically whether it is in the buyer's interest to conceal the impact of non‐price characteristics depends on how important the quality aspects of the procured good are to the buyer: The more important quality aspects are, the more interesting concealment becomes. In a counterfactual analysis using data from a large European procurement platform, we analyze the reduction of non‐price information available to the bidders. Confirming our hypothesis, for auction categories where bidders’ non‐price characteristics strongly influence buyers’ decisions concealment of non‐price information leads to an increase in buyers’ surplus of up to 15% due to higher competitive pressure and lower bids. Conversely, for categories where bidders’ non‐price characteristics are of little importance concealment of non‐price information leads to a decrease in buyers’ surplus of up to 6%.     

Market‐Based Allocation with Indivisible Bids

We study multiunit double auctions accepting bids with indivisibility constraints. Modeling the auction problem as a Multiple Choice Knapsack Problem and using dynamic programming, we show that incremental computations during bid processing can speed the handling of key auction operations such as clearing and quoting. We propose different price‐quote policies and study their influence on the efficiency of market‐based allocation. Using a reconfigurable manufacturing scenario where agents trade large quantities of multiple goods, we demonstrate potential benefits of supporting indivisibility constraints in bidding. These benefits are highly sensitive to the form of price quote provided, indicating interesting tradeoffs in communication and allocation efficiency.     

Price Manipulation and Quasi‐Arbitrage

In an environment where trading volume affects security prices and where prices are uncertain when trades are submitted, quasi‐arbitrage is the availability of a series of trades that generate infinite expected profits with an infinite Sharpe ratio. We show that when the price impact of trades is permanent and time‐independent, only linear price‐impact functions rule out quasi‐arbitrage and thus support viable market prices. When trades have also a temporary price impact, only the permanent price impact must be linear while the temporary one can be of a more general form. We also extend the analysis to a time‐dependent framework.     

DEMOCRATIC MECHANISMS

We introduce democratic mechanisms as a set of rules that must obey liberal democracy's fundamental principles of equal voting and agenda rights. We show that an appropriate combination of three rules may yield efficient provision of public projects: first, flexible and double majority rules, where the size of the majority depends on the proposal, and taxed and non‐taxed individuals need to support the proposal; second, flexible agenda costs, where the agenda‐setter has to pay a certain amount of money if his proposal does not generate enough supporting votes; third, a ban on subsidies. We highlight that universal equal treatment with regard to taxation is undesirable. Finally, we illustrate how simple constitutions involving fixed super majority rules yield socially desirable outcomes if the agenda‐setter is benevolent. (JEL: D62, D72, H40)     

Money in Search Equilibrium,in Competitive Equilibrium,and in Competitive Search Equilibrium

We compare three market structures for monetary economies: bargaining (search equilibrium); price taking (competitive equilibrium); and price posting (competitive search equilibrium). We also extend work on the microfoundations of money by allowing a general matching technology and entry. We study how equilibrium and the effects of policy depend on market structure. Under bargaining, trade and entry are both inefficient, and inflation implies first‐order welfare losses. Under price taking, the Friedman rule solves the first inefficiency but not the second, and inflation may actually improve welfare. Under posting, the Friedman rule yields the first best, and inflation implies second‐order welfare losses.     

Service Systems with Experience‐Based Anecdotal Reasoning Customers

The existing queueing literature typically assumes that customers either perfectly know the expected waiting time or are able to form rational expectations about it. In contrast, in this article, we study canonical service models where customers do not have such full information or capability. We assume that customers lack full capability or ample opportunities to perfectly infer the service rate or estimate the expected waiting time, and thus can only rely on past experiences and anecdotal reasoning to make their joining decisions. We fully characterize the steady‐state equilibrium in this service system. Compared with the fully rational benchmark, we find that customers with anecdotal reasoning are less price‐sensitive. Consequently, with a higher market potential (higher arrival rate), a revenue‐maximizing firm may increase the price if the service rate is exogenous, and it may decrease the price if the service rate is at the firm's discretion. Both results go against the commonly accepted pricing recommendations in the fully rational benchmark. We also show that revenue maximization and welfare maximization lead to fundamentally different pricing strategies with anecdotal reasoning, whereas they are equivalent in the fully rational benchmark.     

基于可变供给量的可分离物品拍卖及其应用

本文对统一价格下可分离物品的拍卖问题进行了研究。首先,在买者报价连续、买者和卖者风险中立、卖者采取可变供给量(将供给量看成价格的函数)的策略下,设计了一个新的基于可变供给量的可分离物品统一价格拍卖机制,研究了其信息激励性和分配的有效性,给出了卖者的最佳供给策略和买者的均衡报价策略。然后,将拍卖机制推广到风险中立、风险爱好和风险厌恶三类风险买者共存的情形,并给出了相应的均衡结论,该结论与现有的一些成果相比更具一般性。最后,给出了拍卖机制在环境规划中应用。具体地,结合"十一五"期间获得的"1+8武汉城市圈"环境规划中有关污染物允许排放总量分配数据和统计申报资料,利用拍卖模型来分析和评价了免费分配方案的有效性程度,并据此给出了关于目前排污申报制度和免费分配方法的若干结论和建议。     

Nonexclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons

A seller can trade an endowment of a perfectly divisible good, the quality of which she privately knows. Buyers compete by offering menus of nonexclusive contracts, so that the seller can privately trade with several buyers. In this setting, we show that an equilibrium exists under mild conditions and that aggregate equilibrium allocations are generically unique. Although the good for sale is divisible, in equilibrium the seller ends up trading her whole endowment or not trading at all. Trades take place at a price equal to the expected quality of the good, conditional on the seller being ready to trade at that price. Our model thus provides a novel strategic foundation for Akerlof's (1970) results. It also contrasts with competitive screening models in which contracts are assumed to be exclusive, as in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Latent contracts that are issued but not traded in equilibrium play an important role in our analysis.     

Liquidity and Trading Dynamics

In this paper, we build a model where the presence of liquidity constraints tends to magnify the economy's response to aggregate shocks. We consider a decentralized model of trade, where agents may use money or credit to buy goods. When agents do not have access to credit and the real value of money balances is low, agents are more likely to be liquidity constrained. This makes them more concerned about their short‐term earning prospects when making their consumption decisions and about their short‐term spending opportunities when making their production decisions. This generates a coordination element in spending and production which leads to greater aggregate volatility and greater comovement across producers.     

Limited Rationality and Strategic Interaction: The Impact of the Strategic Environment on Nominal Inertia

Much evidence suggests that people are heterogeneous with regard to their abilities to make rational, forward‐looking decisions. This raises the question as to when the rational types are decisive for aggregate outcomes and when the boundedly rational types shape aggregate results. We examine this question in the context of a long‐standing and important economic problem: the adjustment of nominal prices after an anticipated monetary shock. Our experiments suggest that two types of bounded rationality—money illusion and anchoring—are important behavioral forces behind nominal inertia. However, depending on the strategic environment, bounded rationality has vastly different effects on aggregate price adjustment. If agents' actions are strategic substitutes, adjustment to the new equilibrium is extremely quick, whereas under strategic complementarity, adjustment is both very slow and associated with relatively large real effects. This adjustment difference is driven by price expectations, which are very flexible and forward‐looking under substitutability but adaptive and sticky under complementarity. Moreover, subjects' expectations are also considerably more rational under substitutability.     

Decision Making and the Price Setting Newsvendor: Experimental Evidence

We present an experimental study of the price‐setting newsvendor problem, which extends the traditional framework by allowing the decision maker to determine both the selling price and the order quantity of a given item. We compare behavior under this model with two benchmark conditions where subjects have a single decision to make (price or quantity). We observe that subjects deviate from the theoretical benchmarks when they are tasked with a single decision. They also exhibit anchoring behavior, where their anchor is the expected demand when quantity is the decision variable and is the initial inventory level when price is the decision variable. When decision makers set quantity and price concurrently, we observe no significant difference between the normative (i.e., expected profit‐maximizing) prices and the decision makers’ price choices. Quantity decisions move further from the normative benchmarks (compared to when subjects have a single decision to make) when the ratio of cost to price is less than half. When this ratio is reversed, there is no significant difference between order levels in single‐ and multi‐task settings. In the multidecision framework, we also observe a tendency to match orders and expected demand levels, which subjects can control using prices.     

Selling with Money‐Back Guarantees: The Impact on Prices,Quantities, and Retail Profitability

In this paper, we consider a retailer adopting a “money‐back‐guaranteed” (MBG) sales policy, which allows customers to return products that do not meet their expectations to the retailer for a full or partial refund. The retailer either salvages returned products or resells them as open‐box items at a discount. We develop a model in which the retailer decides on the quantity to procure, the price for new products, the refund amount, as well as the price of returned products when they are sold as open‐box. Our model captures important features of MBG sales including demand uncertainty, consumer valuation uncertainty, consumer returns, the sale of returned products as open‐box items, and consumer choice between new and returned products and possibility of exchanges when restocking is considered. We show that selling with MBGs increases retail sales and profit. Furthermore, the second‐sale opportunity created by restocking returned products enables the retailer to generate additional revenues. Our analysis identifies the ideal conditions under which this practice is most beneficial to the retailer. Offering an MBG without restocking increases the new product price. We show that if the retailer decides to resell the returned items as open‐box, the price of the new product further increases, while open‐box items are sold at a discount. On the other hand, customers enjoy more generous refunds along with lower restocking fees. The opportunity to resell returned products also generally decreases the initial stocking levels of the retailer. Our extensive numerical study substantiates the analytical results and sharpens our insights into the drivers of performance of MBG policies and their impact on retail decisions.     

PLATFORM COMPETITION IN TWO‐SIDED MARKETS

Many if not most markets with network externalities are two‐sided. To succeed, platforms in industries such as software, portals and media, payment systems and the Internet, must “get both sides of the market on board.” Accordingly, platforms devote much attention to their business model, that is, to how they court each side while making money overall. This paper builds a model of platform competition with two‐sided markets. It unveils the determinants of price allocation and end‐user surplus for different governance structures (profit‐maximizing platforms and not‐for‐profit joint undertakings), and compares the outcomes with those under an integrated monopolist and a Ramsey planner. (JEL: L5, L82, L86, L96)     

石油价格冲击与经济波动风险最小化的货币供应机制分析

本文通过构建一个包含石油价格冲击的DSGE模型,基于经济波动风险的最小化,研究了石油价格冲击对中国货币供应机制的影响。在模型结构参数贝叶斯估计的基础上,通过货币政策前沿的比较分析,回答了中国货币供应机制是否应该对石油价格冲击做出反应以及应该如何反应的政策问题。研究结果表明,中国当前的货币供应机制并没有对石油价格冲击做出显著的反应,但为了减小经济波动的风险,中国的货币供应机制在对产出增长和通货膨胀反应的同时,对石油价格冲击做出反应具有必要性。     

Dynamic Pricing and Lead‐Time Policies for Make‐to‐Order Systems*

Make‐to‐order firms use different approaches for managing their lead‐times and pricing in the face of changing market conditions. A particular firm's approach may be largely dictated by environmental constraints. For example, it makes little sense to carefully manage lead‐time if its effect on demand is muted, as it can be in situations where leadtime is difficult for the market to gauge or requires investment to estimate. Similarly, it can be impractical to change capacity and price. However, environmental constraints are likely to become less of an issue in the future with the expanding e‐business infrastructure, and this trend raises questions into how to manage effectively the marketing mix of price and lead‐time in a more “friction‐free” setting. We study a simple model of a make‐to‐order firm, and we examine policies for adjusting price and capacity in response to periodic and unpredictable shifts in how the market values price and lead‐time. Our analysis suggests that maintaining a fixed capacity while using lead‐time and/or price to absorb changes in the market will be most attractive when stability in throughput and profit are highly valued, but in volatile markets, this stability comes at a cost of low profits. From a pure profit maximization perspective, it is best to strive for a short and consistent lead‐times by adjusting both capacity and price in response to market changes.