Role of Random Capacity Risk and the Retailer in Decentralized Supply Chains with Competing Suppliers

This research considers a supply chain under the following conditions: (i) two heterogeneous suppliers are in competition, (ii) supply capacity is random and pricing is endogenous, (iii) consumer demand, with and without an intermediate retailer, is price dependent. Specifically, we examine how uncertainty in supply capacity affects optimal ordering and pricing decisions, supplier and retailer profits, and the incentives to reduce such uncertainty. When two suppliers sell through a monopolistic retailer, supply uncertainty not only affects the retailer's diversification strategy for replenishment, but also changes the suppliers’ wholesale price competition and the incentive for reducing capacity uncertainty. In this dual‐sourcing model, we show that the benefit of reducing capacity uncertainty depends on the cost heterogeneity between the suppliers. In addition, we show that a supplier does not necessarily benefit from capacity variability reduction. We contrast this incentive misalignment with findings from the single‐supplier case and a supplier‐duopoly case where both suppliers sell directly to market without the monopolistic retailer. In the latter single‐supplier and duopoly cases, we prove that the unreliable supplier always benefits from reducing capacity variability. These results highlight the role of the retailer's diversification strategy in distorting a supplier's incentive for reducing capacity uncertainty under supplier price competition.     

Modelling Labour Demand Dynamics beyond the Frictionless Environment

Abstract. In this study we develop a simple econometric model for labour demand dynamics by explicitly considering deviations from the standard frictionless economic environment. In particular, we explore the potential effect on labour demand of capital market imperfections, labour market institutional rigidities in the form of union power, and the impact of uncertainty. In addition, in the presence of uncertainty, adjustment costs and irreversibility emerge as an important factor that introduces an option value of waiting. According to our results, leverage exerts a direct negative impact on employment dynamics indicating that capital market imperfections are indeed present. Moreover, leverage is found to also affect the adjustment process of employment. Finally, we document asymmetric effects of frictions on labour demand across different size groups that imply a higher vulnerability of small and medium sectors with respect to debt levels. Uncertainty exerts a significantly negative impact on labour demand, which is compatible with presence of partial irreversibility of employment decisions. Finally, unions over and above their effect via higher wages are positively related to employment, a finding that is indicative of their pursue for job security.     

Option Contracts and Capacity Management—Enabling Price Discrimination under Demand Uncertainty

We explore using an option contract as a price discrimination tool under demand uncertainty. In our capacity game model, a monopolistic supplier has to build capacity before observing the uncertain demand. The demand is generated by two potential customers, who privately know their own types. The types could be either high or low, differing in willingness to pay for each unit of demand. To discriminate between the customer types, the supplier designs option contracts so that only the high type will buy options in advance. The high type will do so because the options can hedge their risk of demand loss when capacity is tight. The supplier profits in three ways. First, the high type customers pay higher marginal prices on average. Second, the high type customers' demand is satisfied as a first priority, guaranteeing allocation efficiency. Third, the supplier can observe the number of options being purchased and so determine customer types, improving capacity investment efficiency. We compare our results to those of classical second degree price discrimination. We show that our proposed framework guarantees the same level of supplier profit even when the supplier cannot discriminate between the customers by bundling products.     

Monopolistic Competition,Expected Inflation and Contract Length

Abstract. This paper shows that the explicit consideration of the “expected inflation effect” makes it more likely that increases in wage and price flexibility reduce employment variability. This result, obtained in a monopolistic competition model with synchronized contracts, casts doubts on some existing consensus in the literature pointing towards the opposite view. Wage and price flexibility, although ceteris paribus desirable, is however shown to be an inferior substitute for optimally designed demand management.     

A Note on the Relationship Among Capacity,Pricing, and Inventory in a Make‐to‐Stock System

We address the simultaneous determination of pricing, production, and capacity investment decisions by a monopolistic firm in a multi‐period setting under demand uncertainty. We analyze the optimal decision with particular emphasis on the relationship between price and capacity. We consider models that allow for either bi‐directional price changes or models with markdowns only, and in the latter case we prove that capacity and price are strategic substitutes.     

Entry Deterrence of Capacitated Competition Using Price and Non‐Price Strategies

We analyze the role of pricing and branding in an incumbent firm's decision when facing competition from an entrant firm with limited capacity. We do so by studying two price competition models (Stackelberg and Nash), where we consider the incumbent's entry‐deterrence pricing strategy based on a potential entrant's capacity size. In an extension, we also study a branding model, where the incumbent firm, in addition to pricing, can also invest in influencing market preference for its product. With these models, we study conditions under which the incumbent firm may block the entrant (i.e., prevent entry without any market actions), deter the entrant (i.e., stop entry with suitable market actions) or accommodate the entrant (i.e., allow entry and compete), and how the entrant will allocate its limited capacity across its own and the new market, if entry occurs. We also study the timing difference between the two different dynamics of the price competition models and find that the incumbent's first‐mover advantage benefits both the incumbent and the entrant. Interestingly, the entrant firm's profits are not monotonically increasing in its capacity even when it is costless to build capacity. In the branding model, we show that in some cases, the incumbent may even increase its price and successfully deter entry by investing in consumer's preference for its product. Finally, we incorporate demand uncertainty into our model and show that the incumbent benefits from demand uncertainty while the entrant may be worse off depending on the magnitude of demand uncertainty and its capacity.     

The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks

Uncertainty appears to jump up after major shocks like the Cuban Missile crisis, the assassination of JFK, the OPEC I oil‐price shock, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This paper offers a structural framework to analyze the impact of these uncertainty shocks. I build a model with a time‐varying second moment, which is numerically solved and estimated using firm‐level data. The parameterized model is then used to simulate a macro uncertainty shock, which produces a rapid drop and rebound in aggregate output and employment. This occurs because higher uncertainty causes firms to temporarily pause their investment and hiring. Productivity growth also falls because this pause in activity freezes reallocation across units. In the medium term the increased volatility from the shock induces an overshoot in output, employment, and productivity. Thus, uncertainty shocks generate short sharp recessions and recoveries. This simulated impact of an uncertainty shock is compared to vector autoregression estimations on actual data, showing a good match in both magnitude and timing. The paper also jointly estimates labor and capital adjustment costs (both convex and nonconvex). Ignoring capital adjustment costs is shown to lead to substantial bias, while ignoring labor adjustment costs does not.     

The Effect of Trade on Employment and Wages in Italian Industry

The paper analyses the labour market impact of international trade on the Italian manufacturing sector. Using data for a panel of manufacturing industries the effects of trade‐induced changes in sales on employment and wages are investigated. The evidence suggests that the industry adjustment to demand shocks took place mainly through employment changes. However, increased exposure to foreign competition had a small effect on the Italian labour market, while technological change seems to have a major role in explaining the increase in unemployment.     

Committed Versus Contingent Pricing Under Competition

Should capacitated firms set prices responsively to uncertain market conditions in a competitive environment? We study a duopoly selling differentiated substitutable products with fixed capacities under demand uncertainty, where firms can either commit to a fixed price ex ante, or elect to price contingently ex post, e.g., to charge high prices in booming markets, and low prices in slack markets. Interestingly, we analytically show that even for completely symmetric model primitives, asymmetric equilibria of strategic pricing decisions may arise, in which one firm commits statically and the other firm prices contingently; in this case, there also exists a unique mixed strategy equilibrium. Such equilibrium behavior tends to emerge, when capacity is ampler, and products are less differentiated or demand uncertainty is lower. With asymmetric fixed capacities, if demand uncertainty is low, a unique asymmetric equilibrium emerges, in which the firm with more capacity chooses committed pricing and the firm with less capacity chooses contingent pricing. We identify two countervailing profit effects of contingent pricing under competition: gains from responsively charging high price under high demand, and losses from intensified price competition under low demand. It is the latter detrimental effect that may prevent both firms from choosing a contingent pricing strategy in equilibrium. We show that the insights remain valid when capacity decisions are endogenized. We caution that responsive price changes under aggressive competition of less differentiated products can result in profit‐killing discounting.     

FROM FLEXIBILITY TO INSECURITY: HOW VERTICAL SEPARATION AMPLIFIES FIRM‐LEVEL UNCERTAINTY

This article presents a model where firms may endogenously externalize part of their production process. We start from the premise that adaptation to uncertainty cannot be contracted upon in the worker/employer relationship. Vertical separation then balances flexibility gains against hold‐up costs of opportunistic behavior by outside contractors. In equilibrium, the degree of separation is shown to depend on the degree of product market competition, contractor's bargaining power, and the volatility of demand shocks. Our main result is that an increase in the degree of vertical separation amplifies the elasticity to demand shocks of firms' sales and employment. It does not, however, amplify aggregate uncertainty. Evidence from firm‐level data is shown to be largely consistent with the main implications of our theory. (JEL: L16, L23, L24)     

Is Imperfect Competition in the Product Market Relevant for Labour Markets?

Recent research in macroeconomics emphasises the importance of imperfect competition in the product market for labour market outcomes. We investigate one aspect of this issue by specifying a dynamic labour demand model where firms face different degrees of competition in the product market and test its predictions for 299 US manufacturing industries. We find that the long-run equilibrium level of industry employment as well as the speed of labour demand adjustment decreases with market power. Our results imply that imperfect competition in the product market explains part of the observed labour market rigidities and also sheds new light on two “stylized facts” in industrial organisation, the observation of procyclical movements in productivity and price–cost margins in concentrated industries.     

Real-time schedule adjustment decisions: a case study

Service capacity management has been extensively studied and successfully applied in many industries, with an emphasis on tour/shift scheduling and assignment decisions. However, few studies have addressed real-time work schedule adjustment decisions made necessary by demand uncertainty and/or labor supply disruption. This case study deals with the real-time work schedule adjustment decision and investigates the association of managerial experience, workforce mix (full- and part-time staff), and information accuracy with managers’ adjustment decisions. We designed an experiment that involved practicing service managers from a McDonald's franchise who provided their adjustment decisions for a given set of test scenarios. Their decisions were analyzed and evaluated via a controlled experiment. Using profitability as the primary performance measure, the study identifies the following outcomes: First, senior managers of a store with a higher proportion of part-time staff made more adjustments and attained slightly higher profitability than junior managers, when all employees accepted adjusted schedules. Second, managers of a store with a higher proportion of part-time staff were able to make slightly higher profits, particularly when capacity shortages occurred. And third, to achieve the majority of the benefits from schedule adjustments, it is sufficient to search for information that correctly identifies the direction of demand changes, rather than identifying the exact magnitude of the changes.     

Uncertainty,Flexibility Gap and Labour Demand in the Italian Economy

In this paper we analyse the effects of changes in the degree of uncertainty of the economic system and in the “flexibility gap”, deriving from the combined evolution of the degrees of uncertainty and flexibility of the economic system (in particular, labour market flexibility), on regular and irregular labour demand. On the basis of a simple qualitative model, we give a partial interpretation of some stylized facts of the Italian economy during the last decades. We argue that the low uncertainty and flexibility gap in the 1950s and 1960s, their remarkable increases in the 1970s, their inadequate reduction in the 1980s and the new increase of uncertainty and flexibility gap in the first half of the 1990s, have had a considerable influence on the quantity and quality of the “investment in employment” of Italian economy. The higher degree of uncertainty and the inadequate degree of flexibility of the Italian economic system are likely to have contributed towards the lower regular employment rate, compared to the main industrialized countries, and to high irregular employment. An adequate economic policy for reducing the uncertainty of the economic system together with a structural economic policy for increasing the flexibility of the economic system (in particular, an active labour policy for increasing the flexibility of the labour market), would be likely to produce positive effects on the quantity and quality of labour demand, contributing towards reducing unemployment.     

Regional Labour Market Adjustment: Are Positive and Negative Shocks Different?

This paper analyses regional labour market adjustment in the Finnish provinces during 1971–96. It investigates the interrelations of employment, unemployment and labour force participation to examine how a change in labour demand is adjusted to. The study questions the usual assumption that positive and negative shocks evoke similar adjustment processes. Instead, we test for the possibility that the effects of positive and negative shocks are asymmetric. The analysis reveals that there is little asymmetry in the adjustment to region‐specific labour demand shocks, but adjustment to total (region‐specific plus common component) shocks displays more asymmetry. The region‐specific component of a labour demand shock has short‐lived effects on unemployment and participation, and its effect on employment is very small but permanent [persistent?]. Initially, most of the fall in employment is absorbed by the unemployment and participation rate, but after a few years migration plays a larger role in the adjustment process.     

Safety Stock,Excess Capacity or Diversification: Trade‐Offs under Supply and Demand Uncertainty

Firms mitigate uncertainty in demand and supply by carrying safety stock, planning for excess capacity and diversifying supply sources. In this study, we provide a framework to jointly optimize these three levers in a periodic review infinite horizon setting, and in particular we examine how one can reduce inventory and capacity investments through proper diversification strategies. Observing that a modified base‐stock inventory policy is optimal, we find that the capacity‐diversification problem is well behaved and characterize the optimal mix of safety stock, excess capacity and extra number of supply sources. We find that higher supply uncertainty results in higher safety stock, more excess capacity, and higher diversification. But safety stock and diversification are non‐monotonic in demand uncertainty. Our results can be extended to situations in which suppliers are heterogeneous, and can be used to develop effective heuristics.     

数据优势会使平台企业提高定价吗？——模型推导与理论分析

数字经济时代,数据成为平台企业的重要生产要素。本文分析了垄断环境与差异化竞争环境下,数据对平台企业定价行为的影响。研究结果表明：在垄断环境下,数据会降低平台企业产品或服务的价格;差异化竞争环境下,数据的丰富使市场中的平台企业可以自发地形成两种定价方式：对于为主流领域提供产品或服务的企业而言,数据会使其提高价格获取利润,而对于面临长尾需求的企业而言,数据会使其降低价格,采取"薄利多销"的手段获取利润。同时,本文也提出了对数据优势作用的进一步思考——数据有助于完全价格歧视的实现与产生新价格歧视场景;数据有助于企业识别自身特征,进一步使平台市场自发形成"主流层次"与"长尾层次"两个层次;数据有弱化市场势力的作用。     

需求不确定下生产能力与竞争优势之间的关系

在需求不确定的条件下,用生产能力刻画产量决策的柔性,用古诺模型描述企业间的(产量)竞争,建立一个两企业战略竞争博弈模型,并利用博弈均衡构建柔性水平与竞争优势之间的函数关系。比较静态分析结果表明,(1)其他条件不变,一家企业的相对竞争优势随着自己的生产能力增加而增加,但随着对手的生产能力增加而降低;(2)生产能力较高的企业将获得较高的绝对竞争优势。这些结果暗示,柔性水平与竞争优势之间呈现一种正向的变动关系。这一结论一方面在一定程度上澄清了战略管理文献中呈现出的"战略柔性与竞争优势之间的联系方向模凌两可"这一问题;另一方面,由于引入了竞争性战略互动,从而将基于个人理性决策的结果扩展到战略相互依赖的竞争性情形下。     

Multi‐Product Quality Competition: Impact of Resource Constraints

We study a multi‐product firm with limited capacity where the products are vertically (quality) differentiated and the customer base is heterogeneous in their valuation of quality. While the demand structure creates opportunities through proliferation, the firm should avoid cannibalization between its own products. Moreover, the oligopolistic market structure puts competitive pressure and limits the firm's market share. On the other hand, the firm has limited resources that cause a supply‐side fight for adequate and profitable production. We explicitly characterize the conditions where each force dominates. Our focus is on understanding how capacity constraints and competition affect a firm's product‐mix decisions. We find that considering capacity constraints could significantly change traditional insights (that ignore capacity) related to product‐line design and the role of competition therein. In particular, we show that when the resources are limited, the firm should offer only the product that has the highest margin per unit capacity. We find that this product could be the diametrically opposite product suggested by the existing literature. In addition, we show that for intermediate capacity levels, whereas the margin per unit capacity effect dominates in a less competitive market, proliferation and cannibalization effects dominate in a more competitive market.     

Collective Wage Agreements and Firms’ Employment Policies

This paper provides evidence on the way collective wage agreements affect the adjustment of employment, working hours and other production factors when service‐sector firms are faced with demand shocks. The estimation results indicate that collective wage agreements significantly influence firms’ employment policies. It is shown that recruitment is a widespread instrument for service firms to cope with demand fluctuations which are negatively affected by collective wage agreements. The employment of freelance workers is also negatively affected by collective wage agreements, while their effect on using short‐term employment contracts as a reaction to demand shocks is positive.     

竞争环境下新创企业产量柔性技术战略决策研究

考虑新创企业与成熟企业相互竞争,重点研究竞争环境下,两企业的产量柔性技术选择及产能投资决策。首先分析了四种不同策略组合下两企业的最优产能决策、新创企业的最大生存概率以及成熟企业的最大利润;然后用传统博弈论的方法得出了二者的竞争均衡,并分析影响两企业产量柔性战略决策的因素;最后用数值实验进行验证。研究结果表明：在竞争中,新创企业更加关注成本因素,倾向于选择成本较小的无柔性技术;成熟企业对市场需求的波动更为敏感,当市场需求波动较大时,选择产量柔性技术能提高其收益;当产量柔性技术单位产量调整成本较大时,选择无柔性技术对两企业更为有利。