Empathy and socially responsible consumption: an experiment with the vote-with-the-wallet game

Theory and Decision - We study by means of a laboratory experiment the role of individuals’ empathy in the Vote-with-the-Wallet Game. Our main purpose is to analyze the impact of the ability...     

Differential marginality,van den Brink fairness,and the Shapley value

We revisit the characterization of the Shapley value by van den Brink (Int J Game Theory, 2001, 30:309–319) via efficiency, the Null player axiom, and some fairness axiom. In particular, we show that this characterization also works within certain classes of TU games, including the classes of superadditive and of convex games. Further, we advocate some differential version of the marginality axiom (Young, Int J Game Theory, 1985, 14: 65–72), which turns out to be equivalent to the van den Brink fairness axiom on large classes of games.     

NTU core,TU core and strong equilibria of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies

Theory and Decision - Inspired by Scarf (J Econ Theory 3: 169–181,  1971), Zhao (Int J Game Theory 28: 25–34, 1999), Sandholm (Population games and...     

Marginality,differential marginality,and the Banzhaf value

We revisit the Nowak (Int J Game Theory 26:137–141, 1997) characterization of the Banzhaf value via 2-efficiency, the Dummy player axiom, symmetry, and marginality. In particular, we provide a brief proof that also works within the classes of superadditive games and of simple games. Within the intersection of these classes, one even can drop marginality. Further, we show that marginality and symmetry can be replaced by van den Brink fairness/differential marginality. For this axiomatization, 2-efficiency can be relaxed into superadditivity on the full domain of games.     

The <Emphasis Type="Italic">γ</Emphasis>-core in Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints

In cooperative Cournot oligopoly games, it is known that the β-core is equal to the α-core, and both are non-empty if every individual profit function is continuous and concave (Zhao, Games Econ Behav 27:153–168, 1999b). Following Chander and Tulkens (Int J Game Theory 26:379–401, 1997), we assume that firms react to a deviating coalition by choosing individual best reply strategies. We deal with the problem of the non-emptiness of the induced core, the γ-core, by two different approaches. The first establishes that the associated Cournot oligopoly Transferable Utility (TU)-games are balanced if the inverse demand function is differentiable and every individual profit function is continuous and concave on the set of strategy profiles, which is a step forward beyond Zhao’s core existence result for this class of games. The second approach, restricted to the class of Cournot oligopoly TU-games with linear cost functions, provides a single-valued allocation rule in the γ-core called Nash Pro rata (NP)-value. This result generalizes Funaki and Yamato’s (Int J Game Theory 28:157–171, 1999) core existence result from no capacity constraint to asymmetric capacity constraints. Moreover, we provide an axiomatic characterization of this solution by means of four properties: efficiency, null firm, monotonicity, and non-cooperative fairness.     

Maximin play in completely mixed strategic games

Since the seminal paper of Nash (Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 36:48–49, 1950) game theoretic literature has focused mostly on equilibrium and not on maximin (minimax) strategies. In a recent paper of Pruzhansky (Int J Game Theory 40:351–365, 2011) it was shown that under fairy general conditions maximin strategies in completely mixed games can guarantee the same expected payoff as completely mixed Nash equilibrium strategies. Based on this finding, the current paper argues that maximin strategies have important properties. For instance, maximin strategies may refine Nash equilibria in subjective mixed strategies. Further, Bayesian rationality of the players may favor maximin strategies more often than Nash equilibrium strategies. The paper concludes with several suggestions for further experimental research that may shed more light on whether maximin behavior can explain reality better than Nash equilibrium.     

Guilt and shame: an axiomatic analysis

Using the machinery of Game Theory, this article analyzes how shame and guilt affect preferences. Based on abundant psychological literature, we posit that the preference ordering of someone who can feel shame (or guilt) must satisfy a number of axioms and prove that it can be represented by a particular utility function. Understanding how shame and guilt work is important to explain why people respect social norms and exhibit prosocial behavior, many times contrary to their material interest.     

Toward an understanding of the endogenous nature of group identification in games

It is commonly assumed that identification with a social group is constant throughout the play of a one-shot game in the absence of feedback. Our experiment provides evidence that challenges this assumption. Subjects play one of two versions of the prisoner's dilemma game. These versions are distinguished by the relative attractiveness of the uncooperative action. The version with a relatively attractive uncooperative action is referred to as the Easy Game and the other as the Difficult Game. Subjects who play the Difficult Game, exhibit a change in group identification which is related to their selected action. No such relationship exists within the Easy Game. Additionally, the change primarily occurs after the action is selected rather than upon inspection of the game.     

Embodied viewing and Degas’s Little Dancer Aged Fourteen: a multi-disciplinary experiment in eye-tracking and motion capture

ABSTRACT

This paper presents a cross-disciplinary project based on an experiment in eye-tracking and motion capture (Sainsbury’s Centre for Visual Arts), which aimed to study viewers’ movements around an iconic sculpture: Edgar Degas’s Little Dancer Aged Fourteen. The experiment studies how viewers respond to this three-dimensional artwork not only by looking at it but also through their own bodily reactions to it, such as by unconsciously mimicking a represented attitude or gesture. We compared two groups of viewers: classically trained dancers and non-dancers. Our hypothesis was that the skills and embodied experiences of the dancers would alter the ways in which they engage bodily with the work compared to the non-dancers. Our underlying research question was: how are vision and the body interlinked in esthetic and kinesthetic experience? This paper does not give results, which are forthcoming. It focuses on methodology and provides a commentary on the design and development of the interdisciplinary collaboration behind the project. It explores an interdisciplinary collaboration that bridges the humanities and experimental sciences and asks how being confronted with unfamiliar methodologies forces researchers in a given field to critically self-examine the limits and presuppositions of their practices.     

Abstracts

Conrad Montell Speculations on a Privileged State of Cognitive Dissonance Mervyn Hartwig New Left, New Age, New Paradigm? Roy Bhaskar’s From East to West Thomas Brante Consequences of Realism for Sociological Theory‐Building Fred A. Mael and Blake E. Ashforth Identi?cation in Work, War, Sports, and Religion: Contrasting the Bene?ts and Risks Caroline Susannah Howarth Towards a Social Psychology of Community: a Social Representations Perspective     

Pascal’s and Tabarrok’s Wagers

In a recent paper A. Tabarrok [Believe in Pascal’s Wager? Have I Got a Deal for You!, Theory and Decision 48, 123--128, 2000] argued that a believer who accepts Pascal’s Wager should in addition accept payment of any given fee in return for a given increase in the probability of reaching God. However the conclusion is obtained from manipulations of infinities which are not valid in an expected utility model. In this note, an alternative model is formulated in which Tabarrok’s conclusion can be obtained.     

Folk theorems for the observable implications of repeated games

The fact that infinitely repeated games have many different equilibrium outcomes is known as the Folk Theorem. Previous versions of the Folk Theorem have characterized only the payoffs of the game. This paper shows that over a finite portion of an infinitely repeated game, the concept of perfect equilibrium imposes virtually no restrictions on observable behavior. The Prisoner's Dilemma is presented as an example and discussed in detail.I would like to thank an anonymous referee, Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, David Levine, Thomas Voss, and participants in the UCLA Game Theory Seminar for helpful comments.     

Research Review: Sibling placement in foster care: a review of the evidence

This research review was undertaken to explore the current evidence pertaining to sibling placement in the foster care system. The review specifically addresses the following questions: (1) Which theories inform research on siblings in foster care? (2) Which designs and methodology are used to study brothers and sisters in out of home placement? (3) How do researchers define ‘siblings’ when investigating child placement? and (4) What are the findings of studies pertaining to siblings in the foster care system? This review suggests that incorporation of theory into research regarding siblings in foster care is quite limited. Additionally, few studies clearly state how siblings were identified and defined. A major strength of the research, however, is the diversity of design and methodology used. Overall, the evidence presented in this review strongly supports keeping sibling groups intact unless there is a compelling reason for separate placements.     

Risk and time preferences of entrepreneurs: evidence from a Danish field experiment

To understand how small business entrepreneurs respond to government policy one has to know their risk and time preferences. Are they risk averse, or have high discount rates, such that they are hard to motivate? We have conducted a set of field experiments in Denmark that will allow a direct characterization of small business entrepreneurs in terms of these traits. We build on experimental tasks that are well established in the literature. The results do not suggest that small business entrepreneurs are more or less risk averse than the general population under the assumption of Expected Utility Theory. However, we generally find an S-shaped probability weighting function for both small business entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, with entrepreneurs being more optimistic about the chance of occurrence for the best outcome in lotteries with real monetary outcomes. The results also point to a significant difference in individual discount rates between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs: entrepreneurs are willing to wait longer for certain rewards than the general population.     

Products of non-additive measures: a Fubini-like theorem

For non-additive set functions, the independent product, in general, is not unique and the Fubini theorem is restricted to slice-comonotonic functions. In this paper, we use the representation theorem of Gilboa and Schmeidler (Math Oper Res 20:197?C212, 1995) to extend the M?bius product for non-additive set functions to non-finite spaces. We extend the uniqueness result of Ghirardato (J Econ Theory 73:261?C291, 1997) for products of two belief functions and weaken the requirements on the marginals necessary to obtain the Fubini property in the product. More importantly, we show that for the M?bius product one side of the Fubini theorem holds for all integrable functions if one of the marginals either is a probability or a convex combination of a chain of unanimity games, i.e., we relax the requirement of slice-comonotonicity and enrich the set of possible applications.     

A Brunswik Lens Model of Dialectical Inquiring Systems

Previous papers have introduced the idea of a Dialectical Inquiring System (DIS), i.e., an Information System which for any issue presents strong pro and con arguments. The previous papers showed how the DIS could be made scientifically operational in terms of Russell Ackoff's Behavioral Theory of Communication. In this paper we show how the DIS can be represented in terms of Egon Brunswik's Lens Model. The Brunswik Lens Model formulation is most appropriate for the design of Behavioral Science experiments. It also illuminates further properties of the DIS. We discuss both the use and current limitations of the model in terms of an example currently under experimental investigation. The paper, in effect, argues vigorously for a new methodology of science that is founded on anexplicit, systematic, andcontrolled use of conflict.     

Resolving the Trust Predicament: A Quantum Game-theoretic Approach

Developing a good theoretical understanding of the role of trust in IR (such as in the events leading to the end of the Cold War) is still an open problem. Most game-theoretic studies of trust do not go beyond the limitations of an (ontologically) individualistic paradigm, thus assuming a pre-defined set of individual strategies. Yet, it is a fact that the predicament of collective trust is empirically resolved in many situations. This paper suggests a new game-theoretic approach—Quantum Game Theory (QGT)—to understand and explain how the predicament of trust is resolved. In a quantum game of trust the actors play the game by simultaneously collectively reconstructing the strategic environment in such a way as to become mutually strategically entangled. Quantum strategic entanglement allows trust to emerge between the two actors without assuming a need for signaling, prior “contract” type of arrangement, or any form of third-party communication. The paper develops and solves such a model of quantum game of trust     

An incompleteness problem in Harsanyi's general theory of games and certain related theories of non-cooperative games

The theory of games recently proposed by John C. Harsanyi in A General Theory of Rational Behavior in Game Situations, (Econometrica, Vol. 34, No. 3) has one anomalous feature, viz., that it generates for a special class of non-cooperative games solutions which are not equilibrium points. It is argued that this feature of the theory turns on an argument concerning the instability of weak equilibrium points, and that this argument, in turn, involves appeal to an unrestricted version of a postulate subsequently included in the theory in restricted form. It is then shown that if this line of reasoning is permitted, then one must, by parity of reasoning, permit another instability argument. But, if both of these instability arguments are permitted in the construction of the theory, the resultant theory must be incomplete, in the sense that there will be simple non-cooperative games for which such a theory cannot yield solutions. This result is then generalized and shown to be endemic to all theories which have made the equilibrium condition central to the treatment of non-cooperative games. Some suggestions are then offered concerning how this incompleteness problem can be resolved, and what one might expect concerning the postulate structure and implications of a theory of games which embodies the revisions necessitated by a resolution of this problem.This research was supported by a grant to the author from the City University of New York Faculty Research Award Program.     

On the first-offer dilemma in bargaining and negotiations

Theory and Decision - In bargaining and negotiations, should one make the first offer or wait for the opponent to do so? Practitioners support the idea that moving first in bargaining is a mistake,...