The Effects of Beliefs Versus Risk Attitude on Bargaining Outcomes

In bargaining environments with uncertain disagreement or “impasse” outcomes (e.g., litigation or labor strike outcomes), there is an identification problem that confounds data interpretation. Specifically, the minimally acceptable settlement value from a risk-averse (risk-loving) but unbiased-belief bargainer is empirically indistinguishable from what one could get with risk-neutrality and pessimistically (optimistically) biased beliefs. This article reports results from a controlled bargaining experiment where data on both risk attitude and beliefs under uncertainty are generated in order to assess their relative importance in bargaining experiment outcomes. The average lab subject is risk-averse, yet optimistic with respect to uncertainty, which is consistent with existing studies that examine each in isolation. I also find that the effects of optimism dominate those of risk-aversion. Optimistic bargainers are significantly more likely to dispute and have aggressive final bargaining positions. Dispute rates are not statistically affected by risk attitude, but there is some evidence that risk aversion leads to a weakened bargaining position. Though additional research is needed to understand the limits of extending these results, a key implication follows. In uncertainty environments where optimism dominates, increased settlement rates are more likely achieved by minimizing impasse uncertainty (to limit the potential for optimism) rather than maximizing uncertainty (to weaken the reservation point of risk-averse bargainers), as has been argued in the dispute resolution literature.      

Risk aversion in bargaining: An experimental study

This paper reports the results of three experiments designed to test the predictions of the principal game-theoretic models of bargaining concerning the influence of risk aversion on bargaining outcomes. These models predict that risk aversion will be disadvantageous in bargaining except in situations in which potential agreements are lotteries with a positive probability of being worse than disagreement. The experimental results support the models' predictions. However, in the range of payoffs studied here, the effects due to risk aversion may be smaller than some of the focal point effects observed in previous experiments. Implications for further theoretical and experimental work are considered.     

Uncertainty,the bargaining problem,and the Nash-Zeuthen solution

The Zeuthen bargaining model occupies a prominent place among those theories of the bargaining process that have been formulated and expounded by economists. Its solution to the bargaining problem is essentially economic, since invariant utility functions based on economic factors alone determine the outcome. However, this paper shows that a necessary condition for reaching the Zeuthen solution (shown by Harsanyi to be mathematically equivalent to the game-theoretic solution of Nash's theory) is that bargainers initially take up positions on opposite sides of the outcome that maximizes their utility product. Whether utility functions are mutually known or unknown, inherent in the bargaining situation itself is the requirement that bargainers be at least initially uncertain as to each other's subsequent concession behaviour. With uncertainty, von Neumann-Morgenstern rationality implies that each bargainer would make an initial demand that maximizes the expected gain from holding fast. Therefore, even if Zeuthen's concession criterion should subsequently dictate concession behaviour, expected utility maximization within the context of subjective uncertainty may well yield initial demands that are inconsistent with reaching the Nash-Zeuthen solution. Finally, a general methodological conclusion that emerges from the analysis is that, since the bargaining process necessarily proceeds from a context of subjective uncertainty, greater emphasis needs to be placed on its role as a device for affecting expectations.     

城市“社区性”量表构建研究

在当代社区研究中,“共同体”社区是否存在一直是学界争论的焦点。笔者认为,问题的关键不在于“是否存在”,而在于“以哪种形式存在”。本文提出了以“社区性”这一概念来描述一个社区的“共同体”特性。在相关文献的基础上,笔者构建了一个量表来测量“社区性”,以上海市社区调查的实证数据对其进行信度与效度检验;又使用该量表将上海市的社区划分为六大类,并分析了不同类型社区的特性。     

Fairness motivation in bargaining: a matter of principle

In this paper, we study the role of fairness motivation in bargaining. We show that bargaining between two strongly fairness motivated individuals who have different views about what represents a fair division may end in disagreement. Further, by applying the Nash bargaining solution, we study the influence of fairness motivation on the bargaining outcome when an agreement is reached. In particular, we show that the bargaining outcome is sensitive to the fairness motivation of the two individuals, unless they both consider an equal division fair. We argue that our results accommodate existing experimental and field data on bargaining.     

Risk aversion and the relationship between Nash's solution and subgame perfect equilibrium of sequential bargaining

This article presents some new, intuitive derivations of several results in the bargaining literature. These new derivations clarify the relationships among these results and allow them to be understood in a unified way. These results concern the way in which the risk posture of the bargainers affects the outcome of bargaining as predicted by Nash's (axiomatic) solution of a static bargaining model (Nash, 1950) and by the subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinite horizon sequential bargaining game analyzed by Rubinstein (1982). The analogous, experimentally testable predictions for finite horizon sequential bargaining games are also presented.     

政策实施成本与上下级政府讨价还价的发生机制——基于四东县休禁牧案例的分析

讨价还价是中国上下级政府互动关系中很重要的一种形式。本文详细记述了四东县草原休禁牧政策实施过程中上下级政府的多轮讨价还价，县政府制定政策，政策严格落实导致政府与民众的冲突频发，乡镇政府以冲突为策略与县政府讨价还价，最终获得了相对宽松的执行空间。本文使用实施成本分析框架解释了讨价还价行为的发生机制，执行过程成本、上级施加成本、民众施加成本高昂，致使乡镇政府只能选择与上级讨价还价。随着社会冲突的加剧，乡镇政府的讨价还价能力相对提高，使得双方的协议点从严格执行端向宽松执行端移动。执行无僵局、协议点左右摆动、短期均衡与讨价还价的交替发生是政策执行中上下级政府讨价还价的基本特征。     

Mechanism robustness in multilateral bargaining

This paper discusses the relationship between coalitional stability and the robustness of bargaining outcomes to the bargaining procedure. We consider a class of bargaining procedures described by extensive form games, where payoff opportunities are given by a characteristic function (cooperative) game. The extensive form games differ on the probability distribution assigned to chance moves which determine the order in which players take actions. One way to define mechanism robustness is in terms of the property of no first mover advantage. An equilibrium is mechanism robust if for each member the expected payoff before and after being called to propose is the same. Alternatively one can define mechanism robustness as a property of equilibrium outcomes. An outcome is said to be mechanism robust if it is supported by some equilibrium in all the extensive form games (mechanisms) within our class. We show that both definitions of mechanism robustness provide an interesting characterization of the core of the underlying cooperative game.     

A longitudinal examination of power in sibling and friend conflict

This study examined use of power resources and power effectiveness during the process and outcome of focal children's disputes with their sibling and friend across early and middle childhood. Participants included 35/46 families; focal children (15 males, 20 females) were observed at the age of four (T1) and 3 years later at the age of seven (T2) at home. Sibling and friend conflict sequences were coded for power resources (coercive physical, coercive verbal, simple information, elaborated information, legitimate), immediate power effectiveness (attempt, success), and conflict outcome. Relationship effects indicated focal children employed coercive physical and legitimate power more with siblings whereas they used simple information power more with friends during the conflict process. Focal children were more effective using legitimate power with siblings than friends in the conflict process whereas information power was used more when focal children won conflicts with friends. Regarding developmental effects, focal children employed more coercive physical power at T1 than T2 and elaborated information power at T2 than T1. In contrast, focal children were more effective using information power and coercion when winning conflicts with friends at T2 than T1. Results highlight variability in children's use of power based on relationship partner and development.     

How fair are unemployment benefits? The experience of East Asia

Despite an increasing emphasis on active labour market measures, unemployment benefits still remain a focal point of employment protection. This article takes the cases of four East Asian economies – China, Japan, Republic of Korea, Taiwan (China) –, which are often characterized as having welfare states with a strong developmental and productivist orientation, to investigate whether, as is sometimes argued, unemployment benefits are restrictive and exclusionary. In doing so, it examines the logic behind the design of unemployment benefits and argues that they are in fact progressive in design and fair when they pay out. Nonetheless, low effective coverage and low benefit rates weaken their redistribution and compensation objectives.     

Surprise,surprise: the New Zealand general election of 2017

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the 2017 general election in New Zealand and draws out some of its implications. The final outcome was a surprise, and its implications momentous. Events strengthened Labour under a new leader and weakened the Green and New Zealand First parties, making it possible for Labour to become a viable coalition formateur. Comparing campaign public polling results, at least some of the polls were ‘wrong’, but all added to the excitement and uncertainty. Coupled with a new Labour Party leader, that uncertainty and excitement had mobilising effects that affected the young, but not the old. Finally, this article analyses the changes to the party system, nation-wide, and in the Māori electorates, assessing the degree of two-party dominance, and draws out implications for debates about the threshold for representation.     

Three Models of Conflict Resolution: Effects on Intergroup Expectancies and Attitudes

Gordon Allport (1960) once noted that there are many different approaches to conflict resolution, but that few empirical studies have been conducted to examine their effectiveness. This experiment was designed to evaluate the distributive bargaining, integrative bargaining, and interactive problem solving models of conflict resolution, using intergroup expectancies and attitudes as dependent measures. Jewish and Arab students were paired into mixed-ethnicity dyads to discuss the Israeli-Palestinian dispute about Jerusalem according to one of the three models. It was hypothesized that dyad members using the interactive problem solving model would become the least pessimistic about the conflict, and would show the greatest positive change in their attitudes toward members of the other ethnic group. The results support these predictions, and help to make up for the paucity of research on the assessment of conflict resolution strategies.     

转型社会视域下的多元解纷方式论析——以西安地区建构多元纠纷解决机制为例

我国目前正处在由经济转型而引发的整个社会转型的历史转折点,改革开放30多年带给人民经济福音的同时,也出现了许多前所未有的社会矛盾和社会问题。社会利益纷争日益呈现出多元化的新态势,使得以法治为主的新的多元解纷机制的建构显得极为迫切。本文以西安地区近五年来构建司法、行政、仲裁、调解等多种方式并存的多元解纷机制的实践为对象,在图绘各种解纷方式的现实地位和实际效果的基础上,进行了尝试性的病理分析,进而对转型时期的解纷方式,做出对策性的反思与论证。     

Bargaining Solutions as Social Compromises

A bargaining solution is a social compromise if it is metrically rationalizable, i.e., if it has an optimum (depending on the situation, smallest or largest) distance from some reference point. We explore the workability and the limits of metric rationalization in bargaining theory where compromising is a core issue. We demonstrate that many well-known bargaining solutions are social compromises with respect to reasonable metrics. In the metric approach, bargaining solutions can be grounded in axioms on how society measures differences between utility allocations. Using this approach, we provide an axiomatic characterization for the class of social compromises that are based on p-norms and for the attending bargaining solutions. We further show that bargaining solutions which satisfy Pareto Optimality and Individual Rationality can always be metrically rationalized.     

Bargaining and command by heads of U.S. government departments

The 13 department of heads of the president's cabinet are among the most important and powerful people in the United States government. Laws, presidemtial authority, and administrative theory say that they should command. In fact, they spend much of their time bargaining. They dicker with the president, the White House staff, their own assistant secretaries, their civil service subordinates, and thier clientele. These powerful men and women bargain for the same reasons that they command: to acquire information, to mobilize resources, to implement their programs, and to advance their own positions. Besides standard published sources, the author draws on his personal experience as a presidential appointee in the Carter Administration. On certain points, he compares the American system to the British government.     

Distributive justice of bargaining and risk sensitivity

In this paper we will point out some possibilities and limitations of the discussion of distributive justice by bargaining in the classical bargaining models.We start by considering a kind of bargaining situation where two persons with different risk aversions have to distribute a given quantity of a certain good. Then we define a model in which two bargaining situations are compared. In both situations two persons divide a quantity of a certain good; in the second situation one of the persons, say person 2, is replaced by a more risk averse person. From a well-known theorem of Kihlstrom, Roth and Schmeidler it follows that in the Nash solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Maschler-Perles solution person 1 prefers the situation with the more risk averse opponent.In both classes of problems the judgement of distributive justice is impossible because of an informational poverty of the classical bargaining model. We propose to integrate changes in the economic situation of the persons into the model.Therefore, in a third step, we compare two distributive situations, where differences in the situations are implied by changes in the initial endowments of the persons. Under the assumption that each person has a decreasing local risk aversion, we show that every reallocation of the initial endowments is enlarged or at least preserved by risk sensitive bargaining solutions. This fact has some significance for the discussion of distributive justice in social decision making by bargaining.     

The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval

The role of risk preferences in determining the outcome to bargaining is examined for the case in which acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval. Using an n-agent extension of the Ståhl-Rubinstein alternating offer model, we find that risk preferences play a fundamentally different role when bargaining is settled using a nonunanimity voting rule. Risk preferences determine not only an agent's reservation price but also the likelihood that he is made part of the winning coalition. An implication of this analysis is that when the preferences of the agents are not too diverse, it is advantageous for an agent to be relatively risk-averse.The helpful comments and suggestions of Rich McLean and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. This article was presented as a paper at the 1988 Winter Econometric Society Meetings.     

Tuning in and hanging out: A preliminary study of college students’ use of podcasts for information,entertainment, and socializing

Millions of listeners tune in to Internet-based audio-on-demand programming (commonly known as audio podcasts). College students represent a large and influential group of consumers but little is known about this primary audience's podcast listening choices and related opinions. This research was organized within the uses and gratifications perspective and involved an online survey of college students who identified as podcast listeners. Results showed most collegiate listeners spent no more than an hour a month listening to podcasts, and fewer than half reported listening to all the episodes they downloaded. Most listeners found podcasts fun and entertaining and said they enjoy sharing what they have heard with peers. Respondents reported clearly identified program genre preferences, and reported ‘multitasking’ in a variety of specific ways while listening. This research does not attempt to answer all questions about the college student podcast audience, but it is a starting point for further study into this important user group. Recommendations for future research are offered.     

Subgame perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model with deterministic procedures

Two players, A and B, bargain to divide a perfectly divisible pie. In a bargaining model with constant discount factors, \(\delta _A\) and \(\delta _B\), we extend Rubinstein (Econometrica 50:97–110, 1982)’s alternating offers procedure to more general deterministic procedures, so that any player in any period can be the proposer. We show that each bargaining game with a deterministic procedure has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) payoff outcome, which is efficient. Conversely, each efficient division of the pie can be supported as an SPE outcome by some procedure if \(\delta _A+\delta _B\ge 1\), while almost no division can ever be supported in SPE if \(\delta _A+\delta _B < 1\).     

Are Referees Sufficiently Informed About The Editor'S Practice?

This paper clarifies why editors of academic journals should share with their referees the information about the number of referees they consult and the decision rule they apply. Our analysis also rationalizes the common questionable phenomenon of editors who seem to distort the yes or no recommendations of their referees. The editors request a recommendation of whether to accept or reject the paper as well as an assessment of the paper. The editors need the complete reports to make the appropriate correction of the referees' final recommendations.