The Arab Spring and Revolutionary Theory: An Intervention in a Debate

The so-called Arab Spring of the 2010s that toppled six dictators has spurred productive debates about the character of these political happenings and their implications for revolutionary theory broadly. One such debate that appeared recently on the pages of Historical Sociology questions whether or not we are moving into a fifth-generation revolutionary theory. This essay is an attempt to partake in this conversation, not only because my work is under discussion but because I wish to engage with some of the key arguments in the debate to clarify some misunderstandings and suggest ways that the Arab Spring allows for a new thinking about revolution and revolutionary theory. Whether or not new perspectives have emerged may be contested, but there is surely a need for them.     

Ideology, culture, and ambiguity: The revolutionary process in Iran

Conclusion To varying degrees, polysemous appeals are a feature of nearly all political coalitions and negotiations. But they are especially important in revolutions in which mass protests accompany a sudden collapse and elimination of the old regime state. In such a situation, it is not the case that a few coalition planks are ambiguous in an otherwise institution-alized political structure; instead, even the main outlines of how politics will operate in a new regime is undetermined. Given the chaos and uncertainty, revolutionary unity necessarily focusses upon rejection of the regime itself, and revolutionaries appeal to widely familiar cultural images (as in the appeal to Islam) whose durability within the society has depended on a degree of flexibility in interpretation and application. There is neither time nor reason for the opposition coalition to settle upon a detailed post-revolutionary program.Ambiguous (i.e., polysemous) ideology is an essential component of revolutionary unity and sets the stage for the struggle over the meaning of the revolution, after the fall of the old regime. Different factions struggle over the particular meaning of the images and concepts that had united the revolutionary coalition as a whole. However, this ambiguity makes quite probable an outcome in which revolutions eat their children; the initial revolutionary unity cannot possibly survive, as the construction of a new revolutionary state will necessarily reject some interpretations of the meaning of ambiguous revolutionary ideology.Particularly astute revolutionary leaders - Khomeini or Lenin, for instance - can take advantage of such a situation to create a new revolutionary state in their own image, before many of their potential adversaries fully understand what is happening or how most effectively to resist. In such a case, there often is no obvious, specific program that could truly represent the coalition as a whole, or even a majority of it. The faction that defines the ideology of the revolution by taking control of revolutionary state formation and suppressing alternatives may forever remain a minority. To take one illustration, while both the Bolsheviks and the Islamic Republican Party redefined political discourse, in both cases voting patterns suggested their minority status even after the seizure of power. The Bolsheviks, outpolled by the Socialist Revolutionaries, remained a minority in the voting for the Constituent Assembly after the October Revolution, and thus disbanded the assembly. As the Islamic Republic was institutionalized as a theocracy, voting participation steadily declined. There remains broad opposition to the clerical regime among many initial supporters of the revolution.Nevertheless, while revolutions are situations in which ambiguity is likely to be especially significant, there are different kinds of revolutions; ambiguity will matter more or less depending on exactly how the revolutionary crisis emerges and plays itself out. (Thus the following discussion is partly a response to Skocpol's call for a closer examination of the different revolutionary circumstances that allow ideology to have different kinds of effects.)In some revolutions (though the exception more than the rule) unifying revolutionary ideology will be more specific than the connotative images and concepts that unified the Iranian opposition to the Shah. This is especially likely when there is a revolutionary group poised to implement a program (after the fall of the old regime) because it has a history as an organized, clearly dominant opposition, with an identifiable program and a mass following. This fact may explain why Poland, benefitting from the earlier establishment of Solidarity, at least initially seemed more directed than some of its neighbors in establishing a new political and social order after the collapse of communist states in 1988–1989.Solidarity, then, is an example of the fact that the more time there is for the identity and intentions of a revolutionary group to become known, the less likely that such a group can hide behind an ambiguous program. Protracted civil war is another context that will generally clarify the ideologies of the adversaries, though those adversaries may have initially been united by an ambiguous ideology. And the context of civil war will place great pressure on all organized political groups to choose one side or another.However, sudden revolutionary crises may involve some political floundering for some time, in cases where there is not a long-standing, organized opposition and there do not emerge leaders with a coherent revolutionary vision and the strategic skill to take advantage of the ambiguous ideology and uncertain outcome of revolutionary situations. In the absence of leaders willing or able to negotiate through such unknown terrain, to construct a new state on the basis of a new program - without turning allies into adversaries too quickly - the ultimate meaning of the revolution may be contested for some time. In the case of Madero's anti-reelection revolution in Mexico, for example, mass mobilization and sudden victory over the Diaz regime was followed by the absence of any coherent program, and a subsequent slide into chaos and civil war. A different version of this scenario may be developing in much of Eastern Europe today. Clearly the nations of Eastern Europe experienced sudden state collapse precipitated by mass mobilization. Participants experienced the ectasy and unity of opposition to, and sudden success against, the old regime. But it quickly became unclear what was to be done next. In some cases, there was an apparent commitment to a free-market ideology, but there was little commitment to the details and difficulties that a free-market program would actually entail. While free-market advocates initially appeared dynamic and exciting, their ultimate success may prove superficial. In other cases, as in the former Czechoslovakia, there seemed to be less a post-revolutionary program than an uncertain pattern of continued dismantling of the past, with no obvious replacement offered to guide the future.In such cases, where dominant factions do not commit themselves to a coherent program, Goldstone's explanation of the rise of nationalism may be quite relevant. He argues that nationalism becomes the rallying cry, to a large extent, because revolutionary leaders are unable to deliver on initial promises about economic rejuvenation. Nationalism has of course been one of the primary ideological developments in Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Goldstone's schema also helps explain revolutions in which no faction attempts, or is able, to implement a coherent program soon after the fall of the old regime. For example, in cases where the initial crisis weakens but does not eliminate the old regime state, and elites and masses do not both emphasize total elimination of a hated regime, the revolutionary crisis can initiate a protracted process of increasing revolutionary mobilization best explained by Goldstone's approach. Such would be the case in the French Revolution, for example, where none of the main revolutionary players initially advocated what ultimately became the program of the revolution. Still, even in such cases, ambiguous propositions can be a powerful aspect of unifying ideology: Goldstone notes that, in the heady early days of the French Revolution, the will of the people was the one principle that all accepted for the resolution of conflicts.... One could add to Goldstone's observation that this unifying principle was a very ambiguous one.There are additional factors that may be relevant to the role of ambiguity in revolutionary process and ideology, and whose significance is worthy of further inquiry. For example, it seems likely that some significant degree of shared cultural or political identity is necessary for an ambiguous ideology to serve as a point of unity at all. Thus, while ethnic divisions in Iran were certainly significant in the revolution, the main revolutionary proponents thought of themselves fundamentally as Iranians and, usually, as Shiites. However, to unite ideologically all the societies of the former Soviet Union, after the August 1991 failed coup, would have required such extensive ambiguity as to be unworkable. While the images and concepts that unite a diverse revolutionary coalition can be quite general in nature and subject to diverse interpretations, they do have to be shared and strongly felt.The Iranian Revolution demonstrated how significant shared but unspecified revolutionary ideology can be; and Ayatollah Khomeini and the clerical radicals demonstrated what new ideological directions a revolution can take as a result of the perilous and uncertain struggle to define the new regime of meaning that is a crucial aspect of revolutionary states.     

Why Did the Communists Win or Lose? A Comparative Analysis of the Revolutionary Civil Wars in Russia,Finland, Spain,and China

According to classic interpretations of the communist revolutions, political mobilization of peasantry was critical for the success of the revolutionary forces. This article, which reexamines the experience of civil wars in Russia, Finland, Spain, and China, argues that peasants’ contribution to the revolutions in Russia and later in China became possible under two historical conditions: breakdown of state authorities during the mass mobilization wars and existence of an unresolved agrarian problem in the countryside. Neither of these conditions alone, as the experience of other countries has shown, was sufficient for a success of the revolutionaries. The Spanish civil war of 1936–1939, for instance, was not preceded by a major international war. Because institutions of the traditional social order had not been undermined by war, Franco was able to defeat the Popular Front government, despite the peasants’ support of the revolution. In the Finnish civil war of 1918, which broke out in the wake of World War I and the Russian Revolution, state institutions did not collapse completely and the peasantry was divided in their responses to the revolution; the rural smallholders, for example, aligned with the Mannerheim's White army, not with the urban revolutionaries.     

Toward a Regeneration of Revolutionary Theory

Revolutionary theorists are currently immersed in a critical debate about the future of the field. Allinson has argued that a fifth generation of revolutionary theory has passed us by without our noticing, while I have contended that it is revolutionary theory's fourth generation that is decidedly imperilled. Ritter and Beck – for their part- contend that we should reject the very idea of theoretical ‘generations’, and instead think of progress in revolutionary theory as a series of ongoing and settled debates about certain key topics. The pair contend that revolutionary theory has reached a consensus on two core debates: defining our object of study and determining appropriate methods. Contrary to this position, I argue that while there is much to praise about rejecting generational imagery, doing so necessarily entails that we also critique the self-proclaimed ‘fourth generation' with which such imagery is intertwined. Furthermore, I argue that there does not yet exist consensus among revolutionary theorists about a single definition of revolution, or on the question of which methods to use. Finally, I call for a regeneration of revolutionary theory which moves genuinely beyond the generational mythologies of the past.     

纳赛尔的阿拉伯统一思想及其当代影响

阿拉伯统一是纳赛尔主义的核心。阿拉伯统一思想并非纳赛尔的发明，但对于阿拉伯统一的途径、依靠的基本力量、统一的原则等关键问题，纳赛尔在理论和实践上都进行了深入探索。强调阿拉伯世界的政治团结和统一，突出埃及在阿拉伯统一中的核心作用，将阿拉伯统一与社会革命相联系等都是纳赛尔阿拉伯统一思想的重要特点。纳赛尔主义所强调的阿拉伯团结思想、社会公正思想以及宗教政策对当前阿拉伯世界的团结和现代化仍有很强的现实意义。     

A Comparative Framework for the Analysis of International Student Movements

Recent theory and research on revolution indicate that leadership and ideology play crucial roles. Much of the leadership and ideology for contemporary revolutions developed within the context of student movements. But previous research on student movements has often been limited to developed Western societies and has yielded typologies of student activism that have little application to revolutionary movements worldwide. Based on an analysis of student movements in many societies during the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, a new typology of student movements is formulated. The typology, which allows differentiation among reform student movements, identity radicalism student movements, structural revolutionary student movements, and social revolutionary student movements, appears capable of identifying the essential contrasts as well as key similarities among a wide range of student movements in many societies. Conditions fostering each type of movement are described. The paper concludes with a discussion of case studies in several countries and how these student movements are categorized in the new typology.     

They Say Bad Things Come in Threes: How Economic,Political and Cultural Shifts Facilitated Contemporary Anti‐Immigration Activism in the United States

This paper, first, provides an analysis of contemporary anti‐immigration activism in the United States, situating it historically and theoretically through an examination of nativism and vigilantism. Second, it merges insights from political process theory and structured ignorance theory to develop an historical account of three key preconditions that set the stage for and accelerated contemporary anti‐immigration activism. In so doing this paper addresses fundamental empirical and theoretical gaps in political process theory and demonstrates how structured ignorance theory can help us better understand how shifting structural conditions promoted contemporary anti‐immigration mobilization by generating perceptions conducive to conservative activism.     

The relevance of the Chinese experience for third world economic development

Conclusion If the ten elements of Chinese development strategy discussed earlier are to provide object lessons relevant for other third world nations, they must be potentially transferable to other societies. The extent to which each element of the strategy is transferable depends on the conditions under which it can be successfully implemented, and on the degree to which these conditions are satisfied in other third world nations. I had also sought to determine what political-economic, geographical, and historical conditions are required for the successful implementation of each of the ten elements of strategy. The results of this analysis are summarized in the form of a matrix in Table 1. Each of the ten elements of strategy under discussion requires at least one - and often many more - of the major features of China's political-economic system. In all cases an effective and extensive system of public administration and/or a massoriented class structure are required, and in most cases a considerable degree of public ownership of the means of production and administrative control of resource allocation is either necessary or helpful. Less often required, but crucial in a few cases, are a central government with the power to mobilize resources on a large scale, a political leadership capable of influencing and involving people on a wide scale, and a ruraloriented class structure.Among the key geographic characteristics considered, large size is necessary or helpful for the successful implementation of two of the ten elements of strategy, but is disadvantageous in many cases because it is then more difficult for the political leadership to establish an effective system of public administration and to influence and involve people on a wide scale. An abundance of labor and scarcity of land is quite generally disadvantageous because it makes the achievement of rapid economic growth more difficult under any development strategy. But ethnological unity can be very helpful for the establishment of a strong state in all three respects I have distinguished.A cultural tradition oriented to cooperative work is quite helpful - if not strictly necessary - for three of the elements of strategy. A heritage of educational and administrative experience is helpful - but not absolutely essential - for all ten elements, since it improves the operation of those basic economic institutions and those characteristics of the state which have played an important role in the success of the Chinese development strategy. The less a society has been subject to foreign domination, the more its environment is likely to be conducive to the success of many elements of the Chinese strategy. And, finally, a profound social revolution would appear to be necessary in most instances for the development of three features of the Chinese political-economic system which as a group are indispensable for the success of all ten elements of the Chinese development strategy.These conclusions suggest that most of the elements of strategy described are currently applicable in only a few third world nations at best. Only a handful of nations have experienced a social revolution of any kind, and not all of these revolutions have been strongly rooted in the rural masses. Moreover, many of the revolutionary societies (e.g., Cuba, Mozambique, Vietnam) have a bitter history of Western imperialist domination to overcome, and most have only a limited heritage of educational and administrative experience to draw upon (e.g., the African nations). Some do not have a cultural tradition conducive to collective modes of operation (most notably Cuba), and many are ethnologically heterogeneous (e.g., Angola, Mozambique). Of all contemporary third world nations, North Korea would appear to come closest to meeting the historical, geographical, and political-economic conditions that have played a significant (and in many cases an essential) role in the success of the Chinese development strategy. But even in the case of North Korea the match is far from perfect in many respects.Do these observations imply that the Chinese experience is essentially unique and therefore largely irrelevant for the rest of the third world? I think not. First of all, the Chinese experience has set new and higher standards for the evaluation of development performance and policy throughout the world: it is no longer enough to promote rapid economic growth, but development planners can and will be held accountable for achieving a balanced pattern of development in which non-growth objectives such as greater equity and self-reliance are promoted along with faster growth.Second, certain elements of the Chinese development strategy do lend themselves to successful application - at least to a certain extent - in other societies which differ considerably from China in their political-economic, geographical, and historical conditions. For example, the promotion of mass-oriented human resource development could be carried out with some success in a nation with a reasonably strong state (in terms of its capacity for resource mobilization and public administration) and a political leadership somewhat oriented to the masses. A strategy of restriction of luxury consumption is potentially more widely transferable, for it requires mainly a mass-oriented political leadership and, up to a point, does not depend on an unusually effective state apparatus. Some degree of economic diversification of regions and localities, as well as some degree of amelioration of rural-urban imbalance, can be successfully accomplished provided that the political leadership is sufficiently rural-oriented and can rely upon an effective and extensive administrative system. In all these cases the necessary configuration of political-economic conditions is possible (if not very likely) in a society that has not undergone a profound social revolution and that operates within a predominantly capitalist institutional framework. More revolutionary change would be more conducive to success, but not absolutely essential for some progress to be made.Third, and more important, some of the key conditions required for the successful implementation of much of the Chinese development strategy can be realized in the future even if they do not obtain at present in most third world societies. Here it is important to distinguish between those aspects of the setting of any given society which are virtually immutable and those aspects which are amenable to change under appropriate historical circumstances. The key geographical characteristics that I have discussed clearly involve stable features of a society's environment; nothing short of massive territorial annexation, massive migration, or genocide could alter the size, the resource endowment, or the ethnological structure of contemporary third world nations. The historical characteristics I have cited vary considerably in their susceptibility to change. Cultural traditions built up over centuries (and in some cases millenia) cannot be transformed within a generation. The amount of time it takes to overcome the effects of Western imperialism depends of course on the force and the longevity of its imposition, but in many areas at least a generation might be needed. And a substantial degree of educational and administrative experience can only be built up with several decades of concerted effort. The possibility of significant change in any of these three historical characteristics hinges on some kind of decisive break with the past which ushers in new political leadership determined to bring about large-scale change. Such a decisive break need not involve a revolutionary redistribution of power from dominating to oppressed classes, but it does require at least the accession to power of strongly nationalist forces determined to modernize their country (i.e., to increase its resemblance to the powerful industrialized nations of the modern world). Social revolution is the most fundamental historical characteristic of all, for it underlies the establishment of many of the key features of China's political-economic system and (not incidentally) also creates a context in which the needed changes in the other three historical characteristics become more readily achievable. Profound social revolutions, in which formerly oppressed classes do succeed in wresting power from formerly privileged classes, are not made overnight, but they can be brought about after a period of revolutionary organization and struggle. If the revolutionary movement is to be truly rooted in the masses (and the rural masses in particular), and if it is to succeed in a contemporary international context in which privileged classes in third world nations can often count on support from major foreign powers, it is bound to take a great deal of time and effort. But the point I am making here is that it has been done in some countries in the past, and there is every likelihood that it will eventually be done in some other countries in the future.At present it would be foolhardy to attempt to predict where Chinese-style revolutions might succeed in generating historical and political-economic conditions approximating those which have contributed to the success of the Chinese strategy of development. But there are many third world nations with one or more relevant geographic and historical characteristics already similar to China's. For example, India, Indonesia, and Brazil share China's large size, some of the Latin American nations are ethnologically quite homogeneous, many East and Southeast Asian nations have cultural traditions resembling those of the Chinese, the people of India and some of the other semi-industrialized nations of the third world have already acquired a substantial degree of educational and administrative skills, and nations such as Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan were not thoroughly restructured by foreign powers. Profound social revolutions in any of these nations - however distant the prospect may now appear- would go a long way toward establishing the conditions under which many of the lessons from the Chinese strategy of development could indeed be successfully applied. As for the immediate future, there is little likelihood that the Chinese experience will be of much relevance to development planning in the rest of the third world. For the great majority of third world nations are still dominated by propertied or otherwise privileged elites, and, as one observer has put it, revolution is precisely the fate which [they] are striving to avert through their development.

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Fanon on Decolonization and Revolution: Bodies and Dialectics

This article sets up a conversation with Frantz Fanon about his stretching of dialectics. Against a backdrop where multiple dominant epistemologies of political theory and international relations presume and are shaped by a segregation of the world into anarchy and the desire for an ordered global, Fanon's reading of imperialism's effects in the Wretched of the Earth is of utmost relevance. First, Fanon's work allows us to think dialectics along with ‘globality’ and to confronting dominant presumptions about a Manichean world: anarchy, order, and ‘bodies.’ He focuses on colonization and the White–Black relation and the radical dehumanization of the Other (Black, colonial slave, non-European, etc.). Second, his engagement of colonial violence pushes him to stretch dialectics, reactivating the ‘partially neutralized antagonisms.’ In addition, Fanon wants to think revolutionary practice as a kind of internationalism which will reunite into its own humanness in an open-ended-way—a world where no human being will be subject to dehumanization. I conclude with some ideas on what a revolutionary thinking about a revolutionary subjectivity, movement and thought entails for revolutionary struggles and dialectics today.     

The Sociological Profession and Revolution*

Is present Western sociology helping prepare revolution? Conservative and liberal sociologies clearly help keep the social system as it is without questioning it at its roots. But also the current radical research is not as radical as it may seem, since it implicitly accepts the socio-political ignorance of the masses and does not question the neo-capitalistic principle of separation between theory and praxis. The final objective of a revolutionary sociology should be to make all people become their own revolutionary sociologists.     

The Contentious Roots of the Egyptian Revolution

Although real socio-economic injustices may have been the justification for the Egyptian revolution of 2011, it was not the cause of Egypt's politicization. Demonstrators peacefully toppled a strong Western ally on the premise of high unemployment, lack of opportunity, lack of free elections, food inflation, corruption, and lack of democracy, among other factors. Why did social mobilization lead to a social movement against a state that is highly dependent on coercion? Considering that access to social networks, high unemployment, systematic corruption, and economic stagnation are all commonplace throughout the world, the Egyptian revolution is an anomaly. This article argues that an analysis of the possible roots of the modern era of contentious politics in Egypt and its subsequent politicization will help demystify and decipher how this anomaly occurred. Focusing on the transnationally inspired dynamics of historically unprecedented protest events in relation to Egypt's political and social context will shed light upon the central question that this article aims analyze: how and when did politics make the shift from internal social relations to contentious street politics?     

BETWEEN COSMOPOLITANISM AND THE NATIONAL SLOT: CUBA'S DIASPORIC CHILDREN OF THE REVOLUTION

Although cosmopolitanism used to be associated with Western, elite practices, it has in recent years been used to describe a wider array of practices by non-elite and non-Western groups. This article explores the cosmopolitanism of Cuba's “children of the revolution” living in Spain. They are those now young adults who were born in Cuba after the revolution and who were brought up to become the socialist New Man. Theirs was a world of socialist cosmopolitanism, which simultaneously was infused with commitment to a national, territorially-based political project: an independent, socialist Cuba. However, some of these New Men and New Women now embrace ideals of cosmopolitan individualism rather than the patriotic socialism with which they were inculcated as children. Yet the cultural tools that the children of the revolution make use of in their practices and narratives of cosmopolitanism paradoxically point back to revolutionary Cuba. The article argues that cosmopolitanism as a lived practice owes to experiences within the Cuban socialist-national project and is in effect a response to the ineffectiveness of this project, not necessarily a substantive opposition to it. Social capital and habitus deriving from Cuban socialism gave the children of the revolution the desire to attain cosmopolitanism as part of their life-projects. This finding suggests that the relationship between nationalism and cosmopolitanism needs further rethinking.     

A Fifth Generation of Revolutionary Theory is Yet to Come

Despite revolution's recent return to the world stage, the progress of revolutionary theory has markedly stalled. While some have argued that recent work on the 2011 Arab Spring constitutes a new, misguided ‘fifth generation’ of theory, I show this claim to be misplaced, demonstrating the remarkable continuity between foundational fourth‐generation scholarship and present‐day analyses. Furthermore, I critically analyse the theoretical, methodological and professional obstacles which fourth‐generation theory has encountered, concluding that scholars must move beyond the fourth generation if we are to surmount them. Finally, I consider the theoretical, methodological and ethical prospects of a true fifth generation of revolutionary theory.     

The problem of being a paradigm: the emergence of neural stem cells as example for “Kuhnian” revolution in biology or misconception of the scientific community?

In a thought experiment we want to test how the emergence of adult neural stem cells could constitute an example for a scientific revolution in the sense of Thomas Kuhn. In his major work, “The structure of scientific revolutions, 3rd edn, University of Chicago Press, Chicago” (Kuhn 1996), the philosopher of science, Thomas Kuhn, states that scientific progress is not a cumulative process, but new theories appear by a rather revolutionary sequence of events. Kuhn built his theory on landmark events taken from chemistry and physics, lacking examples from biology. Beginning with Ramon y Cajal’s famous quote, “no new neurons after birth”, from the early years of the twentieth century, and Reynolds and Weiss’s conflicting finding in 1992 of adult neural stem cells giving rise to new neurons, we will test how the finding of neural stem cells in the adult brain matches with Kuhn’s theory. The pivotal problem of defining a paradigm will be our main focus, since the emergence of adult neural stem cells has been acclaimed by the scientific community as the rebuttal of Ramon y Cajal’s paradigm.     

BEYOND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION?

Resource mobilization theory became the dominant paradigm for studying social movements in the 1970s because it was better able to account for the 1960s cycle of protest than previous theories of collective behavior. After almost two decades of theoretical development, the resource mobilization framework is now under increasing challenge. Drawing on research on women's movements in the United States, this article identifies ten issues which collectively pose a major theoretical challenge to the dominance of resource mobilization theory and which may initiate a paradigm shift to a new framework for the study of social movements.     

Trotsky’s error: multiplicity and the secret origins of revolutionary Marxism

ABSTRACT

Uneven and Combined Development uniquely incorporated societal multiplicity into Marxist theory. So why did its first application end in Stalinist dictatorship? This paper seeks an answer by turning the idea back on itself, applying it first to Trotsky’s doctrine of ‘permanent revolution’ and then to Marx’s original idea of revolution. Trotsky hoped that Russia’s ‘revolution of backwardness’ would be rescued by ‘advanced’ revolutions in the West, modelled on the French revolution. But what if – as this paper argues – that event too was ultimately a ‘revolution of backwardness’? Two implications follow. First, Trotsky’s ‘permanentist’ strategy was logically flawed: if all modern revolutions have been internationally-generated catch-up revolutions, then the idea of Bolshevism being rescued by ‘advanced revolutions’ elsewhere fails. But second, the consequences of multiplicity reach even deeper than Trotsky realized: they underlie and explain the original political formation, and troubled history, of revolutionary Marxism itself.     

Socially unrecognized cumulation

Sociologists tend to believe our field is noncumulative because little knowledge is widely recognized throughout the discipline. Disagreement is most widely publicized among theorists. This social recognition criterion of knowledge begs the question of how large a group must be to validate knowledge. Specialized cumulation of knowledge has however taken place in particular research communities. Examples include world-system research, state-breakdown theory of revolution, military-centered theory of state development, social movement theory, and some micro-sociological research programs. There are also instances of lost specialized cumulation, in which fields shift course and ignore previous results, for example in organizational research and small group research. Some independent specialties converge on parallel findings but do not recognize cumulation across fields (as in different specialties studying networks). We can identify and possibly overcome obstacles to recognizing cumulation.     

Economic and cultural production as structural paradox: the case of international fashion magazine publishing

This paper examines four international fashion magazines – Elle, Harper's Bazaar, Marie Claire and Vogue – published in five countries around the world. Based on content analysis, publishers’ marketing data, and interviews with editorial and publishing staff, the paper argues that the field of magazine production is structured by a double- or multiple-audience property which leads to structural homology in the fields of media production generally. Precisely because fashion magazines are simultaneously commodities and cultural productions, in which the not-entirely-separate interests of advertisers, the fashion world and readers come into play, all kinds of contradictions emerge to affect their contents. Focusing on international edition launches and magazines markets, the paper also engages with the meaning of journalistic independence and gives its own Gallic twist to globalisation theory.     

Theories of collective action and the Iranian revolution

Most analyses of the collective actions that led to the Iranian revolution rest upon one of two classical models: social breakdown or social movement. These explanations emphasize such factors as the politicization of recently uprooted migrants, the growth of a new middle class opposing autocracy, the authority of the clergy, and specific aspects of Shiite Islam. Conflicts of interest, capacity for mobilization, coalition formation, and the structure of opportunities that shaped the collective actions of various groups and classes are ignored or downplayed. This paper argues that mobilization and collective action against the monarchy resulted from the adverse effects of state development policies on bazaaris, industrial workers, white-collar employees, and professionals. Bazaaris' mobilization provided an opportunity for other social groups and classes to oppose the government. A coalition of disparate interests, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, brought down the monarchy.Iran's two major twentieth-century revolutions, and especially the second, appear so aberrant. They do not fit very closely widespread ideas of what modern revolutions should be like. Yet there is no doubt that the Islamic revolution in 1978–79 provided a thoroughgoing overthrow of the old political, social, and ideological order (Keddie, 1983:580).     

For a postcolonial sociology

Postcolonial theory has enjoyed wide influence in the humanities but it has left sociology comparatively unscathed. Does this mean that postcolonial theory is not relevant to sociology? Focusing upon social theory and historical sociology in particular, this article considers if and how postcolonial theory in the humanities might be imported into North American sociology. It argues that postcolonial theory offers a substantial critique of sociology because it alerts us to sociology’s tendency to analytically bifurcate social relations. The article also suggests that a postcolonial sociology can overcome these problems by incorporating relational social theories to give new accounts of modernity. Rather than simply studying non-Western postcolonial societies or only examining colonialism, this approach insists upon the interactional constitution of social units, processes, and practices across space. To illustrate, the article draws upon relational theories (actor-network theory and field theory) to offer postcolonial accounts of two conventional research areas in historical sociology: the industrial revolution in England and the French Revolution.