THE IMPACT OF RACE ON DENOMINATIONAL VARIATIONS IN SOCIAL ATTITUDES: THE ISSUE AND ITS DIMENSIONS

Although the impact of religious affiliation on social attitudes is a popular research topic in the sociology of religion, few scholars have examined the role that race plays in this relationship. Moreover, studies that do explore the interplay of race and religious affiliation seldom move beyond the general categories of conservative, moderate, and liberal denominational families. Our research uses recent data from the General Social Surveys to compare the social attitudes of African Americans and their white counterparts within established designations of religious affiliation. Along with control variables, we include attitude measures for political tolerance, legalized abortion, gender equality, premarital sex, homosexual lifestyles, and extramarital sexual relations. Our analysis isolates levels of support for these attitudes within categories of race and religious affiliation to determine whether variations emerge and whether they are nested within specific issues, religious denominations, or reflect more general patterns of race differences.     

Deinstitutionalisierung des Religiösen und Religiöse Individualisierung in Ost- und Westdeutschland

Luckmann’s thesis of “invisible religion” which is based on religious individualization attracts great attention within the field of sociology of religion in the German speaking countries. It states that religion currently is not loosing social relevance, but that current religious changes are characterized by processes of religious individualization in which subjectively constructed, syncretistic, and non-institutionalized systems of ultimate meaning are replacing traditional Christian religious forms. Thus, the thesis contradicts the theory of secularization processes. On the basis of two surveys carried out by the authors, the paper looks for empirical evidence to support this thesis. Three dimensions of religion are distinguished: traditional church affiliation, individual Christian religiosity, and non-church religiosity. Additionally, an individualization index is constructed. The analysis shows that processes of de-institutionalization of religion can be observed, but forms of nonchurch or non-Christian religiosity do not constitute serious alternatives to church adherence and Christian religiosity. Secularization and religious individualization are not two diametrically opposed processes. The trend towards secularization is prevailing in Germany and the tendencies towards religious individualization are components of this pre-dominant trend.     

Gender,Religiosity, Spirituality,and Attitudes toward Homosexuality

This article investigates the relationship between religiosity, spirituality, gender, and attitudes toward homosexuality. The article augments the existing literature by examining the effects of religious affiliation, religiosity, and spirituality on attitudes toward homosexuality separately for men and women using the 2008 and 2010 General Social Surveys. Results indicate significant gender differences in attitudes toward homosexuality for two variables. Southern residence decreases tolerance among men, but not women. Also, men who self-identify as spiritual, but not religious, are more likely to report that homosexuality is not morally wrong than their more religious counterparts; however, a similar finding was not evident among the women who self-identified as spiritual.     

Belonging,believing, behaving,and Brexit: Channels of religiosity and religious identity in support for leaving the European Union*

Having an Anglican affiliation is known to be associated with support for leaving the European Union (EU) in Britain. Religiosity, conceived as strength of religious attachment, has received comparatively little treatment. We investigate religiosity via electoral, household, and attitudinal surveys, distinguishing the effects of “behaving” and “believing.” The association between religiosity and EU Referendum vote choice and position is identified before and after inclusion of values, attitudinal, and civic engagement measures. Consistent with established findings, in socio-structural models Anglicans are more likely to support Brexit than religious Nones. More frequent church attendance is associated with being more pro-Remain. The Anglican effect is primarily mediated by anti-immigrant attitudes, authoritarianism, and salience of ethnic identity, suggesting a Christian nationalist aspect to Leave support. The attendance effect is mediated by warmer attitudes toward immigrants, and social capital. Notably, those exhibiting stronger orthodox belief tend to feature a stronger attachment to “Leave,” with this partly mediated by authoritarianism. To evaluate the net effect of religion on civic life, we should pay more attention to the cultural content of religious beliefs, and how they structure other values and attitudes.     

The determinants of religiosity among immigrants and the native born in Europe

This paper examines differences in religious behaviors of the native born and immigrants in European countries, measured by self-reported religiosity, frequency of praying, and frequency of church attendance. Using the European Social Survey, we first show that, on average, the religiosity of immigrants is greater than that of the native born and is greater than that of the stayers in the European origins, even among those who report they have no religious affiliation. Hypotheses are tested that can explain these observations. Differences in individual characteristics, such as age, education, income, marital status, and notably religious denominations, partly account for the overall differences. Religiosity of migrants declines with duration in the destination, approaching the levels of both the native born in destination countries and of the stayers in European origin countries. Both origin and destination country characteristics affect religiosity, such as economic development, religious pluralism, religious freedom, and societal attitudes towards religion, suggesting that both economic and culture persistence and adaptation take place.     

Religious individualization or secularization? Testing hypotheses of religious change – the case of Eastern and Western Germany

The individualization thesis advanced by sociologists of religion such as Grace Davie, Danièle Hervieu-Léger, Michael Krüggeler, Thomas Luckmann, Hubert Knoblauch, Wade Clark Roof, Wayne E. Baker, and others has become increasingly widespread especially in Europe within the sociology of religion. In contrast to the secularization theory it assumes that processes of modernization will not lead to a decline in the social significance of religion, but rather to a change in its social forms. According to the individualization theory, traditional and institutionalized forms of religiosity will be increasingly replaced by more subjective ones detached form church, individually chosen, and syncretistic in character. The article examines the empirical applicability of the individualization thesis on the basis of how religiosity and church affiliation have evolved in Germany over the past 50 years. It comes to the conclusion that the rise of individually determined non-church religiosity cannot compensate for the losses of institutionalized religiosity, since non-church religiosity remains rather marginal and is interwoven with traditional Christian religiosity. Religious individualization is only a component of the predominant secularization process.     

Personal Religiosity and Spirituality Associated with Social Work Practitioners' Use of Religious-Based Intervention Practices

Abstract

Social workers (N = 221) in the Southeastern USA responded to survey questions measuring 3 outcome variables, attitude toward religion in social work, the appropriateness of 15 religious-based interventions, utilization of these practices, and 3 dimensions of spirituality: spiritual experiences (spirituality), religious practices (organized religiosity), and religious affiliation. Attitude was generally favorable, and more than half of the interventions were judged appropriate and utilized by over 50% of the respondents. Beyond identifying with no religion, which predicted lower outcome scores, high spirituality strongly predicted attitude and utilization, whereas extrinsic organized religiosity was unimportant. A process model utilizing path analysis suggested that personal spirituality increases utilization resulting in corresponding perceptions of appropriateness and attitude toward religion in practice. More research was recommended on (1) utilization prevalence in other and diverse samples, and (2) the efficacy of religious-based practice.     

Family,religion, and work among Arab American women

Using data from a national survey of 501 Arab American women, this study examines the extent to which family behavior mediates the influence of religion on women's labor force activity. Prior research on families has largely overlooked the role of religion in influencing women's labor force decisions, particularly at different stages of the life cycle. The analysis begins to address this gap by examining whether religious affiliation and religiosity have direct relationships to women's work behaviors, or whether they primarily operate through family behaviors at different phases of the life course. The results show that religiosity exerts a negative influence on women's labor force participation, but only when children are present in the home. Among women with no children, religiosity has no effect on employment.     

Religiosität und politische Orientierung – Radikalisierung,Traditionalisierung oder Entkopplung?

In Germany as in other European countries the share of religious and churched persons is shrinking. The process of secularization is progressing gradually but inexorably and affects both Christian churches alike. In this contribution we examine if and how the numerical shrinkage of religious core segments affects the relation between religiosity and political attitudes. From secularization theory one can derive three partly opposing expectations. The radicalization thesis—particularly popular in the USA—assumes religious groups feel threatened by an increasingly secular society and this ties them together, radicalizes and mobilizes them. A second expectation rests on the assumption that in particular younger, economically well-off and highly educated people leave the churches. Through this process the social composition of the remaining church members changes leading not to radicalization but to traditionalization and withdrawal from politics. Finally, according to a third view it can be expected that the secularization process affects the entire society leading to a disintegration of tight religious milieus which in turn leads to a dissolution of social control and a decoupling of religiosity and political orientations. The central finding of our analyses is that—in support of our third hypothesis—religion loses its function for political attitudes and behaviors. In the German context the effect of religiosity on politics has been nearly exclusively studied with respect to voting behavior. By extending the focus to a wide range of other attitudes and behaviors and by taking a dynamic perspective this contribution thus closes an important research gap.     

Religion und Bildungserfolg im Migrationskontext – Theoretische Argumente,empirische Befunde und offene Fragen

Religion has received extensive attention as a factor influencing immigrants’ integration. This paper examines the role of religion in explaining ethnic educational inequalities in Germany. Due to a general lack of research in this field, the paper provides an overview of existing empirical findings, specifies theoretical arguments on how religious affiliation, belief and participation possibly affect educational achievement among children of immigrants. Using data from the first wave of the “Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in four European Countries” collected in 2010/11 the paper tests key arguments on the influence of religion on the educational attainment among 14-year-old immigrant and non-immigrant students at German schools. Compared to other religious groups, Muslims display lower rates of educational achievement. However, this can be largely explained by their social background and is independent from their levels of individual religiosity. Interestingly, individual religiosity has a positive effect on the educational achievement among Protestant students, whether with or without a migration background.     

Religiosity as a predictor of students' political attitudes

This paper analyzes the relationship between students' level of actual religiosity and their sociodemographic characteristics, political orientation, and political attitudes. The paper is based on an online survey conducted at the University of Rijeka (N = 624) in 2021. The vast majority of our respondents (90%) received the three holy sacraments of initiation in their early childhood and attended Catholic religious education at school. The explanation of the significantly less actual religiosity of students is approached from the position of Pickel's contextualized theory of secularization. Relying on Voas and Day, a composite variable distinguishes highly religious students, moderately religious students, weakly religious students, and non-religious students on the basis of the respondents' positioning toward religious self-identification, beliefs, Church attendance, and the importance of religion in one's life. Statistically significant correlations between actual religiosity and political orientation were established. Very religious Catholic students, who are the least numerous and the least homogenous category, are more inclined to right-wing political orientation and reject ethno-nationalism/anti-multiculturalism less and accept clericalism more than other categories of students. In a broader sense, this study reveals that a large number of respondents distance themselves from religion and the Church at student age despite their experience of formal religious socialization at school age. Furthermore, the results suggest that the synergy of the liberalizing effect of education and the tolerant sociocultural atmosphere of an area reduces the influence of religiosity on the political attitudes and orientation of students.     

Religious Affiliation,Religiosity, and Attitudes Toward Same-Sex Parenting

Legalizing marriage and facilitating access to parenting for same-sex couples are controversial subjects in many countries. Based on a survey of 1,861 French heterosexual students, this study examined the effects of gender, methods gays and lesbians use to become parents, religious affiliation (Catholic vs. no religious affiliation), and religiosity (in Catholic participants) on attitudes to same-sex parenting. The participants ranged in age from 18 to 66 (M = 22.27, SD = 5.20), 67% were women, 31% described themselves as Catholic, and 69% had no religious affiliation. The results based on generalized estimating equation analyses indicate that women were more favorable to same-sex parenting than men and that participants across religious groups preferred “traditional” families composed of two, different-sex parents who do not use medically assisted procreation. Of all the methods same-sex couples use to become parents, respondents preferred adoption and rejected surrogacy. Furthermore, Catholic participants were less favorable of same-sex parenting in general than participants without religious affiliation. Higher levels of religiosity intensified that rejection. Gender does not mitigate this effect for Catholic participants, suggesting that religiosity plays a major and independent role in shaping attitudes to same-sex parenting.     

TALKING ABOUT SEX: Religion and Patterns of Parent–Child Communication about Sex and Contraception

Despite the association between religiousness and conservative sexual attitudes, links between religion and patterns of parent–child communication about sex and birth control are largely undocumented. This study examines these relationships using two nationally representative data sets of parents and adolescents. I evaluated a conceptual model of religious influence on the sexual socialization of adolescents. Results suggest that parental public religiosity curbs the frequency of conversations about sex and birth control, and after accounting for conversations about sexual morality, so does parental religious salience. Despite notable relationships with religious affiliation, age, race, and gender still shape parental communication patterns most consistently.     

Random Drug Testing and Religion*

Research recently has begun to examine the link between religion and social control. It has been noted that religion, in particular Protestant conservatism, does play a role in shaping public opinion, and as a result, public policy on crime, crime control, and justice. The present research examines the issue of public support for random drug testing by focusing on the role of religion, specifically religious affiliation, in shaping public opinion. Analysis of survey data from a city in the Southwest identifies two separate dimensions of public support for random drug testing–a utilitarian dimension that is grounded in safety concerns, along with a normative dimension that reflects conservative moral beliefs, including a concern with the “evil” of drugs. Evidence from the data also indicates that conservative Protestants, compared to liberal-moderate Protestants, Catholics, and those with no affiliation, display higher levels of normative-based support for random drug testing. Researchers are encouraged to further explore the role of religion in shaping public support for the development of drug policies and other more general social control policies.     

THE RED, BLACK, AND GRAY MARKETS OF RELIGION IN CHINA

The economic approach to religion has confined its application to Christendom in spite of the ambition of the core theorists for its universal applicability. Moreover, the supply-side market theory focuses on one type of religiosity—religious participation (membership and attendance) in formal religious organizations. In an attempt to analyze the religious situation in contemporary China, a country with religious traditions and regulations drastically different from Europe and the Americas, I propose a triple-market model: a red market (officially permitted religions), a black market (officially banned religions), and a gray market (religions with an ambiguous legal/illegal status). The gray market concept accentuates noninstitutionalized religiosity. The triple-market model is useful to understand the complex religious situation in China, and it may be extendable to other societies as well.     

Attitudes of Muslim Americans toward Homosexuality and Marriage Equality: Moving Beyond Simply Understanding Christian Public Opinions

A number of studies have found a relationship between religious affiliation and attitudes toward LGBQ individuals. To date, however, research on religious attitudes has focused primarily on Christians. We expanded upon existing research by including two of the three largest U.S. religions previously overlooked—Islam and Judaism. We used data from the 2014 Religious Landscape Study, which provided a larger sample of Jewish (n = 475) and Muslim (n = 135) respondents than most public opinion surveys. We found that Muslim and Protestant participants were the least accepting of homosexuality and supportive of same-sex marriage compared with Roman Catholic and Jewish participants. Results also showed that fundamentalism and religiosity were significant predictors of attitudes toward homosexuality and same-sex marriage across all participants, regardless of denomination. Implications for future research and data collection efforts learned from this study are discussed.     

The Influence of Religion on Latino Education,Marriage, and Social Views in the United States

ABSTRACT

This study analyzes the Hispanic Churches in American Public Life National Survey (n = 2,060) data set to examine the relationship between religious affiliation and commitment and education, marital status, and social views in the U.S. Latino community. The findings indicate that religious affiliation and high rates of religious participation and commitment are important factors that are positively and negatively related to Latino education, marriage, and social action. This study found a positive relationship between high rates of religious participation and commitment and high rates of marriage, social action, and conservative views on church–state relations and social issues like abortion and homosexual relations, but not on other social views like the death penalty and the ordination of women. In general, conservative religiosity (in this case Protestant Evangelicalism and Pentecostalism) is positively related to high rates of marriage and social action. However, the data also suggest that high rates of religious participation and commitment do not necessarily result in higher income and educational levels, although this may be due to the fact that many Latinos recently converted from Catholicism to Protestantism and thus have not had a chance to adopt and benefit from Protestant educational attitudes and resources.     

Religion and Voting: A Study of the 1968 Canadian Federal Election in Ontario

On a cherchC A ddceler le genre de liaisons qui existaient entre certaines dimensions de la ferveur religieuse et les prdfdrences dans le vote a l'aide de donndes recueillies sur questionnaire dam la Province de l'Ontario au moment de 1'Clection fCdCrale canadienne de 1968. Les dimensions de la ferveur religieuse sont les suivantes: engagement social dans la communautd religieuse, orthodoxie doctrinale, I'intensitC de la pratique religieuse, les attitudes vis-his les autres groupes religieux et la question des Ccoles dpardes, et l'affiliation religieuse des candidats. Les mesures de l'engagement social sont trks dtroitement reliees A celles des preferences dans le vote tandis que la religion des interrogks ne produit aucun resultat tangible. La liaison entre la religion et le vote est de meme nature et intensite tant au niveau provincial que federal.
Propositions on the association of a number of dimensions of religiosity with voting preferences were tested by survey data collected in Ontario at the time of the 1968 Canadian federal election. The religiosity variables include: social involvement in the religious community, doctrinal orthodoxy, devotionalism, attitudes to other religious groups and to the separate schools issue, and the religion of the candidates. Measures of social involvement had the strongest association with voting preferences while the religion of the candidate had no significant effect. The association between religion and voting was of the same kind and strength at the provincial level as at the federal.     

COUNTY LEVEL SUICIDE RATES AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION: URBANICITY AND ITS ROLE IN THE RELATIONSHIP

This study adds to the existing research concerning ecological relationships between suicide rates, social interaction, and urbanicity in the United States. Age-sex-race adjusted five-year averaged suicide rates for 1993–1997 and various measures of urbanicity are used. Some proposed relationships held true, while others indicate that social integration and urbanicity are so intertwined in their effects on suicide that no clear, unidirectional pattern emerges. The religious affiliation measure captured unique variations in the role religion plays in this relationship, depending on how urbanicity was measured. Findings suggest closer attention needs to be paid to how both urbanicity and religious affiliation are measured. Overall, vast regional variation exists in suicide rates and the role of urbanization can be misunderstood if not properly specified.