Imprecise preferences and the WTP-WTA disparity

This article reports the results of a study designed to elicit willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) values for changes in the risk of nonfatal road injuries. We examine the possibility that individuals' preferences over combinations of wealth, risk, and safety are imprecise, and that this imprecision might result in the observed disparity between WTP and WTA measures of value. The results confirm that individuals' preferences for safety are significantly imprecise, but that this alone is insufficient to explain more than part of the disparity. Indeed, respondents' estimates of the minimum that they would be prepared to accept for a risk increase frequently exceed the maximum that they would be prepared to pay for an equivalent risk reduction.     

Living without state-independence of utilities

This article is concerned with the representation of preferences which do not satisfy the ordinary axioms for state-independent utilities. After suggesting reasons for not being satisfied with solutions involving state-dependent utilities, an alternative representation shall be proposed involving state-independent utilities and a situation-dependent factor. The latter captures the interdependencies between states and consequences. Two sets of axioms are proposed, each permitting the derivation of subjective probabilities, state-independent utilities, and a situation-dependent factor, and each operating in a different framework. The first framework involves the concept of a decision situation—consisting of a set of states, a set of consequences and a preference relation on acts; the probabilities, utilities and situation-dependent factor are elicited by referring to other, appropriate decision situations. The second framework, which is technically related, operates in a fixed decision situation; particular “subsituations” are employed in the derivation of the representation. Possible interpretations of the situation-dependent factor and the notion of situation are discussed.     

Individual fairness in Harsanyi’s utilitarianism: operationalizing all-inclusive utility

Fairness can be incorporated into Harsanyi’s utilitarianism through all-inclusive utility. This retains the normative assumptions of expected utility and Pareto-efficiency, and relates fairness to individual preferences. It makes utilitarianism unfalsifiable, however, if agents’ all-inclusive utilities are not explicitly specified. This note proposes a two-stage model to make utilitarian welfare analysis falsifiable by specifying all-inclusive utilities explicitly through models of individual fairness preferences. The approach is applied to include fairness in widely discussed allocation examples.     

Does Learning Diminish Violations of Independence, Coalescing and Monotonicity?

Violations of expected utility theory are sometimes attributed to imprecise preferences interacting with a lack of learning opportunity in the experimental laboratory. This paper reports an experimental test of whether a learning opportunity which engenders accurate probability assessments, by enhancing understanding of the meaning of stated probability information, causes anomalous behaviour to diminish. The data show that whilst in some cases expected utility maximising behaviour increases with the learning opportunity, so too do systematic violations. Therefore, there should be no presumption that anomalous behaviour under risk is transient and that discovered preferences will be appropriately described by expected utility theory.     

Error Propagation in the Elicitation of Utility and Probability Weighting Functions

Elicitation methods in decision-making under risk allow us to infer the utilities of outcomes as well as the probability weights from the observed preferences of an individual. An optimally efficient elicitation method is proposed, which takes the inevitable distortion of preferences by random errors into account and minimizes the effect of such errors on the inferred utility and probability weighting functions. Under mild assumptions, the optimally efficient method for eliciting utilities and probability weights is the following three-stage procedure. First, a probability is elicited whose subjective weight is one half. Second, the utility function is elicited through the midpoint chaining certainty equivalent method using the probability elicited at the first stage. Finally, the probability weighting function is elicited through the probability equivalent method.     

Analysis of Choice Expectations in Incomplete Scenarios

This paper studies the use of probabilistic expectations data to predict behavior in incomplete scenarios posed by the researcher. The information that respondents have when replying to questions posing incomplete scenarios is a subset of the information that they would have in actual choice settings. Hence such questions do not elicit pure statements of preference; they elicit preferences mixed with expectations of future events that may affect choice behavior. The analysis developed here assumes respondents recognize that their behavior may depend on information they do not have when expectations are elicited, and that they answer coherently and honestly given the information provided. The objective in imagining such ideal respondents is to place a logical upper bound on the predictive content of elicited choice expectations.     

Subjective probabilities and utility with event-dependent preferences

This article generalizes Savage's theory to include event-dependent preferences. The state space is partitioned into finitely many events. The induced preferences over consequences are assumed independent of the underlying states within, but not across, these events. This results in an additively separable representation of preferences over acts. The dependence of the preference relation over consequences on the events is represented by event-dependent mappings of the set of consequences onto itself. Given these mappings, the preferences on acts are represented by the expectation of event-dependent utilities on the consequences with respect to unique subjective probabilities on the states.Helpful discussions with David Schmeidler are gratefully acknowledged.     

Expected Utility Consistent Extensions of Preferences

We consider the problem of extending a (complete) order over a set to its power set. The extension axioms we consider generate orderings over sets according to their expected utilities induced by some assignment of utilities over alternatives and probability distributions over sets. The model we propose gives a general and unified exposition of expected utility consistent extensions whilst it allows to emphasize various subtleties, the effects of which seem to be underestimated – particularly in the literature on strategy-proof social choice correspondences.      

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Meets the ‘Persistently Uninsured’

Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (commonly known as ‘Obamacare’), the national uninsured rate has fallen from 17.3 per cent in 2013 to 11.7 per cent in the first half of 2015. While this is a substantial drop, even accounting for the states that did not expand Medicaid, the remaining double‐digit national rate, as well as higher rates in some states, indicates that a significant minority of Americans are not buying insurance. Researchers have identified a segment of the population with weak or uncertain preferences for health insurance. This article explores how such individuals are unevenly distributed across states and whether cultural preferences relating to time preference and risk aversion underlie the geographic distribution of the ‘persistently uninsured’. It concludes by reviewing the policy implications presented by the presence of numerous health insurance sceptics in certain jurisdictions.     

Equilibria with vector-valued utilities and preference information. The analysis of a mixed duopoly

This paper deals with the equilibria of games when the agents have multiple objectives and, therefore, their utilities cannot be represented by a single value, but by a vector containing the various dimensions of the utility. Our approach allows the incorporation of partial information about the preferences of the agents into the model, and permits the identification of the set of equilibria in accordance with this information. We also propose an additional conservative criterion which can be applied in this framework in order to predict the results of interaction. The potential application of the theoretical results is shown with an analysis of a mixed oligopoly in which the agents value additional objectives other than their own benefit. These objectives are related to social welfare and to the profit of the industry. The flexibility of our approach provides a general theoretical framework for the analysis of a wide range of strategic economic models.     

Ambiguity and decision modeling: A preference-based approach

In this article, we develop a model that permits a decision maker's preferences to depend on the decision maker's ambiguity about the probability of an event that is relevant for decision-making purposes. We deal with ambiguity through preference modeling, with ambiguity leading to modifications in the utilities of outcomes. The behavior of ambiguity premiums and probability premiums as the payoffs are varied depends on the nature of the modifications in utilities. Particular forms of the model that arise under different sets of assumptions about preferences include additive, bilinear, and ratio forms. We conclude with a brief example and some thoughts about potential generalizations and implications of the model.     

On the problem of imprecision

Among the problems raised by admitting statements which are neither true nor false is the problem of how we are to cope with vague concepts. One method of dealing with such concepts has been suggested by Rosser/Turquette (1952), i.e. the employment of a many valued set theory. It is our intention in this paper to discuss the use of many valued logics, especially the set theoretical proposals of Zadeh and Brown, in dealing with this problem. Towards this end, we shall pay close attention to the development of the concepts of fuzzy sets and fuzzy systems. In this regard, it will be argued that Zadeh had in mind a many valued logic where the connectives are interpreted according to Lukasiewicz and Tarski, whereas Brown's version may be based upon a Boolean-valued logic. Furthermore, we shall have occasion to distinguish between two sources of imprecision in specifying the membership of classes, i.e. conceptual vagueness and imprecision due to inexact measurement. Due to Suppes' work in this field, the latter sort of imprecision may be exemplified by providing a theory of the inexact measurement of subjective probability. Finally, we shall discuss some ways in which these two types of imprecision are intertwined.     

A theorem for Bayesian group decisions

This paper presents a natural extension of Bayesian decision theory from the domain of individual decisions to the domain of group decisions. We assume that each group member accepts the assumptions of subjective expected utility theory with respect to the alternatives from which they must choose, but we do not assume, a priori, that the group as a whole accepts those assumptions. Instead, we impose a multiattribute utility independence condition on the preferences of the group with respect to the expected utilities of its actions as appraised by its members. The result is that the expected utility of an alternative for the group is a weighted average of the expected utilities of that alternative for its members. The weights must be determined collectively by the group. Pareto optimality is not assumed, though the result is consistent with Pareto optimality.     

Probability Weighting in Choice under Risk: An Empirical Test

This paper reports a violation of rank-dependent utility with inverse S-shaped probability weighting for binary gambles. The paper starts with a violation of expected utility theory: one-stage gambles elicit systematically different utilities than theoretically equivalent two-stage gambles. This systematic disparity does not disappear, but becomes more pronounced after correction for inverse S-shaped probability weighting. The data are also inconsistent with configural weight theory and Machina's fanning out hypothesis. Possible explanations for the data are loss aversion and anchoring and insufficient adjustment.     

A new test of convexity–concavity of discount function

Discounted utility theory and its generalizations (e.g., quasihyperbolic discounting, generalized hyperbolic discounting) use discount functions for weighting utilities of outcomes received in different time periods. We propose a new simple test of convexity–concavity of discount function. This test can be used with any utility function (which can be linear or not) and any preferences over risky lotteries (expected utility theory or not). The data from a controlled laboratory experiment show that about one third of experimental subjects reveal a concave discount function and another one third of subjects reveal a convex discount function (for delays up to two month).

     

FAIR DIVISION OF INDIVISIBLE ITEMS

This paper analyzes criteria of fair division of a set of indivisible items among people whose revealed preferences are limited to rankings of the items and for whom no side payments are allowed. The criteria include refinements of Pareto optimality and envy-freeness as well as dominance-freeness, evenness of shares, and two criteria based on equally-spaced surrogate utilities, referred to as maxsum and equimax. Maxsum maximizes a measure of aggregate utility or welfare, whereas equimax lexicographically maximizes persons' utilities from smallest to largest. The paper analyzes conflicts among the criteria along with possibilities and pitfalls of achieving fair division in a variety of circumstances.     

Individual vs. couple behavior: an experimental investigation of risk preferences

In this article, we elicit both individuals’ and couples’ preferences assuming prospect theory (PT) as a general theoretical framework for decision under risk. Our experimental method, based on certainty equivalents, allows to infer measurements of utility and probability weighting at the individual level and at the couple level. Our main results are twofold. First, risk attitude for couples is compatible with PT and incorporates deviations from expected utility similar to those found in individual decision making. Second, couples’ attitudes towards risk are found to be consistent with a mix of individual attitudes, women being more influent on couples’ preferences at low probability levels.     

Demand for health risk reductions: A cross-national comparison between the U.S. and Canada

Using a large stated preference survey conducted across the U.S. and Canada, we assess differences in individual willingness to pay (WTP) for health risk reductions between the two countries. Our utility-theoretic choice model allows for systematically varying marginal utilities for avoided future time in different adverse health states (illness-years, recovered/remission years, and lost life-years). We find significant differences between Canadian and U.S. preferences. WTP also differs systematically with age, gender, education, and marital status, as well as a number of attitudinal and subjective health-perception variables. Age profiles for WTP are markedly different across the two countries. Canadians tend to display flatter age profiles, with peak WTP realized at older ages.     

Mean utility preserving increases in risk for state dependent utility functions

This paper defines the concept of a mean utility preserving spread across states (MUPSAS) for state dependent utility functions and analyzes the behavioural impact of shifts in the probability distribution of wealth across states such that overall mean utility is preserved. The main result provides an alternative way of ranking state dependent utility functions according to their degree of risk aversion (thus extending Kami's theorem of comparative risk aversion) and establishes a link between increases in risk and risk aversion for state dependent preferences. In a portfolio problem where preferences and the rate of return of the risky venture are state dependent, we find sufficient conditions to determine the impact of a MUPSAS on the optimal share of the portfolio invested in the risky asset.

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Persistent mind: The effects of information provision on policy preferences

In constitutional states, representatives exchange information, discuss the budget direction and agree on a budget. The agreement is assumed to hold for one fiscal year. To test the validity of this constitutional assumption, we implemented an online panel survey with a randomized conjoint design three times over one year in Japan to track the direction of respondents’ preferences within a multidimensional public policy space. The policy space consisted of spending on education, infrastructure, health insurance, pensions, and poverty relief programs, as well as fiscal retrenchment. Providing information on the poverty rate in the first wave directed respondents’ preferences toward support for poverty relief programs by either increasing or reallocating the budget. The effects persisted in the second wave 5 months later across a diverse range of respondent backgrounds and political positions. By the third wave one year later, the effects had diminished. Once placed in a multidimensional space, information exchange might have a more extended scope than unidimensional approaches have shown. This finding, we believe, can broaden our capability to implement policies for poverty reduction.