Argumentation in Multi-issue Debates

An axiomatic modeling approach to multi-issue debates is proposed. A debate is viewed as a decision procedure consisting of two stages: (1) an “argumentation rule” determines what arguments are admissible for each party, given the “raw data”, depending on the issue or set of issues under discussion; (2) a “persuasion rule” determines the strength of the admissible arguments and selects the winning party. Persuasion rules are characterized for various alternative specifications of the argumentation rule. These characterizations capture rhetorical effects that we sometimes encounter in real-life multi-issue debates.     

Post-graduate educational requirements and entry into the CPA profession

Forty-one states require educational requirements for CPA licensure to include 30 credit hours beyond the baccalaureate degree. This study, using state-level panel data of CPA examination pass rates, examines two hypothesized effects of this requirement: one, it improves the quality of new CPAs, and two, it restricts entry into the profession reducing the supply of potential CPAs. Empirical findings reveal that raising minimum educational requirements increases the success rate of first-time CPA exam takers, leading to improved entrant quality. However, increased success rates are associated with significant declines in the number of exam takers and, hence, reduced supply. This research is based on a chapter in the author’s dissertation. I thank Bernt Bratsberg for his guidence in conducing this research. Additionally, I thank Don Ballante and Antoinette James Criss for helpful comments on drafts of this paper. Any errors are mine.     

Collective bargaining,teachers, and student achievement

Approximately two-thirds of the nation’s elementary and secondary schoolteachers are represented by the American Federation of Teachers or the National Education Association. Surprisingly, however, relatively little is known of the impact of teachers’ unions on student achievement. The authors offer evidence on this point by estimating “college entrance exam production functions” for a national sample of 2,360 students. Of particular importance, the estimation includes a correction for the selectivity bias inherent if the analysis considers only the performance of test-takers. Results indicate that students in a unionized environment score about 4.7 percent higher on their college entrance exams (SAT and ACT) than their counterparts from a nonunion environment. This study was partially supported by the Joint Council on Economic Education through funding provided by the J. Howard Pew Freedom Trust. Additional support was provided by the Dean’s Office and the Division of Business Research, College of Business and Industry, Mississippi State University. The authors thank Margaret Ray for her assistance.     

Majority voting rules and the union success rate in national labor relations board representation elections

This paper simulates how the union success rate in representation elections would be affected if the NLRB reverted from its current simple-majority voting rule to its original majority-in-unit voting rule. Such a rule change would have altered 21 percent of decertification and 16 percent of certification victories over the period 1977–81, resulting in the loss of 180,400 actual or potential bargaining unit members for the union movement. Abstentions play an important role in election outcomes. Under the present voting rule unions have no clear advantage to “get out the vote” in decertification elections, but a clear disadvantage in certification elections. Under a majority-in-unit rule unions hold an advantage when they “get out the vote” in all representation elections. I would like to thank Mike Bognanno, Jim Dworkin, Paul Schumann, two reviewers, and the editor for helpful comments and David Wilson for excellent research assistance. I would also like to thank the NLRB for providing the election data tape.     

Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? An exploratory panel study

This study is an attempt to empirically detect the public opinion concerning majoritarian approval axiom. A social choice rule respects majoritarian approval iff it chooses only those alternatives which are regarded by a majority of “voters” to be among the “better half” of the candidates available. We focus on three social choice rules, the Majoritarian Compromise, Borda’s Rule and Condorcet’s Method, among which the Majoritarian Compromise is the only social choice rule always respecting majoritarian approval. We confronted each of our 288 subjects with four hypothetical preference profiles of a hypothetical electorate over some abstract set of four alternatives. At each hypothetical preference profile, two representing the preferences of five and two other of seven voters, the subject was asked to indicate, from an impartial viewpoint, which of the four alternatives should be chosen whose preference profile was presented, which if that is unavailable, then which if both of the above are unavailable, and finally which alternative should be avoided especially. In each of these profiles there is a Majoritarian Compromise-winner, a Borda-winner and a Condorcet-winner, and the Majoritarian Compromise-winner is always distinct from both the Borda-winner and the Condorcet-winner, while the Borda- and Condorcet-winners sometimes coincide. If the Borda- and Condorcet-winners coincide then there are two dummy candidates, otherwise only one, and dummies coincide with neither of the Majoritarian Compromise-, Borda- or Condorcet-winner. We presented our subjects with various types of hypothetical preference profiles, some where Borda respecting majoritarian approval, some where it failed to do so, then again for Condorcet, some profiles it respected majoritarian approval and some where it did not. The main thing we wanted to see was whether subjects’ support for Borda and Condorcet was higher when this social choice rule respected majoritarian approval than it did not. Our unambiguous overall empirical finding is that our subjects’ support for Borda and Condorcet was significantly stronger as they respect majoritarian approval.     

The power of a collectivity to act in weighted voting games with many small voters

We analyze the propensity to approve a random proposal of a large committee that makes decisions by weighted voting. The approach is a generalized version of James Coleman’s “power of a collectivity to act”. Throughout the paper it is assumed that the voters are of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of “major” (big) voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of “minor” (small) voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain that asymptotically many minor voters act like a modification of the quota for the vote among major voters. The paper estimates the rate of convergence which turns out to be very high if the weight distribution among the small voters is not too skewed. The results obtained are illustrated by evaluating the decision rules for the Council of Ministers of the EU for various scenarios of EU enlargement. I wish to thank Matthew Braham, Sidartha Gordon, Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Choosing subsets: a size-independent probabilistic model and the quest for a social welfare ordering

“Subset voting” denotes a choice situation where one fixed set of choice alternatives (candidates, products) is offered to a group of decision makers, each of whom is requested to pick a subset containing any number of alternatives. In the context of subset voting we merge three choice paradigms, “approval voting“ from political science, the “weak utility model” from mathematical psychology, and “social welfare orderings” from social choice theory. We use a probabilistic choice model proposed by Falmagne and Regenwetter (1996) built upon the notion that each voter has a personal ranking of the alternatives and chooses a subset at the top of the ranking. Using an extension of Sen's (1966) theorem about value restriction, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for this empirically testable choice model to yield a social welfare ordering. Furthermore, we develop a method to compute Borda scores and Condorcet winners from subset choice probabilities. The technique is illustrated on an election of the Mathematical Association of America (Brams, 1988). Received: 18 August 1995 / Accepted: 13 February 1997     

Free agents’ impact on the labor market for baseball players

This paper evaluates the 1976 free agent rule’s impact on the labor market for baseball players. Free agency has specific consequences for monopsonistic exploitation and racial discrimination in salary determination. It reduces monopsonistic exploitation for all players and increases salary opportunities for black and Latino players. However, this change in a player’s status vis-à-vis a team has generated salary disparities among players based, not on race, but bargaining position. I would like to thank Linda Kammann, Mary O’Brien, and Benjamin Preston for their research assistance. Also I wish to thank John Siegfried and an anonymous referee for their comments. I remain solely responsible for the contents of this paper.     

On the equilibrium of voting games with abstention and several levels of approval

We study the core of “(j, k) simple games”, where voters choose one level of approval from among j possible levels, partitioning the society into j coalitions, and each possible partition facing k levels of approval in the output (Freixas and Zwicker in Soc Choice Welf 21:399–431, 2003). We consider the case of (j, 2) simple games, including voting games in which each voter may cast a “yes” or “no” vote, or abstain (j = 3). A necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core of such games is provided, with an important application to weighted symmetric (j, 2) simple games. These results generalize the literature, and provide a characterization of constitutions under which a society would allow a given number of candidates to compete for leadership without running the risk of political instability. We apply these results to well-known voting systems and social choice institutions including the relative majority rule, the two-thirds relative majority rule, the United States Senate, and the United Nations Security Council.     

Toward a reflexive sociology

Gouldner’s call for a “reflexive sociology” in 1970 remains a largely unexamined idea, yet with the breakdown of functionalism’s begemony and the present ferment in theory its time may finally have come. In attempting to clarify and reconstruct Gouldner’s idea, I begin with his concepts “background assumptions” and “domain assumptions,” linking them with Kubn’s ideas. Employing levels of abstraction to approach Gouldner’s material systematically, I proceed to develop and illustrate two contrasting background assumptions or world hypotheses: “stratification” and “interaction.” Finally, I examine some methodological implications of these world views, centering on defining problems, ratio scales and images of measurement, sampling and multivariate-analysis procedures. Introduced to sociology by C. Wright Mills, Bernard Phillips studied with Robin N. Williams, Jr. and taught at the University of North Carolina and the University of Illinois (where he overlapped with Alvin W. Gouldner for a year) before coming to Boston University. A cofounder of the ASA section, Sociological Practice, Phillips’ interests are in Societal Change, Theory and Methods.     

Money-egalitarian-equivalent and gain-maximin allocations of indivisible items with monetary compensation

Suppose that a certain quantity M of money and a finite number of indivisible items are to be distributed among n people, all of whom have equal claims on the whole. Different allocations are presented using various criteria of fairness in the special case where each player's utility function is additively separable. An allocation is “money-egalitarian-equivalent” (MEE) if each player's monetary valuation of his or her bundle is a fixed constant. We show that there is an essentially unique allocation that is MEE and Pareto-optimal; it is also envy-free. Alternatively, the “gain” of a player may be defined as the difference between how the player evaluates his bundle and an exact nth part of the whole according to his numerical evaluation of the whole. A “gain-maximin” criterion would maximize the minimum gain obtained by any player. We show that Knaster's procedure finds an allocation which is optimal under the gain-maximin criterion. That allocation is not necessarily envy-free, so we also find the envy-free allocation that is optimal under the gain-maximin criterion among all envy-free allocations. It turns out that, even though there exist allocations that are simultaneously envy-free and Pareto-optimal, this optimal allocation may fail to be Pareto-optimal, and it may also violate monotonicity criteria. Received: 30 September 1996/Accepted: 6 March 2002 The author would like to thank Professor William Thomson for a discussion on this subject; and he would like to thank the anonymous referees, who made many substantive suggestions for improving this paper – shortening it, streamlining the arguments, improving the terminology, making further ties with the literature, and improving the exposition.     

Reelection threshold contracts in politics

We propose to supplement the democratic election mechanism by threshold contracts. A threshold contract stipulates a performance level that a politician must reach in order to obtain the right to stand for reelection. “Read my lips” turns into “read my contract”. Politicians can offer threshold contracts during their campaigns. Equilibrium threshold contracts are welfare improving and do not violate the liberal principle of free and anonymous elections in democracies. We would like to thank Johannes Becker, Peter Bernholz, Robert Dur, Joao E. Gata, Volker Hahn, Susanne Lohmann, Christian Schultz, Otto H. Swank, Heinrich Ursprung, conference participants at the annual meeting of the Public Choice Society 2000, the European meeting of the Econometric Society 2001 and the annual congress of the European Economic Association 2001 in Lausanne, seminar participants in Heidelberg and Mannheim and the referee for valuable suggestions and comments. Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Games implementing the stable rule of marriage problems in strong Nash equilibria

In a marriage problem, we introduce a condition called “exclusive matchability (EM)”: the condition mainly says that each pair of a man and a woman can choose to be a matching pair regardless of others' actions. This condition is essential to strong Nash implementation of the stable rule. We show that any mechanism which satisfies exclusive matchability implements the stable rule in strong Nash equilibria. Received: 17 May 1999/Accepted: 30 August 2001 I would like to thank anonymous referees for their helpful comments. Financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada is gratefully acknowledged.     

Nash implementable domains for the Borda count

We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satisfies Maskin monotonicity. The basic concept is the notion of a “cyclic permutation domain” which arises by fixing one particular ordering of alternatives and including all its cyclic permutations. The cyclic permutation domains are exactly the maximal domains on which the Borda count is strategy-proof when combined with every possible tie breaking rule. It turns out that the Borda count is monotonic on a larger class of domains. We show that the maximal domains on which the Borda count satisfies Maskin monotonicity are the “cyclically nested permutation domains” which are obtained from the cyclic permutation domains in an appropriately specified recursive way. We thank József Mala for posing the question of Nash implementability on restricted domains that led to this research. We are very grateful to two anonymous referees and an associate editor for their helpful comments and suggestions. The second author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA) through the Bolyai János research fellowship.     

Recent trends in public support for unions in Canada

This paper investigates trends in public support for unionism during the 1980s. Comparing data from two western Canadian cities in 1981 and 1987, we examine the impact of the recession of the early 1980s on public perceptions of the role of unions, whether the differences between cities documented during 1981 had increased or decreased by 1987, and if “hard times” had resulted in more nonunion employees expressing a willingness to join a union. There is little evidence of growing support for negative “big labor” opinions about unions in the two cities. Despite a well-publicized labor dispute involving the use of strikebreakers in one city, there was no increase in support for legislation restricting the practice. Residents in the same city, however, were significantly more likely to agree with “business unionism” sentiments, an opinion trend accompanied by a growing willingness to join a union. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meetings of the Western Association of Sociology & Anthropology, February 1988, Edmonton. We thank the Population Research Laboratory at the University of Alberta and Dr. Raymond Currie, Department of Sociology, University of Manitoba, for making available results of the 1981 and 1987 Edmonton and Winnipeg Area Studies. We also acknowledge the research assistance provided by Alan Law and Mary Thompson, and the word processing done by Linda Abbott.     

The topological approach to the aggregation of preferences

(1) A domain of preferences allows for topological aggregation for each number of people if and only if this domain of preferences is contractible. (2) The combination of continuity and the Pareto principle implies the existence of a unique manipulator. (3) Arrow’s theorem can be translated into the previous statement. All of these results are obtained via algebraic topology. This paper introduces some of the tools developed in topology and applies them upon the problem of preference aggregation. This paper is based upon a lecture given at the conference “Mathematical aspects of social choice”, CREM, Université de Caen and CNRS, November 8–10, 2004. I thank the organizers Maurice Salles and Vincent Merlin for their warm hospitality, and the participants for the stimulating discussion. I am indebted to Bart Capéau and Roeland Vervenne for helpful remarks. I thank the referee for combining speed and quality.     

Measuring autonomy freedom

In the measurement of autonomy freedom, the admissible potential preference relations are elicited by means of the concept of ‘reasonableness’. In this paper we argue for an alternative criterion based on information about the decision maker’s ‘awareness’ of his available opportunities. We argue that such an interpretation of autonomy fares better than that based on reasonableness. We then introduce some axioms that capture this intuition and study their logical implications. In the process, a new measure of autonomy freedom is characterized, which generalizes some of the measures so far constructed in the literature.We thank Martin van Hees, Robert Sugden, Prasanta Pattanaik, the participants at workshops at the CPNSS, London School of Economics, and at the University of Caen and an anonymous referee for their suggestions. The support of the CPNSS is gratefully acknowledged. This paper is part of a research project on “The Analysis and Measurement of Freedom” funded by the Ministero dell’Istruzione, Università e Ricerca (Italy). Its financial support is gratefully acknowledged.     

From the culture of poverty to the underclass: An analysis of a shift in public language

This paper focuses on the emergence of the “underclass,” and the decline of the “culture of poverty,” as terminologies used in scholarly and popular analysis of certain lowincome groups in American society. It is argued that the theoretical cores of these two concepts are similar but not identical, and that a shift in “public language” has occurred. This shift represents the most recent chapter in the historical process of word substitution that Matza (1966) claims has characterized society’s response to the disreputable poor. The factors responsible for this shift are analyzed, and the consequent potential for miscommunication is highlighted. where his research interests include poverty policy and program evaluation. He is the author (with John B. Williamson) ofPoverty and Public Policy (1986). This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, August 1986. I wish to thank the anonymous reviewers ofThe American Sociologist for their thoughtful comments and suggestions.     

The Short and Long-Run Labor Market Effects of Age Eligibility Rules: Evidence from Women’s Professional Tennis

Age is often used in law and public policy as a low-cost proxy for competency, maturity, and ability. Age is also used in numerous sport (and non-sport) labor markets to determine workplace eligibility. We exploit the enactment of the women’s professional tennis minimum age rule (AR) in 1995 to estimate the effects of ARs on short-run and long-run labor market outcomes. We find very limited evidence that the AR has had any systematic beneficial effect on players’ career longevity or success. Our results suggest that sport governing bodies should (re-)evaluate the efficacy and necessity of “one size fits all” age eligibility rules.     

Assessing the Regional Economic Impact of Higher Education Institutions: An Application to the University of Cardiff

I evaluate the regional and local economic impact of the University of Cardiff, dividing its effects into two major sides: expenditure impacts and knowledge impacts. I review the major tools and methodologies available in the literature to assess the two sides. The expenditure impact in the financial year 2000–2001 is measured through a Keynesian multiplier model developed by the Centre for Advanced Studies in Social Sciences, Cardiff University, in order to compare that same impact in the 1994–1995 financial year. The university’s knowledge impact is assessed through two main variables: (1) employment and destination of graduates, or people impact, and (2) kind of knowledge produced. Cardiff University’s graduates enjoy full-employment, and according to our conceptual framework, Cardiff’s higher education system is classified as “nonactive” positional competition and “social” knowledge production.