GRAVITY REDUX: MEASURING INTERNATIONAL TRADE COSTS WITH PANEL DATA

Barriers to international trade are known to be large but because of data limitations it is hard to measure them directly for a large number of countries over many years. To address this problem, I derive a micro‐founded measure of bilateral trade costs that indirectly infers trade frictions from observable trade data. I show that this trade cost measure is consistent with a broad range of leading trade theories including Ricardian and heterogeneous firms models. In an application I show that U.S. trade costs with major trading partners declined on average by about 40 between 1970 and 2000, with Mexico and Canada experiencing the biggest reductions. (JEL F10, F15)     

HIERARCHICAL TRADE

Commodity trading is typically organized hierarchically: Large‐scale trade takes place at the global price system while individuals trade at local price systems within their countries. Agencies or trading houses establish the link between these different market places. In this paper, we devise a framework to study this type of hierarchical trade. We identify the free trade and the autarky equilibrium as polar cases. We show that no other two‐stage market equilibria exist if the commodity space is two‐dimensional. An example demonstrates that other, so‐called intermediate equilibria exist for three‐dimensional commodity spaces. We then provide an explicit construction of special classes of intermediate equilibria. Moreover, we study the consequences when some countries control the agency that organizes trade at the global level and we analyze the role of international goods arbitrage. Finally, we show that profit‐maximizing agencies may not promote free trade outcomes. (JEL D43, D50, F10)     

DETERMINANTS OF TRADE AND SPECIALIZATION IN THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO‐OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT COUNTRIES

This paper empirically investigates the relative importance of productivity, factor endowments, trade costs, and tastes in determining the current pattern of trade and specialization. The results show that productivity and taste differences are the first and second most significant determinants of trade and specialization. Factor endowments are the least influential for the average country in the data set, but their effects are much greater in the poorer than richer countries. The results also show the substantial role of trade costs, which is amplified through interactions with other determinants of trade. Trade costs affect the relative costs of intermediate inputs and final goods, link preferences with specialization, and reduce the geographical range of comparative advantages. (JEL F1, F10)     

TRADE ADJUSTMENT,POLITICAL PRESSURE,AND TRADE PROTECTION PATTERNS

This paper introduces trade adjustment considerations as active determinants of trade policy. Using novel U.S. data sets, I show that, despite their small monetary value, trade‐induced unemployment and trade‐adjustment costs can incite an incumbent politician to grant protection to an unorganized industry, even in the presence of political pressure by organized sectors. This finding complements the theoretical predictions from Grossman and Helpman (American Economic Review, 84, 1994, 833–50) who argue that the government should protect organized industries but should subsidize imports in unorganized sectors. (JEL D73, F13, F14, F16, J68)     

DOES THE VAT TAX EXPORTS?

While a VAT should in principle be neutral with respect to international trade, it may in practice function as a tax on exporters' input purchases if firms receive incomplete VAT refunds. Using data for over 100 countries that span the majority of historical VAT adoption episodes, this paper finds that—consistent with this hypothesis—the VAT reduces the exports of an industry with a 10 percentage point higher intermediate goods share of output by over 8% relative to an industry with a lower share. This effect is driven by developing countries and is absent for high-income countries. (JEL F13, F14, H25, H87, O11)     

TRADE COSTS AND JOB FLOWS: EVIDENCE FROM ESTABLISHMENT‐LEVEL DATA

Changes in the costs of trading inputs or final goods affect establishment‐level job flows. Using a longitudinal database containing the universe of manufacturing establishments in California from 1992 to 2004, we find that a decline in input or final‐good trade costs is associated with job destruction in the least productive establishments, job creation in the most productive establishments, and an increase in the death likelihood of the least productive establishments. The evidence is consistent with predictions of models of trade with heterogeneous firms. Additionally, the evidence shows that the effects of input trade costs on establishment‐level job flows are larger than the effects of final‐good trade costs. (JEL F14, F16)     

CAN TRADE REALLY HURT? AN EMPIRICAL FOLLOW‐UP ON SAMUELSON'S CONTROVERSIAL PAPER

This paper investigates Samuelson's [Samuelson, P. A. “Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut and Confirm Arguments of Mainstream Economists Supporting Globalization.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18(3), 2004, 135–46] argument that technical progress of the trade partner may hurt the home country. We illustrate this prospect in a simple Ricardian model for situations with outward knowledge spillovers. Within this framework Samuelson's Act II effects may occur. Based on industry level panel data for 17 OECD countries for the period 1973–2000 we show econometrically that the outflow of domestic knowledge via exports or foreign direct investment (FDI) to the rest of the world may have a negative impact on industry output in the home country. This is particularly so when exporting to technologically less advanced countries and, more specifically, China. (JEL F10, F11, F14, O30)     

THE HOME MARKET EFFECT IN INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRADE

I show that military spending contributes to international arms proliferation through a push effect: large demand encourages production growth in the domestic market if transport costs are non‐negligible. Under increasing returns to scale, the country can then supply weapons on the global market at low prices. This is a manifestation of the home market effect (HME), which states that countries with higher demand for a differentiated good will be net exporters of that good. I construct a monopolistic competition model of international trade that accounts for differences in demand across countries, and test its predictions using post‐Cold War data. (JEL F1, H5, R1)     

FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AS DYNAMIC FARSIGHTED NETWORKS

In the presence of multilateral negotiations, are Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) necessary for, or will they prevent, global free trade? I answer this question using a dynamic farsighted model of network formation among asymmetric countries. Ultimately, FTAs prevent global free trade when there are two larger countries and one smaller country but FTAs can be necessary for global free trade when there are two smaller countries and one larger country. The model provides insights into the dynamics of recent real‐world negotiations and recent results in the literature on the empirical determinants of trade agreements. (JEL C71, F12, F13)     

TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND CORPORATE INCOME TAX AVOIDANCE

We identify the effect of trade liberalization on corporate income tax avoidance in a sample of Chinese manufacturing firms, taking advantage of China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). We find that firms engage in more tax avoidance in industries with larger tariff reductions. Further analysis shows that firms with a lack of cash or a high demand for cash before WTO entry tend to engage in more tax avoidance after WTO entry. Our study also provides evidence that manipulating costs is one way that firms avoid corporate income tax. (JEL D22, F61, F63, H26)     

STUDYING THE EFFECTS OF HOUSEHOLD AND FIRM CREDIT ON THE TRADE BALANCE: THE COMPOSITION OF FUNDS MATTERS

In this article, we focus on distinguishing between household and corporate sector credit and investigate the effects these two types of credit have on the trade balance. A higher level of private credit indicates better developed financial markets and easier credit access for businesses and households. Yet, both types of borrowers vary in terms of the use of credit. Our model and empirical analysis suggest that the composition of credit does matter for the trade balance: lending to consumers has a negative effect on net exports, while firm loans contribute to a rise in net exports . ( JEL F32, F41, G21)     

INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY AND TRADE: WHICH INSTITUTIONS? WHICH TRADE?

Using a panel of countries over 1990–2000, this paper examines the extent to which different dimensions of the institutional framework affect total exports, exports of manufactured goods, and exports of nonmanufactured goods. It is observed that exports of manufactured goods are positively affected by the quality of institutions but neither total exports nor nonmanufactured exports. The latter may even correlate negatively with the quality of institutions. The results are robust to estimation methods. ( JEL F14, F15, O17)     

THE IMPORTANCE OF TRADE COSTS IN DEVIATIONS FROM THE LAW‐OF‐ONE‐PRICE: ESTIMATES BASED ON THE DIRECTION OF TRADE

The full impact of trade costs in segmenting product markets cannot be captured by considering aggregate prices or in the absence of information on the direction of trade. We address this problem by utilizing product‐specific prices, cross‐sectional productivity indices, and bilateral trade flows, allowing us to identify the probable source of any one product. We show that trade costs in the form of transportation and distribution costs are important in determining international price differences and segmenting international markets. Physical distance relative to the origin has a precisely estimated positive impact on international deviations from the Law‐of‐One‐Price that is larger than estimates that do not account for the origin of each product. Based on our benchmark estimates, the price elasticity of distance was around 10% in 1990. (JEL F4)     

FINANCIAL CONTAGION ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE NETWORK

We combine data on international trade linkages with a network approach to map the global trading system as an interdependent complex network. This enables us to obtain indicators of how well connected a country is into the global trading system. We use these network‐based measures of connectedness to explain stock market returns during recent episodes of financial crisis. We find that a crisis is amplified if the epicenter country is better integrated into the trade network. However, target countries affected by such a shock are in turn better able to dissipate the impact if they are well integrated into the network. A network approach can help explain why the Mexican, Asian, and Russian financial crises were highly contagious, while the crises that originated in Venezuela and Argentina did not have such a virulent effect. We suggest that a network approach incorporating the cascading and diffusion of interdependent ripples when a shock hits a specific part of the global trade network provides us with an improved explanation of financial contagion. (JEL F10, F36, F40, G15)     

INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS AND THE VOLATILITY OF TRADE

Were the large import fluctuations around the 2007–2009 recession because of increasing trade volatility? I show that import volatility relative to gross domestic product (GDP) increased in the 2000s and examine whether vertical specialization (VS) trade can explain this increase. I develop and calibrate a model of VS trade that generates most of the observed increase in relative import volatility from the 1960s to the 2000s. The increase is because of GDP's shift to less volatile services production. VS trade has a negligible impact. VS causes trade to fall more in recession but also increases the share of output that is traded, leaving volatility unaffected. It increases volatility by shifting trade to more volatile sectors, but this effect is quantitatively small. (JEL E3, F1)     

WHEN IS TRADE PROTECTION GOOD FOR GROWTH?

The empirical relationship between trade protection and economic growth is surprisingly fragile, as shown in a number of other papers. We address one possible explanation for these findings: that the relationship is contingent on the pattern of comparative advantage, following the endogenous growth literature. Our findings suggest that such contingencies do in fact exist—in particular, the correlation between tariffs and growth is strong and positive for skill‐abundant countries—and are robust to the choice of control variables. (JEL F13, F43, O19, O24)     

THE WELFARE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION

This paper analyzes the distributional welfare impact of trade liberalization reforms on heterogeneous households. We develop a static applied general equilibrium model, and using a Social Accounting Matrix and Household Expenditure Survey, we calibrate it to match Slovenian data. We simulate the case of Slovenia joining the EU and quantify its welfare impact on households that differ in terms of age, income, and education. Additionally, we compare this benchmark case with two alternative scenarios: (1) a free trade agreement between Slovenia and the EU and (2) a custom union arrangement where tariff revenues are rebated proportionally to the households. We find that while trade liberalization leads to falling consumer prices, increased production in the export sectors, and aggregate welfare gains, the differentiated welfare impacts across heterogeneous households vary in their degrees. (JEL D58, F14, F15)     

DO TERRORIST ATTACKS IMPACT EXCHANGE RATE BEHAVIOR? NEW INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE

This study examines whether terrorist attacks affect bilateral exchange rates. Using historical 10‐minute exchange rate data for 21 countries' currency vis‐à‐vis the U.S. dollar, we show that exchange rate returns of all countries are statistically significantly affected by terrorist attacks. Some exchange rates appreciate and some depreciate following a terrorist attack, some currencies experience exchange rate reversals while others experience a persistent effect. Generally, the effect declines but persists as terrorist attacks become stale information. (JEL F31, F37)     

ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF THE TIMING OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT FORMATIONS AND ENLARGEMENTS

Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have proliferated over the past 60 years. While a small number of recent studies have examined empirically the economic determinants of the likelihood of a pair of countries having a PTA, this study explains empirically the timing of all PTA formations and enlargements from 1950 through 2006 using duration analysis. Our main and novel goal is to predict (in‐ and out‐of‐sample) a substantive share of these 1,560 PTA events using a parsimonious model with mainly economic variables, taking selection dynamics into account. Our analysis reveals that we can predict correctly in‐sample the actual year of entry into force for 26% of the 1,560 bilateral PTA formations/enlargements in the period 1950–2006 among 10,518 pairings of 146 countries using only a few economic and political variables. Moreover, we can predict correctly in‐sample 57% of these PTA events within a 10‐year window leading up to the event using this model. The model also performs well out‐of‐sample for the near term (82%), but not if the out‐of‐sample period is very long. We conclude with an evaluation of the model's ability to predict the timing of the North American Free Trade Agreement, the European Union's formation and enlargements, and the model's ten most likely post‐2006 PTA events. (JEL F14, F15)     

COTTON IN A FREE TRADE WORLD

Trade liberalizing reform in the world cotton market would increase world cotton traded an average 2.69% over 5 yr and increase world cotton prices to an average 10.5%. A partial equilibrium model was used to estimate the effects of removing global domestic subsidies and border tariffs for cotton. Trade flows in international markets would be affected as U.S. market share of world cotton exports decline, net cotton-importing countries with minimum domestic and trade distortions import less because of higher cotton prices, and net cotton-importing countries that subsidize domestic production and/or impose border tariffs significantly increase their imports. ( JEL F17, F42, F47, O2)