DOES RAIDING EXPLAIN THE NEGATIVE RETURNS TO FACULTY SENIORITY?

We track faculty for 30 yr at five PhD‐granting departments of economics. Two‐thirds of faculty who take alternative employment move downward; less than one‐quarter moves upward. We find a substantial penalty for seniority, even after richly controlling for faculty productivity, and the penalty is little changed when we allow wages and returns to seniority to differ by mobility status. Faculty who end up moving to better or comparable positions were penalized as severely for seniority while they were in our sample as faculty who stay. These results are incompatible with the raiding hypothesis. Faculty from top 10 programs are also punished for seniority but to a lesser degree than other faculty, which could reflect reduced monopsony power against such faculty if they are more marketable. All results persist when we control for prospective publications and allow lower returns for older publications. Match‐quality bias has dissipated in the post‐internet period, which may be the consequence of greater availability of information. (JEL J62, J44, J42)     

The publishing of recent economics Ph.D. recipients

We present publication data for recent graduates of 50 economics Ph.D. programs. The data show that publishing output is highly concentrated among graduates of the top programs; the top three programs, for example, generate more than 25% of aggregate publishing output in our sample. We use the data to construct a set of program rankings based on both per capita and aggregate graduate publication and a comparison of faculty performance to graduate performance. The graduate/faculty comparison reveals that programs may be identical in the output of their faculties but starkly different in the output of their graduates.     

WHICH JOURNAL RANKINGS BEST EXPLAIN ACADEMIC SALARIES? EVIDENCE FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

The ranking of an academic journal is important to authors, universities, journal publishers, and research funders. Rankings are gaining prominence as countries adopt regular research assessment exercises that especially reward publication in high‐impact journals. Yet even within a rankings‐oriented discipline like economics there is no agreement on how aggressively lower‐ranked journals are down‐weighted and in how wide is the universe of journals considered. Moreover, since it is typically less costly for authors to cite superfluous references, whether of their own volition or prompted by editors, than it is to ignore relevant ones, rankings based on citations may be easily manipulated. In contrast, when the merits of publication in one journal or another are debated during hiring, promotion, and salary decisions, the evaluators are choosing over actions with costly consequences. We therefore look to the academic labor market, using data on economists in the University of California system to relate their lifetime publications in 700 different academic journals to salary. We test amongst various sets of journal rankings, and publication discount rates, to see which are most congruent with the returns implied by the academic labor market. (JEL A14, I23, J44)     

IS PEER REVIEW IN DECLINE?

Over the past decade, there has been a decline in the fraction of papers in top economics journals written by economists from the highest‐ranked economics departments. This paper documents this fact and uses additional data on publications and citations to assess various potential explanations. Several observations are consistent with the hypothesis that the Internet improves the ability of high‐profile authors to disseminate their research without going through the traditional peer‐review process. (JEL A14, O30)     

CITATIONS OR JOURNAL QUALITY: WHICH IS REWARDED MORE IN THE ACADEMIC LABOR MARKET?

Research quality can be evaluated from citations or from the prestige of journals publishing the research. We relate salary of tenured University of California (UC) economists to their lifetime publications of 5,500 articles and to the 140,000 citations to these articles. Citations hardly affect salary, especially in top‐ranked UC departments where impacts of citations are less than one‐tenth those of journals. In lower ranked departments, and when journal quality is less comprehensively measured, effects of citations on salary increase. If journal quality is just measured by counting articles in journal tiers, apparent effects of citations are overstated. (JEL A14, J44)     

Objective and Reputational Rankings of Ph.D.-Granting Departments of Sociology, 1965–1982

Abstract

From its inception in 1965 until 1975 when it stopped publishing such studies, The American Sociologist (TAS) published numerous quality rankings of Ph.D.-granting sociology departments and several articles that compared different rankings. During these years TAS published far more rankings of sociology departments than did any other journal This article reviews these studies as well as the rankings of sociology departments found in three major multi-disciplinary rankings (Cartter, 1966; Roose and Andersen, 1970; Jones, Lindzey, and Coggeshall, 1982). It discusses the major methodological approaches used in these studies and reviews the debate among scholars regarding the most appropriate ways to rank departments. An analysis of the various objective and subjective rankings reveals that there is an elite group of seven departments that consistently rank at the top regardless of the ranking method employed.     

ON THE SEARCH FOR TALENT IN ACADEMIC LABOR MARKETS: EASILY OBSERVABLE LATER‐GRADUATE STUDY OUTCOMES AS PREDICTORS OF EARLY‐CAREER PUBLISHING,PLACEMENT, AND TENURE

Three easily observed later‐graduate study outcomes, working with a prominent advisor, publishing while in graduate school, and coauthoring with the advisor are demonstrated to be significant determinants of early‐career publishing success for a sample of nearly 3,000 Ph.D. recipients from more than 100 domestic programs between 1990 and 1993. Out‐of‐sample predictions for 681 Ph.D. recipients from the class of 1994 indicate that these easily observed later‐graduate study signals dramatically improve our ability to forecast which students become prolific and which students fail to publish more than one article. Analyzing initial domestic tenure‐track economics placements indicates that hiring departments placed far more emphasis on Ph.D. program pedigree, leading to an initial tenure rate of less than 50% but eventually nearly three‐fourths currently hold tenured positions in the United States. (JEL J24, J44)     

THE EVOLUTION OF THE SCIENTIFIC PRODUCTIVITY OF HIGHLY PRODUCTIVE ECONOMISTS

This paper studies the evolution of research productivity of a sample of economists working in the best 81 departments in the world in 2007. The main novelty is that, in so far as a productivity distribution can be identified with an income distribution, we measure productivity mobility in a dynamic context using an indicator inspired in an income mobility index suggested by Fields (2010) for a two‐period world. Productivity is measured in terms of publications, weighted by the citation impact of the journals where each article is published in the periodical literature. We study the evolution of average productivity, productivity inequality, the extent of rank reversals, and productivity mobility for seven cohorts, as well as the population as a whole. We offer new evidence confirming previous results about the heterogeneity of the evolution of productivity for top and other researchers. However, the major result is that—contrary to what was expected—for our sample of very highly productive scholars the effect of rank reversals between the two periods on overall productivity mobility offsets the effect of an increase in productivity inequality from the first to the second period in the youngest five out of seven cohorts. (JEL A11, A12, B41, D63, I32)     

TRENDS IN RANKINGS OF ECONOMICS DEPARTMENTS IN THE U.S.: AN UPDATE

Economics departments in the U.S. are ranked based on (1) the number of pages published in thirty-six economics journals, (2) publications in five of the top journals, (3) output per faculty member, and (4) an index of the concentration of research in a department. Evidence shows that the top twenty departments have generally retained their positions since the 1970s, but rather large changes have occurred in departments ranked from 240 to 100. An "Economists Hall of Fame" is developed listing the top fifty individual producers of research in the thirty-six journal set and the top five journals.     

TOPICS AND GEOGRAPHICAL DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE IN TOP ECONOMIC JOURNALS

We study the evolution of topics in economics and their geographical specialization by analyzing 13,233 papers from seven top journals between 1985 and 2012 and their forward citations. The share of U.S. publications declines from 75% to 64% with a corresponding increase of the European share from 12% to 24%. We use topic modeling and document the evolution of the discipline over 27 years. We estimate, with a quasi‐structural model, the citation lag distribution for 18 different topics and three large geographical areas. The modal citation lag is about 6.7 years in the entire sample and 4.8 years for citations from the top 100 journals. We quantify (1) the home bias effect in citations, (2) how it fades away over time, (3) the long lasting impact of U.S. publications vis‐à‐vis other geographical areas, and (4) the higher speed of diffusion and faster obsolescence in the United States. (JEL A14, I23, O33, A11)     

YOUR RIGHT ARM FOR A PUBLICATION IN AER?

The time tradeoff (TTO) method is popular in medical decision making for valuing health states. We use it to elicit economists' preferences for publishing in top economic journals and for living without limbs. The economists value journal publications highly and have a clear preference among them, with the American Economic Review (AER) the most preferred. Their responses imply they would sacrifice more than half a thumb for an AER publication. These TTO results are consistent with ranking and willingness to pay results, and indicate that journal preferences are not entirely determined by impact factors or by expectations of a salary increase following a publication in a prestigious journal. (JEL A10, B41, I10)     

Regional mobility of economists

We find that nearly two- thirds of economists move to a different region of the U.S. or to a foreign country to accept their first job after receiving the Ph.D., that the South is the only net importer of economists among regions of the U.S., that the Midwest is the major net exporter, and that the proportion of graduates accepting foreign employment doubled during the 1980s. Gender and field of specialization do not affect mobility; however, doctorates from the top graduate schools and those accepting academic and government jobs are more likely to change regions than are graduates of lower ranked schools or those who are employed in the private sector.     

DIFFERENCES IN CITATION PATTERNS ACROSS JOURNAL TIERS: THE CASE OF ECONOMICS

We study how citation patterns differ between journal tiers in economics by analyzing citations patterns of more than 6,000 research articles published in top five, second tier, and top field economics journals. We find that top five journals' articles receive more citations and that the life cycles of those citations are longer. However, their influence (in term of citations) is overestimated: in its first twenty years since publication, the median top five article accumulates 4.25 as many citations when compared to non-top five median articles. This ratio is strongly associated with the field of economics research and with articles' impact. (JEL A14)     

Unions and productivity: Evidence from academe

In order to test competing hypotheses about the effect of unions on labor productivity, we examine research performance in a sample of 889 Ph.D.-granting departments (175 unionized) in public universities. We find no support for the hypothesis that unions enhance productivity in academe. If we compare union and nonunion departments endowed with (sample) mean amounts of labor and capital, we find that unionization is associated with a 17 percent reduction in output of published articles and a 9 percent reduction in peers’ survey evaluations of a department’s level of scholarly achievement.     

A longitudinal assessment of productivity in prominent sociology journals and departmental prestige

This paper tests the theory of cumulative advantage and disadvantage as it applies to the productivity and prestige of academic departments within sociology. The theory suggests that past perceptions of departmental prestige and cumulative records of faculty productivity are of greater significance than more recent levels of productivity in determining their perceived level of eminence within the discipline; a phenomenon due to the accumulation of past performance and recognition over time. The paper employs two widely disseminated measures of departmental eminence: the 1966 Cartter Report rankings and the 1982 Conference Boards assessments. Measures of departmental productivity are derived from cumulative publication histories of departments between 1936 and 1989 in three preeminent sociological journals; namely, theAmerican Sociological Review, American Journal of Sociology, andSocial Forces. The paper finds that while past accomplishments do not bear importantly on current perceptions of departmental prestige after controlling for the level of productivity maintained during the preceding decade, prior perceptions of prestige are strongly associated with current rankings. In addition, past perceptions of academic prestige are found to be highly stable, thereby creating the potential for a stratification hierarchy that allows for little mobility over time.     

Frequency of Citations as Criterion for the Ranking of Departments, Journals, and Individuals

Interest in the structure and dynamics of sociology as a discipline has led to recurrent attempts to measure the prestige, productivity, and quality of education of the various sociology departments. While several previous papers have suggested the potential value of the Science Citation Index (SCI) as a measure of scientific standing, few attempts have been made to utilize a citation-based measure of scientific prestige. This paper considers the meaning of the citation in science and in stratification theory. Procedures are described whereby citations to individual sociologists and journals are employed to yield rankings of departments of sociology and journals. The differences between these rankings and other rankings are discussed.     

RANKING LAW JOURNALS AND THE LIMITS OF JOURNAL CITATION REPORTS

Journal rankings published by Journal Citation Reports (JCR) are widely used to assess research quality, which influences important decisions by academic departments, universities, and countries in the allocation of research funds. We study refereed law journal rankings by JCR and Washington and Lee Law Library (W&L). JCR's rankings are uncorrelated with W&L's. The differences appear to be attributable to underrepresentation of law journals in JCR's database. We illustrate the effects of database bias on rankings through case studies of three elite journals, the Journal of Law and Economics, Supreme Court Review, and the American Law and Economics Review. (JEL C18, C81, Y10)     

The problem of the 21st century: Economics faculty and the color line

With historical data on black economist hirings in Ph.D. granting economics programs and the supply of new black economics doctorates in the United States, this paper examines the conventional pipeline explanation for the dearth of blacks on economics faculties. Parameter estimates from count data specifications of a demand–supply relationship reveal that increases in the supply of new black economics doctorates do not increase, but instead decrease the likelihood of a Ph.D. granting economics department hiring black economists. Our results suggest that black economists are underrepresented on the faculties of Ph.D. granting economics departments by at least a factor of two. Instead of there simply being too few blacks earning economics doctorates to fill faculty jobs—the so-called pipeline problem—there appears to be a “color line” problem in that race explains the underrepresentation of blacks on the economics faculties of Ph.D. granting departments in the U.S.     

DO SOCIAL PREFERENCES INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY? FIELD EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM FISHERMEN IN TOYAMA BAY

In addition to showing that student measures of social preference, a concern for outcomes achieved by other reference agents, are quite different from those obtained in the field with participants who face social dilemmas in their daily lives, we find links between the social preferences of our field participants and their productivity at work. We also find that the field stock of social preferences evolves endogenously with respect to how widely team production is utilized. Because the link between productivity and social preference is strong, we provide a reason for the wider economics profession to take notice of social preferences. (JEL C93, D21, D24, H41, J24, M52, Z13)