THE COMBINED EFFECT OF SALARY RESTRICTIONS AND REVENUE SHARING IN SPORTS LEAGUES

Many major sports leagues are characterized by a combination of cross‐subsidization mechanisms like revenue‐sharing arrangements and payroll restrictions. Up to now, the effects of these policy tools have only been analyzed separately. This article provides a theoretical model of a team sports league and analyzes the combined effect of salary restrictions (caps and floors) and revenue sharing. It shows that the effect on club profits, player salaries, and competitive balance crucially depends on the mix of these policy tools. Moreover, the invariance proposition does not hold even under Walrasian‐conjectures if revenue sharing is combined with a salary cap or floor. (JEL L83, C72, L11)     

ANTI‐POACHING AGREEMENTS IN LABOR MARKETS

We analyze competition for experienced workers among wage‐setting firms. The firms can design poaching offers with higher wages to workers who switch from rivals relative to wages paid to their own existing employees. We evaluate the profit and welfare effects of anti‐poaching agreements that eliminate poaching offers as a recruiting method. Anti‐poaching agreements increase industry profits, whereas workers are made worse off. We show that the effects of anti‐poaching agreements on total welfare are determined by the magnitude of workers' switching costs and the productivity change associated with switching employers. (JEL L41, L40, J42)     

Work–Life ‘Balance’, Recession and the Gendered Limits to Learning and Innovation (Or,Why It Pays Employers To Care)

The everyday challenges faced by workers ‘struggling to juggle’ competing commitments of paid work, home and family remain stubbornly persistent and highly gendered. Reinforcing these problems, many employers regard work–life balance (WLB) provision as too costly. In response, this paper explores the learning and innovation advantages that can result from WLB provision in knowledge‐intensive firms, as part of a WLB ‘mutual gains’ research agenda. These synergies are explored through a case study of IT workers and firms in two high‐tech regional economies — Dublin, Ireland and Cambridge, UK — prior to (2006–8) and subsequent to (2010) the economic downturn. The results suggest that by making available the kinds of WLB arrangements identified by workers as offering meaningful reductions in gendered work–life conflicts, employers can also enhance the learning and innovation processes within and between firms, which are widely recognized as fundamental for firms' long‐term sustainable competitive advantage.     

MINIMUM WAGES,IMPORT STATUS,AND FIRMS' INNOVATION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM CHINA

This study explores the heterogeneous effects of minimum wage on innovation of different types of firms. We develop an open‐economy R&D‐based growth model and obtain the following result: raising the minimum wage reduces innovation of firms that use domestic inputs but increases innovation of firms that import foreign inputs. We test this result using city‐level data on minimum wages and firm‐level patent data in China. In accordance with our theory, we find that raising the minimum wage is associated with more innovation by importing firms and less by non‐importing firms. This result survives a battery of robustness checks. (JEL E24, F43, O31)     

COLLABORATE OR CONSOLIDATE: ASSESSING THE COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF PRODUCTION JOINT VENTURES

We analyze collaborations in which two firms facing external competition reorganize to form an input joint venture as an alternative to horizontal merger. Under standard regularity conditions, the collaboration can lead to higher profits than a horizontal merger, though the effect on prices, quantities, and welfare depends on the form of downstream competition. In light of our results regarding profits, we provide reasons why firms might still wish to merge: imperfect information, cost synergies, and organizational asymmetries. We further consider how our comparisons change with the managerial structure of the joint venture (i.e., by delegation of input pricing). (JEL L13, L23, L42)     

The Sociology of Innovation: Organizational,Environmental, and Relative Perspectives

Innovation is risky. New products and firms are subject to high failure rates. To minimize the risk associated with innovation, most scholars agree that firms should engage simultaneously in two types of activities: exploring new alternatives and exploiting existing competencies. Firms that simultaneously engage in explorative and exploitative activities are called ambidextrous organizations. Research on ambidextrous organizations, however, inadequately considers the importance of the environment in which organizations operate for innovation success. The sociological view of innovation fills this gap by emphasizing the importance of social context for explaining innovative outcomes. The sociology of innovation highlights, first, the structural arrangements – characteristics of social networks, organizations, and institutions – that influence innovation and, second, the relative nature of innovation – whether an object is considered novel depends on one's vantage point. Drawing on the relative view of innovation, I develop a typology that outlines several paths to innovation with respect to two vantage points: the organization and the environment. I argue that minimizing the risks associated with innovation is most likely to occur when firms follow the path of innovation that consists of generating novel solutions that simultaneously exploit knowledge and resources that are both available to the firm and in the firm's environment.     

EMISSION TAXES,CLEAN TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION,AND PRODUCT MARKET COLLUSION: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

We use a laboratory experiment to study the link between cooperative research and development (R&D) in clean technology and collusion in a downstream product market in the presence of a time‐consistent emissions tax. Such a tax creates additional interconnections between firms, in addition to the standard technological spillovers. Our results show a strong link between R&D cooperation and market collusion under symmetric R&D spillovers in a duopoly, but when the spillovers are asymmetric, R&D cooperation does not necessarily result in collusion. With symmetric spillovers, the link between R&D cooperation and collusion remains strong even in three‐ and four‐firm industries. (JEL C90, L5, O30, Q55)     

DEBT BAILOUTS AND CONSTITUTIONS

A demand‐based theory of subnational debt bailouts is presented. It is shown that demand for bailouts among politicians with regional constituencies is affected by revenue sharing arrangements as a bailout implies a shift of taxation toward the federal tier. Automatic revenue sharing may lead to the formation of pro‐bailout coalitions formed by indebted states and states that are net recipients of the revenue sharing arrangement. The model shows that the state debt bailouts approved by the Brazilian Senate prior to the enactment of the Fiscal Responsibility Act were consistent with politicians who maximize the proceeds accruing to their constituencies. (JEL H70, D70)     

PERSISTENCE OF POLITICIANS AND FIRMS' INNOVATION

We empirically investigate whether the persistence of politicians in political institutions affects the innovation activity of firms. We use 12,000 firm‐level observations from three waves of the Italian Observatory over Small and Medium Enterprises, and introduce a measure of political persistence defined as the average length of individual political careers in political institutions of Italian municipalities. Using death of politicians as an exogenous source of variation of political persistence, we find a robust negative relation between political persistence and the probability of process innovation. This finding is consistent with the view that political stability may hinder firms' incentive to innovate to maintain their competitiveness, as long as they can extract rents from long‐term connections with politicians. (JEL D22, D72, O31)     

PROFIT‐MAXIMIZING GATE REVENUE SHARING IN SPORTS LEAGUES

In this article, I examine how sports leagues can use gate revenue sharing to coordinate talent investments and maximize club profits. Gate revenue sharing reduces incentives to invest in talent. Initially lower investments boost profits, because total costs go down, but investing less also shrinks revenues, which harms profits at higher levels of sharing. The league maximizes profits by setting a sharing rule, which balances these two effects. Gate revenue sharing decreases talent investments more strongly in leagues with heterogeneous rather than homogeneous local market sizes. As a result, the profit‐maximizing level of sharing is higher for relatively homogeneous leagues. This implies that more balanced leagues are expected to share more gate revenues than less balanced leagues. It also explains why gate revenue sharing is widely used in the U.S. major leagues, while it is largely absent in European soccer. (JEL L41, L83)     

COOPERATION SPILLOVERS AND PRICE COMPETITION IN EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS

Firms often cooperate explicitly through activities such as research joint ventures, while competing in other markets. Cooperation in research and development can allow firms to internalize the external benefits of knowledge creation and increase the returns from research and development (R&D) expenditures. Such cooperation may spill over to facilitate collusion in the market, however, potentially lowering welfare and efficiency. This paper uses a laboratory experiment to examine if sellers successfully coordinate to fund a joint research project to reduce their costs, and how this collaboration affects their pricing behavior. The experiment includes control treatments with separate R&D cooperation and markets. Our results show that although participants usually cooperate when given an opportunity, cooperation is observed less frequently when they also compete in the market. Communication improves cooperation in all environments, particularly when the market is present. Nevertheless, the data provide no evidence of seller collusion in the market. (JEL D43, D71, H40, O3)     

STRATEGIC INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: THE CASE OF MULTIATTRIBUTE PRODUCTS WITH HETEROGENEOUS CONSUMERS

We examine the incentives for firms to voluntarily disclose otherwise private information about the quality attributes of their products. In particular, we focus on the case of differentiated products with multiple attributes and heterogeneous consumers. We show that there exist certain configurations of consumers' multidimensional preferences under which a firm, no matter whether producing a high‐ or low‐quality product, may choose not to reveal the quality even with zero disclosure costs. The failure of information unraveling arises when providing consumers with more information results in more elastic demand, which triggers more intensive price competition and leads to lower prices and profits for competing firms. As a result, the equilibrium in which disclosure is voluntary may diverge from that in which disclosure is mandatory. (JEL L15, L5)     

Does profit sharing increase firms’ profits?

Although there is ample evidence that profit-sharing plans increase productivity, little is known about how such plans affect profitability. Using a data set of 198 U. S. firms, I examined the relationship between profit sharing and profits. Results suggest that profit sharing has a significant effect on profits in a single-equation setting. But the significance disappeared in a simultaneous-equations framework because of interdependence between the two variables. In an auxiliary regression, profit sharing is found to increase labor costs. This result partially explains why profit sharing has an insignificant effect on profitability. The author thanks Daniel Mitchell, David Lewin, Sanford Jacoby, Chris Erickson, Douglas Kruse, and Dong-One Kim for helpful comments. He also thanks David Lewin for providing Columbia Business Data and the Institute of Industrial Relations at UCLA for financial support.     

THE COMPETITIVE RETURNS TO THE GLOBAL SEARCH FOR TALENT: PROFESSIONAL SPORTS MARKETS AND FOREIGNERS

We examine the geographical and racial diversity of a market's labor supply. While the likely impact of expanding supply is to increase the level of productivity, it is not obvious what impact the expansion would have on the overall level of competition. If the added labor increases productivity differentials or are disproportionately populated on high achieving firms, then the likely result would be greater imbalance. We find that while increases in the foreign‐born component are associated with an increase in the overall level of competition, the impact has diminished across time. (JEL C22, D23, D30)     

WORKFORCE COMPOSITION AND FIRM PRODUCTIVITY: EVIDENCE FROM TAIWAN

We study the relationship between workforce composition and firm productivity based on a new employee‐employer‐matched data set, using an array of workforce characteristics and three alternative measures of firm productivity. While firm age is not essential for the performance of firms, those of smaller size and those in the steel and transportation industries outperform others. Moreover, labor quality, particularly the middle‐aged with higher education, contributes significantly to firms' productivity. Furthermore, economic incentives and market competition both play important roles in the performance of firms. Finally, there is an employer‐size premium with larger firms paying higher wages and nonwage benefits. (JEL C33, D20, J30)     

A THEORY OF TURNOVER AND WAGE DYNAMICS

We develop a model of turnover and wage dynamics with insurance, match‐specific productivity, and long‐term contracting. The model predicts that wages are downward rigid within firms but can decrease when workers are fired. We apply the model to study the impact of business cycles on subsequent wages and job mobility. Workers hired during a boom have persistent higher future wages if staying with the same firm. However, these boom hires are more likely to be terminated and have shorter employment spells. (JEL C73, D23, D82, J33)     

INFORMATION VALUE UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY AND ENDOGENOUS MARKET LEADERSHIP

In an oligopoly model with firms choosing to produce in one of two periods, we identify the circumstance under which a firm's having early information regarding stochastic demand results in market leadership. High demand volatility leads to Stackelberg competition with the information‐advantaged firm leading. In the N‐firm case an equilibrium with multiple leaders and multiple followers emerges endogenously. In a duopoly information acquisition game we identify conditions that determine whether neither, one, or both firms will pay to acquire early information and note that one firm's obtaining early information may generate a positive externality benefitting its competitor. Both symmetric and asymmetric outcomes are possible and Stackelberg market leadership may occur in equilibrium, but only when firms have different costs of information. Our finding that an information advantage may convey leadership which then affects the value of information to the players applies to other settings exhibiting first‐mover advantage such as certain public good provision games. (JEL C72, D82, L13)     

Corporate social responsibility driven innovation

This study identifies the substantial relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and innovation activities of firms. Using the French Vigeo sustainability rating and the Thomson Reuters, we divided 619 firms into groups by their industry sectors, regions, and firm characteristics such as size and age. We premise that innovative investment is needed to prepare tomorrow's profits not only by considering investments in technology and in R&D, but also by dealing with sustainability to human, social, environmental, technical, and economic investments. Consequently, when the firm manipulates its short- and long-run business strategies, the consideration of the correlation between types of investment and CSR initiatives will lead to more cooperating effect on the outcome of investments. The findings provide a comprehensive understanding on the effect of sustainable management strategies on the innovation and sustainability of firms.     

THE CHALLENGE OF REVENUE SHARING WITH BUNDLED PRICING: AN APPLICATION TO MUSIC

Although bundling can substantially increase profits relative to standalone pricing, particularly for zero‐marginal‐cost information products, it has one major problem: bundling produces revenue that is not readily attributable to particular pieces of intellectual property, creating a revenue division problem. We evaluate several possible solutions using unique song valuation survey data. We find the Shapley value, a well‐motivated theoretical solution, is universally incentive compatible (all bundle elements fare better inside the bundle than under standalone pricing), but revenue‐sharing schemes feasible with readily available consumption data are not. Among feasible schemes, Ginsburgh and Zang's modified Shapley value performs best. (JEL C71, D79, L14)     

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND LABOR‐MARKET DISCRIMINATION

Discrimination reduces the matching probability and output in the skill‐intensive differentiated‐product sector so that discrimination‐induced comparative advantage may overshadow technological comparative advantage in determining the pattern of trade. Trade liberalization generates a decrease in the skilled‐worker wage gap in the country that is an exporter of goods from the simple sector but increases it in the country that is a net exporter of differentiated products. Trade liberalization has an opposite effect on firms. In the country that is an exporter of simple goods, trade liberalization reduces the profits of the nondiscriminatory firms by more than those of the discriminatory firms. (JEL F16, F66, J71)