Decentralizing Wage Bargaining in Germany — A Way to Increase Employment?

Abstract. The area‐wide wage agreement is at the centre of Germany's system of collective bargaining. In recent years, however, there has been a tendency towards the decentralization of collective bargaining. Individual wage agreements have led to more moderate wage developments, whilst collective agreements with individual firms, and agreements at the production unit level, have not had this moderating effect. On the other hand, collective bargaining has become more flexible, leading to greater pay differentiation. The further decentralization of collective bargaining, although desirable, has given rise to objections based in constitutional law and to resistance from employees and employers.     

Union Power and (Un)Employment

Is the monopoly face of unions, i.e. their ability to enforce wages above what non-unionised firms would pay, harmful to employment and output? It is shown that a positive answer to this question is far less compelling than commonly held views based on a negatively sloped labour demand curve suggest. First, the labour demand curve may be irrelevant for the employment decision of unionised firms. Second, even if the labour demand curve is relevant, selfish union workers are likely to accept a system of wage discrimination which does away with discrepancies between the marginal product and the reservation wage. And third, the labour demand curve may have a positive slope.     

Evaluating the Introduction of a National Minimum Wage: Evidence from a New Survey of Firms in Ireland

Abstract. In April 2000 the Irish government introduced a national minimum wage of IR£4.40 (€5.58) an hour. We use data from a specifically designed survey of firms to estimate the employment effects of this change. Employment growth among firms with low‐wage workers prior to the legislation was no different from that of firms not affected by the legislation. A more refined measure of the minimum wage, however, suggests that the legislation may have had a negative effect on employment for the small number of firms most severely affected by the legislation. However, the size of these effects is relatively modest.     

How Selective Are Real Wage Cuts? A Micro‐analysis Using Linked Employer–Employee Data

Using linked employer–employee panel data for Germany, we investigate whether firms implement real wage reductions in a selective manner. In line with insider–outsider and several strands of efficiency wage theory, we find strong evidence for selective wage cuts with high‐productivity workers being spared even when controlling for permanent differences in firms' wage policies. In contrast to some recent contributions stressing fairness considerations, we also find that wage cuts increase wage dispersion among peers rather than narrowing it. Notably, the same selectivity pattern shows up when restricting our analysis to firms covered by collective agreements or having a works council.     

Heterogeneous Firm Responses to Rising Teenage Wages

Substantial youth minimum wage changes in New Zealand between 2000 and 2007 raised teenage average wages by 5–10 per cent relative to those for adults. We use Statistics New Zealand's Linked Employer–Employee Database (LEED) to examine whether firms' teenage labour demand responses to these changes are greater for firms with higher teenage‐employment share. We find evidence that high teen‐employers reduced their teen employment relative to other firms and had lower survival rates over the period. However, firms that entered the main teen‐employment industries had higher teen‐employment shares than continuing firms. The results are consistent with endogenous technology adoption in response to non‐marginal changes in relative wages.     

Paying More than Necessary? The Wage Cushion in Germany

In Germany, more than 40 per cent of plants covered by collective agreements pay wages above the level stipulated in the agreement, giving rise to a wage cushion between actual and contractual wages. Cross‐sectional and fixed‐effects estimations indicate that the wage cushion mainly varies with the profit situation of the plant and with indicators of labour shortage and the business cycle. Whereas plants bound by multi‐employer agreements seem to pay wage premiums in order to overcome the restrictions imposed by the rather centralized bargaining system in (western) Germany, plants that use single‐employer agreements are significantly less likely to have wage cushions.     

DO FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AFFECT FIRMS’ DEMAND FOR DISABLED WORKERS?

A number of OECD countries aim to encourage work integration of disabled persons using quota policies. For instance, Austrian firms must provide at least one job to a disabled worker per 25 nondisabled workers and are subject to a tax if they do not. This “threshold design” provides causal estimates of the noncompliance tax on disabled employment if firms do not manipulate nondisabled employment; a lower and upper bound on the causal effect can be constructed if they do. Results indicate that firms with 25 nondisabled workers employ about 0.04 (or 12%) more disabled workers than without the tax; firms do manipulate employment of nondisabled workers but the lower bound on the employment effect of the quota remains positive; employment effects are stronger in low‐wage firms than in high‐wage firms; and firms subject to the quota of two disabled workers or more hire 0.08 more disabled workers per additional quota job. Moreover, increasing the noncompliance tax increases excess disabled employment, whereas paying a bonus to overcomplying firms slightly dampens the employment effects of the tax.     

THE JOINT DESIGN OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION: A FIRST PASS

Unemployment insurance and employment protection are typically discussed and studied in isolation. In this paper, we argue that they are tightly linked, and we focus on their joint optimal design in a simple model, with risk‐averse workers, risk‐neutral firms, and random shocks to productivity. We show that, in the “first best,”unemployment insurance comes with employment protection—in the form of layoff taxes; indeed, optimality requires that layoff taxes be equal to unemployment benefits. We then explore the implications of four broad categories of deviations from first best: limits on insurance, limits on layoff taxes, ex post wage bargaining, and ex ante heterogeneity of firms or workers. We show how the design must be modified in each case. Finally, we draw out the implications of our analysis for current policy debates and reform proposals, from the financing of unemployment insurance, to the respective roles of severance payments and unemployment benefits.     

Regional Labour Market Adjustment: Are Positive and Negative Shocks Different?

This paper analyses regional labour market adjustment in the Finnish provinces during 1971–96. It investigates the interrelations of employment, unemployment and labour force participation to examine how a change in labour demand is adjusted to. The study questions the usual assumption that positive and negative shocks evoke similar adjustment processes. Instead, we test for the possibility that the effects of positive and negative shocks are asymmetric. The analysis reveals that there is little asymmetry in the adjustment to region‐specific labour demand shocks, but adjustment to total (region‐specific plus common component) shocks displays more asymmetry. The region‐specific component of a labour demand shock has short‐lived effects on unemployment and participation, and its effect on employment is very small but permanent [persistent?]. Initially, most of the fall in employment is absorbed by the unemployment and participation rate, but after a few years migration plays a larger role in the adjustment process.     

Efficiency Wage,Fixed Employment Costs,and Dual Labour Markets

The standard efficiency wage‐based explanation of labour market dualism hinges on the existence of differences in monitoring across sectors. The paper proposes fixed employment costs as an alternative source of wage differentials for homogeneous workers. It shows that firms with larger fixed costs pay higher wages in order to elicit more effort from their workers, and tend to have higher capital/labour ratio and labour productivity. The model generates both involuntary unemployment and involuntary confinement in the secondary sector: high effort–high wage jobs are preferred to low effort–low wage jobs and either are preferred to unemployment. The proposed framework can also account for the various types of treatment of marginal jobs in primary sector firms envisaged by Doeringer and Piore (Internal Labour Markets and Manpower Analysis, 1971). In particular, an increase in fixed costs beyond a certain level may induce primary sector firms to restructure, segment production, and enter the secondary sector, thus converting their jobs into secondary jobs. From a welfare point of view, we cannot state in general the desirability of subsidizing fixed employment costs; however, we show that an employment subsidy financed by a wage tax is able to increase employment with no loss in terms of production.     

Intersectoral Labor Mobility and the Growth of the Service Sector

One of the most striking changes in the U.S. economy over the past 50 years has been the growth in the service sector. Between 1950 and 2000, service‐sector employment grew from 57 to 75 percent of total employment. However, over this time, the real hourly wage in the service sector grew only slightly faster than in the goods sector. In this paper, we assess whether or not the essential constancy of the relative wage implies that individuals face small costs of switching sectors, and we quantify the relative importance of labor supply and demand factors in the growth of the service sector. We specify and estimate a two‐sector labor market equilibrium model that allows us to address these empirical issues in a unified framework. Our estimates imply that there are large mobility costs: output in both sectors would have been double their current levels if these mobility costs had been zero. In addition, we find that demand‐side factors, that is, technological change and movements in product and capital prices, were responsible for the growth of the service sector.     

DISENTANGLING THE MINIMUM WAGE PUZZLE: AN ANALYSIS OF WORKER ACCESSIONS AND SEPARATIONS

Changes in the legislation in the mid‐1980s in Portugal provide remarkably good conditions for analysis of the employment effects of mandatory minimum wages, as the minimum wage increased sharply for a very specific group of workers. Relying on a matched employer‐employee panel data set, we model gross worker flows—accessions and separations—in continuing firms, as well as in new firms and those going out of business, using a count regression model applied to proportions. Employment trends for teenagers, the affected group, are contrasted to those of older workers before and after the raise in the youth minimum wage. The major effect on teenagers of a rising minimum wage has been the reduction of separations from the employer, which, during the period under analysis, has compensated for the reduction of accessions to new and continuing firms. In this sense, our results can reconcile some of the previous evidence in the empirical literature when analyzing the aggregate impact of the minimum wage on youth employment without decomposing it by type of worker flow. (JEL: D21, J23, J38)     

Firm Size and Employment Dynamics: Estimations of Labor Demand Elasticities Using a Fractional Panel Probit Model

This paper examines the comprehensive discussion on the relationship between job creation, or destruction and firm size. More specifically, the study will determine whether the argument about small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) showing higher employment dynamics is confirmed or not. As such, the following work applies elasticities from a standard labor demand model derived from the estimations of fractional probit models for panel data, as process recommended in Papke and Wooldridge [2008; Journal of Econometrics 145(1–2): 121–133]. Elasticities are a useful measure of employment dynamics, if it is assumed that SMEs act on the same markets. The elasticity results from German establishment data illustrate that firm size does matter for the increase or decrease of employment. SMEs with less than 10 workers exhibit a higher employment dynamic, compared with other entities, at each respective percentile in the distribution of the wage share. Additionally, the outcome of the analysis weakly confirms the hypothesis that smaller firms are more restricted to capital markets, compared with large entities. The results also illustrate that firm size only explains one aspect of job creation and destruction. As stated in the well‐known Hicks–Marshall rules for elasticities of factor demand, the results illustrate that the reaction of labor demand on economic changes increases with the share of labor. Firms with a high share of labor also have larger elasticities, compared with firms with a strong use of capital. Both effects, the size effect and the effect of the proportion of labor, would blend in reality, and therefore, possibly lead to controversial results for the relationship between firm size and employment dynamics. In addition, a model with a negative relationship among both variables is too simple to explain the behavior of firms.     

A Note on Job Tenure and Collective Contracts

Abstract. This paper analyses the relationship between individual tenure and the application of collective contracts at the firm level under the specific institutional settings in Germany. The empirical approach is based on a multilevel model and a linked employer–employee data set for the years 1990, 1995, and 2001. The main result is that elapsed tenure is longer in firms applying collective contracts than in companies with individual wage setting: workers in firms with collective contracts benefit not only from higher wages, but also from higher job stability. Furthermore, we find no significant changes in mean tenure during the 1990s as well as stable differences across wage‐setting regimes.     

FROM FLEXIBILITY TO INSECURITY: HOW VERTICAL SEPARATION AMPLIFIES FIRM‐LEVEL UNCERTAINTY

This article presents a model where firms may endogenously externalize part of their production process. We start from the premise that adaptation to uncertainty cannot be contracted upon in the worker/employer relationship. Vertical separation then balances flexibility gains against hold‐up costs of opportunistic behavior by outside contractors. In equilibrium, the degree of separation is shown to depend on the degree of product market competition, contractor's bargaining power, and the volatility of demand shocks. Our main result is that an increase in the degree of vertical separation amplifies the elasticity to demand shocks of firms' sales and employment. It does not, however, amplify aggregate uncertainty. Evidence from firm‐level data is shown to be largely consistent with the main implications of our theory. (JEL: L16, L23, L24)     

Unemployment Benefits and Employment Policies in the Presence of a Strong Trade Union: A Comparison

Abstract. The paper analyses, within a game theoretic approach, the consequences on private employment and real wages of a government policy of raising unemployment benefits following a fall in employment. The effects of such a policy are then compared with those arising from a more conventional demand policy. Under the policy regime described the reaction of the unions will cause, when the economy is hit by a negative shock on employment, a tendency for the real wage to rise and for private employment to decrease further. As far as the comparison of such policy with a policy of direct employment by the government is concerned we have reached the following conclusions. A policy based on unemployment benefit will give rise to a smaller increase in the real wage than a policy based on public employment if the change in the marginal utility of being employed due to change in the unemployment benefit is smaller than the utility that the union will obtain from an extra employed person. Moreover it appears that a policy based on unemployment benefits has a smaller negative effect on private employment, than a policy based on direct employment. if such a policy is adopted just after an employment benefits represent also a subsidy to the firms. We have shown that the effects on the real wage of the Policy rule considered are in this case stronger. The effects on employment depend on the relative strength of the union reaction and of the policy's supply side effects.     

Modeling Earnings Dynamics

In this paper, we use indirect inference to estimate a joint model of earnings, employment, job changes, wage rates, and work hours over a career. We use the model to address a number of important questions in labor economics, including the source of the experience profile of wages, the response of job changes to outside wage offers, and the effects of seniority on job changes. We also study the dynamic response of wage rates, hours, and earnings to various shocks, and measure the relative contributions of the shocks to the variance of earnings in a given year and over a lifetime. We find that human capital accounts for most of the growth of earnings over a career, although job seniority and job mobility also play significant roles. Unemployment shocks have a large impact on earnings in the short run, as well as a substantial long‐term effect that operates through the wage rate. Shocks associated with job changes and unemployment make a large contribution to the variance of career earnings and operate mostly through the job‐specific error components of wages and hours.     

A Theory of the Firm with Non‐binding Employment Contracts

This paper examines an employment relation in which individual workers enjoy some bargaining power vis‐a‐vis the firm although they are not unionized. The main elements of the situations studied here are that the employment contracts are non‐binding across periods of production and that the firm has opportunities to replace workers. The paper analyzes a dynamic model in which the processes of contracting and recontracting between the firm and its workers are intertwined with the dynamic evolution of the firm's workforce. The analysis of the model is somewhat complicated because the employment level is a nondegenerate state variable that evolves over time and is affected by past decisions. The main analytical results characterize certain important equilibria: the profit maximizing and stationary equilibria. The unique stationary equilibrium is markedly inefficient: it exhibits inefficient over‐employment and the steady state wages coincide with the workers' reservation wage. It confirms earlier results derived by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a, b) in the context of a static model and shows that they are very robust even when the firm has nearly frictionless hiring opportunities. In contrast, in the profit maximizing equilibrium the outcome is nearly efficient and the wage exhibits a mark‐up over the reservation wage.     

Is Wage Leadership an Instrument to Coordinate Unions’ Wage Policy?The Case of Imperfect Product Markets

Given an oligopolistic product market, trade unions organized at firm level want to coordinate their bargaining activities. If for some exogenous reasons centralization is not possible, unions could try to coordinate wage setting by wage leadership. The outcome of such wage leadership is compared with that of an uncoordinated bargaining and is characterized by higher utilities for all unions. But wages and employment levels are not symmetrical either for unions or for firms. The leader firm employment decreases and the follower firm employment rises compared with uncoordinated bargaining. This may cause problems with the implementation of wage leadership.     

On the Dynamics of Unemployment and Wage Distributions

Postel‐Vinay and Robin's (2002) sequential auction model is extended to allow for aggregate productivity shocks. Workers exhibit permanent differences in ability while firms are identical. Negative aggregate productivity shocks induce job destruction by driving the surplus of matches with low ability workers to negative values. Endogenous job destruction coupled with worker heterogeneity thus provides a mechanism for amplifying productivity shocks that offers an original solution to the unemployment volatility puzzle (Shimer (2005)). Moreover, positive or negative shocks may lead employers and employees to renegotiate low wages up and high wages down when agents' individual surpluses become negative. The model delivers rich business cycle dynamics of wage distributions and explains why both low wages and high wages are more procyclical than wages in the middle of the distribution.