The Skilled Wage Premium and the Growth of Small Firms in UK Manufacturing

We document the role of small firms in explaining the growth of the skilled/unskilled wage premium in UK manufacturing over the 1980s. Our major findings are (i) the share of manufacturing employment in small firms' (0–99) employees has risen by 35 percent over this period; (ii) small firms pay more unequal wages than do large firms: the non-manual/manual wage premium is 1.53 in small firms and 1.50 in firms of over 1,500 workers; (iii) the growth in small firms over the period explains about 20 percent of the rise in the skilled/unskilled wage premium.     

The Role of Profit Sharing in Dual Labour Markets with Flexible Outsourcing

We combine profit sharing for high‐skilled workers and outsourcing of low‐skilled tasks in a partly imperfect dual domestic labour market, which means that only low‐skilled labour is represented by a labour union. In that framework we analyse how the implementation of profit sharing for high‐skilled workers influences the amount of outsourcing and the labour market outcome for low‐skilled worker. By doing this, we use some specific assumptions, e.g. exponentially increasing outsourcing costs or the wage for low‐skilled workers will be determined by a union whereas the wage for high‐skilled workers is given. Assuming that low‐skilled labour and outsourcing are interchangeable we show that profit sharing has a positive effect on the wage for low‐skilled workers and helps to decrease wage dispersion. However, under these circumstances, profit sharing enhances outsourcing. Concerning the employment effects for high‐ and low‐skilled workers, we show that there is an employment reducing effect due to higher wages for low‐skilled work, which can be offset by higher productivity of highly skilled workers, as the domestic labour inputs complement each other.     

A New Look at the Public Wage Premium in Italy: The Role of Schooling Endogeneity

This paper uses a sample of male workers to estimate public and private wage structures and the public wage premium for Italy. Results from a model with endogenous sector and schooling suggest that public employees have on average lower unobserved wage potentials in both sectors than private employees, but work in the sector where they benefit from a comparative wage advantage. Schooling is positively correlated with wages in both sectors, and controlling for that is crucial to get more reliable estimates and predictions. The associated average unconditional public wage premium is 12 per cent. The net premium is 9 per cent, but not statistically significant.     

Public Sector Wage Premium in Canada: Evidence from Labour Force Survey

Although previous research has pointed to a public/private sector wage gap for men and women in Canada, the extent of this gap has not been measured in recent years. Using data from the Canadian Labour Force Survey for September 2008, and using an endogenous switching regression framework to control for self‐selection, I find that both men and women earn a wage premium in the public sector in Canada, although the premium is higher for women. The pure wage premium or economic rent that public sector workers receive relative to their counterparts in the private sector is $1.09, or 5.4 per cent for men and $3.15, or 20 per cent for women. An analysis of selection in the pubic/private sector reveals that public sectors workers are ‘positively selected’ on observables and consist of the ‘cream of the crop’.     

Technology Effects on Wages in Finnish Manufacturing

In this paper we study the effect of technology on establishment‐level wages using a classification of manufacturing industries based on four technology levels. The technology wage premiums are estimated separately for non‐manual and manual workers using wage equations with available control variables for plant and workforce characteristics (human capital) over the time period 1974–93. The results do not show a straightforward increasing relationship between a plant’s average wages and its technology at higher technology levels. However, establishments with the lowest technology level paid the lowest wages during the whole period. We also find that the relative non‐manual to manual wage ratio increased over the time period in the highest technology levels. These findings are consistent with technology wage premiums and skill‐biased technological change found in studies for other countries     

Capital‐skill Complementarity and Inequality: A Macroeconomic Analysis

The supply and price of skilled labor relative to unskilled labor have changed dramatically over the postwar period. The relative quantity of skilled labor has increased substantially, and the skill premium, which is the wage of skilled labor relative to that of unskilled labor, has grown significantly since 1980. Many studies have found that accounting for the increase in the skill premium on the basis of observable variables is difficult and have concluded implicitly that latent skill‐biased technological change must be the main factor responsible. This paper examines that view systematically. We develop a framework that provides a simple, explicit economic mechanism for understanding skill‐biased technological change in terms of observable variables, and we use the framework to evaluate the fraction of variation in the skill premium that can be accounted for by changes in observed factor quantities. We find that with capital‐skill complementarity, changes in observed inputs alone can account for most of the variations in the skill premium over the last 30 years.     

What Survey Data Reveal about Price and Wage Rigidity in Portugal

This paper exploits the information collected from a survey conducted on a sample of Portuguese firms to study the patterns of firms’ price and wage adjustments and the extent of nominal price and wage rigidities. The evidence shows that the frequency of price changes varies substantially across sectors and depends on the intensity of competition, the share of labor costs and firms’ price reviewing behavior. The results also suggest that the constraint imposed by the presence of downward nominal wage rigidity is less important in firms where the fraction of permanent and high‐skilled workers is lower and the share of flexible pay components is higher.     

Preliminary Evidence on Wage Setting in Greek Manufacturing

Abstract. The negotiating power of the unions and their role in wage determination depends on the level of centralization of the wage bargaining system as well as on other institutional arrangements. In this study, we estimate a set of wage equations in order to study the employment effects of different unions’ stances in wage determination as well as to investigate other characteristics of employment in Greek manufacturing. We discriminate between workers and employees (blue‐ and white‐collar workers) and between sectors in order to capture differences in the relative supply as well as differences in the negotiating power among the staff of the same industry. Empirical findings reveal that the persistence of unemployment arises as a result of the great bargaining power of the unions in negotiations at a sectoral level. White‐collar workers exhibit a stronger negotiating power compared with blue‐collar workers because of differences in the institutional framework.     

UNDERSTANDING THE EVOLUTION OF THE US WAGE DISTRIBUTION: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

In this paper, we propose an analytically tractable overlapping‐generations model of human capital accumulation and study its implications for the evolution of the US wage distribution from 1970 to 2000. The key feature of the model, and the only source of heterogeneity, is that individuals differ in their ability to accumulate human capital. Therefore, wage inequality results only from differences in human capital accumulation. We examine the response of this model to skill‐biased technical change (SBTC) theoretically. We show that in response to SBTC, the model generates behavior consistent with some prominent trends observed in the US data including (i) a rise in overall wage inequality both in the short run and long run, (ii) an initial fall in the education premium followed by a strong recovery, leading to a higher premium in the long run, (iii) the fact that most of this fall and rise takes place among younger workers, (iv) a rise in within‐group inequality, (v) stagnation in median wage growth (and a slowdown in aggregate labor productivity), and (vi) a rise in consumption inequality that is much smaller than the rise in wage inequality. These results suggest that the heterogeneity in the ability to accumulate human capital is an important feature for understanding the effects of SBTC and interpreting the transformation of the US labor markets since the 1970s.     

Low‐wage Jobs — Springboard to High‐paid Ones?

We examine whether low‐paid jobs have an effect on the probability that unemployed persons obtain better‐paid jobs in the future (springboard effect). We make use of data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel (SOEP) and apply a dynamic random effects bivariate probit model. Our results suggest that low‐wage jobs can act as springboards to better‐paid work. The improvement of the chance to obtain a high‐wage job by accepting low‐paid work is particularly large for less‐skilled persons and for individuals who experienced longer periods of unemployment. Low‐paid work is less beneficial if the job is associated with a low social status.     

A Distributional Analysis of Public–Private Wage Differential in India

In this paper, we examine public–private wage differential among men in India across the entire wage distribution. We find that the raw wage gap between public and private sector is positive across the entire wage distribution in both urban and rural areas. A quantile regression‐based decomposition reveals that that the public sector workers enjoy a positive wage premium across the entire wage distribution in both urban and rural areas, although the magnitude of wage premium is smaller at the top quantiles.     

Wage Bargaining with On‐the‐Job Search: Theory and Evidence

Most applications of Nash bargaining over wages ignore between‐employer competition for labor services and attribute all of the workers' rent to their bargaining power. In this paper, we write and estimate an equilibrium model with strategic wage bargaining and on‐the‐job search and use it to take another look at the determinants of wages in France. There are three essential determinants of wages in our model: productivity, competition between employers resulting from on‐the‐job search, and the workers' bargaining power. We find that between‐firm competition matters a lot in the determination of wages, because it is quantitatively more important than wage bargaining à la Nash in raising wages above the workers' “reservation wages,” defined as out‐of‐work income. In particular, we detect no significant bargaining power for intermediate‐ and low‐skilled workers, and a modestly positive bargaining power for high‐skilled workers.     

DO BETTER PAID POLITICIANS PERFORM BETTER? DISENTANGLING INCENTIVES FROM SELECTION

The wage paid to politicians affects both the choice of citizens to run for office and the performance of those who are appointed. First, if skilled individuals shy away from politics because of higher opportunities in the private sector, an increase in politicians’ pay may change their mind. Second, if the re‐election prospects of incumbents depend on their in‐office deeds, a higher wage may foster performance. We use data on all Italian municipal governments from 1993 to 2001 and test these hypotheses in a quasi‐experimental setup. In Italy, the wage of mayors depends on population size and sharply rises at different thresholds. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the only threshold that uniquely identifies a wage increase: 5,000 inhabitants. Exploiting the existence of a two‐term limit, we further disentangle the composition from the incentive component of the effect of the wage on performance. Our results show that a higher wage attracts more‐educated candidates, and that better‐paid politicians size down the government machinery by improving efficiency. Importantly, most of this effect is driven by the selection of competent politicians, rather than by the incentive to be re‐elected.     

MANUFACTURING PROCESS TECHNOLOGY and SUPPORT STAFF COMPOSITION: AN EMPIRICAL VIEW OF INDUSTRY EVIDENCE

Despite the attention given to restructuring and trimming down manufacturing firms during the 198Os, little attention has been paid to the mix of skills they needed under different circumstances. We examined the patterns of employment by occupation in manufacturing industries utilizing different production technologies and the effect of establishment size on nonproduction employment. We found that a relationship exists between production technology and nonproduction employment per 100 production workers. Establishment size is found to be a moderator between nonproduction employment and production technology. Our findings imply two clear messages for managers. First, when considering major changes in production technology, managers should be aware that the supporting skills they will need from their nonproduction work force are likely to change greatly. Further, these changes involve technical and managerial workers as well as clerical and production support people. Second, they should restructure the functional or occupational mix of an organization in the context of the process technologies in place. Different process technologies require different structures.     

Overeducated Workers as an Insurance Device

Empirical findings show that firms frequently employ overeducated workers. Since overeducated workers earn more than adequately educated ones working in similar jobs these findings seem to be puzzling. In this paper, we introduce an insurance approach to explain the employment of overeducated workers. Referring to this approach, overeducated workers are employed by a firm to avoid high losses in the case of a crisis (e.g. when the production process breaks down). Contrary to adequately educated workers, overeducated ones may be helpful in this situation by quickly offering improvisatorial solutions. First, we use a simple model to demonstrate the insurance argument. Second, we test the major implication of the model empirically by using industry panel data: if and only if high‐skilled workers are employed for insurance purposes, the average wage of high‐skilled workers in firms that need insurance will be lower compared with firms that do not need insurance. The data confirm this theoretical result.     

Temporary/Permanent Workers' Wage Gap: A Brand‐new Form of Wage Inequality?

By easing restrictions on the use of short‐term contracts, the 30/2003 act represents contemporaneously the more extensive and the more radical policy aimed at introducing flexibility in the Italian labour market. By virtue of a difference‐in‐differences estimator, the paper provides an estimate of the impact of the 30/2003 reform on the wage gap across fixed‐term and long‐term employees. It will be given evidence that the policy has widened the wage differentials and the effect is particularly stronger to skilled workers compared with unskilled workers. These findings would suggest the existence of a possible brand‐new form of wage inequality.     

Up in the Skies? The Relationship between Body Height and Earnings in Germany

Abstract. This paper analyses whether taller workers earn more than their shorter counterparts. Using GSOEP data from 1991 to 2002, earnings functions are estimated for male and female workers for both West and East Germany. The Hausman–Taylor IV estimator is applied to account for unobservable heterogeneity including also time‐invariant indicators. The results do not imply wage differentials based on height for female workers and male East German workers. For the height range up to 195 cm there is, however, a wage premium associated with stature for male workers from West Germany of about 4 per cent for each additional standard deviation increment in height.     

Labour Policy and Determinants of Employment and Wages in a Developing Economy with Labour Shortage

Using data from a sample of 1,099 workers, this paper investigates the determinants of employment and wages for workers in the United Arab Emirates. The paper further examines the wage distribution and the decomposition of the wage gap between the public and the private sectors. Results of the study are consistent with the dual labour market theory and indicate that the labour market in the United Arab Emirates is segmented based on sectors (public versus private) and types of workers (nationals versus non‐nationals). The study concludes with a discussion of the implication of these findings for the effectiveness of labour and economic policy.     

WHERE THE MINIMUM WAGE BITES HARD: INTRODUCTION OF MINIMUM WAGES TO A LOW WAGE SECTOR

Between 1993 and April 1999 there was no minimum wage in the United Kingdom (except in agriculture). In this paper we study the effects of the introduction of a National Minimum Wage (NMW) in April 1999 on one heavily affected sector, the residential care homes industry. This sector contains a large number of low paid workers and as such can be viewed as being very vulnerable to minimum wage legislation. We look at the impact on both wages and employment. Our results suggest that the minimum wage raised the wages of a large number of care home workers, causing a very big wage compression of the lower end of the wage distribution, thereby strongly reducing wage inequality. There is some evidence of employment and hours reductions after the minimum wage introduction, though the estimated effects are not that sizable given how heavily the wage structure was affected. (JEL: J4, J8)