CEO变更与企业价值关系的实证模型

委托代理理论认为CEO变更是由于代理人没有实现委托人对企业价值的预期,委托人以解除契约的形式来体现其约束机制的威力。为验证委托代理理论对CEO变更与企业价值关系的解释力,基于委托代理理论的两个前提假设,即委托代理关系的成立和企业价值低于股东的预期,构建CEO变更与企业价值关系的Logistic回归模型。选取2005年至2009年中国资本市场发生CEO变更、A股持续经营的上市公司样本,依据样本企业价值和企业性质的不同对Logistic回归模型进行分组检验。研究结果表明,企业价值水平较高时,股东对企业价值的预期通常能够得到满足,导致股东依据企业价值水平变更CEO的可能性较小;民营企业由于公司治理水平较低,CEO与股东之间的委托代理关系不一定成立,这两种情况均会降低委托代理理论对CEO变更与企业价值关系的解释能力,因此仅用委托代理理论来解释CEO变更与企业价值关系具有一定的局限性。     

公司治理策略对政府权责调控规制的借鉴——基于委托代理理论的分析

起源于公司治理研究领域内的委托代理理论能够清晰地阐明企业股东(委托人)与经理层(代理人)之间的权利和责任界限及其冲突,并通过多种激励与监督措施促使代理人以委托人利益最大化为行为目标,以缓解代理冲突.与公司治理相比,公共治理尽管在权力运行、利益分配、组织目标等方面存在差异,但二者仍存在共通之处,委托代理理论能够解释政府权责形成机制,借鉴公司治理策略能够有效协调政府管理中的目标利益冲突问题,有利于形成权责一致、运转高效的政府管理体系.     

公司治理、内部控制、组织结构互动关系研究

在几年来,国内企业自身出现问题的现象经常发生,大多都是由公司治理和内部控制以及组织结构这三方面的问题导致的。本文通过委托代理这一理论和组织学理论对公司中治理和内部控制以及组织结构这三方之间的关系进行了解释,并且提出了将科学政策以及效率经营作为核心,将决策机制和激励机制以及监督约束相关机制作为纽带,从而建立起治理型企业内部控制的观点。     

过去产品成功与失败经验的绩效反馈机制:IVC与CVC的调节作用

在高度竞争的行业中,企业如何从过去产品的成功与失败经验中及时获得绩效反馈,进而提升未来新产品绩效是学术界关注的热点问题。本文基于绩效反馈相关理论,探讨在高度竞争行业中,企业过去产品的成功与失败经验如何影响未来的新产品绩效,并基于委托代理理论考察不同背景风险投资对过去成功、失败经验与企业新产品绩效关系的调节效应,以2019年度始终处于App Store畅销榜单前200的76个移动游戏应用作为样本进行实证检验。结果发现:(1)在高度竞争行业中,过去产品的成功经验对企业新产品绩效具有显著的正向影响,而失败经验对企业新产品绩效具有显著的负向影响;(2)当企业拥有独立背景风险投资(IVC)时,过去产品成功经验对企业新产品绩效的正向作用会增强,失败经验对企业新产品绩效的负向作用同样会增强。相比之下,当企业拥有企业背景风险投资(CVC)时,过去产品成功经验对新产品绩效的正向作用会减弱,而失败经验对新产品绩效的负向作用同样会减弱。本研究丰富了绩效反馈相关理论发挥作用的内在机制及边界条件,对我国移动游戏领域创业企业新产品开发策略选择也具有一定参考价值。     

技术互依性、组织间沟通强度与研发外包协调治理模式选择

本文基于组织协调和探索能力供需匹配视角,采用计算机仿真方法深入考察技术互依性和组织间沟通强度对研发外包协调治理模式(混合型或整合型)选择的影响。研究表明,技术互依性、组织间沟通强度和研发外包协调治理模式共同影响研发外包情境下组织协调和探索能力供需在不同时间维度的匹配程度,进而决定绩效产出的高低。对于短期绩效产出而言,当技术互依性程度较高时,混合型模式总是最优选择,反之组织间沟通强度影响研发外包协调治理模式的选择。对于长期绩效产出而言,研发外包协调治理模式选择则只与技术互依性有关,且当技术互依性程度较高(低)时,整合型(混合型)模式是最优选择。这些研究结论不仅能为研发外包情境下组织间协调治理机制设计提供新启示,也能够帮助企业识别提高研发外包绩效产出的边界条件。     

公司治理、税收规避和现金持有价值——来自我国上市公司的经验证据

本文以我国2008-2012年沪深两市A股类上市公司为研究样本,采用剔除了盈余管理的会税差异作为衡量税收规避的指标,以及在综合考虑了股票回报率和企业净利润变动率的基础上确定现金持有价值,在委托代理理论的分析框架中,考察了税收规避对现金持有价值的影响以及公司治理机制在税收规避影响现金持有价值中的调节作用.研究发现,税收规避不会增加现金持有价值;公司治理机制在税收规避影响现金持有价值中具有一定的调节作用.这些研究结论对于深入研究税收规避与现金持有价值的关系,对于完善公司治理机制,抑制管理者和控股股东的代理问题,使税收规避能够增加企业价值,都具有一定的借鉴意义.     

创业供应链对新企业绩效作用机理:基于组态视角的定性比较研究

当面对愈发激烈的市场竞争时,诸多新企业借助创业与供应链融合实现独特的竞争优势,从而克服与规模和资源相关的劣势。然而,创业供应链的研究仍在起步阶段,已有研究缺乏创业供应链对新企业绩效作用机理的深入探讨。新企业绩效的提升面临着资源约束、合作伙伴机会主义行为等问题,构建创业供应链能力、采取恰当的供应链治理机制,已成为企业整合创业资源和治理外部关系的主要手段。本文以104家汽车供应商新企业为样本,应用组态理论和定性比较分析方法(QCA)整合创业供应链能力层面和治理机制层面的5个条件,揭示影响创业供应链新企业绩效的复杂因果机制。研究结果表明,驱动高绩效的组态解有3条,非高绩效的驱动机制有2条,其中高水平的能力与高水平的治理机制在高绩效组态中同时出现,对提升新企业绩效起到组态作用;而在非高绩效组态,能力和治理机制并未同时出现。本文的研究结论揭示了高绩效与非高绩效的驱动机制存在的非对称性关系,有助于深化对新企业关键要素替代性与互补性的理解,并为供应链新企业绩效提升提供卓有成效的建议。     

企业经营原因不明中的企业家能力

产业组织理论将企业经营绩效的决定归因于外部因素,而企业的资源、能力观则试图从企业内部来解释经营绩效,其中,原因不明是一个重要的难以模仿的资源,成为企业获得持续竞争优势的重要基础。本文对原因不明的内涵、特征进行了探讨,指出对企业家能力的忽视是导致原因不明的重要原因,抓住了企业家因素,原因不明似乎可以得到解释了。     

企业集团中母子公司的治理研究(二)

公司治理产生于委托代理问题,它的一个基本任务就是协调资本所有者和经营者的利益,将由于两权分离而产生的代理成本降到最低。公司治理包括内部的治理结构和外部治理,相对于一般公司治理,企业集团母子公司治理的最大差别就是要设计一套控制、协调、激励和约束机制,控制和协调好母子公司的关系,发挥集团的整体功能。本文着重对我国母子公司治理存在的若干问题作了理论思考。     

基于权力视角的供应链协调机制分析框架

协调机制是影响供应链绩效的主要因素.供应合同研究忽视了机会主义行为的影响,同时也未涉及合同的达成过程.合作伙伴关系研究考虑了防范机会主义行为的问题,但仍未涉及协调机制的达成过程.供应链契约演化理论强调协调机制的调整是成员企业学习的结果,但忽视了协调机制的利益分配功能.综合上述理论及资源依赖理论,本文提出,协调机制是权力博弈的结果.每一种任务依赖关系都对应着一个潜在的有效率的协调机制,只有当权力结构与有效率的协调机制相适应时,才可能实现供应链整体绩效最优化的目标.     

Capital structure,managerial ownership and firm performance: evidence from Egypt

This paper focuses on an important issue, which has generally received less attention in corporate governance literature, being the effect of managerial ownership on the relationship between debt and firm performance. By employing a sample of Egyptian listed firms, the generalized least squares method, as a panel data technique, is used to examine the joint effect of debt and managerial ownership on various measures of firm performance (i.e., Tobin’s q and ROA). The results reveal that managerial ownership moderates the relationship between debt and firm performance, with the relationship being negative (positive) in presence (absence) of managerial ownership concentration. The implication of this finding is that the optimal capital structure is more likely to be contingent on contextual variables as well as the roles, power, and stakes of key internal and external actors. Put simply, the effectiveness of one corporate governance mechanism (i.e., debt) is more likely to be contingent on the effect of other existed corporate governance mechanisms, and hence, there is not one best arrangement of either capital structure or ownership structure, but different arrangements are not equally good.     

A cyclical view of the relationship between corporate governance and strategic management

The vast majority of research on the relationship between corporate governance and strategic management focuses on the impact of corporate governance on strategic management. In this article we propose a cyclical model, highlighting that strategic decisions can also affect corporate governance through shaping firm ownership structure. We discuss the impacts of strategic decisions on firm ownership structure and corporate governance in the contexts of publicly traded firms, private firms, and the privatization of state-owned enterprises. We hope that our cyclical model can promote researchers to develop a more complete view about the relationships between strategic management, ownership structure, and corporate governance.     

Beyond the “silo view” of strategic management and corporate governance: evidence from Fiat,Telecom Italia and Unicredit

While corporate governance and strategic management have for a long time suffered from artificial separation and, therefore, generally been tackled in a secluded manner, their combined organizational impact makes them stringently related to one another in the firms’ evolution. In this paper, we argue that, transcending the “silo view” of corporate governance and strategic management, time has come to acknowledge that, depending on circumstances and time periods, within a firm is possible to detect the relative dominance of corporate governance over strategic management, rather than the leadership of strategic management over corporate governance. Drawing on a contingency approach, we dissect the relationships (and the mechanisms that control it) between the strategic function (i.e., which defines the firms’ strategy and supervisions its implementation) and the governance function (i.e., the congruence assessment between the firm strategy selected and the interests of the ownership and of other relevant stakeholders represented in the board of directors and the effectiveness appraisal of the entrepreneurial action). Then, by performing a thorough retrospective qualitative analysis of three relevant case-histories of Italian firms (Fiat, Telecom Italia and Unicredit) operating in three different industries (automobile, banking and telecommunications), we surmise that, either in corporate governance (board) oriented or in strategic management (CEO) oriented companies, the ‘real’ problems arise when the quality of corporate governance or strategic management is poor. Interestingly, we eventually suggest to adopt a value-based approach to the relationship between corporate governance and strategy that may fruitfully complement the contingency perspective taken at the onset of the work.     

Corporate governance effectiveness along the entrepreneurial process of a family firm: the role of private equity

This paper was motivated by the increasing interest in the corporate governance debate on how effective structure and processes may influence entrepreneurial transitions. Along the entrepreneurial process, little research to date has investigated the exit in the context of entrepreneurial family firms. Previous literature has considered the exit mainly as a failure for entrepreneurial families, but when uncertainties arise this choice may enable ownership transitions, thus facilitating survival and long term strategies. Among the exit options, a private equity buyout may balance the family’s wealth protection and the firm’s future growth. However, which family specific characteristics and strategic needs may affect the exit option still remains a neglected topic. Drawing on corporate governance literature and recent research addressing entrepreneurship in family firms, this paper investigates, by a single case study, the bridging role of private equity buyout for going through entrepreneurial transitions. Findings suggest that a private equity buyout is a governance mechanism that may sustain an entrepreneurial transition by realigning family interests and goals. It may also allow the family commitment for improving organizational capabilities required by an entrepreneurial transition.     

连锁董事与公司绩效:针对中国的研究

关于连锁董事对公司绩效产生正面影响还是负面影响的争论一直存在.一种假设认为,连锁董事在转型经济中能够弥补市场失灵和制度漏洞,从而有助于改善公司绩效.而另一相对的假设则认为,转型中的公司治理失灵催生了连锁董事作为一种社会凝聚的工具,有利于实现管理层利益的最大化.但是,还尚未有在制度变迁背景下对这一问题的研究.利用中国当前制度变迁的大环境,我们建立了284家上市公司连续八年的面板数据库,并针对以上两个假设进行了实证检验.研究结果发现,连锁董事的网络核心度与企业绩效呈负相关关系,即处于连锁董事网络中越核心位置的企业其绩效越差.该结果支持了治理失灵假设.本研究对连锁董事网络研究、公司治理以及转型经济研究具有重要借鉴.     

Managerial incentive, organizational slack, and performance: empirical analysis of Japanese firms’ behavior

The main purpose of this study is to investigate how organizational slack is created and how it affects a firm’s performance. To address these questions, we construct three equations: managerial incentive function, organizational slack formation function and performance function, and we apply 3SLS simultaneously to these functions by using the data sets of 2,791 Japanese firms from the years 2001 and 2006. From the empirical analysis of these Japanese firms, we obtain the following results: a firm’s performance declines as organizational slack increases; organizational slack is affected by annual change rate of revenues but not by managerial incentive; managerial incentive decreases as a firm’s performance improves while it increases as the structure of corporate governance is strengthened.     

A Review of Theory in Family Business Research: The Implications for Corporate Governance

In recent years, increasing scholarly attention has been directed toward the field of family business research. Based on an exhaustive sample of 235 publications, this article provides a comprehensive review and a critical assessment of the theoretical underpinnings and corporate governance issues in family business research. Three predominant theoretical perspectives, namely principal–agent theory, stewardship theory and the resource‐based view of the firm, have emerged and provide empirical evidence that family businesses significantly differ from non‐family firms in important dimensions such as agency costs, competitive advantages or corporate governance structure. On their own, none of the aforementioned perspectives succeeds in addressing all complexities associated with family businesses and their corporate governance. Accordingly, joint approaches combining different theoretical frameworks can help to improve understanding of the family business. The article concludes by discussing possible directions for future research that might further contribute to building a comprehensive theory of the family business and its corporate governance.     

Entrenchment in publicly traded family firms: Evidence from the S&P 500

Family involvement in corporate governance through ownership, management, and board membership presents a unique dilemma for understanding the strategic impetus and costs of entrenchment decisions. The presence of shared family ties and the family-centered goals of firm principals call to question the applicability of extant agency arguments regarding the nature and antecedents of managerial entrenchment. Exploring this, we develop and test a model of family firm-specific determinants (i.e., family ownership and family's involvement in management and governance) of entrenchment in publicly traded firms by drawing upon principal-principal agency theory. Findings of the empirical analysis of family owned S&P 500 firms suggest family firms are motivated to entrench managers when doing so supports the pursuit of family-centric goals. However, the extent to which entrenchment supports such goals varies at different levels of family ownership.     

Effect of the board of directors and the audit committee on firm performance: a panel data analysis

This research examines the relationship between independent directors, the audit committee (AC), and firm performance, taking into account the impact of the chief executive officer’s powers and block shareholders. We use the maximum likelihood estimator, based on agency theory assumptions and cylindered panel data, to examine three models of firm performance. The results show that the independence of the board is reflected clearly by increased economic and equity performance of the firm. However, an AC that is fully independent or meets frequently is associated with lower firm performance. Unlike pension funds, institutional shareholders can be considered an effective control mechanism in the context of France. Our results development includes advanced explanations for market liquidity and shareholders’ portfolios. The study period ends before the European regulation on ACs came into effect in 2008. This allows for an appreciation of soft law in French corporate governance. It also lets us compare the data with the way firms operate their boards one decade later. The evidence provides useful guidelines on the supremacy of soft law in corporate governance and suggests that the composition and functioning of the board of directors should be moderated based on the firms’ context. The specificity of the cylindered panel data helps to better examine the impact of the board and AC’s independence and functioning in French corporate governance structure.     

Dual-class shares,external financing needs,and firm performance

Whereas the agency theory predicts that dual-class shares decrease firm performance, the stewardship theory predicts that dual-class shares increase firm performance. The cumulative findings on the performance consequences of dual-class shares have been weak and/or inconclusive. Because endogeneity is a constant challenge in empirical corporate governance studies, this study uses a unique law change in Switzerland as a source of exogenous variation in the fraction of firms with dual-class shares. Controlling for firm fixed effects and time-varying confounders, we find that dual-class shares neither harm nor benefit firm performance on average. However, dual-class shares increase firm performance if the firm requires external finance and dual-class shares decrease firm performance if the firm does not require external finance. External financing needs mitigate the agency costs between controlling and minority shareholders and create a context in which dual-class shares facilitate firm-specific investments instead of private perquisites. The study’s results have both managerial and policy implications.