A preliminary analysis of the high birth rate in India]

The author first provides some basic demographic data for India and points out that the current annual rate of population growth of 2.45 percent is slightly higher than the annual increase in food production. Problems in the areas of employment, education, housing, and transportation, as well as the general problem of poverty, are seen as a consequence of this imbalance. The lack of success of the national family planning program is attributed primarily to the failure to achieve a satisfactory rate of economic growth. Contributory factors include early marriage, the low status of women, the desire for large families, and administrative problems associated with the family planning program.     

Kenya's record population growth: a dilemma of development

The causes and implications of Kenya's 4% rate of natural increase and fertility rate of 8.1 births per woman were examined. Attention was directed to the following: pronatalist pressures; inadvertent pronatalist impact of development; women's education and employment and fertility; population growth and pressures; mortality decline and population growth; fertility levels and differentials; fertility desires; the family planning program; and family planning knowledge, attitudes, and practice. Kenya's development success has worked to push up the population growth rate. Improved health care and nutrition halved infant mortality from 160 to 87 deaths/1000 live births between 1958 and 1977 and a marked increase in primary school enrollment may be factors in the birthrate increase to 53/1000 population. At this time fertility is highest among women with 1-4 years of education. The 1977-1978 Kenya Fertility Survey showed that only 5.8% of married women were using modern contraception, indicating that the national family planning program, established in 1967, has made little progress. Program difficulties have included shortages of staff, supplies and easily accessible clinic as well as an almost universal desire on the part of Kenyans for families of at least 7 children. Children are viewed as essential to survival and status to the rural population.     

Religion and fertility in the United States: The importance of marriage patterns and hispanic origin

The marital fertility of white Catholic wives in the United States was higher than that of non-Catholic wives in 1977–1981, but when Hispanics were excluded, the differential disappeared; therefore, the Catholic-non-Catholic differential in recent years was due entirely to the higher fertility of Hispanic Catholics. The Total Fertility Rates (TFR) of Catholics were slightly lower in 1977–1981 than those for white Protestants, primarily because Catholic women tend to marry later than Protestant women. This finding was confirmed by multivariate analysis of data on children ever born. We examine some additional data and various theories to speculate on whether these patterns will last.     

The prediction of fertility among catholics: A longitudinal analysis

A longitudinal analysis of the reproductive behavior of a sample of Catholics who were participants in the 1965 NFS and reinterviewed in 1969 is reported in this paper. Fertility over the period studied varied systematically with the additional number of children intended in 1965. In addition, this study has documented a predictive role for method of contraception and the experience of premarital pregnancy. Women using less effective methods and those premaritally pregnant had higher fertility over the interval net of controls for other variables in the analysis, including life-cycle stage and 1965 intentions. Surprisingly, the planning status of the last pregnancy before 1965 was not found to have any independent association with subsequent fertility.     

Effects of education on reproductive behavior: lessons from Pakistan

Evidence from the Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey 1990/91 (PDHS) and a 1987 study by Zeba A. Sathar and Karen Oppenheim on women's fertility in Karachi and the impact of educational status, corroborates the correlation between improved education for women and fertility decline. PDHS revealed that current fertility is 5.4 children/ever married woman by the end of the reproductive period. 12% currently use a contraceptive method compared to 49% in India, 40% in Bangladesh, and 62% in Sri Lanka. The social environment of high illiteracy, low educational attainment, poverty, high infant and child and maternal mortality, son preference, and low status of women leads to high fertility. Fertility rates vary by educational status; i.e., women with no formal education have 2 more children than women with at least some secondary education. Education also affects infant and child mortality and morbidity. Literacy is 31% for women and 43% for men. 30% of all males and 20% of all females have attended primary school. Although most women know at least 1 contraceptive method, it is the urban educated woman who is twice as likely to know a source of supply and 5 times more likely to be a user. The Karachi study found that lower fertility among better educated urban women is an unintended consequence of women's schooling and deliberate effort to limit the number of children they have. Education-related fertility differentials could not be explained by the length of time women are at risk of becoming pregnant (late marriage age). Fertility limitation may be motivated by the predominant involvement in the formal work force and higher income. The policy implications are the increasing female schooling is a good investment in lowering fertility; broader improvements also need to be made in economic opportunities for women, particularly in the formal sector. Other needs are for increasing availability and accessibility of contraceptive and family planning services and increasing availability and accessibility of contraceptive and family planning services and increasing knowledge of contraception. The investment will impact development and demography and is an adjunct to child health an survival.     

Age at marriage,family planning practices,and other variables as correlates of fertility in Korea

The relationships between fertility and thirteen variables are examined in three groups of married Korean women, about 400 each from urban, rural, and semi-rural areas. Data were obtained by interview. Age at marriage and family planning practice are the strongest predictors of fertility and account for about 10 percent and 7 percent of the total variance, respectively. Other factors which accounted for lesser fractions of variability are ideal number of children, rural versus urban residence, education, aspiration for daughters, exposure to mass media, and economic status. Most of the relationships appear to be stable over time; others, which are associated with modernization, appear to be changing. The thirteen variables combined can account for a maximum of 40 percent of the variance in fertility.     

American Catholicism and the International Family Planning Movement

This paper examines the role of the American Catholic Church in the international family planning movement and discusses elements of the Catholic opposition to birth control. The paper argues that the reaction of American Catholics to government support for contraceptive services was based not only on the Church's condemnation of particular contraceptive methods, but also on a variety of other factors including class and ethnic hostility between Catholics and the promoters of family planning, jurisdictional disputes over what institutions would guide family life, the perceived threat that government support of family planning was to the authority of the Church and the Church's understanding of sex and women. The role of an American theology of political compromise and accommodation in mitigating the American Catholic Church's opposition to organized family planning is assessed.     

Only children as adult women: Life course events and timing

A comparison between adult women who are only children and women who grew up with siblings is performed in relation to life course characteristics (events and timing), using a random sample of Canadian women (birth cohorts 1905–29 and 1930–44) surveyed, by telephone, in Vancouver and Victoria (total n of 1 251, with a response rate of approximately 60 percent). Initial analysis shows that female adult only children are less likely to have large families, more likely to marry and have their first child at older ages, more likely to attain high levels of education, and, among the younger cohort, more likely to cohabitate at younger ages. However, more refined analysis reveals that differences are, for the most part, the result of family of origin variables associated with sibsize rather than the result of only child status per se. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for research within the life course perspective, and in the light of possible changes accompanying population aging.     

Theoretical explanation of rapid decline in China's fertility]

China's fertility decline is widely acknowledged. The 1982 census and a random survey of 1/1,000th of the nation's population set the total fertility rate at 2.6%. Bureau of statistics data collected in 1984 showed the nation's birth rate as 1.7% and total fertility rate 1.94%. Friendly observers call this a miracle; others blame the decline on forced government family planning policy. Scientific pursuit of the causes for the decline is an issue of practical and realistic value. First, favorable conditions for fertility decline have been fostered by the socialist system and are deeply rooted in the country's economic development. China's industrialization and urbanization have brought new lifestyles and liberated individuals and families from the constraints of traditional family life. Couples have chosen to limit the number of children, to enhance the quality of life and education potential of their children, thus altering the traditional high fertility in China. Education of women has played a role in raising women's consciousness; a 1982 census placed the fertility rate of women with high-school level education or above, lower than that for less or uneducated women. Neonatal mortality rate decline is also related to the spontaneous decline in fertility rate, as high fertility has historically been intended to compensate for high child mortality rates. Welfare and social security systems for the elderly have also helped change the traditional mentality of having many children as assurance of life support in old age. Social organizations have accelerated knowledge and methods of planned fertility. Later marriages are also a factor: in 1970 the average marriage age was 19 - 20 and had increased by 1976 to 22 - 23. Other favorable social factors include free birth control and the view of population planning as an essential part of national welfare.     

Attitudes toward family size and family planning in nairobi

In Nairobi, 352 married African adults, 152 men and 200 women, were interviewed on their attitudes toward family size and family planning. The respondents had, on the average, slightly less than three children at the time of interview and hoped to add slightly more than three children to this total. There was little difference in desired family size by sex.About one-half of both men and women had some knowledge of family planning methods, and there was a general interest (75 percent of the men and 90 percent of the women) in learning more. In addition, two out of every three men, and nine out of every ten women, approved of family planning, and even greater majorities of both sexes were willing to have the government of Kenya provide such services.In spite of their approval, however, only 13 percent of the men, and 2 percent of the women, had ever practiced family planning. These findings are broadly comparable to those found in other emerging nations and suggest that knowledge, interest, and approval generally precede use.     

Married-Couple Families With Step,Adopted, and Biological Children

National estimates of the numbers of families with step, adopted, and biological children have not previously been developed. In this work, parent types for children in married-couple families were indirectly identified by using marriage and birth dates. Families were then classified by the types of children present. A large majority (79 percent) had only biological children; however, a significant minority (16 percent) had at least one stepchild and 4 percent had at least one adopted child. This analysis provides national estimates of the numbers and characteristics of married-couple families with step, adopted, and biological children.     

Fertility trends in rural Hebei Province,People's Republic of China

Background: The People's Republic of China (PRC) has conducted several different population policies since its establishment. Although fertility has declined dramatically in the past three decades, the degree to which this was the result of the different population policies is still under debate. Purpose: We attempt to evaluate the effect of the different formal population policies conducted in the PRC by looking at the fertility behavior of rural women. Unlike urban women, rural women experienced less social control (in the absence of a work unit) and received fewer benefits from adhering to the one-child policy. Data: The data analyzed were collected from a stratified sample of households from 288 villages in 9 counties of Hebei Province, PRC, between 1996 and 1999. The number of children ever born was reported by 4,168 ever-married women aged 25 and over who had had at least one birth. Findings: Our analysis indicates that the formal population policies of the PRC had little effect on the number of children ever born to rural women in Hebei. These retrospective data, by cohort, indicate consistently declining fertility since the revolution (1949). Limited child bearing was associated with age and the level of education. Controlling for the effect of age and education, women born after 1960, at whom the one-child policy was directed, actually had more children than older women. Conclusions: The Chinese fertility decline, at least as reflected in the experience of rural women in Hebei Province, derived mainly from secular changes in women's access to education and other social resources rather than from the direct effects of population policies.     

Family growth and family planning: Responses to a family-planning action program in a rural district of Thailand

A resurvey of a rural district in Thailand, of about 70,000 population, was conducted after a family-planning program had been in operation for eight months in order to ascertain indications of effectiveness of the program. Both the "before" and "after" surveys employed a 25 percent simple random, though non-overlapping, sample of married women 20-44 years of age whose husbands were living. The only difference in design and execution was the inclusion in the resurvey of questions about the action program. Barring one or two exceptions, the characteristics of the two population samples were so similar that differences in knowledge, attitudes, and practices could be regarded as effects of the program.The action program not only made itself widely known in the district, it also evoked a highly favorable appraisal, to such an extent that nine of every ten women thought the program should be extended over the entire kingdom. Motivation to engage in family planning increased perceptibly. A substantial proportion (23 percent) of the women who formerly disapproved of the practice changed their attitudes to approval, mainly because they had become convinced of the harmlessness and the utility of fertility control. Less than 3 percent of the former approvers had become negative.The proportion of women who claimed some kind of knowledge about contraceptive methods more than doubled during the eight months of the program's operation. More impressive, however, was the change in actual use of methods, which rose from 1 to 21 percent of the eligible women (women who were not pregnant, subfecund, or sterilized). Another 16 percent, in the resurvey, planned to begin use of contraceptives in the near future, in most instances after a current pregnancy. The frequency of acceptance of family planning practice exceeded the expected frequency among women who were approaching or had attained the "ideal" number of children (4.0 children). High-parity women 40 or more years of age seldom accepted clinical assistance.     

Is Stepfamily Status Associated With Cohabiting and Married Women’s Fertility Behaviors?

Children from prior relationships potentially complicate fertility decision-making in new cohabitations and marriages. On the one hand, the “value of children” perspective suggests that unions with and without stepchildren have similar—and deliberate—reasons for shared childbearing. On the other hand, multipartnered fertility (MPF) research suggests that childbearing across partnerships is often unintended. Using the 2006–2010 National Survey of Family Growth and event-history models, I examine the role of stepfamily status on cohabiting and married women’s fertility and birth intendedness, with attention to union type and stepfamily configuration. Adjusting for covariates, women in stepfamily unions are more likely to have a first shared birth in a union than women in unions in which neither partner has children from past relationships, but stepfamily births are less likely to be intended than unintended. Further, this association varies by union type: married women have similar birth risks across stepfamily status, but births are less likely to be intended in marital stepfamilies. For cohabitors, women in a stepfamily are more likely to have a birth than women in nonstepfamily unions, with no differences in intendedness. Configuration (whose children and how many) also matters; for instance, women with one child from a past relationship are more likely to have a birth and to have an intended than unintended birth than women with other stepfamily configurations. It appears that children from either partner’s prior relationships influences subsequent fertility decision-making, undermining the utility of the “value of children” perspective for explaining childbearing behaviors in complex families.     

Impact of educational attainments on women's fertility]

The fertility rates of Chinese women of different educational backgrounds and ages were studied. The results indicate that women with higher educational backgrounds are likely to marry later in life, and have fewer children. The converse is also true; women with little or no education marry very young and have significantly more offspring. It is noted that many of the poory educated are traditionally conservative; they strongly desire at least 1 male offspring, and generally understand the least about matters related to family planning. In terms of economics and human investment, intellectuals are less likely to want more than 1 child. 2 of the most effective ways in which fertility rates may be lowered are to reduce early fertility and to improve the educational levels of women.     

Case study: fertility decline in Iran

Iran has experienced one of the most successful family planning programs in the developing world, with 64 percent decline in total fertility rate (TFR) between 1986 and 2000. This paper focuses on Iranians’ unique experience with implementation of a national family planning program. Recognition of sensitive moral and ethical aspects of population issues resulted in successful collaboration of technical experts and religious leaders. Involvement of local health workers, women health volunteers and rural midwives led to great community participation. Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data in 2000 indicated a TFR of 2.0 births per women and 74 percent contraceptive use among married women. This case study will help policy makers and researchers in Moslem countries and other developing countries with high fertility rate to consider a successful family program as a realistic concept with positive impacts on nation’s health and human development.     

Destroying False Images of God: The Experiences of LGBT Catholics

This article is about how lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans (LGBT) Catholics imagine God and how images of God change in parallel with their self-image. The study is based on qualitative research with LGBT Catholics, most of whom are members of Drachma LGBTI in Malta or Ali d’Aquila in Palermo, Sicily. LGBT Catholics’ image of God changes as they struggle to reconcile their religious and sexual identities and as they go through a process of “conversion” from deviants and sinners to loved children of God. One study participant compares his faith in God to peeling an onion: “With every layer one peels off, one destroys false images of God.” Most study participants have moved away from the image of God as a bearded old man and father of creation and moved more toward a conception of God as love once identity conflicts are resolved.     

Connecting older grandmothers raising grandchildren with community resources improves family resiliency,social support,and caregiver self-efficacy

Custodial grandparenting can be especially challenging for older grandmothers facing age specific issues. Kinship navigator programs are social service delivery programs intended to inform grandparents and other relatives raising children about available resources and services, provide information specific to their individual needs, and help families navigate service systems. Our study utilizes self-report data from one kinship navigator federal demonstration project, which used a randomized control trial, to examine demographic characteristics for grandmothers under and over 55 years of age, whether grandmother caregivers (≥55 years) improve family resilience, social support, and caregiver self-efficacy, and which interventions improved outcomes for grandmothers (≥55 years). Each participant was randomly assigned to one of four groups: Usual Care (traditional child welfare services), Standard Care (family support and case management), Peer-to-Peer Care Only, and Full Kin Tech Care (peer navigators with computer access and interdisciplinary team). Thirty-nine percent of grandmothers (55-75 years) were mostly living in poverty, predominantly Caucasian, with 36% identifying as African American/Black, with at least one to two children at home. Repeated-measures ANOVAs for each subscale showed statistically significant within- and between-group differences for Family Functioning, Social Supports, Concrete Supports, Child Development, and Nurturing and Attachment, with the exception of Usual Care, which showed a decline in protective factors consistently across subscales. Future research with kinship families could qualitatively examine the experiences for older women in navigator programs and replication of kinship navigator programs could build capacity in data collection and maintenance systems to gain better perspective about how systems of care impact families.     

Evolving Fertility Goals and Behaviors in Current U.S. Childbearing Cohorts

In the post-Recession era, U.S. fertility rates have continued to fall. It is unclear if these declines are driven by shifts in fertility goals or growing difficulty in achieving goals. In this paper, we construct synthetic cohorts of men and women to examine both cross-cohort and within-cohort changes in fertility goals using multiple cycles of the National Survey of Family Growth. Although more recent cohorts exhibit lower achieved fertility at younger ages than earlier cohorts at the same age, intended parity remains around two children, and intentions to remain childless rarely exceed 15 percent. There is weak evidence of a growing fertility gap in the early 30s, suggesting more recent cohorts will need considerable childbearing in the 30s and early 40s to “catch up” to earlier goals, yet low-parity women in their early 40s are decreasingly likely to have unfulfilled fertility desires or intentions to have children. Low-parity men in their early 40s, though, are increasingly likely to intend children. Declines in U.S. fertility thus seem to be largely driven not by changes in early-life fertility goals so much as either a decreasing likelihood of achieving earlier goals or, perhaps, shifts in the preferred timing of fertility that depress period measures.     

Missing the Target? Correspondence of Fertility Intentions and Behavior in the U.S.

Building on a framework suggested by Bongaarts (2001)and using data from the 1979 National LongitudinalSurvey of Youth, we describe the correspondencebetween intended family size and observed fertilityfor the 1957 to 1961 birth cohorts of U.S. women andmen. Over an 18-year period (1982–2000), we showthat while aggregate intentions are quite stable,discrepancies are very common at the individual level.Women and men were more likely to err in predictingnumber of additional births in the period 1982–2000 thanto hit their target number. A very strong predictor of over-and underachieving fertility is initial intended parity. Thosewho intended more than two children tended to have fewerchildren than intended, while those who intended fewer thantwo children tended to have more children than intended. Inaddition and consistent with life course arguments, thoseunmarried in 1982, childless in 1982, and (for women) stillin school in 1982 were most likely to underachieve their 2000intended parity (i.e., have fewer children than intended). Weconclude by reflecting on how the circumstances that allowdiscrepancies between intentions and behavior to almost``balance'' in the U.S. may cumulate differently elsewhere toproduce much lower fertility.