Political and Cultural Dimensions of Tea Party Support, 2009–2012

The Tea Party Movement (TPM) burst onto the political scene following the 2008 elections. Early on, the movement attracted broad public support and seemed to tap into a variety of cultural concerns rooted in the changing demographic, political, and economic face of the nation. However, some observers questioned whether the Tea Party represented anything more than routine partisan backlash. And what had started as a seemingly grassroots movement that changed the face of American politics in the 2010 election was reduced to being mainly a caucus within Congress by 2012. In this article, we examine the cultural and political dimensions of Tea Party support over time. Using polling data from North Carolina and Tennessee and quantitative media analysis, we provide new evidence that cultural dispositions in addition to conservative identification were associated with TPM favorability in 2010; that these dispositions crystallized into shared political positions in 2011; and that by 2012 little distinguished TPM adherents from other conservatives.     

American Evangelicals and Conservative Politics: Past,Present, and Future

Since the late 1970s, American evangelicals have been a potent influence in conservative politics. Recent scholarship both refines and contextualizes some of the central themes found in the broader literature on evangelical politics. We first review key recent scholarship in American religious history. It shows that current patterns of evangelical conservatism are the product of historically contingent social forces and that political conservatism was never uniform among evangelicals. We then discuss recent scholarship on evangelicals' attitudes toward public issues. This work indicates that commitment to moral traditionalism on social issues is the dominant force animating evangelical political conservatism and that evangelicals remain distinctly Republican in their partisan voting despite economic and foreign policy commitments that are not as strongly aligned with Republican priorities. We then shift our focus to the dominant conservative movement of the moment: the Tea Party. We cite evidence that evangelicals and the Tea Party remain distinct in terms of constituents and issue priorities but that social concerns may be taking precedence over the economic concerns that birthed the movement. We conclude by discussing recent trends that suggest that a de‐alignment between evangelicalism and conservative politics may be underway.     

The Undeserving Rich: “Moral Values” and the White Working Class1

White working‐class citizens who vote for the Republican Party have been fodder for much political discussion and speculation recently, and a debate has arisen about the role that “moral values” played in the political decision making of this segment of voters. In this article, we defend a version of the moral values claim. We show that although the Republicans’ policies are unpopular, they are bundled with an overarching moral framework that is extremely resonant to this set of voters, and we use in‐depth interviews to uncover this framework. A key feature of this framework, on which in the 2004 presidential election George W. Bush scored high and John Kerry scored low, is the appropriate attitude to wealth, which serves as an indicator for a candidate’s general moral philosophy and as a heuristic about whether the candidate will govern with working‐class voters’ interests in mind. National Election Studies data support the argument that this was a key influence on the voting decision in 2004, even controlling for voters’ partisan identification.     

Partisan Political Identification among White Ethnic Groups: An Historical Analysis

Abstract

This article presents evidence and argument dealing with partisan political identification among white ethnic groups. Recently, numerous political commentators and analysts have argued that the ethnic-labor component of the New Deal coalition is in the midst of collapse and decay, and that white ethnics are re-aligning with the Republican Party. Through an analysis of public opinion data gathered between 1936 and 1974, the partisan re-alignment theory is critically examined. The data show little or no support for the idea that Catholic and Jewish ethnics are identifying more closely with the Republican Party. Data show that degree of identification with the Democrats is nearly the same in 1974 as it was in 1936.     

Social Movement Theory and the “Modern Day Tea Party”

The rise of the Tea Party movement took many political observers by surprise, but social movement theory can help us to understand how the Tea Party began. Frustration with the federal government's plans for economic recovery, combined with opposition to President Obama's election, morphed into nationwide protests and a vocal presence in the 2010 midterm elections. This paper uses the Tea Party as an example to illustrate social movement life cycles, explaining relevant theories, their application to the movement in each phase of its development, and areas in which the Tea Party challenges current literature on social movements. Social movement theory is discussed as a tool that is constantly being honed as new research increases our understanding of how movements develop and function.     

Some Notes on Local Level Political Activism

Abstract

The large number of studies of the impact of Watergate have generally ignored its electoral repercussions. This paper helps to fill this void by reporting the results of a statewide panel study which investigated the effects of attitudes toward Watergate on shifts in political party identification between 1970 and 1974. We found a considerable amount of change in the partisan identifications of the panel members during the four years; however, while both parties suffered an overall loss of support to the “Independents,” the Republicans did lose considerably more support than did the Democrats. More importantly, the greater Republican losses were found to be significantly related to attitudes toward Watergate. It therefore appears that Watergate contributed to the shrinking proportion of Republicans within our panel. While the Republican losses were not of great magnitude, they appear sufficiently large to have had an effect on recent elections.     

Protest Movements and Citizen Discontent: Occupy Wall Street and the Tea Party

Why do citizens indicate support for protest movements such as the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street? There have been two general sets of explanations. One set emphasizes that support comes from those for whom the existing party system, and the ideological differentiation that corresponds to party divisions, are irrelevant. The second set takes the opposite tack, and emphasizes that the only thing that supporters of protests movements find lacking in the party system is extremity. Using some underexplored data, we present evidence that both accounts are incorrect for the case of these recent movements (Occupy and the Tea Party): what provokes support for protest movements is not ideology itself but a fundamental rejection of the current state of the party system, which we call disgruntlement. What ideology does for supporters is provide a sense of political friends and enemies (or near and far), which then can channel the direction that this disgruntlement takes. Further, ideologues with more education are more resistant to the appeal of the protest movement associated with the other political camp.     

How media diet,partisan frames,candidate traits,and political organization-public relationship communication drive party reputation

This study examined the ability of antecedents such as media diet and candidate traits to impact political organization-public relationships (POPRs), in turn affecting views on party reputation. As expected, survey respondents reported greater levels of relationship-focused communication and higher reputation assessments of their own parties, additionally rating their party’s candidate higher in authenticity and character. Connecting media diet and reputation, heavier use of partisan, traditional media (e.g., talk radio and cable news) indicated increased partisan divides, suggesting young and often inexperienced voters engage in motivated reasoning, seeking out information from sources that cater to their existing ideologies. This pattern was less pronounced for infotainment and social media sources, suggesting promising agenda-building opportunities for political PR practitioners. SEM analyses demonstrated the significant influence of candidate traits and POPR on party reputation, though manifestations of effects differed among Democrats and Republicans, the implications of which are discussed.     

Quality Controlled: An Ethnographic Account of Tea Party Messaging and Action

What strategies do Tea Party movement organizers use to achieve frame alignment, that is, uniformity of grievance, purpose, and action, with their participants? Evidence to answer this question is gathered from a year‐length participant‐observation case study of one city‐based Tea Party organization, primarily through the meetings of its localized grassroots chapters. Principal findings are that Tea Party organizers employ quality control of off‐message grievances, for example, abortion, as well as any action or communication that would or could be perceived as racially prejudicial, or otherwise inflammatory. Formally, these findings demonstrate the influence of organizational hierarchy on grassroots practice. Substantively, they demonstrate the complex relationship between a broader conservative ideological repertoire as empirically deployed by participants, and the more focused frame alignment attempts of a particular social movement organization. In short, the findings elucidate the importance of interaction and organizational structure as they influence social movement messaging and action.     

Are They Not Worthy? How Partisan Political Blogs Legitimize the Tea Party Movement and Occupy Wall Street

Social movements struggle to gain acceptance as legitimate actors so that they can raise money, recruit members, and convince politicians to meet their demands. We know little, however, about how this legitimacy is granted by various political authorities, in part because legitimacy is often poorly operationalized. To operationalize legitimacy, I revise Charles Tilly's ( 1999 ) classic concept of WUNC displays (i.e., public presentations of worthiness, unity, numbers, commitment) to assess how political authorities legitimize social movements. I analyze original data on the coverage the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street received from 20 elite political blogs during a critical event early in each movement's development. I find that liberal and conservative blogs both use the same aspects of worthiness (and not unity, numbers, or commitment) to endorse their preferred movement but different aspects of unworthiness to denounce the movement they opposed. Conservative outlets were more partisan on both accounts. This suggests that these blogs' shared status as distinctly partisan political outsiders produces a similar, but not identical, relationship with social movements. While both sets of blogs legitimize and delegitimize a movement based on its specific strengths and weaknesses, conservative blogs act more as a partisan bullhorn and liberal blogs act more as a forum for debate.     

Race,Religiosity, and the Women's Vote

Abstract

Much of our popular political discourse focuses on the Democratic character of the women's vote, but there is, in fact, considerable diversity among female voters. Important sectors of the female electorate have political concerns that are at odds with the Democratic Party, though they hold these preferences less strongly than do men. This article focuses on these differences between women and links them to electoral behavior in the 1996 presidential election. I argue that women, like men, cast their vote with the party that best represents their interests, as they understand them. African American women overwhelmingly supported the Democratic Party in 1996, which is consistent with theories of racial group interests, but white women diverge politically.

The main finding of this research is that religious values play a central role in white women's voting behavior, even after taking into account ideological and partisan predispositions. We see this result, I argue, because religious and secular women correctly identify the Republican Party as the repository of social conservatism and the Democratic Party as embracing social liberalism.     

The echo chamber is overstated: the moderating effect of political interest and diverse media

ABSTRACT

In a high-choice media environment, there are fears that individuals will select media and content that reinforce their existing beliefs and lead to segregation based on interest and/or partisanship. This could lead to partisan echo chambers among those who are politically interested and could contribute to a growing gap in knowledge between those who are politically interested and those who are not. However, the high-choice environment also allows individuals, including those who are politically interested, to consume a wide variety of media, which could lead them to more diverse content and perspectives. This study examines the relationship between political interest as well as media diversity and being caught in an echo chamber (measured by five different variables). Using a nationally representative survey of adult internet users in the United Kingdom (N?=?2000), we find that those who are interested in politics and those with diverse media diets tend to avoid echo chambers. This work challenges the impact of echo chambers and tempers fears of partisan segregation since only a small segment of the population are likely to find themselves in an echo chamber. We argue that single media studies and studies which use narrow definitions and measurements of being in an echo chamber are flawed because they do not test the theory in the realistic context of a multiple media environment.     

New Pride and Old Prejudice

The determinants of women's political orientations are explored in terms of two perspectives: ambition and gender role and their interrelationship. A sample of 1336 Democratic and Republican delegates to the 1972 national nominating conventions was used to compare the political expectations and aspirations of men and women. Women were found tohave less interest in holding public officebut equalled men in aspiring to party careers. Party as well as sex differences affected the political ambitions of female elites, with Democratic women more likely to pursue public office holding and Republican women remaining committed to the party sphere. Women's roles in the family and at work were also found to influence the development of political ambition among women. In addition, gender roles had an impact on the type of ambition women developed and the styles of activism they pursued.     

God,Party, and the Poor: How Politics and Religion Interact to Affect Economic Justice Attitudes

Moral attitudes justifying economic inequality are often embedded within conservative religion and politics in the United States, even as traditional Christian values assert the need for compassion toward the poor. Using the Baylor Religion Survey, we assessed the role of religion in influencing partisan attitudes about poverty, finding that Republicans not only oppose federal policy aimed toward redistribution of wealth but also articulate less of a personal moral obligation to help the poor. However, Republicans who believe in a highly engaged God are strikingly similar to Democrats on these economic justice issues, suggesting that some types of religion do make conservatives more “compassionate.”     

When parties and candidates collide: citizen perception of house candidates' positions on abortion

When candidates assume issue positions opposite those of their sponsoring political party do citizens recognize these positions? Relatedly, what role do candidates' actual issue positions play in citizens' perceptions of their issue positions? Examining citizens' perceptions of 1996 and 1998 House candidates' position on abortion, this research finds that citizens' perceptions are shaped largely by partisan and, to a lesser extent, gender stereotypes. However, candidates' individuating positions on abortion influence perceptions of the candidates' position, but the effects are considerably stronger for perceptions of Republican candidates. Democratic candidates are likely to adopt anti-abortion positions in districts characterized by lower than average levels of political awareness and education, reducing the likelihood their party-contradicting position is accurately perceived. In contrast, Republican candidates adopt a pro-choice position in districts characterized by high education and political awareness, increasing the likelihood their position is accurately perceived.     

The Green Elephants in the Room: Perceived Environmental Harm and Support for Regulation Among Republicans

Previous research identifies a “great paradox” in attitudes toward environmental regulation: some people close to environmental risk nevertheless oppose environmental regulation for partisan reasons. Does this pattern hold in large survey samples? Unexpectedly, we do not find evidence for it. Instead, we find that Republicans who report higher levels of personal environmental harm also report stronger support for environmental regulation. This pattern holds across varied measurement specifications, and it is weaker for Democrats, suggesting that exposure to environmental harm might directly challenge and change partisan opposition to environmental reform. We present a theory and research agenda that accounts for these “green elephants in the room.” Our work, as we will demonstrate, crosses at least three disciplinary boundaries: social psychology, cultural sociology, and political science. A conceptual replication of results is provided in the Appendices S1 and S2.     

A GREAT DIVIDE?

Since 1980 most social scientists have found little evidence in support of popular and recurring commentaries that identify religion (and evangelical Protestants, in particular) as a major source of conservative political trends in the United States. But in the past several years a new line of research has reported results suggesting that earlier studies underestimated evidence that partisan change among specific religious groups has contributed to an emerging Republican electoral advantage. We assess this latter body of research, presenting the most comprehensive analysis to date of the effects of religious group memberships on political outcomes in national elections from 1972 through 2000. We address the limitations of past studies by incorporating advances in the measurement of religious denomination, adjudicating competing statistical models of the changing interrelationship of religion and voter alignments and extending previous investigations by simultaneously considering the impact of religion on (1) voting behavior, (2) partisanship, and (3) the representation of religious groups within the Democratic and Republican parties' electoral coalitions. Our results refine and extend past studies of religion and political change, providing evidence of limited changes in group-specific voting coupled with much larger changes in religion-based partisanship and party coalitions.     

The Paranoid Style Revisited: Pseudo‐Conservatism in the 21st Century

Fifty years ago, the Pulitzer Prize‐winning historian Richard Hofstadter published the seminal essay, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics.” In this and related works he examined the rhetoric animating the extreme right‐wing of the country's electorate. In this article I revisit Hofstadter's claims regarding the marginalization of the paranoid style and its connection to status‐based politics. A review of the most popular “pseudo‐conservative” commentators, survey data, the rise of the Tea Party, and the intransigence of the present day Republican Party suggests that a worldview that was once extreme has now become “mainstreme” within the political culture.     

Out of Step? Voters and Social Issues in U.S. Presidential Elections

Recent political commentary has argued that the Republican Party is “out of step” with voters on social issues, costing Republicans the 2012 presidential election. This dramatic claim is deserving of scrutiny in its own right and also for the way it offers new perspective on long‐standing controversies concerning the role of social issues in U.S. national elections. We present results that seek to advance established scholarship on electoral politics as well as journalistic claims concerning the rising importance of social issues for elections. Using data from the American National Election Study, we find that social issues mattered to voters in presidential elections from 1992 through 2012. The influence of social issues on voter choice rivals those of attitudes toward defense spending and government provision. We find further evidence that liberalizing trends in social issue opinion consistently benefited Democratic candidates in presidential elections. We consider the relevance of these results for scholarship on voter choice and elections, noting further implications for commentary on the 2012 presidential election.     

Social media use and democratic engagement: a comparative study of Hong Kong,Taiwan, and China

Recent studies in political communication have found a generally positive role of social media in democratic engagement. However, most research on youth’s social media use in relation to their political engagement has been conducted in the context of American and European democracies. This study fills a gap in the literature by examining the effects of the uses and structural features of social media on democratic engagement in three different Asian political systems: Taiwan (young liberal democracy); Hong Kong (partial democracy); and China (one-party state). The findings showed that sharing political information and connections with public actors consistently predicted offline participation (i.e., civic and political participation) and online participation (i.e., online political expression and online activism) in the three political systems. Although social media use for news, network size, and network structure did not consistently predict political outcomes, they played significant roles in influencing different engagement in the three political systems. The comparative approach used in this study helped to demonstrate the role of social media in the democratic engagement of youth in three places with similar cultures but different political contexts.