The Contemporary Family in Poland: New Trends and Phenomena

At the beginning of the 21st century, Poland can still be examined in the context of a political and economic transformation. The building of democracy and the intentional, ongoing reshaping of the Polish economy in the direction of a market economy are exerting significant influences on a wide range of issues that are affecting contemporary life. This article examines how these changes have affected women, men, and children as members of contemporary families. The article places the transformation to a market economy and to democracy within the context of the historical economic and social forces that have affected all modern states and concludes with a discussion of the potential short and long run impact of Polands entry in the European Union.     

Negotiating the New Market: Women,Families, Women’s Organizations and the Economic Transition in Poland

Women have been affected more negatively than men by the economic transformation in Poland. They are the majority of the unemployed and the poor, they have a more difficult time finding jobs, and their incomes are significantly lower than mens. The disadvantageous position of women on the labor market, coupled with increasing governmental withdrawal from social provisioning like childcare, health care, and education, has created problems for families, especially for growing numbers of single mothers and two-parent low-income families. The transition to a market economy also has generated a steady growth of womens organizations which have stepped in where the state has withdrawn from social provisioning and provide assistance to women and their families. These organizations are not only helping women and low-income families adjust to the new market situation, but also to negotiate the market so that it better responds to their needs.     

Comment on stephen M. Wunker, ‘The promise of non-profits in Poland and Hungary: an analysis of third sector renaissance’

Both the pre-war tradition and the real socialist system have influenced the form of the non-profit sector emerging in Poland. In as much as the pre-war traditions are continued by the church charities, lay institutions are established on the basis of state structures in the form of specific non-profit organisations subsidised to a large extent by the state (the so-called non-profit social institutions). Perhaps in this way partnership relations will develop between the government and nonprofit organisations which will continue to expand. The stage through which Poland is currently passing means that a coherent system of non-profit organisations has not yet developed and, what is more, it is seldom called a voluntary or third sector. The only formalised institutions are foundations and associations. It is evidently necessary to fill the gap in social service provision caused by government and market failures, and we may cherish a hope that such a system of non-profit organisations providing services to those in most need will soon be created in Poland.     

Poland's crisis and East European socialism

Conclusion We began this article by asking whether the Polish crisis is a socialist or a Polish disease. By citing the structural factors, we brought out the common difficulties affecting all East European societies in their political and economic development. These difficulties arose out of the transition from extensive to intensive economic growth and the consequent need to replace political mobilization of the population with their political integration. The structural contradictions occurred together with conjunctural developments in the world economy, the collapse of detente, the post-war demographic explosion, and natural calamities. Poland was least able to cope with these structural and conjunctural dynamics. The result was a society united on a national basis in its conflicts with the Party State apparatus. This conflict was never resolved by Solidarity nor by the subsequent military coup.While Poland and Romania had quite similar structural and conjunctural dynamics, it was only in Poland that the constellation of nation-specific factors yielded a societal reaction of system-threatening character. Looking at the rest of Eastern Europe, we do not see a similar constellation of factors. Rather, the combination of structural, conjunctural, and specific conditions has prevented the deeper contradictions from evolving into Solidarity-type mass movements of the Polish variety. Thus, we believe that the Polish developments will not be replicated in any of the other East European countries in the foreseeable future.Does this mean that the Polish experience is so unique that it is without relevance for the other East European states? On the contrary, the recognition of common structural problems points to fundamental conflicts in all the countries of actually existing socialism. The essence of these conflicts may be the same. It is the ability to identify and deal with them that distinguishes one East European regime from another. This ability varies with the specific and conjunctural factors as applied to each country. While there is little likelihood that the Polish disease will spread, this is partly because the other East European states are beginning to take preventive measures. In other words, they are learning from the Polish experience.There are several indicators that these regimes have learned from the Polish crisis. We can summarize them in the following predictions:First, we believe that state power and the repressive apparatus of the various East European countries will be reinforced and made more effective. This applies not so much to overt shows of force but to more sophisticated methods of social control and repression: e.g., limiting information channels, dispersing dissident groups, giving in to workers protests before they spread, taking practical measures to prevent consumer shortages from getting out of hand, and the like.Second, we can expect that oppositional forces, especially intellectuals, will be increasingly restricted in their ability to formulate and articulate system-threatening demands. The East European states will take any measures - jail, slander, internal deportation, cooptation, forced emigration - to make sure that intellectuals' contact with workers is weakened or at least strictly supervised.Third, we can expect the Eastern European states to take further measures to integrate potential system-threatening movements into the official system. We will see further attempts to improve the access possibilities for those social interests that have up to now been neglected, e.g. in physical and social infrastructures, neglected regions. Moreover, there will be renewed efforts to make the system of political socialization (education, propaganda, culture) more effective. Finally, we can expect anti-corruption campaigns within the State, Party, and industrial bureaucracies as the elites attempt to make these organs more legitimate in the eyes of the population.In recent months there seems to be considerable evidence that the East European regimes have taken all these measures. There have been attempts to re-invigorate the official trade unions. Yuri Andropov's succession was marked by a highly publicized anti-corruption campaign designed to win favor among rank-and-file workers. In Romania there have been exhortations towards more self-sufficiency and self-management, so that individual producers will be less dependent on State retail outlets, and the country less dependent on costly foreign imports. The reduction in East-West trade and decline of detente have also given more leeway for the East European repressive apparatus to crack down on dissidents and oppositional movements.With reduced trade, the economic benefits of detente no longer exist as a restraining factor on the authorities. The West now has reduced influence on domestic politics in East Europe. The combination of integration and repressive measures has so far prevented the structural contradictions from growing into true political crises of the Polish variety. Eastern Europe (and Poland) is remarkably quiet.With the broad enthusiasm fostered in the West by the rise of Solidarity, it is understandable that its brutal demise had generated parallel feelings of disillusionment. It would be erroneous to consider the Polish events as an archetype for Eastern Europe. The problems of East European regimes reflect a general system crisis (economic and political), each country's response depends on specific local conditions and fortuitous conjunctures. If the Polish events are to be understood, they must be explained as a variant in a larger East European context.Having concentrated on the crisis aspects in Poland and Romania should not blind us from the fact that these systems have an amazing ability to reproduce themselves - to muddle through. Actually existing socialism is more than simply brute force. Each of the East European societies exhibits a complex dialectic between the forces of functional stability and the forces of immanent contradictions. As such, in addition to their structural aspects, we must analyze each of these societies in their differing vulnerability to conjunctural events and in their specific political, social, and cultural characters.For those who seek to replace actually existing socialism with a more emancipatory socialism, the Polish crisis constitutes a key point of departure. It should be discussed both in terms of what it means for Poland, and for Eastern Europe. The Polish events provide further evidence that the tasks of social theory reside as much in explaining why societies muddle through as why they fall apart.     

Financial manager's perception of rural household Economie Well-Being: Development and testing of a composite measure

An index of Perceived Economic Well-Being is constructed using factor analysis and tested for reliability and validity. The index is composed of (a) perceived income adequacy, and satisfaction with (b) current total household income, (c) amount of money your family is able to save, (d) amount of current debt, (e) level of consumption, (f) amount of household net worth, and (g) resources available to meet a financial emergency. The index is used in regression analysis. Results show that financial managers perceive economic well-being more favorably if they are more satisfied with resources and with the current level of living, view the present financial situation as better compared to 5 years ago, save on a regular basis for goal(s), and have a higher income. Financial managers who report more frequent financial problems, worry more about where money would come from to pay bills, and more frequently make only minimum payments on charge accounts perceive economic well-being less favorably.Preparation of this research was supported in part by the Illinois Agricultural Experiment Station. Data were collected in conjunction with the cooperative regional research project NC-182, Family Resource Utilization as a Factor in Determining Economic Well-Being of Rural Families. Cooperating states are Arizona, California, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, and Minnesota.He received his Ph.D. from the University of Illinois in 1991 with Dr. Fitzsimmons as advisor. His current research interest is economic well-being.She received her Ph.D. from the University of Illinois; her current research interests include gender roles, family financial management, and economic well-being.     

The state and the economy in late imperial China

Conclusions Non-development of a modern economy, the failure to begin modern economic growth, I am prepared to argue but that would require another article- is over-determined. It's not a particularly interesting theoretical question any more. Proponents of economic, political, cultural, social structural, demographic and other explanations have each adduced overwhelming arguments and evidence for their favored explanations. In fact, any one - or two - is a sufficiently mortal debility for the premodern economies and societies that they have studied. More is merely overkill. What we really don't know for sure yet is how modern economic growth begins - even in the case of Western Europe whose economic history has been minutely examined for more than a century. The common fate of most of mankind before the very recent past - slow and uncertain premodern growth of population and output where it occurred, stagnation or decline otherwise - has not (by historians at least) received attention comparable to the more fashionable problem of modern development, whether that be phrased as the Marxist transition from feudalism to capitalism, the neo-classical growth model, or the perhaps now somewhat faded study of modernization.Late imperial China - from the tenth century to the nineteenth - experienced in world perspective a remarkable millennium of premodern economic growth (see table 1). Population and total grain output each increased by a factor of five or six over these centuries, in contrast to the first millennium of the imperial era - from the Qin (221–206 B.C.) through the Tang (618–906) during which, with often sharp fluctuations, a sort of plateau seems have been reached early and never overcome. (Europe's population growth was comparable - the estimates of course, like those for China, are sometimes more testimony to our faith than to our science. There were perhaps 39 million inhabitants in about 1000, 74 million before the demographically disastrous fourteenth century, a recovery to 50 million by 1450,105 million in about 1600, 115 million about 1700, and a total of possibly 190 million inhabitants in 1800.) While overall impressive, the growth of people and production in late imperial China was uneven in both rate and locale, and punctuated by severe fluctuations due to both natural and manmade disasters.Neither the direct nor the indirect influences of the state on the economy were major factors determining the nature and rate of this premodern economic growth. That was largely decided by the dynamics of the dominant private sector of the economy. So far as they affected premodern growth the policies and actions of China's imperial government do not seem to have differed greatly in range or quality from those of the emerging national states of early modern Europe before, let us say, the seventeenth century. Certainly the acceleration of traditional growth in seventeenth- and especially eighteenth-century China argues against the view that the late imperial feudal autocracy was a major obstacle to economic performance in the Ming and Qing periods. On balance, the actions of the state probably helped rather than hindered the long-term growth of population and total output. The state's control of or influence over only a very low percentage of gross national product at the very least limited negative interference with the private sector where the most remarkable Ming-Qing achievements originated.Toward modern economic growth, on the other hand, the Chinese state contributed little if anything, in contrast to the history of early modern Europe. I have already suggested that this conclusion should not be surprising. It, rather than the still only partially understood European experience, represents the mode in world history. The fact that state policies and performance might have lubricated late imperial economic expansion does not imply any necessary forward linkages to the much different and much more difficult task of expanding not just total output but output per capita. The experience of the past is surely not irrelevant, but it may not all be positive for the goal of achieving economic growth in the modern epoch. Thus the Chinese experience of managing and participating in complex bureaucratic organizations may have left a positive legacy for the twentieth century. And similarly, the much higher degree of male literacy in Qing China than we have hitherto assumed, demonstrated in the admirable work of Evelyn S. Rawski, would presumably be conducive to the later achievement of modern economic growth. But the distancing - whether by cultural choice or due to political weakness - of the state from the private economy, while it may have facilitated premodern growth, could be a negative rather than a positive asset for a backward country seeking economic growth in the twentieth century, as Professor Gerschenkron has shown us. Does the contrast between late imperial China and early modern Europe derive, after all, mainly from the greater relative success of the Chinese experience under conditions of premodern economic growth? I refer of course to the achievement of a unified and integrated polity with an adequate customary standard of living for most of the population (in normal times), which was spared (or deprived of?) disquieting church-state conflicts and international wars (for the most part), where one found no Sunday Confucians and no domestic modernist challenge to a deeply rooted and genuine conservatism before the twentieth century. There was little reason for the Qing emperors and the bureaucratic elite who served them, while they still had the power to do so before the shameful nineteenth century, to follow the path of the Houses of Stuart, Bourbon, and Hapsburg and their bureaucratic administrators who built the modern European nation-states and purveyed some of the critical abstractions and institutions of law and property that unwittingly perhaps facilitated Europe's modern economic growth. The Chinese rulers already possessed all under heaven (tianxia), and they could hardly foresee how parochial that universal conceit would become.

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The Portuguese Disinflation Process: Analysis of Some Costs and Benefits

This study aims to analyse the Portuguese economic policy of disinflation through a nominal stabilization policy of the Portuguese escudo. We study the pegging of the Portuguese escudo to the deutschmark knowing the reputation of the Bundesbank for its anti-inflationary record. The acceptance of German monetary policy allowed the Portuguese economy to achieve its primary goal of price stability. The nominal stability policy of the escudo may serve as an example for other small economies that may be presently involved in the European integration process such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia.

Who Supports Marketization and Democratization in Post-Communist Romania?

The post-1989 change in former Communist societies in East and Central Europe is generally viewed as a double transition involving both marketization (removal of state hegemony over the economy)anddemocratization (move to a Western-style liberal democracy). Data from a nationwide survey of Romania in 1993 demonstrates that Romanians in fact distinguish two reform dimensions—marketization and democratization—as opposed to a single pro-Westernization dimension. Though Romanians distinguish marketization and democratization conceptually, support for reform in both instances is strongest among the same segments of the population: the young, the better educated, men, and those living in cities. Further analysis reveals that the effects of age, gender, and urban residence (but not education) largely wash out once the effects of risk aversion, individualistic ideology, and personal economic expectations are controlled for. Risk aversion is an especially important mediating variable. Men, the young, and those in cities are more likely to support marketization and democratization in large part because they tend to be less averse to risk.     

From migrant enclaves to mainstream: Reconceptualizing informal economic behavior

The informal economy has developed in sociological theory to refer to clusters of illegal or quasi-illegal activities, usually unreported, by which people in some immigrant or ethnic communities earn income outside regular businesses and jobs. This article first extrapolates a set of characteristics beyond the legal status of such activities that define the informal economy. These provide a richer framework for future research and the basis for identifying informal economic activity in other sectors of the legitimate mainstream economy. In fact, informalization seems to have gone from marginal activities to a mainstream movement to make large sectors more fluid, network-based, and less regulated—the informalized economy. Its characteristics are identified. They overlap with the first set but differ principally in terms of extending Merton's proposition that different social structures exert different pressures to engage in non-conforming behavior. The article concludes with policy implications for fostering greater entrepreneurship in marginal migrant communities, and it suggests new ways for economic sociologists to study network transactions in modern corporations of informal economic activity through generative sociology.     

Barriers and facilitators to adherence to group exercise in institutionalized older people living with dementia: a systematic review

Objectives

Research suggests targeted exercise is important for people living with dementia, especially those living in residential care. The aim of this review was to collect and synthesize evidence on the known barriers and facilitators to adherence to group exercise of institutionalized older people living with dementia.

Methods

We searched all available electronic databases. Additionally, we searched trial registries (clinicaltrial.gov, and WHO ICTRP) for ongoing studies. We searched for and included papers from January 1990 until September 2017 in any language. We included randomized, non-randomized trials. Studies were not eligible if participants were either healthy older people or people suffering from dementia but not living in an institution. Studies were also excluded if they were not focused on barriers and facilitators to adherence to group exercise.

Results

Using narrative analysis, we identified the following themes for barriers: bio-medical reasons and mental wellbeing and physical ability, relationships dynamics, and socioeconomic reasons. The facilitators were grouped under the following thematic frames: bio-medical benefits and benefits related to physical ability, feelings and emotions and confidence improvements, therapist and group relationships dynamics and activity related reasons.

Conclusions

We conclude that institutionalized older people living with dementia, even those who are physically frail, incontinent and/or have mild dementia can demonstrate certain level of exercise adherence, and therefore can respond positively to exercise programs. Tailored, individually-adjusted and supported physical activity, led by a knowledgeable, engaging and well communicating therapist/facilitator improves the adherence to group exercise interventions of institutionalized older people living with dementia.

     

Household expenditure patterns and resource pooling: evidence of changes in post-apartheid South Africa

The primary aim of this paper is to examine whether resources accruing to different members of the household and from different sources have differential impacts on household expenditure patterns. The issue is of considerable policy interest for, if the identity of the income recipient does matter in the household’s expenditure decisions, then it indicates the usefulness of targeting income assistance at particular members of the household. The South African evidence is generally supportive of the hypothesis of resource pooling by the income earners in their spending decisions on food, clothing and energy. The results of this paper have been placed in the wider context of social, political and economic developments following the end of apartheid that have caused significant changes in the nature of resource inflow and in the balance of power in decision making within the South African household. The results are indicative of improvements in the standard of living of the majority of South Africans following the end of apartheid.

Out-of-Home Placement of Children and Economic Factors: An Empirical Analysis

In this paper, we use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to estimate the effects of income, maternal employment, family structure, and public policies on several measures of childrens living arrangements. We use both linear probability models and discrete-time event history models to explore the effects of these factors on: (1) the probability that a child is living out-of-home in a given year; (2) the probability that a child is removed from home in a given year, conditional on the child living at home in the previous year; (3) the probability that a child is removed from home for the first time; (4) the probability that a child is reunified with his/her biological parent(s) given that the child was living out-of-home in the previous year. We also analyze whether these estimates differ by types of out-of-home placements. Our results suggest that children from lower-income, single-mother, and mother–partner families are considerably more likely both to be living out-of-home and to be removed from home. A change in family structure also tends to place a child at higher risk of an out-of-home living arrangement, unless this transition functions to bring a childs father back into the household. Maternal work appears to increase the probability that a child lives at home. Additionally, once a removal has taken place, we do not find a relationship between income and the probability of a family reunification, but we do find that single-mother and mother–partner families are less likely to reunify. Finally, our analyses provide some evidence that welfare benefit levels are negatively related to out-of-home placements.Funding for this project was provided the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development through grant number 5 F32 HD044 302-02. We are grateful to Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman, Jennifer Hill, Sanders Korenman, Leonard Lopoo, Katherine Magnuson, and Christina Paxson for their excellent comments and advice.JEL Classification: D10, I30, J13     

The social construction of the medical malpractice crisis: A case study of Massachusetts physicians

This study used observations from the 1985 Massachusetts malpractice insurance rate hearings, semistructured interviews conducted in 1985–1986, a survey of Massachusetts physicians in February 1988, and newspaper reports from theBoston Globe. Physicians and the Massachusetts Medical Society have promoted the medical malpractice crisis as an economic one. The after-expense income of most physicians, however, has remained relatively constant. The more serious threat to physicians appears to be the reduction of their autonomy. It is concluded that the medical malpractice crisis has been socially constructed in economic rather than autonomy terms because, traditionally, economics has been a more acceptable basis for labor unrest in the United States. Constructing malpractice as an economic crisis presents a more viable argument for stemming social change adverse to the medical profession.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 57th annual meeting of the Eastern Sociological Society, May 1987, Boston, Massachusetts.     

Aversion to inequality in Italy and its determinants

The main goal of this paper is to estimate the preferences of the Italian society towards equity in order to verify whether preferences (i) have changed across the years, and (ii) can be related to specific socio-demographic characteristics. Introducing equity concerns in the implementation of economic policies is a fundamental problem faced by both economists and policy makers. This paper uses a social welfare function à la Jorgenson and Slesnick to estimate societys aversion towards inequality by implement in a voting scheme for compiling individuals equity preferences in to a social choice by majority rule. The results show that preferences are highly polarized toward a low and a high concern for equity aversion and that this concern is significantly related with several sociodemographic characteristics. Among them, income plays an important role with richer people tending to favor less equity. Results also show that preferences towards equity have changed across the years.     

Census data on non-profit organisations

This paper describes how the Bureau of the Census collects and publishes data on non-profit organisations in its economic censuses programme. The paper provides a brief history of the economic censuses and describes in more detail the census of service industries component. The progressive expansion of the industry coverage of the census is explained and related to the non-profit sector. The paper further describes concepts and methodologies that are used in collecting and publishing data for non-profit organisations. Definitions, methods of enumeration, and basic data measures are explained and contrasted to concepts used in covering the for-profit sector. Finally, the paper describes how census data can be used to better understand the non-profit sector and identifies some possibilities for improving information from the economic censuses and other statistical programmes which cover non-profit organisations.     

When You Can't Afford to Leave Home: Clinical Implications of Economic Realities

Young adults entering the job market are finding that, despite strong corporate profits, economic growth is not trickling down to worker earnings, and federal policies are moving from the notion of entitlement to one of blame (Uchitelle, 1996, Sec. 4, p. 1). Adolescence is becoming increasingly confusing, since for many Americans economic opportunity is more fantasy than reality. This article highlights the declining opportunity for young adults and points out the limitations of existing adult developmental theory, both of which call for altered treatment conceptualizations that include the clinician operating as an anthropologist and utilizing the concepts of relationship-differentiation and response/ability from Stone Center writings.     

Normative population theory

Utilitarian and contractarian solutions to the problem of optimal population are examined and shown to have unacceptable implications. As argued by Parfit, for instance, utilitarianism may imply large numbers of people at a very low standard of living. An analogy is drawn between optimal population for a society and the optimal structure of an individual life. The ideal life need not maximize cardinal utility, because an individual may prefer a shorter life with less, more intense utility to a very long life with higher total utility (Methuselah's Paradox). The optimal population is what an individual would prefer if he had to sequentially live out each life in his choice.The author wishes to thank John Broome, Amihai Glazer, Jack High, Joseph Kalt, Randy Kroszner, Thomas Schelling and an editor of this journal for useful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Social choice in economic environments with dimensional variation

An argument for welfarist social evaluation is presented that replaces the independence axiom with a consistency axiom for social-evaluation functionals in economic environments. This axiom (consistency across dimension or COAD) requires that, if two allocations contain suballocations in common, and if individual utility functions are projected down to the smaller economy where allocations change, then these small allocations must be ranked in the same way that their ancestral allocations were.The basic result is applied to different information environments and a variety of ethical axioms appropriate to economic environments is investigated.We are indebted to Charles Blackorby, Erwin Diewert, Ed Morey, Bill Schworm and John Weymark for helpful discussions, and to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, the Killiam Foundation and the National Science Foundation, for research support.     

The Associations of Financial Stress and Parenting Support Factors with Alcohol Behaviors During Young Adulthood

This study examined concurrent and prospective associations of financial stress (financial strain, lack of financial access, public assistance) and parenting support factors (relationship quality, living at home, financial support) with young adults’ alcohol behaviors (alcohol use, heavy drinking, and problematic drinking) over a 5-year period. Analyses of National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health) data (N = 7,159) showed that, over the study period, alcohol use and heavy drinking declined while problematic drinking increased. In addition, living at home and parental relationship quality were associated with fewer concurrent and prospective alcohol behaviors whereas financial strain and parents’ financial support were associated with more alcohol behaviors. The implications for minimizing alcohol misuse in young adults amid uncertain economic conditions are discussed.