Individualism and conformity in the 1950s vs. the 1980s

If the 1950s are remembered for conformity, the 1960s for rebellious individualism, and the 1970s for narcissistic individualism, images of the 1980s contain an ambiguous mixture of individualism and conformity, with similarities to the 1950s. But if the 1980s resemble the 1950s in some respects, are portraits of individualism and conformity in the later decade nevertheless different from their earlier incarnations? A comparative analysis of best-selling self-help books in the 1950s and the 1980s reveals the following changes: from “maturity” as a desirable end to an ever-changing self; from determinism about the self to antideterminism and constructionism; from institutional constraints and joys to interpersonal ones. These changes reflect the incorporation of ideas from the counterculture of the late 1960s and early 1970s, and may also stem from perceptions of a simultaneous increase in structural determinism and individual empowerment.     

The theoretical underpinnings of Chicago sociology in the 1920s and 30s

This paper looks at the work of the Chicago School in the 1920s and 1930s from the standpoint of the debate between positivism and its critics within the discipline of sociology. It is argued that, despite appearances to the contrary, Chicago sociology at this time is based on a rejection of the principles of positivism. It is an attempt to apply the principles of interpretative understanding to the practical problems of empirical research.     

Women's and men's subjective class identification from the 1970s to the 1990s

This study examines the subjective class identification of employed married women and men during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Using data from the General Social Survey, we test three competing models of subjective class identification: status borrowing, independent status, and status sharing. The findings indicate that the predictors of class identification for both women and men have changed considerably over the past three decades. The model for men has shifted from an independent model in the 1970s to a sharing model that depends on their gender‐role attitudes in the 1980s, and, further, to a sharing model irrespective of gender‐role attitudes in the 1990s. The model for women has moved away from a complex borrowing model of the 1970s toward a sharing model in the 1980s and 1990s, with women's gender‐role attitudes shaping their class identification process in the 1970s and 1980s, but not in the 1990s.     

Chilean Feminism(s) in the 1990s Paradoxes of an Unfinished Transition

This article discusses the changes experienced by the feminist movement in post- transition Chile from the perspective of two specific issues. First, the fundamental "paradox' facing this movement today, that is, its relative success in "gender mainstreaming' together with feminism's increasing weakness as a political actor. And second, the relevance of external and internal factors in transforming feminism and the role each has played in its current situation. The article attempts to answer some of the queries posed by this two-fold process: What explains the feminist movement's absence from public spheres? Why was the movement's previous creative force not translated into renewed political power in the democratic context? What factors have contributed towards the lack of articulation among actors who had been able to form a visible movement for the rest of society in the past? And, to what extent have structural transformations conditioned the changes experienced by feminism? The article is structured in three sections. The first analyses some of the social and political factors relevant for the reconfiguration of the movement in the 1990s through an analysis of the political system. The second concentrates on the object of study itself, that is, the feminist movement. It seeks to reconstruct its trajectory, origins and development, the changes it has undergone throughout the transition process and, especially, its present characteristics. Finally, some concluding remarks are provided.     

Versions of the Pastoral: Poverty and the Poor in English Fiction from the 1840s to the 1950s

Abstract: Fictional treatment of the poor has varied with changing perceptions of their position and role in English society. In part these perceptions have been affected by the social locations of the writers. But this essay argues that a major determinant of the treatment of the poor has been the inheritance of a pastoral tradition of viewing them. Writers have largely worked within this tradition. Only in the 1930s was a determined attempt made to break out of it. This failed, and after the war fiction gradually abandoned its efforts to deal with the poor, preferring to leave that to the newer media of film and television.     

Legalization of lotteries in the 1980s

The decade of the 1980s has witnessed an explosion in legalized gambling. Most dramatic has been the growth of state-sponsored lotteries. The spread of these state-operated lotteries is the result of pressure for more revenues for state operating costs. Lotteries are viewed as a means of raising these revenues: In 1987, state-operated lotteries grossed over $12 billion in sales. Eight states had sales exceeding $1 billion (New York Times, 1988). Clearly, state lotteries have become big business. The purpose of this article is to describe the spread of lotteries in the 1980s and to note the minimal attention given to compulsive gambling in debates on lotteries.Mr. Braidfoot is General Counsel for the Christian Life Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention. He is the author ofGambling: The Deadly Game.     

Children of Divorce in the 1990s

Abstract

Amato and Keith's (1991) comprehensive meta-analysis of well-being differences in children from divorced and intact families found that, when studies were divided by era (1950-1969, 1970-1979, and 1980-1989), the apparent decrements to children of divorce became smaller over time. In an attempt to replicate and extend the Amato and Keith meta-analysis, we conducted a similar one for the 1990s, drawing from 35 published articles. Results showed that across several domains of child well-being (school achievement, conduct, psychological adjustment, self-concept, social adjustment, mother-child relations, and father-child relations), decrements to children of divorce between 1990-1999 were slightly-though consistently-more pronounced than in the previous decade.     

Gender Differences in Policy Preferences: A Summary of Trends from the 1960s to the 1980s

Using 267 repeated policy questions (962 time points), we examinegender differences in policy choices and how they have changedfrom the 1960s to the 1980s. The average gender difference inpreferences toward policies involving the use of force haveconsistently been moderately large. Sex differences in opiniontoward other policies—regulation and public protection,"compassion" issues, traditional values—have been approximatelyhalf as large but they also warrant more attention than in thepast. Our analysis suggests that the salience of issues hasincreased greatly for women, and as a result differences inpreferences have increased in ways consistent with the interestsof women and the intentions of the women's movement.     

From the 30s to the 60s: The folk music revival in the United States

Conclusion Woody Guthrie's ashes were spread by the wind over the water from a Coney Island, New York pier a few days after he died on Oct. 3, 1967. His wife and children, including his 19-year-old son Arlo, were present as America's greatest folksinger was laid to rest. One of the last things Woody heard before he died was Arlo's recorded voice singing the draft-dodging tale of Alice's restaurant. He must have sensed that the spirit had been passed on. Woody Guthrie died just as the second great wave of popular interest in American folk music was coming to an end. Alice's Restaurant was in many ways one of its last echoes. The symbolism could not have been more poignant. At the center of the first folk revival, Woody Guthrie was a vital source of inspiration for the second.The new generation of singer-songwriters who marked the second wave was largely composed of those with at least some contact with the new mass higher education and those multi-versities that were built to dispense it. They were neither members of a déclassé elite, as could be said of Charles and Pete Seeger and John and Alan Lomax, nor were they authentic folk singers, like Woody Guthrie. Nor could they be. By the 1960s, the conditions that had created the possibility for the first wave of the movement had been irretrievably altered. After the Second World War, with a postwar economic expansion and population explosion under way, America was a different place. Besides, the first folk revival had already claimed authenticity as its own. For the most part, if there was any aspiration toward authenticity amongst the topical singer-songwriters (those in New York City in any case), it was to be as close a copy of the first generation, Guthrie and Seeger, as possible. Purism was the second wave's answer to the authenticity of the first.Being part of an expanding generation of white, college-educated youths affected the form and content of the music that characterized the second wave. The most obvious aspect of this was the arena of performance and the audience who filled it. Gone were the union halls, the singing in working-class bars and beerhalls and at Party functions, all of which had characterized the first wave. These were replaced first by coffee shops and small clubs, either in Greenwich Village or those surrounding college campuses. The forays into the South in support of the civil-rights movement were for the most part short-lived and highly symbolic, not to say self-serving. The real mass audience arrived with the antiwar activity and was largely university centered.It was also this audience that filled the auditoriums and concert halls for the more obviously commercial performances by the singer-songwriters of the second wave. This overlapping public provided the grounds for a new mass market in folk music. Peter, Paul, and Mary, who sang in front of many mass demonstrations in protest against the war in Vietnam or in support of civil rights, were, although they saw themselves as carrying on in the spirit of the Weavers, an entirely commercial creation. In the article from the East Village Other cited above, written just after the first big concert in America against the war in Vietnam, Izzy Young angrily notes that everybody was a part of it except the people managed by Albert Grossman - Peter, Paul and Mary, and Bob Dylan. When the war in Vietnam became popular, three years later, Peter, Paul and Mary flew down to Washington, D.C. to take their place in front of the cameras.Commercial rationality was much more a factor in defining the second folk revival than the first. The possibilities were greater and the structure of the music industry was different. With a new mass market still in the process of formation and thus unspecified in terms of taste, the larger record companies could afford to take a liberal attitude and to include under their label, all the revolutionaries, as Columbia Records proudly announced in its contemporary advertising. Commercial possibilities thus were more important in shaping the musical form and content of second folk revival than politics, which were so central to the first. As opposed to the old left, the new left was a loosely organized contingent of organizations and groups with little coordination between them. In fact, many if not most of the organizations were ad hoc committees formed for a specific strike or demonstration. No one group was thus in a position to exert ideological hegemony. Following from this, at least during the period under discussion, there was little political dogmatism to be found. With no powerful organization to impose it, there was no clear political line to defend and thus to sing about. Even the notion of the people, so central to the first folk revival, was relatively absent in the second. Who were the people addressed? Certainly not the working class or even the common man. I am just a student, Sir, I only want to learn, sang Phil Ochs.During the second folk revival, the people had become the silent majority, the province of the conservative right. Neither in music nor in politics did the new left make many attempts to reach the common man in the street. The people had been massified, according to new left theory, and in the new one-dimensional mass society the grounds of political and social identity were always shifting. Besides, country music had already established itself as the musical genre of the rural, southern, western and white, common man. From a commercial point of view, there was little need to look for authenticity or the people; the market was sufficiently large and getting larger as more and more young people entered the institutions of higher education. Politically, this was not a serious problem either, as long as the aim was not revolution as it had been for the old left. It was sufficient, then, to address the masses of youngsters gathering together at institutions of higher education. If there was a revolution at foot, this was it.While the first wave practically had to invent folk music, the second could draw on the reservoir of public culture that to a large extent resulted from this invention. The networks and institutional support provided by the old left and the personal authority of a figure like Alan Lomax made possible the imposition of rather strict criteria for determining in what exactly folk music consisted. Neither networks nor gatekeepers were so determinate to the second wave. With the folksong and folksinger already invented, the new generation could pick and choose from a rather wide range of options. In addition, by the time the new left and the topical-song movement achieved at least a semblance of cohesion, folk music was already institutionally supported by radical entrepreneurs like Izzy Young and the more commercial recording industry. There were, thus, strong institutional bases for folk music outside of politics. Politics, in other words, was not the only game in town. But neither was commerce. The civil-rights movement and the new social movements that developed out of it opened for a short period a space, a public arena, in which the idea of folk music could be reinvented anew. Within this space the traditions constituted during the first wave of folk revival were experimented with and modified in light of the new social and historical context. America was not the same place in the 1960s as it had been in the 1930s and neither could its folk music be. The actors, the setting, and the songs were all different, yet still the same.In attempting to account for both this continuity and change in the two waves of folk revival we have drawn from both the cognitive approach to the study of social movements, which calls attention to the creative role of social-movement actors in the production of knowledge, and the production of culture perspective, which highlights the effects of institutional arrangements in the production of cultural goods. From the former, we have focused on the changing character of movement intellectuals, those to whom Ralph Rinzler in the epigraph that begins this article gave special place; from the latter, we have noted how, among other things, the changing nature of the recording industry helped recast the folk music revival. We hope that the foregoing has demonstrated that in combining these approaches, as well as areas of research interest, we have uncovered aspects of the folk revival others may have missed.     

Cultural Change and Gender Identity Trends in the 1970s and 1980s

Abstract  As in most capitalist countries, the advent of the "consumer society" has brought about radical cultural change in Japanese society. In this paper I aim to illustrate the undercurrents of this change, focusing on the transformation of social consciousness and gender identity as it is reflected in the popular and youth cultures. In order to show these changes, I have sellected several bestsellers from youth fictions ( sekhun-shousetsu ) as my main object of study and have presented several diagrams to illustrate the apparent relationship between this type of fictions and the so-called "aprgs-guerre" generation, the "gang of sun," the "baby-boomers," the "moratorium generation," the "mutant generation." While analyzing the historical trend of youth fiction for the last 45 years and refering to the other types of popular culture (films, popular songs, comics etc.), I shall attempt to throw light upon the substance of these changes and predict what directions the Japanese culture is likely to take in the future.     

The Evolution of Skill-Biased Effects on American Wages in the 1980s and 1990s

This study estimates the contributions of skill-biased technological change and international trade to the rise in the skill premium during the 1980s and 90s using the Feenstra and Hanson (Q J Econ 114(3):907–940, 1999) two-stage methodology. Newly available data on high-technology capital provide separate measures of computer and software investment. New estimates suggest that investment in software contributed to a substantial portion of the observed increase in the skill premium while investment in computers lead to a reduction in the rate of skill premium growth. Contrary to the findings of Feenstra and Hanson for the 1980s, neither software nor computers had a significant effect on wages during the 1980s. Foreign outsourcing does not appear to have significantly affected wages during the 1990s. The contribution to theory is that software is more complementary to increases in worker productivity due to human skills. Computers, on the other hand, reduced the growth of wage inequality by giving unskilled labor a more efficient set of tools with which to work.

互联网鸿沟形成机制的代际差异——“70后”“80后”“90后”互联网参与实证研究

互联网鸿沟存在于接入、技能和应用等三个层面。"70后""80后""90后"群体内部在三个层面的互联网鸿沟形成机制方面存在着代际差异。家庭经济状况和父母受教育水平在第一道互联网鸿沟形成过程中的影响越来越大;学校培训、日常上网活动对第二道互联网鸿沟形成过程的影响逐渐加大,性别对第二道互联网鸿沟的影响减弱;个体的互联网相关技能掌握对第三道互联网鸿沟来说是重要影响因素。代际群体在互联网基础应用方面的差异逐渐消弭,90后在网络自我互动和网络学习方面的参与显著领先,而80后则在网络表达、网络生活助手和网络学习方面的参与显著领先。     

Voluntary Childlessness in the 1980s

No abstract available for this article.