战略顾客下最惠顾客保证对提前购买的价值

百货行业与零售行业频繁降价促销使得顾客会评估产品未来可能的获得性与价格,典型特征是利用等待,跨期选择购买时机.文中研究了顾客最大支付意愿事前异质和事后异质两种情形下最惠顾客保证的价值.最惠顾客保证是指销售商一旦降价销售,就对提前购买的顾客给予价格差额补偿.结论表明,在事前异质中,顾客理性购买.即使顾客最大支付意愿低于销售价格,也倾向于提前购买.最惠顾客保证通过创造隐性价格风险鼓励提前购买.而在事后异质中,销售商提供部分退货补偿,顾客体验购买.当顾客购买并保留的产品数量较小时,销售商的最优策略是降价销售剩余库存.最惠顾客保证通过创造隐性配给风险诱导提前购买.     

基于顾客战略行为下的供应链系统的绩效研究

供应链系统由一个供应商、一个零售商和顾客群组成,且顾客具有战略行为特征,其可以选择在一级市场上购买,也可以选择在二级市场上购买。在销售第一期,零售商向供应商提出订购,并在一级市场上销售,期末剩余产品被供应商回购;在销售第二期,供应商把回购产品通过直销渠道在二级市场上进行销售。采用参数分析和数值模拟得出,首先,顾客战略行为对供应链系统订购量、及系统总收益是否有负影响,取决于顾客对二级市场产品接受度。其次,分散管理系统中,通过提供依赖于集中管理系统下的最优订购量的回购合同,供应商能够协调分散管理系统;并且,无论是否存在顾客战略行为,分散管理系统中的最优回购价格均不受影响。最后,零售商是否接受回购合同,依赖于是否存在顾客战略行为,以及顾客对二级市场产品的接受度。     

对多产品销售的激励合同设计及定价研究

在制造商雇用销售商销售多种产品的市场背景下,本文分析了当制造商面临的销售商有关于销售能力的私有信息时,制造商如何制订多种产品的销售价格并设定多产品的激励合同问题。模型中,制造商通过提供多个规定目标销售量的合同供销售商进行选择,在销售商选择后,制造商了解到销售商的真实销售能力。由于制造商和销售商之间存在不对称信息,制造商需要付出一定的信息成本才能获得销售商的销售能力。研究发现,制造商能够通过合适地设定不同产品的销售价格,以获得在不同产品上的分配销售商销售努力的权力。进一步,在一定的条件下制造商可以根据自己的需要任意设定合同中不同产品的目标销售量而不影响其最终期望利润。本文找到了上述最优销售价格以及多种产品目标销售量所需要满足的条件。     

针对不同类型销售商的长期激励合同设计研究

在制造商雇用销售商销售产品的过程中,双方之间常常存在关于销售商销售能力和销售努力的不对称信息,制造商需要通过设定合同来激励销售商付出实现制造商利润最大化的销售努力。本文建立了信息不对称情况下,制造商在两周期的长期合同设计并同时制定产品价格的模型。虽然不对称信息存在时,制造商在单周期的最优合同策略是分离策略,而本文的两周期模型结果表明,长期合同中第一个周期的最优合同策略并不一定是分离策略,有可能是混同策略,这与第二周期的折现因子有关。而两周期产品价格也与单周期不同,其大于单周期采取混同策略时的价格,小于单周期采取分离策略时的价格。     

伴随销售商促销努力的供应链契约设计

在大多数供应链契约文献中,市场需求被假设为了一个独立的外生随机变量.但实际情况中,市场需求往往受到销售商各种促销活动的影响.文中首先分析了在市场需求受促销活动影响情况下的集中控制模式及不合作模式的销售商最优促销努力水平和最优订购数量的决策问题;然后设计了基于回购契约的促销成本分担契约协调机制;最后通过一个算例比较了在不采取任何促销活动、不合作情况下销售商单方进行促销活动以及协调机制下销售商进行促销活动三种策略下的供应链绩效水平.     

风险规避供应链的回购契约安排

运用CVaR方法研究了具有促销效应且风险规避供应链的回购契约协调问题.探讨了促销效应和风险规避对最优订购量的影响,指出促销效应的存在增大了最优订购量,而销售商的风险规避减小了最优订购量.考察了两种能协调风险规避供应链的改进回购契约安排,表明当销售商不过于规避风险时,引入成本分摊机制的回购契约就能协调供应链;但当销售商非常规避风险时,需要对回购商品的数量进行限制且使回购价格不小于批发价格才能协调供应链.最后讨论了供应商对两类契约的选择问题,并考察了销售商的风险规避对回购价格的影响.     

顾客策略行为与风险偏好下供应链利润分享

考虑由1个生产商、1个销售商和具有策略行为与风险偏好的顾客群体所组成的供应链.存在顾客策略行为与风险偏好的情况下,利用理性预期均衡的相关知识,分析销售商定价与库存决策,研究供应链利润分享契约问题.研究结果表明:销售商的利润随着顾客风险偏好程度的增加而减少;为了缓解利润削减,销售商需要降低销售价格和订货量,而不是提高销售...     

基于异质性顾客的随机配给策略研究

文中考虑了三类异质顾客:战略顾客、迟钝顾客与询价顾客,其中,战略顾客具有完全理性与风险中性特征;迟钝顾客由于其迟钝本性,表现出有限理性与隐性风险规避特征,这两类顾客的战略等待加剧了产品供给与需求的不匹配风险。研究了销售商采用随机配给策略以减少延迟购买期中产品可获得概率,促使战略顾客与迟钝顾客提前购买的价值。结论表明,在固定折扣价格策略中,当迟钝顾客的迟钝强度较低时,销售商最优策略是故意创造配给风险分割市场;在弹性折扣价格策略中,销售商是否运用随机配给策略不仅与迟钝强度有关,还取决于弹性价格折扣幅度。然后运用数值分析对这两种机制进行了比较,发现,销售商采用弹性折扣价格策略时,弹性折扣价格越低,随机配给的价值越大,即提供较大幅度价格折扣,反而增加其利润。     

汽车市场中租赁渠道对传统零售渠道的影响

在零售与租赁混合渠道供应链中,占主导地位的单个汽车制造商向单个零售商和单个租赁商分别销售产品,然后零售商在零售市场销售产品,租赁商在租赁市场出租产品。在两周期设置下根据制造商是否向租赁商提供回购合同,将渠道结构划分为独立式、冲突式和回购式三类,并分析了租赁渠道对传统零售渠道的影响以及对制造商的启示。     

合同订购与现货市场混合交易下的双渠道供应链优化决策

为了更好地匹配需求与供应, 提高企业收益和服务水平, 本文研究了合同订购与现货市场交易结合下的双渠道供应链优化决策问题。首先分析了单纯批发价合同订购模式下的决策, 进一步考虑现货市场单向交易及双向交易的情形, 将供应链回购合同与数量柔性合同引入单向现货市场, 建立了这两类合同订购分别与现货市场补货、现货市场卖货相结合的订购模型, 以及批发价合同订购与现货市场买卖双向交易联合的决策模型。分析了不同模式下回购价格、缺货成本、补货成本、现货价格、现货价格波动及风险偏好对订购决策的影响, 并通过算例仿真, 分析了各类现货市场的使用对销售商收益的影响。结果表明, 合同订购与双向现货市场结合可以充分利用现货市场即时交易的优势, 提高供应链效益;而合同订购与单向现货市场结合, 虽然可以通过合同提高供货水平, 降低库存积压风险, 但该情形需要考虑供应商的回购或补货价格, 销售商仍有一定风险。不论单向或双向现货市场与合同订购的联合, 均可使供应链的利润优于单纯合同订购的情形。     

Managing High‐Tech Capacity Expansion via Reservation Contracts

We study capacity reservation contracts between a high‐tech manufacturer (supplier) and her OEM customer (buyer). The supplier and the buyer are partners who enter a ‘design‐win” agreement to develop the product, and who share the stochastic demand information. To encourage the supplier for more aggressive capacity expansion, the buyer reserves capacity upfront by paying a deductible fee. As capacity expansion demonstrates diseconomy of scale in this context, we assume convex capacity costs. We show that as the buyer's revenue margin decreases, the supplier faces a sequence of four profit scenarios with decreasing desirability. We examine the effects of market size and demand variability to the contract conditions. We propose two channel coordination contracts, and discuss how such contracts can be tailored for situations where the supplier has the option of not complying with the contract, and when the buyer's demand information is only partially updated during the supplier's capacity lead‐time.     

A delay-in-payment contract for Pareto improvement of a supply chain with stochastic demand

We consider a supply chain consisting of a single supplier and a single retailer with stochastic customer demand, which is operated over an infinite horizon. We propose a delay-in-payment contract to coordinate the supply chain. With this contract, the supplier allows the retailer to pay partial order cost at the ordering epoch, and to pay the remaining portion after a permissible number of periods. The system is formulated as a stochastic dynamic programming problem. It is shown that there exists a base-stock policy to be optimal. Compared with the traditional wholesale-price contract, the delay-in-payment contract with appropriate parameters can achieve a Pareto improvement (i.e., the performances of both the supplier and the retailer using the delay-in-payment contract are better than those using the wholesale-price contract). Numerical studies are performed to investigate both the effectiveness of the Pareto improvement, and the impact of the major parameters of the delay-in-payment contract on the system performance.     

The Impact of Revenue‐Maximizing Priority Pricing on Customer Delay Costs

Speed is an increasingly important determinant of which suppliers will be given customers' business and is defined as the time between when an order is placed by the customer and when the product is delivered, or as the amount of time customers must wait before they receive their desired service. In either case, the speed a customer experiences can be enhanced by giving priority to that particular customer. Such a prioritization scheme will necessarily reduce the speed experienced by lower‐priority customers, but this can lead to a better outcome when different customers place different values on speed. We model a single resource (e.g., a manufacturer) that processes jobs from customers who have heterogeneous waiting costs. We analyze the price that maximizes priority revenue for the resource owner (i.e., supplier, manufacturer) under different assumptions regarding customer behavior. We discover that a revenue‐maximizing supplier facing self‐interested customers (i.e., those that independently minimize their own expected costs) charges a price that also minimizes the expected total delay costs across all customers and that this outcome does not result when customers coordinate to submit priority orders at a level that seeks to minimize their aggregate costs of priority fees and delays. Thus, the customers are better off collectively (as is the supplier) when the supplier and customers act independently in their own best interests. Finally, as the number of priority classes increases, both the priority revenues and the overall customer delay costs improve, but at a decreasing rate.     

服务质量影响市场需求下资金约束型网购供应链协调研究

高质量发展服务业已经写入国家战略，其重要性在以顾客需求为导向的网购市场经济中尤为突出。企业服务质量直接决定顾客的购物体验。在供应链意图改善顾客体验但零售商受资金约束的背景下，考虑服务质量对市场需求的影响，设计回购契约与"基于目标销售量的信用契约"组合，构建资金约束型网购供应链协调决策模型，并对其进行求解以获得供应链最优经营策略。研究结果显示，运用最优策略不仅有助于缓解零售商的资金压力，而且能激励其提高服务质量，改善顾客购物体验；所得契约设计不仅能实现网购供应链协调，而且能实现供应链总利润在节点企业之间的任意分配，提高了契约的操作性，保障了最优策略的有效性。     

Optimizing Customer Forecasts for Forecast‐Commitment Contracts

We study a “Forecast‐Commitment” contract motivated by a manufacturer's desire to provide good service in the form of delivery commitments in exchange for reasonable forecasts and a purchase commitment from the customer. The customer provides a forecast for a future order and a guarantee to purchase a portion of it. In return, the supplier commits to satisfy some or all of the forecast. The supplier pays penalties for shortfalls of the commitment quantity from the forecast, and for shortfalls of the delivered quantity from the customer's final order (not exceeding the commitment quantity). These penalties allow differential service among customers. In Durango‐Cohen and Yano (2006), we analyzed the supplier's problem for a given customer forecast. In this paper, we analyze the customer's problem under symmetric information, both when the customer is honest and when he strategically orders more than his demand when doing so is advantageous. We show that the customer gains little from lying, so the supplier can use his control over the contract parameters to encourage honesty. When the customer is honest, the contract achieves (near‐)coordination of the supply chain in a great majority of instances, and thus provides both excellent performance and flexibility in structuring contracts.     

基于收益共享契约的供应链质量控制与协调机制

研究了单个供应商和单个零售商构成的供应链中,零售商采用收益共享契约对供应链成员质量控制决策的协调作用。分析了使用收益共享契约、供应商与零售商合作、使用批发价格契约三种情况下供应链成员的博弈均衡,并进一步通过比较讨论了收益共享契约对于供应链成员质量控制的优势和局限。研究表明,当销售量的变化对产品质量改进的敏感程度较高时,收益共享契约的协调效果较好,但对于零售商来说,虽然其利润高于采用批发价格契约,可利润份额却有所下降,这意味着收益共享契约对供应商更有利。     

Coordinating Supply Chains via Advance‐Order Discounts,Minimum Order Quantities,and Delegations

To avoid inventory risks, manufacturers often place rush orders with suppliers only after they receive firm orders from their customers (retailers). Rush orders are costly to both parties because the supplier incurs higher production costs. We consider a situation where the supplier's production cost is reduced if the manufacturer can place some of its order in advance. In addition to the rush order contract with a pre‐established price, we examine whether the supplier should offer advance‐order discounts to encourage the manufacturer to place a portion of its order in advance, even though the manufacturer incurs some inventory risk. While the advance‐order discount contract is Pareto‐improving, our analysis shows that the discount contract cannot coordinate the supply chain. However, if the supplier imposes a pre‐specified minimum order quantity requirement as a qualifier for the manufacturer to receive the advance‐order discount, then such a combined contract can coordinate the supply chain. Furthermore, the combined contract enables the supplier to attain the first‐best solution. We also explore a delegation contract that either party could propose. Under this contract, the manufacturer delegates the ordering and salvaging activities to the supplier in return for a discounted price on all units procured. We find the delegation contract coordinates the supply chain and is Pareto‐improving. We extend our analysis to a setting where the suppliers capacity is limited for advance production but unlimited for rush orders. Our structural results obtained for the one‐supplier‐one‐manufacturer case continue to hold when we have two manufacturers.     

Option Contracts and Capacity Management—Enabling Price Discrimination under Demand Uncertainty

We explore using an option contract as a price discrimination tool under demand uncertainty. In our capacity game model, a monopolistic supplier has to build capacity before observing the uncertain demand. The demand is generated by two potential customers, who privately know their own types. The types could be either high or low, differing in willingness to pay for each unit of demand. To discriminate between the customer types, the supplier designs option contracts so that only the high type will buy options in advance. The high type will do so because the options can hedge their risk of demand loss when capacity is tight. The supplier profits in three ways. First, the high type customers pay higher marginal prices on average. Second, the high type customers' demand is satisfied as a first priority, guaranteeing allocation efficiency. Third, the supplier can observe the number of options being purchased and so determine customer types, improving capacity investment efficiency. We compare our results to those of classical second degree price discrimination. We show that our proposed framework guarantees the same level of supplier profit even when the supplier cannot discriminate between the customers by bundling products.     

供应商管理库存下基于消费者行为偏好的全渠道运营策略

在供应商管理库存背景下,研究了消费者线上参考效应、线下库存效应以及渠道偏好对供应链成员运营策略的影响。利用微分博弈和连续型动态规划理论获得了独立运营、基于供应商服务成本分担契约的部分合作运营以及协同运营三种模式下的成员策略及绩效。由比较静态分析和对比分析发现：库存效应对生产量具正向影响,对产品质量、大数据营销服务和线下服务具负向影响;消费者不同条件下的线上偏好对企业决策有不同的影响;供应商服务成本分担契约能激励零售商提升线下产品服务,一定程度上改进企业独立运营的绩效水平。为进一步协调分散式供应链,在上述契约基础上设计了供应商收益分享及双边成本分担契约。数值算例发现：新契约在一定条件下可实现分散式供应链的完美协调;消费者参考质量过度依赖品牌商誉易产生"锚定心理",不仅会抑制成员生产和服务积极性,造成库存积压,阻碍品牌商誉积累,损害企业利润,也不利于消费者获得更好的购物体验。     

Pay‐Back‐Revenue‐Sharing Contract in Coordinating Supply Chains with Random Yield

We consider coordination issues in supply chains where supplier's production process is subject to random yield losses. For a simple supply chain with a single supplier and retailer facing deterministic demand, a pay back contract which has the retailer paying a discount price for the supplier's excess units can provide the right incentive for the supplier to increase his production size and achieve coordination. Building upon this result, we consider coordination issues for two other supply chains: one with competing retailers, the other with stochastic demand. When retailers compete for both demand and supply, they tend to over‐order. We show that a combination of a pay back and revenue sharing mechanism can coordinate the supply chain, with the pay back mechanism correcting the supplier's under‐producing problem and the revenue sharing mechanism correcting the retailers' over‐ordering problem. When demand is stochastic, we consider a modified pay‐back‐revenue‐sharing contract under which the retailer agrees to not only purchase the supplier's excess output (beyond the retailer's order), but also share with the supplier a portion of the revenue made from the sales of the excess output. We show that this contract, by giving the supplier additional incentives in the form of revenue share, can achieve coordination.