HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF PRODUCTION

Firms in the same industry exhibit systematic differences in the organization of production and the structure of employment. Entrepreneurial ability is the specific scarce input that limits the size of a firm. This input must be allocated to two activities, coordinating production and monitoring workers. Able entrepreneurs can convert calendar time into larger supplies of coordinating effort that enable them to assemble large firms. Greater ability implies a higher shadow price of time which increases the implicit costs of monitoring. A dispersion of entrepreneurial abilities generates an equilibrium size distribution of firms. Differences in monitoring costs affect the choice of worker productivities, the design of products, and the organization of production. The monitoring cost hypothesis advanced in this paper goes a long way in explaining the equilibrium of an industry containing heterogeneous firms that differ in size and behavior.     

THE CONSISTENCY OF PERFECT AND MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION

In this paper I have suggested the formal consistency between the models of perfect and monopolistic competition. When products are differentiated only by their quality, the zero-profit equilibrium position of the perfectly competitive firm can be recast diagrammatically in a way which coincides with the traditional exposition of Chamberlinean tangencies. The illusory excess capacity theorem confuses average revenue product curves with demand schedules. These results should hardly be surprising. Indeed, if such a thing as “perfect” competition actually exists (even in theory), it must be conceivable within a model in which firms are allowed to compete in other dimensions as well as price.     

AN OPEN‐ECONOMY MODEL WITH MONEY,ENDOGENOUS SEARCH,AND HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS

This paper describes a new monetary open‐economy model where firms have market power due to search frictions in the goods market, and endogenous search effort by consumers mitigates this market power. The optimal inflation rate generally depends positively on the cost of search effort, the cost of firm entry, and the cost of trade. Higher inflation always improves a country's terms‐of‐trade against its trading partners. I also characterize a general class of matching processes which offer a novel approach to modeling firm sales. (JEL D43, E40, F12)     

BACK-LOADED WAGES AND ON-THE-JOB TRAINING IN A FRICTIONAL LABOR MARKET

This paper analyzes the coexistence of on-the-job (general) training and on-the-job search in a frictional labor market where firms post skill-dependent labor contracts to preemptively back-load compensation after training. The back-loaded compensation scheme discourages trained workers' efficient job-to-job transition, as if they accumulated relationship-specific capital, which induces overintensified training among more productive firms. The quantitative analysis predicts that the market equilibrium, relative to the efficiency benchmark, gets more skilled workers (training inefficiency) and less output (allocation inefficiency). It further demonstrates that efficiency loss is moderate due to positive externality and can be improved, as search friction is mitigated. (JEL J24, J31, J64)     

ANTICIPATED INFLATION AND AGGREGATE EMPLOYMENT: THE CASE OF COSTLY PRICE ADJUSTMENT

Even if inflation is perfectly anticipated, a firm that finds nominal price adjustments sufficiently costly will reset its price at multi-period intervals. Consequently, its average output will change in a direction that depends on properties of its profit function. On the basis of this observation, which does not involve money illusion, the paper shows that anticipated inflation can stimulate aggregate employment through a process that entails changes in the factor demands of individual monopolistic firms and in the intersectoral allocation of consumer expenditure. Simulations indicate, however, that the gain in aggregate employment is likely to be modest.     

STICKY WAGES AND IMPLICIT CONTRACTS: A TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH

Sticky wages have been explained in the recent implicit contracts literature as a risk shifting device. Risk averse employees purchase insurance via an implicit contract from risk neutral firms. This paper offers an alternative explanation of the phenomenon. Various alternative organizational forms for labor markets are analyzed from a transactions cost viewpoint. Observed labor market institutions (including sticky wages) are seen as ways to economize on transactions costs. In fact, it is argued that sticky wages would be observed even if workers were risk neutral. Thus the emphasis on risk shifting in the implicit contracts literature seems misplaced.
A fall (in price) arising from temporary distress will be attended probably with no correspondent fall in the rate of wages: for the fall in price, and the distress, will be understood to be temporary, and the rate of wages, we know, is not so variable as the price of goods.     

CORPORATE CONTROL AND RISK

Previous empirical research examining the link between firm risk and the type of stockholder control has yielded conflicting results. These studies have sorted firms into two categories, owner-controlled firms and manager-controlled firms, even though the theoretical discussion implies behavior associated with three distinct groups. This paper argues both theoretically and empirically that an owner-manager has more incentive and more opportunity to take risks than a hired manager. Moreover, a hired manager under the control of a dominant stockholder has less opportunity and less incentive to take risks than managers in firms without a dominant stockholding interest.     

INFORMATION VALUE UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY AND ENDOGENOUS MARKET LEADERSHIP

In an oligopoly model with firms choosing to produce in one of two periods, we identify the circumstance under which a firm's having early information regarding stochastic demand results in market leadership. High demand volatility leads to Stackelberg competition with the information‐advantaged firm leading. In the N‐firm case an equilibrium with multiple leaders and multiple followers emerges endogenously. In a duopoly information acquisition game we identify conditions that determine whether neither, one, or both firms will pay to acquire early information and note that one firm's obtaining early information may generate a positive externality benefitting its competitor. Both symmetric and asymmetric outcomes are possible and Stackelberg market leadership may occur in equilibrium, but only when firms have different costs of information. Our finding that an information advantage may convey leadership which then affects the value of information to the players applies to other settings exhibiting first‐mover advantage such as certain public good provision games. (JEL C72, D82, L13)     

ADJUSTMENT TO PRODUCTION UNCERTAINTY AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM

This paper considers the behavior of the firm which faces uncertainty in its production process but can adjust its output once the uncertainty is resolved. Ex post adjustment, unlike previous treatments, involves a marginal cost penalty if more output is required and a lowering of price if too much is produced. With ex post adjustment allowed in this fashion, it is found that nonlinear risk preferences do not affect the sign of the firm's marginal risk premium at optimum ex ante output. The firm will produce less output than under certainty whether it is risk averse, risk neutral, or prefers risk.     

Demografischer Wandel,Alterung und Arbeitsmarkt in Deutschland

Debates about the consequences of demographic change for the labor market relate to two distinct levels; both will be addressed in this chapter. First, demographic ageing changes the composition of the workforce. Theories about how labor markets work lead to the conclusion that demographic changes do not affect immediately supply and demand of labor and the structure of the workforce. Rather, consequences of demographic changes are moderated by labor market institutions.Second, demographic ageing has consequences for the organization of work. Permanent topics of sociological research are consequences of ageing workforces in the firm for productivity and innovation, consequences of ageing workforces for human resource policies of firms, extent of and coping with the problem of limited durations to perform strenuous work tasks, and consequences of ageing workforces for industrial relations. One central finding is that firms meet various challenges in their external and internal environments, among them being ageing workforces only one. Moreover, as strategic actors, different firms can choose different strategies even in similar environments. Consequences of demographic changes for work organization on enterprise level are, therefore, far from deterministic.     

AN OPTIMAL MIDDLEMAN FIRM PRICE ADJUSTMENT POLICY: THE "SHORT-RUN INVENTORY-BASED PRICING POLICY"

This paper examines the optimum pricing policies of middleman firms who carry an inventory of goods bought for resale. Each period the firm in the theoretical model is required to post a price before it observes its realized demand. In disequilibrium situations, the firm's profit-maximizing pricing policy is shown to be a "short-run inventory-based pricing policy" which requires the firm to post a price below the long-run equilibrium price upon observing its actual beginning inventory level above its optimum level, and to post a price above the long-run equilibrium price upon observing its actual inventory level below its optimum level. The final section suggests that the use of such policies by middleman firms will lead to market price adjustments which are both consistent with the "law of supply and demand" and which are based on explicit maximizing behavor.     

Stock-price response to profit sharing in unionized settings

Prior research shows that stock price responds favorably to managerial incentive schemes which lower costs and stimulate growth. This article analyzes the consequence for shareholders of introducing profit sharing in unionized firms. Positive abnormal returns were associated with the announcement of collective agreements incorporating risk-sharing components, especially when the firm was experiencing preexisting financial distress. The realized gains generally exceeded that which could be attributed to strike activity or negotiated wage reductions. However, there was no indication that profit sharing decreased the perceived risk of investing in the firm.     

WELFARE AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONALIZED PRODUCTION

I incorporate internationalized production, whereby firms hire domestic and foreign production factors, into the model of Corsetti and Pesenti (2001). In contrast to their conclusion, I find that an expansionary monetary shock can be beggar-thy-neighbor and a fiscal shock can improve national welfare. The transmission mechanism of public policy here is different from theirs. In particular, a fiscal shock can affect the short-run exchange rate and generate long-run welfare effects even if it is temporary. Results in this article offer another rationale for international retaliation and coordination. (JEL F30, F40 )     

OFFSHORE OUTSOURCING DECISION AND CAPITAL INTENSITY: FIRM‐LEVEL RELATIONSHIPS

In offshore sourcing, a firm chooses outsourcing to independent suppliers or in‐sourcing from own foreign direct investment (FDI) subsidiaries. Based on the firm‐level data on offshore make‐or‐buy decision covering all manufacturing industries, this paper compares averages, documents inter‐firm distributions, and estimates multinomial logit models of the firm's sourcing mode choice. As predicted by previous theoretical models, this paper directly confirms at the firm level that outsourcing firms tend to be substantially labor‐intensive compared with firms in‐sourcing from the same region, even after the firm's R&D intensity, firm size, or industry is controlled for. (JEL F23, L23, L24, L14)     

PRODUCTION EXTERNALITIES AND LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIA: BARGAINING AND PIGOVIAN TAXATION

This paper analyzes bargaining and Pigovian taxation solutions to inefficiencies from production externalities with free entry. The Coase Theorem fails in a decentralized context but remains valid if the property rights holder can act like a command economy planner. A less powerful price-taking rights holder's objective function is nonconcave, causing an inefficient bargaining outcome. Bargaining complicates Pigovian taxes with a nonlinear tax scheme required to sustain the optimum. Polluting firms pay a franchise tax whose revenue is given lump sum to consumers and face a marginal charge only on excess output, which thus raises no revenue in equilibrium.     

The duality of world cities and firms: comparing networks,hierarchies, and inequalities in the global economy

Much of the research on globalization conceives of the global economy as structured by networks among places, while separately organizational research has examined the role of networks among firms in structuring competition, collaboration, and cooperation. In both cases, position and centrality within the network confers certain advantages and disadvantages, the distribution of which defines a hierarchy. In this article, I explore the idea of dual networks of world cities and firms, then use Breiger's approach to define two such networks: one among 313 world cities, another among 100 advanced producer service firms. Comparison of the degree of inequality in the hierarchies implied by these networks suggest that world city hierarchies are steeper than firm hierarchies (that is there is greater inequality among cities). Thus, even under conditions of footloose global capitalism, place still matters: where a producer is located has more impact than who provides support services.     

MONETARY NEUTRALITY UNDER EVOLUTIONARY DOMINANCE OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY

We provide evolutionary game‐theoretic microfoundations to a dynamic complete nominal adjustment in response to a monetary shock by introducing a novel analytical notion that we call boundedly rational inattentiveness. We investigate the behavior of the general price level in a context where a firm can either pay a cost (featuring a random component) to update its information set and establish the optimal price (Nash strategy) or freely use non‐updated information and establish a lagged optimal price (bounded rationality strategy). We devise evolutionary microdynamics (with and without mutation) that, by interacting with the dynamics of the aggregate variables, determines the coevolution of the frequency distribution of information‐updating strategies in the population of firms and the extent of the nominal adjustment of the general price level to a monetary shock. As it turns out, evolutionary learning dynamics take the information‐updating process to a long‐run equilibrium configuration in which, albeit either most or even all firms play the bounded rationality strategy, the general price level is the symmetric Nash equilibrium price and the monetary shocks have persistent, although not permanent, impacts on real output. (JEL E31, C73, D83)     

LABOR QUEUES AND INVOLUNTARY UNEMPLOYMENT

This paper outlines a job search model which emphasizes the placing of applications by job searchers and the firm's use of a queue of applicants as an inventory of labor. The paper analyzes the consequences of the assumption that firms hold queues of applicants both for the decisions of a single firm and for a market composed of several such firms. The aggregate results suggest that considering such labor market queuing helps explain wage rigidity and involuntary unemployment.     

TARIFF POLICY AND ENTRY WITH COST-BASED INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES

This study introduces a cost-based informational asymmetry into a two period signaling model. We examine the effects of import tariff policy within this environment of incomplete information and compare them to the standard, full information effects. When tariff rates can be credibly fixed, the standard effects of tariff policy may be significantly altered. For example, lower tariffs may discourage foreign entry because of the induced signaling effects of tariff policy. Moreover, because the impact of tariff policy depends on the cost structure of domestic firms, uninformed policymakers will not be able to predict the qualitative effects of tariff policy. ( JEL F12, F13)     

FISCAL POLICY, EXPECTATION TRAPS, AND CHILD LABOR

This paper develops a dynamic model with overlapping generations where there are two possible equilibria: one without child labor, and one with it. It is shown that intergenerational transfers can eliminate the child labor equilibrium and that this intervention is Pareto improving. However, if society does not believe that the government will implement the transfer program, it won't, reinforcing society's expectations. This is true even if the transfer program would have been implemented in the absence of uncertainty. Thus a government may be powerless to prevent the child labor equilibrium if it does not command the confidence of their populace, leaving the country in an expectations trap. ( JEL D91, E60, J20, O20)