An analysis of the fertility transition in developing countries]

Most developing countries are in the demographic stage of early mortality, high birth rates and high rates of natural population increase. A characteristic of developing countries is that after World War ii, particularly since the 1960s fertility rates are on the decline, even though they still remain high. The fertility rate of developed countries fell from a 1950 rate of 22.9/1000 to 15/1000 in 1982, a decrease of 34.5%, whereas the fertility rate of developing countries hovered around 43/1000 between 1930-1950, 40.6/1000 during the 1960s and 33/1000 in 1982. Between 1950 and 1982 there was a decrease of 24.8%. But the main reason for this decrease is the decline in the last 20 years of the fertility rates of China and India, whose rates fell 34.9% from 1960-1980. Changes in fertility rates are influenced by the age structure of a country, as seen in the changing age structure of developing countries from 1960-80. For example, an increase in fertility rates was 1 consequence of an increase in the number of fertile women aged 15-45 from 42.6% in 1960 to 44.4% in 1980. Nevertheless, there exists some sort of birth control, whether conscious or subconscious, because the number of births per fertile woman is 3-4 fewer than the 14-15 children a woman can theoretically bear. The reason for changes in fertility rates in developing countries can be traced to marriage and family customs, and even more important, to social and economic factors. For example, Asian, African and Latin American cultures tend to support early marriages. When the fertility rates of developed and developing countries are looked at for a comparable period, then the rate of decrease for developing countries is slower than developed countries. But, if the comparison is made for a transitional period (i.e., industrialization), then the rate of decrease for developing countries is faster than for developed countries. Currently there are 25 developing countries that have attained a fertility rate of 25/1000 or lower, and 52 developing countries with a rate of 35/1000.     

Birth delays skew developing world's fertility figures

This article explains that birth delays skew developing world's fertility figures. When successive groups of women who have delayed childbearing start having children, the rapid fertility decline stalls. Such change in the timing of childbearing skews the total fertility rate (TFR). Analysis of the tempo component of TFR trends in Taiwan suggests that tempo effects reduced its TFR by about 10% in the late 1970s and early 1990s and by about 19% in the late 1980s. In Colombia, on the basis of increasing mean maternal age at childbirth between the 1970s and the late 1980s, tempo distortions of the TFR during the most of the 1980s seem likely. Moreover, many developing countries are now experiencing rapid fertility declines that are in part attributable to tempo changes. These changes have accelerated past fertility transitions, but they also make these countries vulnerable to future stalls in fertility when the delays in childbearing end. Since fertility reductions caused by tempo effects lead to real declines in birth rates and hence in population growth, countries that wish to reduce birth rates can take actions that encourage women to delay marriage and the onset of childbearing.     

Trade and fertility in the developing world: the impact of trade and trade structure

In the literature on trade and development, fertility and trade have been widely discussed as two separate economic forces. However, an important recent contribution connects these two and suggests that international trade between developed and developing countries has an asymmetric effect on the demand for human capital. The asymmetry leads to a decline in fertility rates in developed countries and an increase in these rates in developing countries. We provide additional comprehensive empirical evidence in support of this novel hypothesis. Our findings suggest that countries that export skill-intensive manufacturing goods experience a decline in fertility rates, whereas in countries that export primary, low-skill-intensive goods, fertility rates are affected positively. Further, our findings indicate that the negative influence of manufacturing exports on fertility holds primarily and most strongly for middle-income countries where structural modernization and a growing manufacturing-intensive export sector is observed.     

Gender preference and birth spacing in matlab,Bangladesh

Gender preference, particularly son preference, is believed to sustain high fertility in many Asian countries, but previous research shows unclear effects. We examine and compare gender-preference effects on fertility in two otherwise comparable populations in Bangladesh that differ markedly in their access to and use of contraception. We expect, and find, stronger effects of gender preference in the population that has more access to contraception and higher levels of contraceptive use. Thus gender preference may emerge as a significant barrier to further national family planning efforts in Bangladesh. We find that if a woman has at least one daughter, the risk of a subsequent birth is related negatively to the number of sons. Women with no daughters also experience a higher risk of having a subsequent birth; this finding suggests that there is also some preference for daughters. Son preference is strong in both the early and later stages of family formation, but women also want to have at least one daughter after having several sons.     

The effects of temperature on human fertility

Monthly birth and temperature data for a variety of states and countries are used to estimate the effect of short-run temperature fluctuations on fertility. Regressions of monthly births on a flexible specification of lagged monthly temperature show that temperature has quantitatively important effects on both seasonal and nonseasonal variation in births. Summer temperature extremes reduce conceptions in the southern United States, explaining a substantial part of the observed seasonal birth pattern. Extreme cold shows no evidence of affecting conceptions. The results also show significant seasonality in births even after accounting for temperature. Controls for monthly temperature do not explain the persistent spring peak in births in northern Europe. This finding suggests that other factors play an important role.     

The empowerment of women,fertility, and child mortality: Towards a theoretical analysis

This paper examines one avenue through which female autonomy impinges on fertility and child mortality in developing countries. A simple model is set out in which couples are motivated to have children for old age security purposes. The decisions of a couple regarding fertility and allocation of resources for the healthcare of their children are made within a bargaining framework. An increase in female autonomy translating into an increase in the relative bargaining power or the threat point utility of mothers is shown to reduce fertility and also to reduce child mortality rates. Paradoxically, the increase in female autonomy within a household may increase the disadvantage suffered by female children in that household with respect to survival. Received: 4 August 1999/Accepted: 7 September 2000     

Cheaper by the dozen? The marginal time costs of children in the Philippines

The important relationship between fertility rates and economic development has prompted many researchers to try and better understand the determinants of family size. It has repeatedly been shown that the costs of children, both direct and indirect, are one of the most important determinants of fertility, exerting a significantly negative effect on birth rates in both developed and developing countries. Many studies which investigate the relationship between the costs of children and family size have assumed that these costs do not vary with parity. However, there is substantial evidence that the marginal costs of children are not constant but decrease with birth order in developed countries. In this paper, the hypothesis that there are diminishing marginal time costs of children is tested using household data from the developing country setting of the Philippines. By examining the determinants of additional time spent in childcare before and after the birth of a child, it is found that the marginal time costs are not the same across households of various sizes. Firstborn children cost significantly more in terms of additional mother's time than children of higher birth orders. In addition, the time costs of the second child are found to be significantly greater than those of the third child. However, these economies of scale in childcare are limited and do not extend beyond three children. The effect of birth spacing on the marginal time costs of children is also found to be significant.     

The World Fertility Survey: charting global childbearing

Interviewing some 350,000 women in 42 developing countries and 20 developed countries representing nearly 40% of the world's population, the World Fertility Survey (WFS) is in a unique position to document the historic 1970s slowdown in global population growth. This Bulletin describes efforts begun in 1972 to ensure high quality, internationally comparable, accessible data, the data's importance for policymakers, planners and researchers, and major findings available by early 1982 from directly assisted WFS surveys in 29 developing countries and contraceptive use data from WFS-type surveys in 16 developed countries. Marital fertility has declined in all developing regions except Africa but still averages from 4.6 children/woman in Latin America to 6.7 in Africa, while preferred family size ranges from 3.0 children in Turkey to 8.9 in Senegal--far above the average 2.2-2.5 children/woman needed to end developing countries' population growth in the long run. However, women ages 15-19 prefer nearly 2 children fewer than the oldest women ages 45-49; 3.8 vs. 5.7 on the average. Nearly 1/2 (48%) of married women surveyed in 27 countreis said they wanted no more children. Preventing all unwanted births would reduce birth rates up to 15 births/1000 population in these countries. Overall, 32% of married, fecund women in developing countries are using contraception compared to an average 72% in 16 developed countries. Education, literacy, and more available family planning services increase contraceptive use. Age at marriage is rising in Asia, but this factor alone has little effect on fertility. Infant mortality is higher in many developing countries than previously thought. Breastfeeding is an important restraint on fertility in most developing countries but is declining among more educated, employed, and urban women which could raise fertility if not compensated for by gains in contraceptive use.     

Family Planning and Women’s and Children’s Health: Long-Term Consequences of an Outreach Program in Matlab, Bangladesh

We analyze the impact of an experimental maternal and child health and family planning program that was established in Matlab, Bangladesh, in 1977. Village data from 1974, 1982, and 1996 suggest that program villages experienced a decline in fertility of about 17 %. Household data from 1996 confirm that this decline in “surviving fertility” persisted for nearly two decades. Women in program villages also experienced other benefits: increased birth spacing, lower child mortality, improved health status, and greater use of preventive health inputs. Some benefits also diffused beyond the boundaries of the program villages into neighboring comparison villages. These effects are robust to the inclusion of individual, household, and community characteristics. We conclude that the benefits of this reproductive and child health program in rural Bangladesh have many dimensions extending well beyond fertility reduction, which do not appear to dissipate rapidly after two decades.     

文化力对中国生育率下降的重要影响

中国在经济不发达的情况下 ,仅用 30年的时间实现了人口再生产类型从高出生、低死亡、高增长到低出生、低死亡、低增长的历史性转变。中国生育率迅速下降是政策力、经济力、文化力综合作用的结果。其中文化力对生育率的下降起着推动力、导向力、凝聚力和鼓舞力的作用。在文化力日积月累、潜移默化的影响下 ,中国城乡育龄夫妇生育观念正在发生巨大变化 ,且这种变化还远没有完成。     

Equity,Security and Fertility: A Reaction to Thomas

This paper assesses recent arguments that sustained fertility decline cannot occur in circumstances of inequality, insecurity, and injustice. Naturally, these conditions are to be abhorred. However, the empirical record suggests that none of them acts as an absolute barrier to mass adoption of birth control and subsequent fertility decline. Recent trends in Bangladesh illustrate this point most vividly. One of the greatest fallacies of many fertility theories has been the assumption that there is an economic or social imperative in underdeveloped countries for couples to have many children. To the contrary, the historic norm for all societies has been an average of only about two surviving children per woman, implying an adaptation to low, not high, net fertility.     

Population, climate, and electricity use in the Arctic integrated analysis of Alaska community data

Towns and villages of Arctic Alaska experience substantial year-to-year variations in weather, overlaid on longer-term warming trends. Community populations often are changing as well, reflecting highly variable net migration, overlaid on longer-term trends of natural increase. Both environmental and population change affect Arctic communities?? energy needs. Energy needs in the Arctic tend to be high and expensive, posing challenges to communities?? long-term viability. In this paper, we analyze relationships between weather, population, and one important measured component of energy??community-level electricity consumption. Electricity for the most part is generated locally from diesel fuel, which has a local environmental footprint as well. Taking a new approach to the integrated analysis of climate and human-dimensions data, we apply mixed-effects modeling to time series of electricity, weather, population, and price indicators across 42 Alaska towns and villages. Population dominates annual variations in electricity use, showing both general and community-specific effects that are strongest in the regional centers. Weather also affects electricity use, but for different reasons than it does in more urban areas to the south. Given population stability, a warming climate should lead to lower electricity demand. Population growth can override climate effects, however. Net of population, weather, and price, there has been an upward trend in per capita electricity use.     

Birth and death in cities in the developing world

City dwellers in Sub-Saharan Africa have increased roughly 600% in the last 35 years. Throughout the developing world, cities have expanded at a rate that has far outpaced rural population growth. Extensive data document lower fertility and mortality rates in cities than in rural regions. But slums, shantytowns, and squatters' settlements proliferate in many large cities. Martin Brockerhoff studies the reproductive and health consequences of urban growth, with an emphasis on maternal and child health. Brockerhoff reports that child mortality rates in large cities are highest among children born to mothers who recently migrated from rural areas or who live in low-quality housing. Children born in large cities have about a 30% higher risk of dying before they reach the age of 5 than those born in smaller cities. Despite this, children born to migrant mothers who have lived in a city for about a year have much better survival chances than children born in rural areas to nonmigrant mothers and children born to migrant mothers before or shortly after migration. Migration in developing countries as a whole has saved millions of children's lives. The apparent benefits experienced in the 1980s may not occur in the future, as cities continue to grow and municipal governments confront an overwhelming need for housing, jobs, and services. Another benefit is that fertility rates in African cities fell by about 1 birth per woman as a result of female migration from villages to towns in the 1980s and early 1990s. There will be an increasing need for donors and governments to concentrate family planning, reproductive health, child survival, and social services in cities, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, because there child mortality decline has been unexpectedly slow, overall fertility decline is not yet apparent in most countries, and levels of migration to cities are anticipated to remain high.     

Estimation of Adult Mortality From Orphanhood Before and Since Marriage

The prevalence of intentional control of reproduction increases in developing countries in which there is rapid modernization, and there are also important changes in breastfeeding practices. The effects of increased contraception and reduced breastfeeding on the pace and level of fertility and on the patterns and levels of infant and early childhood mortality are in opposite directions. In this paper we propose a technique to estimate the net effects of such changes on the natural rate of increase, and to assess the gross contribution of the various components of change. Applications of the technique to Latin American countries indicate that changes in fertility due to higher contraceptive prevalence are dominant, but that they are partially offset by the indirect effects on fertility of changes in breastfeeding. Likewise, changes in breastfeeding have the strongest direct impact on infant mortality, but are partially offset by the beneficial effects of a more favourable pace of childbearing induced by higher contraceptive prevalence.     

The Effect of Urbanization on China’s Fertility

The relationship between urbanization and fertility decline is known to be inverse in developed countries. However, the nature of this relationship in developing countries that already have relatively low fertilities is not well-understood. This study aims to illustrate how much urbanization contributed to China’s fertility decline between 1982 and 2008 and forecasts how much it can contribute to future reductions in fertility. The study examines changes in the total fertility rate (TFR) at both the national and provincial levels, given regional differences in the urbanization rate. The results show that changes in rural fertility behavior accounted for most of the decline in the national TFR between 1982 and 2008. This finding suggests that official birth control policies were instrumental in curbing China’s population growth. However, urbanization was responsible for about 22% of the decrease in TFR during this period, and its effect was especially important during the latter years (2001–2008). In most provinces, urbanization associated with a decline in provincial-level fertility. The forecasts indicate that urbanization will become the primary factor behind future declines in national fertility. Given the negative effect of urbanization on the TFR, it is possible to relax the one-child policy without having adverse implications for population growth.     

Family planning practice and women's fertility decision-making power

This paper investigates the effects of family planning practice on fertility decision-making power in South Korea. The log-linear analysis of the 1981 survey data by the Institute of Population and Health Services Research, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea, shows that those urban and rural women who practice family planning or have experienced abortion exercise greater influence on a couple's fertility decision making than those who do not practice family planning or who have had no abortion experience. In addition, there is the interactive effect of abortion experience and contraceptive use on fertility decision making among urban women. This finding is significant because regardless of how birth control is available within a society, birth control use enhances women's decision making power where fertility is concerned.     

Can We Still Learn Something From the Relationship Between Fertility and Mother’s Employment? Evidence From Developing Countries

In this work, I study the impact of fertility on mothers’ employment for a sample of developing countries. Using the event of multiple births as an instrumental variable (IV) for fertility, I find that having children has a negative impact on female employment. In addition, three types of heterogeneity are found. First, the magnitude of the impact depends on the birth at which the increase in fertility takes place. Second, the types of jobs affected by a fertility shock (multiple births) are jobs identified with a higher degree of informality, such as self-employment or unpaid jobs. Finally, the heterogeneity analysis reveals that an unexpected change in fertility is stronger at a higher education level of the mother and in urban areas.     

The Role of Migration in the Urban Transition: A Demonstration From Albania

Although natural increase has been recognized as the main driver of postwar urban growth in developing countries, urban transition theory predicts a dominant role for population mobility in the early and late phases of the process. To account for this discrepancy between theory and empirical evidence, I demonstrate the complex role played by internal and international migration in the pattern of urban growth. Using a combination of indirect demographic estimations for postwar Albania, I show that the dominant contribution of natural increase from the 1960s to the 1990s was induced by a limited urban in-migration; this was due to the restrictions on leaving the countryside imposed under communist rule and, thereafter, to the redirection abroad of rural out-migrants. Although young adults in cities also engaged in international movements and significantly reduced their fertility, the indirect effects of rural-to-urban migration attenuated the fall in urban birth rates and postponed demographic aging. In-migrants swelled urban cohorts of reproductive age and delayed the urban fertility transition. Despite a high level of urban natural increase in Albania, I thus conclude that the role of population mobility dominated in the early and most recent phases of urban growth. The results also have implications for our understanding of demographic processes during the second urban transition in developing countries.     

Low Fertility Trap:Theories,Facts and Implications

The low Fertility Trap Hypothesis proposes that there are three self-reinforcing mechanism--demographic,sociological and economic,working towards a downward spiral in future fertility.Once TFR drops below 1.5,it will be difficult to recover.The fertility recovery emerging in many countries across the world has changed the lowfertility trap theory and also the justification of the theory itself.So low-fertility trap is more likely a pattern summarized from a short-time phenomenon than a generalized social law.As with China,the current fertility level is above 1.5 births per woman,and China is not in the "Low-fertility trap".Moreover,most recent surveys suggests that current fertility intention in China is above 1.8 births per woman and more than60 percent of people would have a second child if there is an adjustment of fertility policy.In addition,birth postponement is still playing an important role in reducing TFR in China.Thus,with the high fertility intention,adjustment of family planning policy and decreasing tempo effect,TFR in China will experience upturn but not further decline in the near future.It is lack of evidence to conclude that China has already been or is going to be trapped in low fertility.     

Our population predicament: a new look

Issued to mark the Population Reference Bureau's 50th anniversary, this issue updates the story of world population presented in its popular predecessor of 1971, "Man's Population Predicament." Estimated at 1/2 billion in 1650, world population reached about 2 billion in 1930, 4 billion in 1975, and is projected to be about 6 billion in 2000. Most of today's rapid growth is occurring among the 3/4 of the world's peoples living in less developed countries where the post-World War II gap between high birth rates and falling death rates has only recently begun to narrow. This growth, coupled with high consumption in developing countries, is putting tremendous pressures on the Earth's resources, environment, and social fabric. New evidence on Europe's population transition and from China, Indonesia, and Thailand in the 1970s suggests that well-designed family planning programs can speed fertility decline but rapid worldwide attainment of replacement level fertility will also require special development efforts and measures that go beyond family planning. Current projections of the world's ultimate peak population range from 8 billion in the mid 21st century to 11 billion in about 2125, depending on when replacement-level fertility is reached. China's drive for a drastic birth rate reduction and the oil crisis might change fertility behavior more rapidly than most demographers have heretofore thought likely.