Migration Movements from and into Poland in the Light of East‐West European Migration

This article investigates migratory movements from and into Poland before and after the collapse of communism. The character and scale of these movements are of considerable significance, not only for politicians and societies in the CEE region, but also for European integration. The Polish eastern border is likely to remain one of the few places in Europe where it will be possible to control mobility on the East‐West axis. One cannot discuss East‐West mobility without discussing the emigration of Poles. Because recent immigration into Poland from the East should also be assessed from the perspective of both Poland and the West, the article examines emigration trends from Poland and immigration into Poland as well as the demographic characteristics of migrants. Only official statistical data are considered. Migration pressure from the East induced by the collapse of the system, combined with the restricted migration policy of Western Europe towards former USSR countries, were conducive to the formation of the Central European buffer zone. Poland is probably the best example of a buffer zone country. From the Western perspective it is also the most important country because the future of East‐West migration depends on the extension of the visa regime by Poland. Irrespective of the introduction of new hurdles, there will be other ways of channelling the movement from the East via Poland to the West. Globalization of migration will inevitably increase flows from the East. It is argued that the key to future European migration lies also in the West, more specifically in the employment needs of western labour markets.     

Re‐Thinking Migrants’ Networks and Social Capital: A Case Study of Iranians in Turkey

Existing research on international migration has focused on the importance of social networks and social capital in the countries of origin and destination. However, much less is known about the importance of social networks and associated social capital in transit countries. Drawing on ethnographic research on Iranian transit migrants in Turkey, this paper argues that migrant networks and social capital are equally important in transit countries. These networks, however, do not always generate positive social capital for Iranian migrants as there are scarce resources and there is no “enforceable trust”. Iranian migrant networks reorganized in a transit country like Turkey are not static structures and they are largely affected by macro‐variables such as current immigration and asylum policies of Turkey and Europe, transnationalism and globalization, and other place‐specific features like Turkey’s location bridging East and West, the existence of human smuggling networks, and its proximity to Iran. But Iranian migrant networks in Turkey are also affected by micro‐variables, such as gender, religion, and ethnicity of individual migrants.     

Social effects of migration in receiving countries

This paper examines the impact of post-1945 migration into Western, Middle, and Northern Europe from Southern Europe, Turkey, and Northern Africa, and migration to the traditional immigration countries by Asian and Latin American immigrants, on the social structures of receiving countries. Between 1955 and 1974, 1) traditional migration to the US and Australia became less important for European countries while traditional receiving countries accepted many immigrants from developing countries; and 2) rapid economic revival in Western and Northern Europe caused a considerable labor shortage which was filled by migrant workers especially from Southern Europe, Turkey, and Northern Africa, who stayed only until they reached their economic goals. Since 1974, job vacancies have declined and unemployment has soared. This employment crisis caused some migrants 1) to return to their countries of origin, 2) to bring the rest of their families to the receiving country, or 3) to lengthen their stay considerably. The number of refugees has also significantly increased since the mid-970s, as has the number of illegal migrants. After the mid-1970s, Europe began to experience integration problems. The different aspects of the impact of migration on social structures include 1) improvement of the housing situation for foreigners, 2) teaching migrants the language of the receiving country, 3) solving the unemployment problem of unskilled migrants, 4) improvement of educational and vocational qualifications of 2nd generation migrants, 5) development of programs to help unemployed wives of migrants to learn the language and meet indigenous women, 6) encouraging migrants to maintain their cultural identity and assisting them with reintegration if they return to their original country, 7) coping with the problems of refugees, and 8) solving the problems of illegal migration. Almost all receiving countries now severely restrict further immigration. [Those policies should result in improved development of aid policies towards sending countries. Immigration from other countries to those of the European Economic community should be limited to that for humanitarian reasons.     

Unauthorized Migration from Africa to Spain

The dynamics of unauthorized border‐crossing in the Mediterranean region has received extensive media coverage but little academic attention. This article examines the patters and dynamics of transit migration towards the Spanish‐African borders, and of unauthorized migration across these borders. The geography of migration is examined in detail, and this leads to several conclusions with implications for migration management. First, the origins of sub‐Saharan African transit migrants in Morocco are remarkably diverse. Second, cities and towns far beyond Europe play a pivotal role in the migration dynamics at the Spanish‐African borders. Third, the Strait of Gibraltar itself has lost much of its importance as a crossing point. Fourth large‐scale smuggling to the Canary Islands directly from West Africa is still marginal in numerical terms, but represents a worrying scenario.     

Eastern Europe and Community of Independent States

This article reviews the literature on migration, HIV/AIDS, and sexually transmitted diseases in Eastern Europe and the Community of Independent States (CIS): Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the former Yugoslavian countries; and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. There is little in-depth research on the prevalence of HIV/AIDS. After the collapse of the USSR, the opening up of borders presented greater options for the spread of HIV. During 1991-1996, HIV-infected persons increased from 0.3/100,000 to 7.8/100,000. Syphilis and gonorrhea also spread in the 1990s. The increased prevalence is attributed to changes in sexual behavior due to increased travel and migration, disruption among families, and changes in sexual mores; and changes in the structure, availability, and effectiveness of health services. Many migrants in the CIS are young people. Mobile populations in the CIS include labor migrants, refugees, persons displaced by armed conflicts, repatriates, forced migrants, resettlement of formerly deported persons, and ecological migrants. It is general knowledge that migrants are poorly informed about HIV/AIDS. Condoms are not readily available in the CIS. Eastern Europe has high rates of HIV among migrant sex workers.     

Thailand's responses to transnational migration during economic growth and economic downturn

This paper gives an historical overview of immigration to Thailand since the 1970s and emigration since the 1960s. It describes migration policies since the 1930s. Final discussion focuses on the impact of economic contraction on migration. Immigration to Thailand dates back to the 1760s when a huge wave of Chinese emigrated to Thailand. The flow continued until about 1850 and resumed during 1905-17. The next big waves of immigrants were after 1975, when refugees fled Indochina, and in the 1990s, when migrants flocked from neighboring countries drawn to the booming economy. Thai professionals left in the 1960s for the USA. During the 1980s, many left for work in the Middle East. During the 1990s, Thai migrants moved within the East and Southeastern Asian countries and the USA or Europe, and they included many women and illegal migrants. Emigrants leave as arranged by the government, by employers, by recruitment agencies, and as trainees. The first official act was in 1950 and revised in 1979. Many work permits were approved in the 1990s, especially for unskilled labor. There are supports for Thai migrants abroad, but little is offered to foreigners at home. By 1997, the country's recession led to nonrenewal of many work permits. The 1998 economic crisis led to a new labor policy that deported illegal and unskilled migrant workers in order to create jobs for Thais. Policy encouraged Thais to seek work overseas.     

Does Europe need immigrants? Population and work force projections

European countries defined as all Northern and Western Europe including the former East Germany had a population of 498.4 million in 1990. In 1990 Western Europe had 374.4 million people. The European Community (EC) makes u 92% of the total population. Projections forecast a peak of the EC population (excluding the former East Germany) in 2005 at 334.2 million compared with 327 million in 1989, then declining to 332.5 million in 2010, 329.0 million min 2015 and 324.5 million in 2020. In Europe outside the East, the 20-24 year old work force entrance age group will drop from 29,860,000 in 1990 to 26,400,000 in 1005 and 23,480,000 in 2000: decreasing by 6,380,000 or 21.3%. Fertility rose by 22% in Sweden between 1985 and 1990, the rise of negligible in France and Belgium, but 2% in the UK and Switzerland, 4% in the Netherlands, 13% in Norway, 16% in Denmark, and even 6% in Germany and Luxembourg. The Ec labor force was 145 million in 1990 (excluding East Germany); it is projected to peak at 146.9 million in 2000, decline slowly until 2010 and decline faster up to 2025 with the steepest decline occurring in Germany and Italy. Unemployment rates would change from the 1990 estimate of 15.7 million to 15.5 million in 1995. Net migration into the 12 EC countries was on average -4,800 from 1965 to 1969; 357,000 from 1970 to 1974; 164,400 from 1980 to 1984; and 533,000/year from 1985 to 1989 as a result of the rise of asylum applicants and migration of ethnic Germans into Germany. Increased immigration is not needed to satisfy work force shortages for the next 10-20 years in Western Europe or in the EC. Other issues addressed are the economic activity forecast, the hidden labor supply, skill shortages, Eastern Europe, and teenage shortage. High-level manpower movements, immigration of asylum seekers, and illegal immigration will continue, but in the long run the conditions of employment and welfare support have to be improved for the women of Europe.     

Luanda – Holanda: Irregular Migration from Angola to the Netherlands

Against the backdrop of push‐pull and social network theories on migration and criminological theory on human smuggling, this article tries to answer the questions of why and how Angolan asylum‐seekers migrated to the Netherlands since the end of the 1990s. The study shows that the migrants can be described as opportunity seeking migrants, rather than survival migrants. Most migrants made no use of typical human smugglers during their travel. They rather used assistance from their social network and made use of the services of middlemen, called esquemas, on an ad‐hoc basis. In this article it is argued that “archetypal” large smuggling organisations in Angola have not evolved because of the existence of these highly informal networks. Support is found that both push‐pull and social network theories can contribute to explaining irregular, asylum migration.     

International migration data: their problems and usefulness in Venezuela

During the 1940s and 1950s Venezuela was an important destination for migrants from Southern Europe, a flow that disappeared almost entirely during the 1960s, to be replaced by border movements and the largely illegal migration of Colombians. The oil boom of the 1970s saw an increase of the latter, which may have subsided during the 1980s due to the more difficult economic conditions that have also led to significant emigration levels of Venezuelans and former immigrants. Methods of data collection systems that provide information on migrants include the National Population and Housing Census, the National Household Survey, migration surveys, arrival and departure statistics, registration systems operated by the Direccion General Sectorial de identificacion y Control de Extranjeros, the 1980 regularization drive, statistics gathered by the Ministry of Labor, and vital and civil registration statistics. The lack of effective coordination among the different government agencies gathering information and the administrative nature of the data collected give rise to problems of comparability. Mechanisms to publish and disseminate the data available are not well developed, so that researchers often have no access to potentially useful sources of information. Problems of timeliness in the publication of the most widely used information are also present, as is the large gap existing in data pertaining to emigration, be it of Venezuelan nationals or of immigrants leaving the country.     

The Emergence of Pro-Regularization Movements in Western Europe

Contrary to the image conveyed by existing research on irregular migrants as powerless and exploited victims of restrictive immigration policies, irregular migrants in some European countries display a strong potential for collective action. In France, Spain and Switzerland since the mid‐1990s pro‐regularization movements have emerged which have claimed the collective regularization of illegal migrants. At the centre of these new social movements were illegal migrants from sub‐saharan Africa, Latin America and former Yugoslavia who went public and claimed a legal residence status. This article starts form the assumption that despite important differences between the three countries, they share several central characteristics which enabled the emergence of these pro‐regularization movements. In order to identify these pre‐conditions, three country studies, based on an innovative social movement research approach, were carried out. The findings of the country studies show that the findings of the country studies shows that in the three countries the same specific preconditions existed which encouraged the emergence of the pro‐regularization movements.     

International migration in Western Europe since 1973: developments,mechanisms and controls

"This presentation describes the development of migration to and from Western Europe and seeks to determine to what extent such immigration and return migration movements are influenced by governmental action and regulation." It is observed that the basic factors determining immigration and return migration flows are the characteristics of the migrants themselves, policies of the receiving countries, and economic conditions in the sending and receiving countries. Data comparing alien populations and migration trends in selected European countries are provided     

Best Practice Options: Albania

The Cooperative Efforts to Manage Emigration (CEME) site visit to Italy and Albania – organized in cooperation with the Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale (CeSPI), an Italian independent research institute – took place in June 2002. Albania is a country of 3.1 million people with a GDP of $4.1 billion that switched in the early 1990s, after 45 years of communism, from economic autarky to a peculiar form of market economy, and experienced some of the world’s highest emigration rates in the 1990s. Some 600,000 to 700,000 Albanians, or almost one–fourth of Albanians, and half of Albanian professionals, emigrated. As a result, the labour force is only 38 per cent of the population, versus 50 per cent in most industrial countries (UNDP, 1996, 2000). The major destinations of Albanian migrants in the 1990s were Greece, which had 400,000 to 600,000 Albanians in 2002, and Italy, which had 144,000 legal residents and probably some tens of thousands illegals at the end of 2001. 1 The Albanian Government estimates that about half of the Albanians in Greece are legal residents. There are also about 100,000 Albanians in Switzerland, the UK, Germany, and other Western European countries.
Many Albanians have become legal residents of Greece and Italy as a result of regularization–legalization programmes. Albania is also a transit point for third country nationals attempting to reach the rest of Europe via Albania. Of particular interest to the CEME members were efforts by the Italian and Albanian governments to cooperate in managing the flows of Albanian and transit migrants. When the CEME visit was made, Albania was experiencing rapid, yet unbalanced economic growth as a result of $615 million in remittances from Albanians abroad (estimates: Bank of Albania annual report, 2001), and aid from the European Union (EU) and other sources. The spending of remittances and aid has fuelled a building boom, but there was no clear sense of how Albania would use the window of opportunity opened by remittances and aid to develop a viable economy. The optimistic scenario is that remittances and investments from Albanians abroad will produce an economic take off based on value–added food production and tourism in the “Switzerland of the Balkans”. The pessimistic scenario is that corruption and divided government will prevent the development of a successful economic strategy, and that low wages, high unemployment, and inadequate services such as health care and education will prompt the continued emigration of young and educated Albanians. Potential best practices include: joint Italian–Albanian marine patrols to discourage smuggling and trafficking in small “fast boats”; Italy granting Albania at least 6,000 work visas a year to publicize that there is a legal way to work in Italy, helping to discourage illegal migration; and bilateral and international assistance to enable Albania to develop laws and institutions to deal with foreigners transiting Albania, and foreigners requesting asylum in Albania. Albania does not, on the other hand, appear to be a best practice in managing the use of remittances to aid economic development. Although remittances play an important role in basic subsistence and construction of housing, there have been fewer efforts to encourage investment of these funds in infrastructure or productive activities. The banking system needs substantial reform to become a venue for transfer of remittances and source of credit for enterprise development. Albania would benefit from a more systematic examination of the lessons learned in other countries about the investment of remittances for economic development.     

Illegal Migration: What Can We Know And What Can We Explain? The Case of Germany1

Methodological problems in the study of illegal migration as defined in this article relate to questions of indicators for illegal migration, with special reference to Germany. It is argued and demonstrated that illegal immigrants are traceable, to some degree, in official statistics and that these can be analyzed for trends. In present‐day migration processes, illegal immigration frequently is undertaken with the support of human smugglers. The analysis of the social organization of different forms of smuggling is the other main focus of the article. From a methodological point of view, the literature and public discourse lack adequate concepts for describing and explaining the social organization of human smuggling. The theory of organized crime as a main actor in human smuggling is criticized. The study borrows concepts from market and networks theory and applies these to different forms of human smuggling and illegal migration. The social and technological organization of smuggling is under constant pressure to adapt to new conditions. The dynamism for this change results mainly from an “arms race” between smugglers and law enforcement. Since control over territory and population are central elements of state sovereignty, the state cannot simply withdraw from this race.     

The Global Compact for Migration: what could it mean for women and gender relations?

ABSTRACT

Under half of international migrants throughout the world are women. While large movements of people, human rights and humanitarian crises, and migrant deaths are not new, the public attention given to the arrivals of refugees and migrants to the shores of Europe has compelled governments to engage in a multilateral manner. In September 2016, the United Nations General Assembly held its first-ever summit dedicated to large movements of refugees and migrants, reaffirming the importance of existing legal instruments to protect refugees and migrants, and also foreseeing the development of two new Global Compacts: one on refugees, and the other for safe, orderly and regular migration. This article examines the process to elaborate the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration from a gender-responsive perspective. It takes into consideration the advocacy role that the Women in Migration Network and other civil society stakeholders have played in its development, identifies the various opportunities and gaps within the Global Compact, and explores how women’s organisations and development organisations can promote change for women in migration under the new Global Compact.     

Language Policy in Practice: Re‐bordering the Nation

We present findings from an anthropological field study on the role of language and language policy in migration from Poland to Norway, and the larger implications for emerging language and immigration policy in Europe. Initial fieldwork in Norway found that Polish workers without knowledge of the Norwegian language struggled to secure employment in the formal economy. The 2008 financial crisis intensified competition in the labour market and underscored fluency in Norwegian as a means of discriminating among workers. Comparative case studies of language schools revealed that these organizations are active participants in channeling Polish migrants' movements into a segmented labour market, often in ways that involve cooperation between private companies and the State. We frame the Norwegian case within the larger context of Europe and the trend there toward favoring integration over multiculturalism. The emergence of restrictive language policies in Europe may be interpreted as a legally and culturally acceptable means for discouraging access to rights associated with permanent residency or citizenship by work migrants from CEE countries, while at the same time permitting them access to the labour market for temporary work. The long‐term consequences of such policies for European society are uncertain.     

Chinese Migration to Eastern Europe

Most of the work on the early history of Chinese migration to eastern Europe, that is, the first half of the twentieth century, has been written by Russian scholars. Contemporary sources — accounts of Russian travellers and government documents — are overwhelmingly preoccupied with migration to the Russian Asian territories. But the interest in Chinese immigration since the 1990s has resulted in considerable attention being paid to the historical background as well, notably by Larin (1998, 2000) and Saveliev (2002). Chinese scholarship on Chinese labour in Europe during World War I (e.g. S. Chen, 1986) only devotes little space to eastern Europe. Yet, Chinese migration to eastern Europe has a particular policy interest because in the past decade it has proven to be predictive of trends in Europe as a whole. A new flow of entrepreneurial migrants, who often had no connection to the historical, rural‐based chains of migration that produced the earlier Chinese migrant populations of western Europe, found it possible and profitable to do business and settle on the European periphery during a brief period of liberal migration controls. Erratic crackdowns on illegal migration in the absence of thought‐through migration regimes resulted in a volatile situation, periodically generating migration flows from one country in the region to another. These were facilitated by, and gave further rise to, networks of kinship and information spanning both eastern and western Europe. While this paper focuses on Hungary, it also attempts to review information on other eastern European countries (particularly Russia, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the Czech Republic) where it is available. In doing so, it intends to fill a gap in information on Chinese in eastern Europe until more substantial research is produced, as well as to highlight the common features of, and links between, Chinese migration into individual eastern European countries as well as into western Europe.     

Imagining a future in ‘bush’: migration aspirations at times of crisis in Anglophone Cameroon

This article addresses the migration aspirations of young, lower middle-class Cameroonians living in Anglophone Cameroon. Deportations and prevention campaigns portray the negatives of migration, yet often have little impact because they assume that migrants’ aspirations are grounded in the prior success of other migrants. This research takes its lead from the question: Why aren’t aspiring migrants in Cameroon discouraged by migration failure? It is based on an ethnographic fieldwork conducted between September 2007 and January 2009 in Buea (South West Cameroon). Since the late 1990s, the desire for a future ‘away from home’ has come to be expressed in Anglophone Cameroon by aspirations of going to ‘bush’. Taking seriously people’s conceptions of success and failure in places of departure, the article argues that locally voiced claims of ‘global belonging’ exert an important influence on migration aspirations. An understanding of deeply rooted migration desires must include an analysis of identity politics.     

East European Jewish migrants and settlers in Belgium, 1880–1914: a transatlantic perspective

This article analyses whether the Jews leaving Tsarist Russia and the Austro‐Hungarian Empire, part of the transatlantic mass migration of the end of the nineteenth century, became subject to state control. Most emigrants from Eastern Europe in this period passed through the ports of Bremen, Hamburg and Antwerp. In the 1880s only a few emigrants were not welcome in America and sent back to Europe, but economic competition and the supposed health threat immigrants posed meant the US became the trendsetter in implementing protectionist immigration policy in the 1890s. More emigrants were returned to Europe because of the newly erected US federal immigration control stations, but many more were denied the possibility to leave for the United States by the remote control mechanism which the American authorities enforced on the European authorities and the shipping companies. At the Russian–German border and the port of Antwerp, shipping companies stopped transit migrants who were deemed medically unacceptable by American standards. The shipping companies became subcontractors for the American authorities as they risked heavy fines if they transported unwanted emigrants. The Belgian authorities refused to collaborate with the Americans and defended their sovereignty, and made shipping companies in the port of Antwerp solely responsible for the American remote migration control. Due to the private migration control at the port of Antwerp transit migrants became stuck in Belgium. The Belgian authorities wanted these stranded migrants to return “home.” It seems that the number of stranded migrants remained manageable as the Belgian authorities did not make the shipping companies pay the bill. They were able to get away by making some symbolic gestures and these migrants were supported by charitable contributions from the local Jewish community.     

East European assimilation and (re)integration: the interwar legacies of transatlantic migration and “Russian” Orthodox conversion (1918–1939)

In the 1920s and 30s, mass conversion movements to “Russian” Orthodoxy emerged among Greek Catholics in Czechoslovakia and Poland, comprising a new chapter in a continuing saga of conversion which began in the late nineteenth century, in what was then Austria–Hungary. Pre-1914 conversion movements arose in large part due to transatlantic migration – especially return migration – between Austria–Hungary and the Americas. Americanists have generally treated the 1920s and 30s as the era when transnational migration’s impact waned owing to US immigration restrictions, while East Europeanists have minimized or ignored the impact of transnational migration upon East European regions. Interwar Catholic-to-Orthodox conversions, however, are not merely attributable to historical legacy: transatlantic migration continued to influence the dynamics of conversion as an active, contemporary force. As had been true prior to World War I, returning migrants and their families comprised the most significant constituency of the movements after the war; migrants remaining in the Americas supported the East European movements with economic and social remittances, and activists on either side of the Orthodox/Catholic divide treated the conversions as transnational phenomena. This essay analyzes the impact of transnational migration upon shifting ethnoreligious identifications, in the context of shifting social, national, and geopolitical circumstances, 1918–1939.     

Transnational social protection infrastructures: African migrants in Mexico

In the past years, increasingly restrictive migration policies have pushed many migrants to seek new and more risky migration routes. Many studies have investigated aspects of social protection for migrants from the Global South in industrialized countries of the Global North, with powerful welfare states. Yet, such focus has failed to understand the complexities during the migration process, where people often spend uncertain periods of time in transit countries and the state is frequently absent. In these contexts, social protection is predominantly provided by the third sector (TS) and informal networks both nationally and transnationally. Based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted with African migrants and TS organizations in Mexico, this paper explores the different and often semi-formal relationships between the TS, the state, and the migrants that result in complex transnational social protection infrastructures to cover the migrants' basic social protection needs.