Advantages and Disadvantages of Shared Housing

This article reviews recent developments in the field of shared housing by the elderly, differentiating 3 types of shared housing by their level of association with social service agencies. An examination of the stated advantages and disadvantages of sharing, reported by 79 occupants of agency-assisted and agency-sponsored shared housholds in the Washington, D.C. area, leads to consideration of the varied roles of this housing option and possible variations in the development of shared housing programs.     

Strategic voting and nomination

Using computer simulations based on three separate data generating processes, I estimate the fraction of elections in which sincere voting is a core equilibrium given each of eight single-winner voting rules. Additionally, I determine how often each rule is vulnerable to simple voting strategies such as ‘burying’ and ‘compromising’, and how often each rule gives an incentive for non-winning candidates to enter or leave races. I find that Hare is least vulnerable to strategic voting in general, whereas Borda, Coombs, approval, and range are most vulnerable. I find that plurality is most vulnerable to compromising and strategic exit (causing an unusually strong tendency toward two-party systems), and that Borda is most vulnerable to strategic entry. I use analytical proofs to provide further intuition for some of my key results.     

上海建设全球城市的战略框架和战略重点

上海全球城市建设应以崇尚先进、海纳百川的海派文化为引领;以打造世界级资本、信息、能源、资源流动管理的交流协商平台为核心;以制度创新保障科技创新为手段;以包客创新风险为发展关键.上海全球城市建设的战略重点应是:营造多元文化氛围,提高人口国际化水平;推进产业的服务化、提升经济全球控制力;建立人才荟萃之都,促进科技创新;引入国际组织,增强国际影响力和话语权;重视海洋发展战略,促进区域一体化发展.     

Strategic Appointments

This article develops an institutional spatial theory of presidentialappointments to administrative agencies that falls within thespirit of a recent line of theoretical research toward an institutionaltheory of the presidency. We show that when bureaucrats implementpolicy that results from negotiation with constituents, theally principle—appointing political allies—holdsonly as a knife-edge condition. Presidents are better servedby appointing administrators whose preferences partially offsetthe influence of organized interests. The incentives describedhave implications for the selection of a whole range of bureaucraticpersonnel at various levels, generating significant implicationsfor the study of public management on issues such as personneladministration, representative bureaucracy, and the devolutionof administrative authority.     

创造循环经济优势

面对日益严峻的资源短缺问题,不论是决策者还是客户都热切希望企业能生产出更具可持续性的产品,对于企业而言,这是开启循环经济模式、打造企业循环优势的最佳时机.尽管企业是推动循环经济转型的关键,但政府扮演的角色同样不容小觑.政府需要创建适宜的政策环境,扶植各种循环商业模式发展.这些政策包括:税收基础由劳动力转向资源;制定各行业具体的回收目标;使企业在整个产品生命周期中负起责任;为再生资源的利用提供税费优惠.     

Advantages of Groups in Market Transactions

This paper takes individuals as rationaleconomic decision makers but ones operating withinwell-defined groups not just today but into the futurewhen a reputation for fair dealing will be ofsignificance. The paper explores the functional advantageswhich might accrue from group membership in suchcircumstances. As social science makes clear, mostgroups come into being for social and cultural reasonsindependent of any obvious immediate economic advantage.For this reason, this paper is exploratory of theboundary between economic reasoning and that of othersocial sciences. It explores the bridge toofar, cited by Loveridge in the 1993 special editionof this journal. This is a metaphor for the possibilityof a meaningful connector between social psychologicaland economic reasoning. This paper tentatively looks into the relationships that might beestablished between the specific economic analysiscovered by this paper and that deployed in other socialsciences. In essence, the paper suggests that bothreputational and informational benefits arise from groupbehavior. These benefits accrue to both its members andothers. By extension it is argued that similaradvantages can accrue to families ofproducts in marketing. In both cases, reputationallinkage serves as a commitment device(Schelling, 1960) with ensuing benefits to all membersof the group or product family. These relationships areseen to mediate the reputational guarantees given to consumers.     

Strategic Groups and Rent Dissipation

We consider a rent-seeking contest in which players can form strategic groups before expending their outlays. We examine the profitability of endogenous group formation and the effect of such group formation on rent dissipation. We show the following: When just one strategic group is formed in equilibrium, group formation is beneficial both to the group members and to the nonmembers, and rent dissipation is smaller than with usual individual rent seeking. However, when more than two strategic groups are formed in equilibrium, group formation is never profitable to any players, and rent dissipation is greater than with individual rent seeking.