THE CHOICE OF EXCHANGE‐RATE REGIME AND SPECULATIVE ATTACKS

We develop a framework that makes it possible to study, for the first time, the strategic interaction between the ex ante choice of exchange‐rate regime and the likelihood of ex post currency attacks. The optimal regime is determined by a policymaker who trades off the loss from nominal exchange‐rate uncertainty against the cost of adopting a given regime. This cost increases, in turn, with the fraction of speculators who attack the local currency. Searching for the optimal regime within the class of exchange‐rate bands, we show that the optimal regime can be either a peg (a zero‐width band), a free float (an infinite‐width band), or a nondegenerate band of finite width. We study the effect of several factors on the optimal regime and on the probability of currency attacks. In particular, we show that a Tobin tax induces policymakers to set less flexible regimes. In our model, this generates an increase in the probability of currency attacks. (JEL: F31, D84)     

Competition,formal governance and trust in alliances: An experimental study

We study the role of alliance governance in the behavior of partners in alliances with different degrees of competition. Using data from a lab experiment on 1,009 alliances and 31,662 partners' choices, we explore whether and how alliances succeed in different competitive scenarios, contingent on the use of formal governance mechanisms (termination clauses) and the number of partners in the alliance. We find that trust, an informal governance mechanism, emerges as a complement to formal governance in order to establish success in our experimental alliances, especially when competition is high. In particular, we document the significance of “trust-building” in initial stages and “trust repair” in later stages of our experimental alliances.     

EGO UTILITY,OVERCONFIDENCE, AND TASK CHOICE

This paper models behavior when a decision maker cares about and manages her self‐image. In addition to having preferences over material outcomes, the agent derives “ego utility” from positive views about her ability to do well in a skill‐sensitive, “ambitious,” task. Although she uses Bayes' rule to update beliefs, she tends to become overconfident regarding which task is appropriate for her. If tasks are equally informative about ability, her task choice is also overconfident. If the ambitious task is more informative about ability, she might initially display underconfidence in behavior, and, if she is disappointed by her performance, later become too ambitious. People with ego utility prefer to acquire free information in smaller pieces. Applications to employee motivation and other economic settings are discussed. (JEL: D83, D11)     

Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a game in strategic form. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the “proposer commitment” procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash's two‐player variable‐threat model; a key feature is the commitment to “threats.” We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies, the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable. (JEL: C70, C71, C78, D70)     

Putting the “psychic” Back in Psychic Distance: Awareness,Perceptions, and Understanding as Dimensions of Psychic Distance

Unlike the IB literature whose emphasis within the term ‘psychic distance’ has been more on “distance” and less on “psychic,” our starting point is all “psychic” and no “distance,” assuming distance is defined as the difference between two countries. We propose that psychic distance be centered on the firm's managers and explain how their cognitive limitations, perceptions, heuristics, and experiences interact with a foreign environment to influence their decision making. We replace the conventional definition of distance with the cognitive dimensions of managerial awareness, perceptions, and understanding. Awareness captures the manager's consciousness of foreign context elements relevant to the firm's decision, perception is the manager's interpretation of the extent of these relevant environmental elements, and a manager's understanding captures the relationships among these context elements and the firm's decision. We argue that a multidimensional psychic distance construct is necessary as many of distance's problems are due to the illusion it promises of capturing a manager's perception of a complex foreign environment in a single number. Our approach eliminates distance's problems of symmetry and linearity. It also eliminates the constraint that distance is only associated with negative outcomes. After explaining the theoretical value of awareness, perception, and understanding by developing propositions predicting context traps, we present our operationalization of psychic distance.     

The Non‐Democratic Roots of Elite Capture: Evidence From Soeharto Mayors in Indonesia

Democracies widely differ in the extent to which powerful elites and interest groups retain influence over politics. While a large literature argues that elite capture is rooted in a country's history, our understanding of the determinants of elite persistence is limited. In this paper, we show that allowing old‐regime agents to remain in office during democratic transitions is a key determinant of the extent of elite capture. We exploit quasi‐random from Indonesia: Soeharto‐regime mayors were allowed to finish their terms before being replaced by new leaders. Since mayors' political cycles were not synchronized, this event generated exogenous variation in how long old‐regime mayors remained in their position during the democratic transition. Districts with longer exposure to old‐regime mayors experience worse governance outcomes, higher elite persistence, and lower political competition in the medium run. The results suggest that slower transitions towards democracy allow the old‐regime elites to capture democracy.     

THE TIMING OF LABOR TRANSFERS IN DUAL RESOURCE-CONSTRAINED SYSTEMS: “PUSH” VS. “PULL” RULES*

Altough the dual resource-constrained (DRC) system has been studied, the decision rule used to determine when workers are eligible for transfer largely has been ignored. Some earlier studies examined the impact of this rule [5] [12] [15] but did not include labor-transfer times in their models. Gunther [6] incorporated labour-transfer times into his model, but the model involved only one worker and two machines. No previous study has examined decision rules that initiate labor transfers based on labor needs (“pull” rules). Labor transfers always have been initiated based on lack of need (“push” rules). This study examines three “pull” variations of the “When” labor-assignment decision rule. It compares their performances to the performances of two “push” rules and a comparable machine-limited system. A nonparametric statistical test, Jonckheere's S statistic, is used to test for significance of the rankings of the rules: a robust parametric multiple-comparison statistical test, Tukey's B statistic, is used to test the differences. One “pull” and one “push” decision rule provide similar performances and top the rankings consistently. Decision rules for determining when labor should be transferred from one work area to another are valuable aids for managers. This especially is true for the ever-increasing number of managers operating in organizations that recognize the benefits of a cross-trained work force. Recently there has been much interest in cross-training workers, perhaps because one of the mechanisms used in just-in-time systems to handle unbalanced work loads is to have cross-trained workers who can be shifted as demand dictates [8]. If management is to take full advantage of a cross-trained work force, it need to know when to transfer workers.     

LEGAL STANDARDS,ENFORCEMENT, AND CORRUPTION

Stricter laws require more incisive and costlier enforcement. Because enforcement activity depends both on available tax revenue and the honesty of officials, the optimal legal standard of a benevolent government is increasing in per capita income and decreasing in officials' corruption. In contrast to the “tollbooth view” of regulation, the standard chosen by a self‐interested government is a non‐monotonic function of officials' corruption, and can be either lower or higher than that chosen by a benevolent regulator. International evidence on environmental regulation shows that standards correlate positively with per‐capita income, and negatively with corruption, consistent with the model's predictions for benevolent governments. (JEL: D73, K42, L51)     

An Empirical Approach to Sufficient Similarity: Combining Exposure Data and Mixtures Toxicology Data

When assessing risks posed by environmental chemical mixtures, whole mixture approaches are preferred to component approaches. When toxicological data on whole mixtures as they occur in the environment are not available, Environmental Protection Agency guidance states that toxicity data from a mixture considered “sufficiently similar” to the environmental mixture can serve as a surrogate. We propose a novel method to examine whether mixtures are sufficiently similar, when exposure data and mixture toxicity study data from at least one representative mixture are available. We define sufficient similarity using equivalence testing methodology comparing the distance between benchmark dose estimates for mixtures in both data‐rich and data‐poor cases. We construct a “similar mixtures risk indicator”(SMRI) (analogous to the hazard index) on sufficiently similar mixtures linking exposure data with mixtures toxicology data. The methods are illustrated using pyrethroid mixtures occurrence data collected in child care centers (CCC) and dose‐response data examining acute neurobehavioral effects of pyrethroid mixtures in rats. Our method shows that the mixtures from 90% of the CCCs were sufficiently similar to the dose‐response study mixture. Using exposure estimates for a hypothetical child, the 95th percentile of the (weighted) SMRI for these sufficiently similar mixtures was 0.20 (i.e., where SMRI <1, less concern; >1, more concern).     

Matching and Network Effects

The matching of individuals in teams is a key element in the functioning of an economy. The network of social ties can potentially transmit important information on abilities and reputations and also help mitigate matching frictions by facilitating interactions among “screened” individuals. We conjecture that the probability of two individuals forming a team falls in the distance between the two individuals in the network of existing social ties. The objective of this paper is to empirically test this conjecture. We examine the formation of coauthor relations among economists over a twenty‐year period. Our principal finding is that a new collaboration emerges faster among two researchers if they are “closer” in the existing coauthor network among economists. This proximity effect on collaboration is strong: Being at a network distance of 2 instead of 3, for instance, raises the probability of initiating a collaboration by 27%. (JEL: C78, D83, D85)     

Cultural Values,Trust, and Benefit‐Risk Perceptions of Hydraulic Fracturing: A Comparative Analysis of Policy Elites and the General Public

Hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) has recently become a very intensely debated process for extracting oil and gas. Supporters argue that fracking provides positive economic benefits and energy security and offers a decreased reliance on coal‐based electricity generation. Detractors claim that the fracking process may harm the environment as well as place a strain on local communities that experience new fracking operations. This study utilizes a recently conducted survey distributed to a sample of policy elites and the general public in Arkansas and Oregon to examine the role of cultural value predispositions and trust in shaping the perceptions of risks and benefits associated with fracking. Findings indicate that cultural values influence both trust and benefit‐risk perceptions of fracking for both policy elites and the general public. More specifically, we found that trust in information from various sources is derived from the intrinsic values held by an individual, which in turn impacts perceptions of related benefits and risks. We also found that while the overall pattern of relationships is similar, trust plays a larger role in the formulation of attitudes for policy elites than for the general public. We discuss the implications of the mediating role of trust in understanding value‐driven benefit‐risk perceptions, as well as the disparate role of trust between policy elites and the general public in the context of the policy‐making process for both theory and practice.     

Perception of Hazards: The Role of Social Trust and Knowledge

Recent research indicates that social trust of those who manage a hazard is strongly correlated to judgments about the hazard's risk and benefits. The present study investigates the more specific question of “For which hazards is this?” It was postulated that when an individual lacks knowledge about a hazard, social trust of authorities managing the hazard determines perceived risks and benefits. On the other hand, when an individual has personal knowledge about a hazard and therefore does not need to rely on managing authorities, social trust is unrelated to judged risks and benefits. Participants (N = 91) assessed risks, benefits, and trust in managing authorities and personal knowledge associated with 25 hazardous technologies and activities. As expected, strong correlations between social trust and judged risks and benefits were observed for hazards about which people did not possess much knowledge. No significant correlations between social trust and judged risks and benefits were found for hazards about which people were knowledgeable. Results suggest that the lay public relies on social trust when making judgments of risks and benefits when personal knowledge about a hazard is lacking. Replicating findings of other studies, the present study also found negative correlations between perceived risks and perceived benefits. When social trust was controlled for, correlations between perceived risks and benefits diminished. Implications of the results for risk management are discussed.     

THE BALANCED US PRESS

We measure the relative ideological positions of newspapers, voters, interest groups, and political parties, using data on ballot propositions. We exploit the fact that newspapers, parties, and interest groups take positions on these propositions, and the fact that citizens ultimately vote on them. We find that, on average, newspapers in the United States are located almost exactly at the median voter in their states—that is, they are balanced around the median voter. Still, there is a significant amount of ideological heterogeneity across newspapers, which is smaller than the one found for interest groups. However, when we group propositions by issue area, we find a sizable amount of ideological imbalance: broadly speaking, newspapers are to the left of the state‐level median voter on many social issues, and to the right on many economic issues. To complete the picture, we use two existing methods of measuring bias and show that the news and editorial sections of newspapers have almost identical partisan positions.     

Replenishment Strategies for Micro‐Retailers in Developing Countries

When formal distribution channels are absent in developing countries, micro‐retailers travel a long distance to replenish their stocks directly from suppliers. This “informal” replenishment strategy is inefficient due to high imputed travel costs involved in the replenishment process. To improve efficiency, one “hybrid” replenishment strategy has emerged under which one of the micro‐retailers in a neighborhood, while continuing its own retail business, also operates as a wholesaler to serve other micro‐retailers in the neighborhood. A major obstacle for the transition from the informal strategy to the hybrid strategy is that the micro‐retailers are reluctant to source from a wholesaler who also competes with them in the retail market. Thus, it is not clear when the micro‐retailers adopt the hybrid strategy instead of the informal strategy. Meanwhile, the micro‐retailers may prefer the “formal” strategy: a traditional replenishment strategy under which one of the micro‐retailers relinquishes its retail business and operates purely as a wholesaler. We examine a situation when competing micro‐retailers contemplate with the three potential aforementioned replenishment strategies. Our equilibrium analysis of the two‐store model reveals that the dominant strategy is: (a) the hybrid strategy when the travel cost is high; (b) the formal strategy when the travel cost is medium; and (c) the informal strategy when the travel cost is low. This key insight is shown continue to hold when we extend the two‐store model to incorporate other issues including: quantity discounts from the supplier, variable operating costs, price competition, local monopolies, and different decision sequences. One additional finding is that the transition from the informal strategy to the hybrid strategy could benefit consumers if the micro‐retailers receive quantity discounts from the supplier. Furthermore, when there are more than two stores, we show that the formal strategy is never dominant. Moreover, when the number of stores increases, the hybrid strategy becomes more preferable to the informal strategy.     

Production,Process Investment,and the Survival of Debt‐Financed Startup Firms

Whether to invest in process development that can reduce the unit cost and thereby raise future profits or to conserve cash and reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy is a key trade‐off faced by many startup firms that have taken on debt. We explore this trade‐off by examining the production quantity and cost reducing R&D investment decisions in a two period model wherein a startup firm must make a minimum level of profit at the end of the first period to survive and operate in the second period. We specify a probabilistic survival measure as a function of production and investment decisions to track and manage the risk exposure of the startup depending on three key market factors: technology, demand, and competitor's cost. We develop managerial insights by characterizing how to create operational hedges against the bankruptcy risk: if a startup makes a “conservative” investment decision, then it also selects an optimal quantity that is less than the monopoly level and hence sacrifices some of first period expected profits to increase its survival chances. If it decides to invest “aggressively,” then it produces more than the monopoly level to cover the higher bankruptcy risk. We also illustrate that debt constraint shrinks the decision space, wherein such process investments are viable.     

Trust and Terrorism: Citizen Responses to Anti‐Terrorism Performance History

The “intuitive detection theorists” model of trust posits greater trust for correctly distinguishing danger from safety and an activist response under uncertainty about danger. An American sample evaluated U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) performance after two possible terrorism events in which DHS has the same activist or nonactivist response bias. Outcomes were two successes (bombing prevented or lack of threat accurately foretold), two failures (bombing or DHS action against high school prank leads to student deaths), or a mix. Hindsight empathy (a belief one would have made the same decision) differed across treatments but trust less so; contrary to a similar one‐event experiment in Germany, an active but incorrect response did not raise trust relative to passive incorrect action. Political conservatives were much more trusting and empathetic than liberals, and all ideological groups (including moderates) exhibited little internal variation reflecting experimental conditions. Consistently accurate outcomes rated significantly higher in empathy than either inconsistent results or consistent inaccuracy (the lowest rated); trust exhibited no significant differences. Results in this study show actual (experimentally manipulated) performance being trumped by the interpretive screen of political ideology, but this seemed less the case in the earlier German study, despite its finding of a strong moderating effect of right‐wing authoritarianism. Trust scholars need to attend more to effects of performance history (i.e., a sequence of events) and their limiting factors. More systematic testing of effects of ideology and performance history would enhance future research on trust.     

Regression Versus Causation,Revisited

I recently discussed pitfalls in attempted causal inference based on reduced‐form regression models. I used as motivation a real‐world example from a paper by Dr. Sneeringer, which interpreted a reduced‐form regression analysis as implying the startling causal conclusion that “doubling of [livestock] production leads to a 7.4% increase in infant mortality.” This conclusion is based on: (A) fitting a reduced‐form regression model to aggregate (e.g., county‐level) data; and (B) (mis)interpreting a regression coefficient in this model as a causal coefficient, without performing any formal statistical tests for potential causation (such as conditional independence, Granger‐Sims, or path analysis tests). Dr. Sneeringer now adds comments that confirm and augment these deficiencies, while advocating methodological errors that, I believe, risk analysts should avoid if they want to reach logically sound, empirically valid, conclusions about cause and effect. She explains that, in addition to (A) and (B) above, she also performed other steps such as (C) manually selecting specific models and variables and (D) assuming (again, without testing) that hand‐picked surrogate variables are valid (e.g., that log‐transformed income is an adequate surrogate for poverty). In her view, these added steps imply that “critiques of A and B are not applicable” to her analysis and that therefore “a causal argument can be made” for “such a strong, robust correlation” as she believes her regression coefficient indicates. However, multiple wrongs do not create a right. Steps (C) and (D) exacerbate the problem of unjustified causal interpretation of regression coefficients, without rendering irrelevant the fact that (A) and (B) do not provide evidence of causality. This reply focuses on whether any statistical techniques can produce the silk purse of a valid causal inference from the sow's ear of a reduced‐form regression analysis of ecological data. We conclude that Dr. Sneeringer's analysis provides no valid indication that air pollution from livestock operations causes any increase in infant mortality rates. More generally, reduced‐form regression modeling of aggregate population data—no matter how it is augmented by fitting multiple models and hand‐selecting variables and transformations—is not adequate for valid causal inference about health effects caused by specific, but unmeasured, exposures.     

Will More Purchasing Options Benefit Customers?

This paper considers the sale of a seasonal product in the face of strategic customers. At the beginning of the selling season, the retailer announces both the price p_h at which the product will be sold during the selling season and the post‐season clearance price p<p_h for unsold items. We analyze two operating regimes: The “no reservation regime” allows a buyer either to purchase the product at price p_h when he arrives or to enter a lottery to purchase at price p if the product remains unsold. The “reservation regime” offers each buyer one extra option than the no reservation regime: reserve the product for purchase at the clearance price p. If the buyer reserves the product under the reservation regime and if it remains unsold at the end of the selling season, then he is obligated to purchase it at price p. We consider a situation in which heterogeneous customers with probabilistic valuation arrive in accord with a Poisson process. We characterize the rational purchasing behavior wherein each arriving customer is strategic; each customer takes other customers' purchasing behavior into consideration. By considering the Nash equilibrium of this game, we show that strategic customer behavior can render the customer to be worse off and the retailer to be better off under the reservation regime, despite the fact that this regime offers one extra option (reservation) to a customer. Hence, more purchasing options do not necessarily benefit customers.     

Understanding Mechanisms Underlying Peer Effects: Evidence From a Field Experiment on Financial Decisions

Using a high‐stakes field experiment conducted with a financial brokerage, we implement a novel design to separately identify two channels of social influence in financial decisions, both widely studied theoretically. When someone purchases an asset, his peers may also want to purchase it, both because they learn from his choice (“social learning”) and because his possession of the asset directly affects others' utility of owning the same asset (“social utility”). We randomize whether one member of a peer pair who chose to purchase an asset has that choice implemented, thus randomizing his ability to possess the asset. Then, we randomize whether the second member of the pair: (i) receives no information about the first member, or (ii) is informed of the first member's desire to purchase the asset and the result of the randomization that determined possession. This allows us to estimate the effects of learning plus possession, and learning alone, relative to a (no information) control group. We find that both social learning and social utility channels have statistically and economically significant effects on investment decisions. Evidence from a follow‐up survey reveals that social learning effects are greatest when the first (second) investor is financially sophisticated (financially unsophisticated); investors report updating their beliefs about asset quality after learning about their peer's revealed preference; and, they report motivations consistent with “keeping up with the Joneses” when learning about their peer's possession of the asset. These results can help shed light on the mechanisms underlying herding behavior in financial markets and peer effects in consumption and investment decisions.