Capital‐skill Complementarity and Inequality: A Macroeconomic Analysis

The supply and price of skilled labor relative to unskilled labor have changed dramatically over the postwar period. The relative quantity of skilled labor has increased substantially, and the skill premium, which is the wage of skilled labor relative to that of unskilled labor, has grown significantly since 1980. Many studies have found that accounting for the increase in the skill premium on the basis of observable variables is difficult and have concluded implicitly that latent skill‐biased technological change must be the main factor responsible. This paper examines that view systematically. We develop a framework that provides a simple, explicit economic mechanism for understanding skill‐biased technological change in terms of observable variables, and we use the framework to evaluate the fraction of variation in the skill premium that can be accounted for by changes in observed factor quantities. We find that with capital‐skill complementarity, changes in observed inputs alone can account for most of the variations in the skill premium over the last 30 years.     

UNDERSTANDING THE EVOLUTION OF THE US WAGE DISTRIBUTION: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

In this paper, we propose an analytically tractable overlapping‐generations model of human capital accumulation and study its implications for the evolution of the US wage distribution from 1970 to 2000. The key feature of the model, and the only source of heterogeneity, is that individuals differ in their ability to accumulate human capital. Therefore, wage inequality results only from differences in human capital accumulation. We examine the response of this model to skill‐biased technical change (SBTC) theoretically. We show that in response to SBTC, the model generates behavior consistent with some prominent trends observed in the US data including (i) a rise in overall wage inequality both in the short run and long run, (ii) an initial fall in the education premium followed by a strong recovery, leading to a higher premium in the long run, (iii) the fact that most of this fall and rise takes place among younger workers, (iv) a rise in within‐group inequality, (v) stagnation in median wage growth (and a slowdown in aggregate labor productivity), and (vi) a rise in consumption inequality that is much smaller than the rise in wage inequality. These results suggest that the heterogeneity in the ability to accumulate human capital is an important feature for understanding the effects of SBTC and interpreting the transformation of the US labor markets since the 1970s.     

Opt‐Out Options in New Product Co‐development Partnerships

We study three contractual arrangements—co‐development, licensing, and co‐development with opt‐out options—for the joint development of new products between a small and financially constrained innovator firm and a large technology company, as in the case of a biotech innovator and a major pharma company. We formulate our arguments in the context of a two‐stage model, characterized by technical risk and stochastically changing cost and revenue projections. The model captures the main disadvantages of traditional co‐development and licensing arrangements: in co‐development the small firm runs a risk of running out of capital as future costs rise, while licensing for milestone and royalty (M&R) payments, which eliminates the latter risk, introduces inefficiency, as profitable projects might be abandoned. Counter to intuition we show that the biotech's payoff in a licensing contract is not monotonically increasing in the M&R terms. We also show that an option clause in a co‐development contract that gives the small firm the right but not the obligation to opt out of co‐development and into a pre‐agreed licensing arrangement avoids the problems associated with fully committed co‐development or licensing: the probability that the small firm will run out of capital is greatly reduced or completely eliminated and profitable projects are never abandoned.     

A GLOBAL VIEW OF CROSS‐BORDER MIGRATION

This paper evaluates the global welfare impact of observed levels of migration using a quantitative multi‐sector model of the world economy calibrated to aggregate and firm‐level data. Our framework features cross‐country labor productivity differences, international trade, remittances, and a heterogeneous workforce. We compare welfare under the observed levels of migration to a no‐migration counterfactual. In the long run, natives in countries that received a lot of migration—such as Canada or Australia—are better off due to greater product variety available in consumption and as intermediate inputs. In the short run, the impact of migration on average welfare in these countries is close to zero, while the skilled and unskilled natives tend to experience welfare changes of opposite signs. The remaining natives in countries with large emigration flows—such as Jamaica or El Salvador—are also better off due to migration, but for a different reason: remittances. The welfare impact of observed levels of migration is substantial, at about 5% to 10% for the main receiving countries and about 10% in countries with large incoming remittances.     

THE REPLACEMENT PROBLEM IN FRICTIONAL ECONOMIES: A NEAR‐EQUIVALENCE RESULT

We examine how technological change affects wage inequality and unemployment in a calibrated model of matching frictions in the labor market. We distinguish between two polar cases studied in the literature: a “creative destruction” economy, where new machines enter chiefly through new matches and an “upgrading” economy, where machines in existing matches are replaced by new machines. Our main results are: (i) these two economies produce very similar quantitative outcomes, and (ii) the total amount of wage inequality generated by frictions is very small. We explain these findings in light of the fact that, in the model calibrated to the US economy, both unemployment and vacancy durations are very short, i.e., the matching frictions are quantitatively minor. Hence, the equilibrium allocations of the model are remarkably close to those of a frictionless version of our economy where firms are indifferent between upgrading and creative destruction, and where every worker is paid the same market‐clearing wage. These results are robust to the inclusion of machine‐specific or match‐specific heterogeneity into the benchmark model. (JEL: J41, J64, O33)     

SHOCKING STUFF: TECHNOLOGY,HOURS, AND FACTOR SUBSTITUTION

The response of hours to technology shocks is a key controversy in macroeconomics. We show that differences between RBC and NK models hinge on highly restrictive views of technology. We introduce CES production technologies and demonstrate that the response of hours depends on the factor‐augmenting nature of shocks and the capital–labor substitution elasticity in both models. We develop analytical expressions to establish the thresholds determining its sign. This opens new margins for shock identification combining theory and VAR evidence. We discuss how our models provide new robust restrictions for empirical work, especially using the labor income share.     

Political Economy of Mechanisms

We study the provision of dynamic incentives to self‐interested politicians who control the allocation of resources in the context of the standard neoclassical growth model. Citizens discipline politicians using elections. We show that the need to provide incentives to the politician in power creates political economy distortions in the structure of production, which resemble aggregate tax distortions. We provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in the long run. If the politicians are as patient as the citizens, the best subgame perfect equilibrium leads to an asymptotic allocation where the aggregate distortions arising from political economy disappear. In contrast, when politicians are less patient than the citizens, political economy distortions remain asymptotically and lead to positive aggregate labor and capital taxes.     

LONG‐TERM PERSISTENCE

We study whether a positive historical shock can generate long‐term persistence in development. We show that Italian cities that achieved self‐government in the Middle Ages have a higher level of civic capital today than similar cities in the same area that did not. The size of this effect increases with the length of the period of independence and its intensity. This effect persists even after accounting for the fact that cities did not become independent randomly. We conjecture that the Middle‐Age experience of self‐government fostered self‐efficacy beliefs—beliefs in one's own ability to complete tasks and reach goals—and this positive attitude, transmitted across generations, enhances civic capital today. Consistently, we find that fifth‐graders in former free city‐states exhibit stronger self‐efficacy beliefs and that these beliefs are correlated with a higher level of civic capital. (JEL: O43, P16, O10)     

All‐Pay Contests

This paper studies a class of games, “all‐pay contests,” which capture general asymmetries and sunk investments inherent in scenarios such as lobbying, competition for market power, labor‐market tournaments, and R&D races. Players compete for one of several identical prizes by choosing a score. Conditional on winning or losing, it is weakly better to do so with a lower score. This formulation allows for differing production technologies, costs of capital, prior investments, attitudes toward risk, and conditional and unconditional investments, among others. I provide a closed‐form formula for players' equilibrium payoffs and analyze player participation. A special case of contests is multiprize, complete‐information all‐pay auctions.     

ON THE WINNER‐TAKE‐ALL PRINCIPLE IN INNOVATION RACES

What is the optimal allocation of prizes in an innovation race? Should the winner take all, or is it preferable that the original inventor shares the market with subsequent independent duplicators? Some recent papers in law and economics have argued that the latter, more permissive solution is socially preferable under mild conditions. We re‐examine that issue, arguing that a permissive regime may turn the innovation race into a waiting game, reducing the power of incentives, and may invite socially wasteful duplicative R&D expenditures. In a model that accounts for these effects, the winner‐take‐all system turns out to be preferable in a broad set of circumstances, especially in highly innovative industries. (JEL: K11, L1, O34)     

Trade and Factor Market Reforms in China

The benefits of the multi‐faceted liberalization of the Chinese economy can be seen in various indicators of economic development. The rate of growth of the economy, the flow of foreign investment in China, and rising quality of life are some of the indicators of gains from the liberalization process. Most of the research has focused on the role of trade reforms on the Chinese economy. There is, however, one unfinished agenda that has not been addressed adequately by policy makers as well as academia, i.e. labor‐sector reforms. In this paper, we analyze the effect of labor market liberalization in China using a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. Most CGE models on China using a neoclassical approach assume that there is a single wage rate for the economy. This is a simplifying assumption and has strong implications. Studies show that inter‐industry wage differentials persist even after accounting for obvious explanations such as differences in human capital or job hazard. Inter‐industry structural rigidities in developing countries lead to wage differentials. In China, labor mobility from the rural to the urban sector is restricted. Furthermore, China is on its way to joining the WTO agreement. As a signatory to the WTO agreement, China would be required to reform its trade sector by eliminating tariffs. In this paper, we explicitly model wage differentials in the case of the Chinese economy. Various counterfactual experiments have been conducted to introduce efficiency by the removal of factor market differentials in China in the presence and absence of tariff and non‐tariff barriers. Our results indicate that factor market reforms are essential to the realization of full gains from accession to the WTO agreement.     

Discrimination and Resistance to Low‐skilled Immigration

Abstract. This paper shows that the immigration of some low‐skilled workers can be of advantage for low‐skilled natives when the host economy suffers from unemployment due to the presence of trade unions and an unemployment insurance scheme. This benefit arises if trade unions have appropriate bargaining power and preferences for members’ income, labor market discrimination against immigrants is strong enough and the unemployment tax rate is low.     

Macroeconomic Effects of Public‐Sector Unions

Motivated by the highly unionized public sectors, the high public shares in total employment, and the public‐sector wage premia observed in Europe, this paper examines the importance of public‐sector unions for macroeconomic theory. The model generates cyclical behavior in hours and wages that is consistent with data behavior in an economy with highly unionized public sector, namely Germany during the period 1970–2007. The union model is an improvement over a model with exogenous public employment. In addition, endogenously determined public wage and hours add to the distortionary effect of contractionary tax reforms by generating greater tax rate changes, thus producing higher welfare losses.     

Intersectoral Labor Mobility and the Growth of the Service Sector

One of the most striking changes in the U.S. economy over the past 50 years has been the growth in the service sector. Between 1950 and 2000, service‐sector employment grew from 57 to 75 percent of total employment. However, over this time, the real hourly wage in the service sector grew only slightly faster than in the goods sector. In this paper, we assess whether or not the essential constancy of the relative wage implies that individuals face small costs of switching sectors, and we quantify the relative importance of labor supply and demand factors in the growth of the service sector. We specify and estimate a two‐sector labor market equilibrium model that allows us to address these empirical issues in a unified framework. Our estimates imply that there are large mobility costs: output in both sectors would have been double their current levels if these mobility costs had been zero. In addition, we find that demand‐side factors, that is, technological change and movements in product and capital prices, were responsible for the growth of the service sector.     

Quantile Uncertainty and Value‐at‐Risk Model Risk

This article develops a methodology for quantifying model risk in quantile risk estimates. The application of quantile estimates to risk assessment has become common practice in many disciplines, including hydrology, climate change, statistical process control, insurance and actuarial science, and the uncertainty surrounding these estimates has long been recognized. Our work is particularly important in finance, where quantile estimates (called Value‐at‐Risk) have been the cornerstone of banking risk management since the mid 1980s. A recent amendment to the Basel II Accord recommends additional market risk capital to cover all sources of “model risk” in the estimation of these quantiles. We provide a novel and elegant framework whereby quantile estimates are adjusted for model risk, relative to a benchmark which represents the state of knowledge of the authority that is responsible for model risk. A simulation experiment in which the degree of model risk is controlled illustrates how to quantify Value‐at‐Risk model risk and compute the required regulatory capital add‐on for banks. An empirical example based on real data shows how the methodology can be put into practice, using only two time series (daily Value‐at‐Risk and daily profit and loss) from a large bank. We conclude with a discussion of potential applications to nonfinancial risks.     

人口老龄化、金融资产结构与宏观经济波动效应

本文构建了一个包含平均年龄异质性家庭和创新异质性企业的动态随机一般均衡模型,模拟分析人口老龄化对宏观经济的冲击效应得出:随着中国人口老龄化程度的提高,家庭持有的流动性金融资产占金融总资产的比例上升、资本性金融资产所占比重逐渐下降,从而引起宏观金融结构的变动;中国人口老龄化引发的金融结构变动将导致劳动减少、消费减少、产出降低,甚至影响企业创新投资降低,进而导致高投资的经济增长模式发生变化。研究结论的政策含义在于:劳动增长依赖、投资增长依赖、技术模仿依赖都难以为继,经济高质量发展的动力应集中到创新方面,激励企业技术创新是市场机制改革的重要方向,引导市场资金对技术创新型企业的投资支持,同时应避免企业技术创新投资的剧烈上涨造成经济震荡。     

人力资本不平等对全要素生产力增长的影响研究

本文通过理论和实证分析研究了人力资本不平等对全要素生产力增长的影响。文章首先对人力资本不平等影响全要素生产力增长率的作用进行了数理分析。在实证研究部分,采用DEA包络分析法计算了1995-2005年30个省的全要素生产力增长率及其两个组成部分——技术进步率和效率变化率的曼奎斯特指数,利用30个省的面板数据分别用三个计量经济模型对人力资本水平和人力资本不平等与全要素生产力增长率、技术进步率和技术效率变化率之间的关系进行了实证检验。通过理论与实证分析提出本文的政策建议。     

GROUP INEQUALITY

We explore the combined effect of segregation in social networks, peer effects, and the relative size of a historically disadvantaged group on the incentives to invest in market‐rewarded skills and the dynamics of inequality between social groups. We identify conditions under which group inequality will persist in the absence of differences in ability, credit constraints, or labor market discrimination. Under these conditions, group inequality may be amplified even if initial group differences are negligible. Increases in social integration may destabilize an unequal state and make group equality possible, but the distributional and human capital effects of this depend on the demographic composition of the population. When the size of the initially disadvantaged group is sufficiently small, integration can lower the long‐run costs of human capital investment in both groups and result in an increase the aggregate skill share. In contrast, when the initially disadvantaged group is large, integration can induce a fall in the aggregate skill share as the costs of human capital investment rise in both groups. We consider applications to concrete cases and policy implications.     

Modeling Imbalanced Economic Recovery Following a Natural Disaster Using Input‐Output Analysis

Input‐output analysis is frequently used in studies of large‐scale weather‐related (e.g., Hurricanes and flooding) disruption of a regional economy. The economy after a sudden catastrophe shows a multitude of imbalances with respect to demand and production and may take months or years to recover. However, there is no consensus about how the economy recovers. This article presents a theoretical route map for imbalanced economic recovery called dynamic inequalities. Subsequently, it is applied to a hypothetical postdisaster economic scenario of flooding in London around the year 2020 to assess the influence of future shocks to a regional economy and suggest adaptation measures. Economic projections are produced by a macro econometric model and used as baseline conditions. The results suggest that London's economy would recover over approximately 70 months by applying a proportional rationing scheme under the assumption of initial 50% labor loss (with full recovery in six months), 40% initial loss to service sectors, and 10–30% initial loss to other sectors. The results also suggest that imbalance will be the norm during the postdisaster period of economic recovery even though balance may occur temporarily. Model sensitivity analysis suggests that a proportional rationing scheme may be an effective strategy to apply during postdisaster economic reconstruction, and that policies in transportation recovery and in health care are essential for effective postdisaster economic recovery.     

PERFORMANCE AND BEHAVIOR OF FAMILY FIRMS: EVIDENCE FROM THE FRENCH STOCK MARKET

This paper empirically documents the performance and behavior of family firms listed on the French stock exchange between 1994 and 2000. On the French stock market, approximately one third of the firms are widely held, whereas the remaining two thirds are family firms. We find that, in the cross‐section, family firms largely outperform widely held corporations. This result holds for founder‐controlled firms, professionally managed family firms, but more surprisingly also for firms run by descendants of the founder. We offer explanations for the good performance of family firms. First, we present evidence of a more efficient use of labor in heir‐managed firms. These firms pay lower wages, even allowing for skill and age structure. We also find that descendants smooth out industry shocks and manage to honor implicit labor contracts. Second, we present evidence consistent with outside CEOs in family firms making a more parsimonious use of capital. They employ more unskilled, cheap labor, use less capital, pay lower interest rates on debt and initiate more profitable acquisitions. (JEL: G32, L25, J31)