How Do Education and Family Planning Accelerate Fertility Decline?

Education and family planning can both be influenced by policy and are thought to accelerate fertility decline. However, questions remain about the nature of these effects. Does the effect of education operate through increasing educational attainment of women or educational enrollment of children? At which educational level is the effect strongest? Does the effect of family planning operate through increasing contraceptive prevalence or reducing unmet need? Is education or family planning more important? We assessed the quantitative impact of education and family planning in high-fertility settings using a regression framework inspired by Granger causality. We found that women's attainment of lower secondary education is key to accelerating fertility decline and found an accelerating effect of contraceptive prevalence for modern methods. We found the impact of contraceptive prevalence to be substantially larger than that of education. These accelerating effects hold in sub-Saharan Africa, but with smaller effect sizes there than elsewhere.     

Left behind: intergenerational transmission of human capital in the midst of HIV/AIDS

This paper provides evidence on how adverse health conditions affect the transfer of human capital from one generation to the next. We explore the differential exposure to HIV/AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa as a substantial health shock to both household and community environment. We utilize the recent rounds of the Demographic and Health Surveys for 11 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. First, we find that an additional year of maternal education leads to a 0.37-year increase in children’s years of schooling in the developing economies in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, our results show that mother’s HIV status has substantial detrimental effects on inheritability of human capital. We find that the association between infected mothers’ and their children’s human capital is 30 % less than the general population. Finally, focusing only on noninfected mothers and their children, we show that HIV prevalence in the community also impairs the intergenerational human capital transfers even if mother is HIV negative. The findings of this paper are particularly distressing for these already poor, HIV-torn countries as in the future they will have even lower overall level of human capital due to the epidemic.     

An analysis of variations in U. S. fertility and female labor force participation trends

This study is based on time series data from 1947–1977 on fertility and female labor force participation, and examines (a) the effects of male relative income and female earnings on the level and timing of fertility and female labor force participation, and (b) the relative importance of variations in relative income and female wage rates in explaining the fluctuations in both fertility and female labor supply. The results suggest that relative income exerts a significant positive effect on fertility and a negative effect on female work effort. However, female wage rates appear to be the dominant factor in explaining variations in fertility and female labor force participation over the past two decades, with increases in female earnings leading to both depressed fertility and increased labor force participation of women.     

亚洲女性收入对生育率影响的国际比较研究--基于劳动参与率、受教育程度、就业方式的视角

通过构建家庭效用函数模型,论证了家庭收入增长中女性收入对家庭生育决策的影响,说明了随着女性收入的提高,会降低生育率。进一步,通过引用女性劳动参与率、受教育程度及就业方式作为女性收入对生育率影响的中间变量,再运用相关数据进行实证分析,发现女性劳动参与率、受教育程度对生育率有着负向的影响,而女性非全日制就业方式对生育率有着正向的影响。再进一步,对亚洲各国生育政策的调整进行国际比较,探讨生育政策的具体措施与影响女性收入的三个因素之间的关系,最后针对中国目前的生育水平提出两方面的建议：硬政策的完善和软环境的支持,以有助于提高人口素质,优化人口结构。     

Demography,Education, and Democracy: Global Trends and the Case of Iran

Reconstructions and projections of populations by age, sex, and educational attainment for 120 countries since 1970 are used to assess the global relationship between improvements in human capital and democracy. Democracy is measured by the Freedom House indicator of political rights. Similar to an earlier study on the effects of improving educational attainment on economic growth, the greater age detail of this new dataset resolves earlier ambiguities about the effect of improving education as assessed using a global set of national time series. The results show consistently strong effects of improving overall levels of educational attainment, of a narrowing gender gap in education, and of fertility declines and the subsequent changes in age structure on improvements in the democracy indicator. This global relationship is then applied to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Over the past two decades Iran has experienced the world's most rapid fertility decline associated with massive increases in female education. The results show that based on the experience of 120 countries since 1970, Iran has a high chance of significant movement toward more democracy over the following two decades.     

Education,employment, and fertility in Kinshasa and prospects for changes in reproductive behavior

This paper examines fertility behavior of women in Kinshasa, Zaire's capital city with a population of roughly four million. We look at relationships linking women's education, employment, and fertility behavior (children ever born, age at first marriage, contraception, abortion, breastfeeding, and postpartum abstinence), using data from a 1990 survey of reproductive-age women. Other things equal, there are significant differences by educational attainment and by modern sector employment in lifetime fertility and in most of the proximate determinants as well. The results suggest that modern contraception and abortion are alternative fertility control strategies in Kinshasa, with abortion appearing to play an important role in contributing to the observed fertility differentials by education and employment. The dramatic increases that have taken place in women's access to secondary and higher education are likely to reduce fertility in the future, while the effects of Zaire's current economic and political crisis are uncertain. Our findings are consistent with some of the arguments of Caldwell et al. (1992) on a new type of fertility transition in sub-Saharan Africa. If Zaire seeks to lower fertility, policy efforts should be made to soften the impact of economic crisis on school enrollments and enhance opportunities for young women to remain in school, at least well into the secondary level. Policy should also seek to promote more effective marketing and delivery of modern family planning services, so as to induce women to substitute modern contraception for abortion as a means of controlling their fertility.     

High Fertility and Children's Schooling in Ghana: Sex Differences in Parental Contributions and Educational Outcomes

This paper explores the linkages at the family level between sustained high fertility and children's schooling in Ghana, in the context of a constrained economic environment and rising school fees. The unique feature of the paper is its exploration of the operational significance of alternative definitions of “sib size” – the number of “same-mother” siblings and “same-father” siblings – in relation to enrolment, grade attainment, and school drop-out for boys and girls of primary and secondary school age. The analysis is based on the first wave of the Ghana Living Standards Measurement Survey (GLSS) data, collected in 1987–88. The results of the statistical analysis lead to the conclusion that the co-existence of high fertility, rising school costs, and economic reversals is having a negative impact on the education of girls, in terms of drop-out rates and grade attainment. Some of the costs of high fertility are borne by older siblings (particularly girls) rather than by parents, with the result that children from larger families experience greater inequality between themselves and their siblings by sex and birth order. Because fathers have more children on average than mothers, the inequality between their children appears to be even greater than between mothers' children, particularly given the importance of fathers' role in the payment of school fees. The paper concludes that the greatest cost for children in Ghana of sustained high fertility is likely to be the reinforcement of traditional sex roles, largely a product of high fertility in the past.     

Explaining spousal differences in reproductive preferences: A gender inequality approach

Using data from the 1988 Ghana Demographic and Health Survey we show that, contrary to some earlier findings, substantial differences in fertility goals exist between spouses in sub-Saharan Africa. Further, we indicate that gender inequality is associated with these differences in fertility goals. Women in dyads that give nonnumeric responses to questions on preferred family size are very likely to have low status, which may lead them to have high fertility. The need for more research at the micro level is stressed, given the social, economic, and environmental costs of neglecting to do so.     

The differential effects of husbands' and wives' statuses on marital fertility

As an extension of prior subjectively-oriented studies that predicted couples' fertility decisions or outcomes by the expected costs and benefits of childbearing to husbands and wives, this article examines the differentiated effects of husbands' and wives' objective statuses on marital fertility, using the cumulative 1972–1990 GSS data. An interesting finding is that wives' education has a significant, negative effect on fertility while the effect of husbands' education is positive and statistically insignificant. This suggests that the generalization of the negative effect of education on fertility may be misleading if one fails to make a distinction between marital partners. Meanwhile, this study finds no significant differences in the effects of husbands' and wives' occupational and work statuses on fertility. By and large, the husbands' status variables add little information to the models explaining fertility. It is also found that the effects of husbands' and wives' statuses are contingent upon their relative education.     

生育进度效应调整指标研究的新进展

随着经济和社会的不断发展,生育推迟现象在全世界范围内日益普遍。由于生育推迟所产生的进度效应会对生育水平造成影响,因此,如何测度生育进度效应便成了人口学界研究的重要内容。自Bongaarts和Feeney的去进度效应总和生育率提出以来,各种新的改进方法与指标不断出现。本文对生育进度效应调整指标的新进展及具体指标进行梳理与比较。从时期角度出发,主要包括方差效应调整后的TFR、PATFR*、调整后的TFRSUV_N和ITFR四种指标;从队列角度出发,主要包括TFRp*、TFR†和ACF三种指标,这些指标有各自的优缺点。研究发现:首先,由于不同去进度效应改进指标的假设、适用条件、研究角度、改进方向都不同,很难有一套数据同时适用于多种去进度方法,因此,生育进度效应的诸多改进指标并没有哪个指标“更好”,只有“更合适”;其次,绝对的去进度效应只能停留在理论层面,而实际上却很难做到,种种去进度方法都只是一种“相对的去”,而不是“绝对的去”。过去我们所熟悉的进度效应是生育推迟,而目前世界范围内生育推迟速度开始逐渐放缓,未来我们甚至不能排除生育推迟在某个时期或某些区域会发生逆转,届时可能会出现与目前影响方向相反的进度效应,这可能是下一步关于生育进度效应研究应该注意的新方向。     

Determinants Of Cumulative Fertility In Ghana

The relatively few studies conducted on fertility differentials in Ghana have not controlled for the effect of important demographic variables, such as age at first marriage and current age of respondent. This paper attempts a multivariate analysis of the relationship between cumulative fertility and age at first marriage, level of education, religion, form of marriage and residence of husband. Data drawn from a census sample survey in 1971 include 72,816 currently married females aged 15–49 years. Age at first marriage was inversely related to cumulative fertility. The differentials were more pronounced for older women. Among the older women, the differentials were larger for rural than urban women. There were also significant fertility differentials associated with level of education, religion and form of marriage. Husband’s residence was a poor predictor of cumulative fertility. As a policy measure, it is suggested that priority be given to providing young women with more education or employment opportunities as an alternative to early marriage.     

Modernization and Tradition in the Recent History of Italian Fertility

The secular decline of Italian fertility, started in the last decade of the nineteenth century, came to an end in the early 1950'sand has recovered slightly in the last fifteen years. Italian experience seems to follow, with a twenty-year lag, the experience of the more advanced western European populations. At present, with an average of 2.5 children per marriage, Italian fertility is very close to the French and to the average European level.At the regional level, two contrasting patterns can be detected. On one side stands the very low fertility of the North and of the Center, mostly below replacement in the last thirty years;on the other, the still high fertility of the South.In the North and in the Center, where the decline started earlier, fertility has fallen well below replacement level in the last thirty years. In the South, where the decline started in the late 1920's and early 1930's, a large family system still prevails, and the spreading of voluntary control faces barriers setup by a long historyof cultural isolation,attachment to tradition and religion. In the last 15 years, however, the gap has narrowed slowly, more because of an upturn of fertility in the North and in the Center than because of the decline in the South.Another interesting feature of Italian fertility is low class differentials: the fertility of the most prolific segment (farmers, farm laborers) is only 20 percent higher than the fertility of the less prolific professional groups. Finally, Italian experience provides an interesting example of the changing relationship linking the economic level of the population and fertility changes; in 1931-51 a negative correlation linked the changes in fertility to the economic level of the region, while in 1951-61 and 1961-66 a very high and positive correlation can be observed.As for the future trends in fertility, two factors may have an important role. In the first place, on the one hand, the economic policy of the government, aiming at reducing the economic gap between the South and the rest of the country, may accelerate the leveling of regional fertility differentials. The same effect, on the other hand, may be reached by more liberal legislation, now under way, for birth control and family planning propaganda.     

Son targeting fertility behavior: Some consequences and determinants

This article draws out some implications of son targeting fertility behavior and studies its determinants. We demonstrate that such behavior has two notable implications at the aggregate level: (a) girls have a larger number of siblings (sibling effect), and (b) girls are born at relatively earlier parities within families (birth-order effect). Empirically testing for these effects, we find that both are present in many countries in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and North Africa but are absent in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Using maximum likelihood estimation, we study the effect of covariates on son targeting fertility behavior in India, a country that displays significant sibling and birth-order effects. We find that income and geographic location of families significantly affect son targeting behavior.     

The one child certificate in Hebei province,China: Acceptance and consequence, 1979–1988

As part of its One Child Policy, China developed the one child certificate which offered numerous benefits to couples who had one child and promised to have no more. Using data from the Two-per-Thousand National Fertility Survey, this study describes the level of certificate acceptance in Hebei province from 1979 to 1988 and analyzes socioeconomic, cultural and early family formation factors affecting certificate acceptance as well as the role of certificate acceptance on transition to second parity. During the past decade, the level of initial certificate acceptance was 22.6 percent. This estimate is much lower than earlier published rates because it utilizes the concept of women at risk. Public resistance to the One Child Policy is evident in declining acceptance from 26.0 percent during the first five years of the policy to 11.3 percent during the 1984–1988 period. Women's response to the certificate has been influenced by the woman's status as reflected in education and occupation as well as cultural traditions, particularly son preference. The one child certificate, however, independently depresses subsequent fertility. This research indicates that efforts to understand fertility decline in China must simultaneously acknowledge the role of government family planning programs as well as socioeconomic and cultural factors.Revision of paper presented at the American Sociological Association Meeting, 1990.     

Relative Income,Race, and Fertility

If a white husband's income is higher than expected for men of his age, race, education, job characteristics, and region, economic theory predicts higher complete fertility for his wife. In the present study one per cent public use samples from the 1970 Census for California and Hawaii were used to examine the effect of relative income on Japanese, Chinese, and black fertility. Relative income was defined in two ways: (1) with regard to earnings of husbands of the same race, education, employment, and state; (2) with regard to earnings of white husbands of the same education, employment, and state. High relative incomes defined in each way were associated with increased completed fertility of Japanese and Chinese in Hawaii, where Orientals form a majority. Neither definition of high relative income was associated with the completed fertility of Japanese, Chinese, or blacks in California, where non-whites form a minority. The results suggest that the effect of relative income on fertility for a racial group will be positive only where there are few racial barriers to their attainment of high incomes.     

World population in transition

The world's population growth rate peaked at slightly over 2%/year in the late 1960s and in 1986 is down to 1.7% and falling. Annual numbers added continue to rise because these rates apply to a very large base, 4.9 billion in 1986. According to UN medium variant projections, world population growth will peak at 89 million/year in the late 1990s and then taper off until world population stabilizes in the late decade of the 21st century at about 10.2 billion. Close to 95% of this growth is occurring in less developed countries (LDCs) of Africa, Asia (minus Japan), and Latin America. LDC fertility rates are declining, except in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Latin America and South Asia, but most have far to go to reach the replacement level of 2.1 births/woman. Fertility is below replacement in virtually all more developed countries. For LDCs, large numbers will be added before stabilization even after attainment of replacement level fertility because of the demographic momentum built into their large and young population bases. This complicates efforts to bridge gaps between living standards in LDCs and industrialized countries. From a new debate about whether rapid population growth deters or stimulates economic growth, a more integrated view has emerged. This view recognizes the complementary relationship between efforts to slow population growth and other development efforts; e.g., to improve health and education, upgrade women's status, increase productivity. Most effective in the increased contraceptive prevalence and fertility declines seen in many LDCs has been the combination of organized programs to increase access to family planning information and supplies with socioeconomic development that enhances the desire for smaller families.     

我国实际低生育水平的影响因素分析——邦戈茨低生育率模型应用

本文使用2010年江苏省六县市"生育意愿与生育行为研究"跟踪调查数据,应用邦戈茨低生育率模型,对已基本完成生育周期且可生育二孩妇女的实际生育水平的影响因素进行了分析。在以意愿生育水平为参照的条件下,研究发现,初育年龄推迟、教育水平提高,工作压力等都对妇女的实际生育水平产生了显著的抑制作用。     

Sub-Saharan Africa: population pressures on development

The population of sub-Saharan Africa, estimated at 434 million in 1984, is expected to reach 1.4 billion by 2025. The birth rate, currently 48/1000 population, continues to increase, and the death rate, 17/1000, is declining. Rapid population growth has curtailed government efforts to provide adequate nutrition, preserve the land base essential for future development, meet the demand for jobs, education, and health services, and address overcrowding in urban areas. Low education, rural residence, and low incomes are key contributors to the area's high fertility. Other factors include women's restricted roles, early age at marriage, a need for children as a source of security and support in old age, and limited knowledge of and access to modern methods of contraception. Average desired family size, which is higher than actual family size in most countries, is 6-9 children. Although government leaders have expressed ambivalence toward development of population policies and family planning programs as a result of the identification of such programs with Western aid donors, the policy climat is gradually changing. By mid-1984, at least 13 of the 42 countries in the region had indicated that they consider current fertility rates too high and support government and/or private family planning programs to reduce fertility. In addition, 26 countries in the region provide some government family planning services, usually integrated with maternal and child health programs. However, 10 countries in the region do not support family planning services for any reason. Unfortunately, sub-Saharan Africa has not yet produced a family planning program with a measurable effect on fertility that could serve as a model for other countries in the region. Social and economic change is central to any hope of fertility reduction in sub-Saharan Africa. Lower infant and child mortality rates, rising incomes, higher education, greater economic and social opportunities for women, and increased security would provide a climate more conducive to fertility decline. Given the limited demand, great sensitivity must be shown in implementing family planning programs.     

Education and fertility in sub-Saharan africa: Individual and community effects

Using data from Demographic and Health Surveys for 22 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, I show that the average educational level in a village or a community of a similar size has a significant depressing effect on a woman's birth rates, net of urbanization and her own education. According to simulations, average fertility for these countries would be 1.00 lower if education were expanded from the current level in the region to the relatively high level in Kenya. The exclusion of aggregate education from the model leaves a response of only 0.52. A considerable aggregate contribution is estimated even when several potential determinants of education are included. This finding illustrates the need to consider aggregate education in future assessments of the total impact of education.     

Demographic transition in sub-Saharan Africa: How big will the economic dividend be?

In mid-demographic-transition, many Asian countries enjoyed a large demographic ‘dividend’: extra economic growth owing to falling dependant/workforce ratios, or slower natural increase, or both. We estimate the dividend, 1985–2025, in sub-Saharan Africa and its populous countries. Dependency and natural increase peaked around 1985, 20 years after Asia. The UN projects an acceleration of the subsequent slow falls but disregards slowish declines in young-age mortality and thus, we argue, overestimates future fertility decline. Even if one accepts their projection, arithmetical and econometric evidence suggests an annual, if not total, dividend well below Asia's. The dividend arises more from falling dependency than reduced natural increase, and could be increased by accelerating the fertility decline (e.g., by reducing young-age mortality) or by employing a larger workforce productively. Any dividend from transition apart, low saving in much of Africa (unlike Asia) means that, given likely natural increase, current consumption per person is unsustainable because it depletes capital per person.