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1.
This article compares the performance of the expected utility (EU) and lottery-dependent expected utility (LDEU) models in predicting the actual choices of experimental subjects among risky options. In the process, we present two approaches for calibrating the LDEU model for an individual decision maker. The results indicate that while LDEU exhibits a higher potential for correctly predicting choice, the version of the model calibrated by indifference judgments does not outperform EU. We suggest a functional form for the parametric functions that defines the LDEU model, and discuss ways in which this function can be incorporated into choice-based assessment approaches to improve predictions.This research was supported in part by the Business Associates Fund at the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University.  相似文献   

2.
In recent years there has been an active debate between proponents of two different models of rational decision. One model is evidential decision theory, which is characterized by the fact that it holds the principle of maximizing expected utility to be appropriate whenever the states are probabilistically independent of the acts. The other model, causal decision theory, holds that the principle of maximizing expected utility is appropriate whenever the states are causally independent of the acts. The proponents of evidential decision theory include Richard Jeffrey and Ellery Eells, who claim that evidential decision theory has significant advantages over causal decision theory. In this paper I discuss the two main advantages which have been claimed for evidential decision theory, and show that in fact evidential decision theory does not possess either of these advantages.  相似文献   

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An extensive literature overlapping economics, statistical decision theory and finance, contrasts expected utility [EU] with the more recent framework of mean–variance (MV). A basic proposition is that MV follows from EU under the assumption of quadratic utility. A less recognized proposition, first raised by Markowitz, is that MV is fully justified under EU, if and only if utility is quadratic. The existing proof of this proposition relies on an assumption from EU, described here as “Buridan’s axiom” after the French philosopher’s fable of the ass that starved out of indifference between two bales of hay. To satisfy this axiom, MV must represent not only “pure” strategies, but also their probability mixtures, as points in the (σ, μ) plane. Markowitz and others have argued that probability mixtures are represented sufficiently by (σ, μ) only under quadratic utility, and hence that MV, interpreted as a mathematical re-expression of EU, implies quadratic utility. We prove a stronger form of this theorem, not involving or contradicting Buridan’s axiom, nor any more fundamental axiom of utility theory.  相似文献   

6.
Comparative statics for rank-dependent expected utility theory   总被引:7,自引:3,他引:4  
Recently, a number of generalizations of the expected utility (EU) model have been proposed. In order to make such generalizations useful, it is necessary that they should yield sharp comparative static results, like those obtained using EU theory. In this article, rank dependent expected utility (RDEU) theory, a generalization of EU theory based on the concept of probability weighting, is examined. A number of methods of extending results from EU to RDEU are considered. It is shown that a major class of comparative static results can be extended to the RDEU model, but not to the case of general smooth preferences. This is because RDEU maintains the separation between probabilities and utilities that is abandoned in the general case.  相似文献   

7.
Models of the insurance markets and institutions are routinely based on expected utility. Since EU is being challenged by an increasing number of decision models, we examine whether EU-based models are robust in their predictions. To do so, we rework some basic models of optimal insurance contracts and equilibrium using the “dual” theory to EU of Yaari. When there is a single, insurable source of risk, dual theory permits only corner solutions if the contract itself is linear. This contrasts sharply with EU. Nonlinearity, and thereby the possibility of interior solutions, is introduced in two ways. First, the contract itself is nonlinear, i.e., a deductible insurance policy. Or second, the decision maker is subject to some background risk such as uninsurable risky assets or default of the insurer. When decision problems are subject to nonlinearity, the predictions on optimal insurance are more similar to, though not identical with, those generated with EU.  相似文献   

8.
In this study, we analyze choice in the presence of some conflict that affects the decision time (response time), a subject that has been documented in the literature. We axiomatize a multiattribute decision time (MDT) representation, which is a dynamic extension of the classic multiattribute expected utility theory that allows potentially incomplete preferences. Under this framework, one alternative is preferred to another in a certain period if and only if the weighted sum of the attribute-dependent expected utility induced by the former alternative is larger than that induced by the latter for all attribute weights in a closed and convex set. MDT uniquely determines the decision time as the earliest period at which the ranking between alternatives becomes decisive. The comparative statics result indicates that the decision time provides useful information to locate indifference curves in a specific setting. MDT also explains various empirical findings in economics and other relevant fields.  相似文献   

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Expected utility maximization problem is one of the most useful tools in mathematical finance, decision analysis and economics. Motivated by statistical model selection, via the principle of expected utility maximization, Friedman and Sandow (J Mach Learn Res 4:257–291, 2003a) considered the model performance question from the point of view of an investor who evaluates models based on the performance of the optimal strategies that the models suggest. They interpreted their performance measures in information theoretic terms and provided new generalizations of Shannon entropy and Kullback–Leibler relative entropy and called them U-entropy and U-relative entropy. In this article, a utility-based criterion for independence of two random variables is defined. Then, Markov’s inequality for probabilities is extended from the U-entropy viewpoint. Moreover, a lower bound for the U-relative entropy is obtained. Finally, a link between conditional U-entropy and conditional Renyi entropy is derived.  相似文献   

11.
In an earlier paper, we axiomatized a lexicographic expected utility model for preference in decision under uncertainty that is patterned on the models of Ramsey and Savage but omits their Archimedean axioms. Our model has the unusual feature that subjective probabilities are matrices that premultiply utility vectors in the lexicographic representation of preference between acts. Our purpose here is to analyze the model in relation to the Ramsey-Savage theory along with other models that have a lexicographic feature. A point of departure is Savage's postulate P4, whose purpose is to weakly order hisis more probable than relation on events. This postulate does not hold in our model and we therefore encounter incomparability between events. The paper explores the nature of incomparability, which can be widespread in high-dimensional situations. We include special cases of our model that retain a lexicographic component but also satisfy P4.  相似文献   

12.
In decision theory, the betweenness axiom postulates that a decision maker who chooses an alternative A over another alternative B must also choose any probability mixture of A and B over B itself and can never choose a probability mixture of A and B over A itself. The betweenness axiom is a weaker version of the independence axiom of expected utility theory. Numerous empirical studies documented systematic violations of the betweenness axiom in revealed individual choice under uncertainty. This paper shows that these systematic violations can be linked to another behavioral regularity—choice shifts in a group decision making. Choice shifts are observed if an individual faces the same decision problem but makes a different choice when deciding alone and in a group.  相似文献   

13.
The particular attention paid by decision makers to the security level ensured by each decision under risk, which is responsible for the certainty effect, can be taken into account by weakening the independence and continuity axioms of expected utility theory. In the resulting model, preferences depend on: (i) the security level, (ii) the expected utility, offered by each decision. Choices are partially determined by security level comparison and completed by the maximization of a function, which express the existing tradeoffs between expected utility and security level, and is, at a given security level, an affine function of the expected utility. In the model, risk neutrality at a given security level implies risk aversion.  相似文献   

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I analyze two expected utility models which abandon the consequentialist assumption of terminal wealth positions. In the expected utility of gambling wealth model, in which initial wealth is allowed to be small, I show that a large WTA/WTP gap is possible and the (Rabin in Econometrica, 68(5), 1281–1292, 2000) paradox may be resolved. Within the same model the classical preference reversal which allows arbitrage is not possible, whereas preference reversal (involving buying prices in place of selling prices), which does not allow arbitrage, is possible. In the expected utility of wealth changes model, in which there is no initial wealth, I show that both a WTA/WTP gap as well as the classical preference reversal are possible due to loss aversion, both in its general as well as some specific forms.  相似文献   

16.
An expected utility model is formulated and axiomatized which allows the decision maker to specify his actions in the form of partial rather than complete contingency plans, and to simultaneously choose goals and actions in end-mean pairs. Both utility and probability are conditioned on selected goals and actions, and both are defined over the same set of events. For adaptive sequential decision problems this symmetrical treatment of utility and probability permits the expected utility criterion function to be directly updated in each decision period via transitional utility assessments in a manner analogous to Bayes' rule for updating probability distributions.This study is a condensed revised version of discussion papers [14] and [15]. Research underlying this paper was supported by National Science Foundation Grants GS-31276X and GS-35682X. Valuable comments by Professors J. S. Chipman, C. Hildreth, L. Hurwicz, I. Richards, and M. K. Richter are gratefully acknowledged.  相似文献   

17.
The results of a new experimental study reveal highly systematic violations of expected utility theory. The pattern of these violations is exactly the opposite of the classical common ratio effect discovered by Allais (1953). Two recent decision theories—stochastic expected utility theory (Blavatskyy 2007) and perceived relative argument model (Loomes 2008)—predicted the existence of a reverse common ratio effect. However, these theories can rationalize only one part of the new experimental data reported in this paper. The other part appears to be neither predicted by existing theories nor documented in the existing empirical studies.  相似文献   

18.
This article provides unified axiomatic foundations for the most common optimality criteria in statistical decision theory. It considers a decision maker who faces a number of possible models of the world (possibly corresponding to true parameter values). Every model generates objective probabilities, and von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility applies where these obtain, but no probabilities of models are given. This is the classic problem captured by Wald’s (Statistical decision functions, 1950) device of risk functions. In an Anscombe–Aumann environment, I characterize Bayesianism (as a backdrop), the statistical minimax principle, the Hurwicz criterion, minimax regret, and the “Pareto” preference ordering that rationalizes admissibility. Two interesting findings are that c-independence is not crucial in characterizing the minimax principle and that the axiom which picks minimax regret over maximin utility is von Neumann–Morgenstern independence.  相似文献   

19.
Pareto utility     
In searching for an appropriate utility function in the expected utility framework, we formulate four properties that we want the utility function to satisfy. We conduct a search for such a function, and we identify Pareto utility as a function satisfying all four desired properties. Pareto utility is a flexible yet simple and parsimonious two-parameter family. It exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion and increasing but bounded relative risk aversion. It is applicable irrespective of the probability distribution relevant to the prospect to be evaluated. Pareto utility is therefore particularly suited for catastrophic risk analysis. A new and related class of generalized exponential (gexpo) utility functions is also studied. This class is particularly relevant in situations where absolute risk tolerance is thought to be concave rather than linear.  相似文献   

20.
Experimental studies have discovered behavior that is inconsistent with the expected utility model (EU) of risky choice (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953). The two approaches to address these paradoxes are tested: generalized expected utility models (GEU) and models incorporating decision-making limits or costs through question similarity. Tests are carried out over risky pairs related to well-known examples from Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) influential work. Statistical analysis reveals that GEU models of choice are significantly violated for choice patterns consistent with the similarity hypothesis. Additional tests point to shortcomings in the similarity approach that are consistent with fanning out behavior.  相似文献   

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