UNEMPLOYMENT RISK AND COMPENSATING DIFFERENTIALS IN NEW JERSEY MANUFACTURING

We present evidence that low-skill workers received larger compensating differentials than more skilled workers when facing unanticipated unemployment in an era without unemployment insurance. Using information from surveys of New Jersey workers conducted during the 1880s, we test the theory of compensating wage differentials. We find that workers who faced a higher probability of predictable unemployment received compensating differentials and that the size of the differential differed across industries and skill levels. With few firm- or industry-specific skills, unskilled workers were less subject to "informational capture" than skilled workers who had more but less easily transferable human capital. (JEL N31 )     

Unemployment,union density,and wages

We investigate, both theoretically and empirically, whether long-run industry unemployment rates modify the wage impact of union density on the earnings of members. Our theory suggests that the density effect increases as unemployment increases. Our empirical estimates use wage equations exclusive and inclusive of unemployment and of the interactive effect of unemployment and density in influencing wages. Based on a 1985 sample of manufacturing production workers, our findings indicate that the wage effect of union density for union workers as usually measured is only 41 percent as large as the effect when unemployment is in the model.     

SKILLED‐UNSKILLED WAGE INEQUALITY AND URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT

The impact of trade liberalization on the labor market in the North has drawn tremendous attention in the face of the growing skilled‐unskilled wage gap but in the South it has been somewhat neglected. One of the key structural differences between the North and the South is that the South experiences a pronounced rural‐urban migration in the presence of urban unemployment. We introduce this feature in the structure of a simple general equilibrium model to analyze the effects of trade liberalization and fragmentation on employment and the skilled‐unskilled wage differential in the South. In particular, we show that while fragmentation necessarily improves the unskilled wage and the skilled wage, more lucrative global opportunities for the skilled final product, in the absence of fragmentation, can reduce the rural wage and increase urban unemployment. The effect of fragmentation, ceteris paribus, on the skilled‐unskilled wage gap is sensitive to the degree of substitutability between land and unskilled labor. As such, fragmentation can magnify the increase in the skilled‐unskilled wage gap resulting from an improvement in the terms of trade. It is also shown that a technological progress in the intermediate goods sector increases the skilled‐unskilled wage gap and raises urban unemployment. (JEL F1, O1, F11, F12)     

Minimum Wages in a Segmented Labor Market: Evidence from South Africa

The segmented labor market model describes the impacts of minimum wages on covered and uncovered sectors. This paper examines the impacts of an industry-specific minimum wage in South Africa, a state characterized by high unemployment, a robust union movement, and the presence of a large informal sector. Under the industry-specific wage law, formal agricultural and household workers are covered, while workers in other sectors are not. The unique aspect of this paper lies in the ability to compare the impacts of minimum wage legislation on formal covered, informal covered, formal uncovered, and informal uncovered workers. This natural experiment allows us to test whether industry-specific minimum wage legislation leads to higher wages, whether wage increases are restricted solely to covered formal sectors or if there are spillover effects, and whether such legislation manifests in disemployment effects. We find evidence of higher wages yet disemployment among black workers in formal markets. In informal markets we find no employment effects, but higher wages in formal markets appear to have spilled over into informal markets in covered sectors.     

Spatial variations in U.S. unemployment

Interstate unemployment rate differentials are large, tend to persist, and have not converged in recent times. The interstate differential in the natural rate of unemployment seems partially explained by several factors related to labor costs, including wage rates and such institutional factors as unionization, welfare, and probably tax policy. Differential welfare incidence may explain the black-white unemployment differential. Variations in intertemporal fluctuations in unemployment across states seem related to institutionalized wage rigidity caused by such factors as unions and welfare. For still unexplained reasons, unemployment tends to be higher in the West, deep South, and the industrial Midwest.     

Work hours,social value of leisure and globalisation

We examine how openness interacts with the coordination of consumption–leisure decisions in determining the equilibrium working hours and wage rate when there are leisure externalities (e.g., due to social interactions). The latter are modelled by allowing a worker's marginal utility of leisure to be increasing in the leisure time taken by other workers. Coordination takes the form of internalising the leisure externality and other relevant constraints (e.g., labour demand). The extent of openness is measured by the degree of capital mobility. We find that: coordination lowers equilibrium work hours and raises the wage rate; there is a U-shaped (inverse-U-shaped) relationship between work hours (wages) and the degree of coordination; coordination is welfare improving; and, the gap between the coordinated and uncoordinated work hours (and the corresponding wage rates) is affected by the extent and nature of openness.     

The Socioeconomic Incorporation of Immigrant and Native‐born Day Labourers in Tshwane,South Africa

It has been widely documented that unauthorized immigrants experience adverse economic incorporation in destination countries, particularly in the global North. Faced with restricted employment opportunities, many are drawn into informalizing segments of the labour market where earnings are low and unstable. Much less is known about how immigrant workers fare in the informal economy of cities of the South. Using surveys conducted in 2004, 2007 and 2015, we examine the economic outcomes of immigrant and native‐born workers who participate in the day labour markets of Tshwane, South Africa. In 2004 there were signs that foreign‐born workers enjoyed modestly better outcomes than South Africa‐born workers. In the latter periods, however, these advantages have disappeared and there are indications of a downward convergence of employment outcomes. The article concludes with a call for creating worker centres to regulate informal job markets for the benefit of workers, regardless of immigration status.     

Comparative advantage and the welfare effects of uniform wage policies

This paper analyzes the theoretical impact of a commonly cited union goal — the elimination or reduction of wage differentials within occupations. By dropping the usual assumption of homogeneous labor, we show how, and under what market conditions, workers will receive rents due to individual comparative advantage. In competitive labor markets a union-imposed uniform wage may lower the earnings of workers holding a productive advantage, causing a reduction in employment and a welfare loss of comparative advantage rents. The implications of a strict uniform wage rule imply that unions may be forced to adapt their wage policy to allow more productive workers to receive wage differentials. This consideration helps explain some common trade union institutions.     

Immigration and the Transformation of American Unionism

Does immigration hamper union organizing in the United States? The prevailing literature strongly suggests that it does and for two reasons: first, immigrants increase the labor pool and diminish union influence over the labor market. And second, immigrants may be harder to organize than native workers. In this dominant view, unions are well served to restrict immigration and have always done so. But how, then, to explain the fact that American labor has long been deeply divided over the response to immigration? Drawing on new archival research and interviews, this paper uncovers a neglected side of American labor history in which many union leaders have extended solidarity to immigrants and sought to organize them. Moreover, analysis of time series data on immigration and union density corroborates the implicit theory of this alternate account of labor history: immigration has, in fact, no statistically significant effect – either positive or negative – on union density over time. Depending on specific conditions and strategies, unions can and have been successful in organizing during periods of high immigration.     

Countercyclical union wage premium? Evidence for the 1980s

Empirical results based on pooled male data from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics indicate an overall union wage premium of about 11.92 percent for the 1980s. In response to fluctuations in local labor market conditions, proxied by the local unemployment rate, a much more flexible wage-setting process is found in the nonunion sector relative to the union sector. The long-term effect of unemployment on nonunion real wages suggests an approximate 0.6 percent decline for every one percentage point increase in unemployment, a statistically significant reduction, but the long-term effect of unemployment on real wages of union members is negligible. The union wage premium ranges between 11.6 to 12.3 percent for the sample years. Even though union wages are insensitive to short-run fluctuations in local labor market conditions, and are somewhat countercyclical in nature, widespread union wage concessions which occurred during the 1980s may now be exerting a downward pressure on union wages. We acknowledge financial support of National Science Foundation [OSR-9350540], the Ada Howe Kent Research Fund, and The Fogelman Academic Research Excellence Fund. We thank Barbara Ganley for valuable editorial comments and Noga Peled for her able research assistance. The usual caveat applies.     

Strategic behavior and the impact of unions on wage incentive plans

This paper analyzes optimal wage incentive plans in situations in which firms make capital investments and employees supply work effort. An efficient contract will take workers’ response into account in its design, leading to a competitive contract that takes the form of a lump sum penalty and full marginal rewards to workers, or equivalently, a base wage and a piece rate above a quota. A union optimizing worker welfare will alter this lump sum amount rather than attempt to control worker effort or the marginal rewards for additional output. The greater utilization of piece rate systems in capital-intensive industries is correctly predicted by the analysis.     

The effect of type of union on member-nonmember wage differentials

The union-nonunion wage differential can be decomposed into bargaining and membership effects. While some analysts suggest that they are not separable and that bargaining power is a function of membership density, others argue that they are separable and that the former derives from monopoly power while the latter stems from socialization. Our results support the latter view. We derive estimates of bargaining and membership effects for workers covered by national, industrial, and craft union contracts as well as for all covered workers taken together. Since industrial and craft unions differ in structure and organization, we expect differences in the socialization effects among types of unions. It is clear from our results that union membership per se in each case gives a large positive wage advantage.     

The 2011 Industrial Relations Reform and Nominal Wage Adjustments in Greece

This study investigates nominal contractual base-wage adjustments in Greece associated with the 2011 industrial relations reform which re-defined the limits within which base wages could oscillate and allowed workers’ associations to negotiate for wages at the firm level. The assessment covers the period 2010–2013 and is based on information extracted from the universe of firm-level contracts signed in this period. We found that firm-level contracts increased dramatically shortly after the reform, now covering a larger pool of workers, especially in larger firms, and are associated with higher base-wage reductions in the post-reform period. At the firm level, wage reductions are higher when workers are represented by a workers’ association rather than a typical trade union. In addition, a heterogeneous effect is uncovered regarding the factors that shape base-wage adjustments (firm size, profitability, structure of bargaining body and aggregate unemployment) between new and traditional forms of workers’ representation in collective bargaining.     

The minimum wage can harm workers by reducing unemployment

Economists may disagree over how much raising the minimum wage increases unemployment, though few argue that the unemployment effect is zero. According to the standard model, the less the unemployment caused by a minimum wage increase, the less the harm (or greater the good) that results. But by recognizing that minimum wage workers receive fringe benefits, I show that increasing the minimum wage may not cause any unemployment and harms workers because it doesn 't. Furthermore, when there is lumpiness in providing fringe benefits, a minimum wage increase may harm workers by     

Needed: a new international for a just transition and against fascism

ABSTRACT

We urgently need a new global solidarity movement, but it will not be shaped like the old ones, with failing solidarity when it is most needed or at the service of anti-imperialist regimes. What we need, urgently, is a global movement for a just transition, combining social and environmental justice, as well as a strong movement against re-emerging fascism, in North and South.     

UNION POWER,COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,AND OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY

We study Ramsey policies and optimal monetary policy rules in a dynamic New Keynesian model with unionized labor markets. Collective wage bargaining and unions' monopoly power amplify inefficient employment fluctuations. The optimal monetary policy must trade off between stabilizing inflation and reducing inefficient unemployment fluctuations induced by unions' monopoly power. In this context the monetary authority uses inflation as a tax on union rents and as a mean for indirect redistribution. Results are robust to the introduction of imperfect insurance on income shocks. The optimal monetary policy rule targets unemployment alongside inflation. (JEL E0, E4, E5, E6)     

PATENT BREADTH IN AN INTERNATIONAL SETTING

We examine the Nash equilibria of a game where two national governments set patent breadth strategically. Broader patents make R&D more attractive, but the effect on static efficiency is nonmonotonic. In a North–South model, where only the North can innovate, harmonization of patent breadth lowers welfare relative to the Nash equilibrium. When both countries can innovate, harmonization toward narrower patent breadth may raise world welfare. (JEL F02, F13, O3, O31, O32)     

Have unions impeded growing wage dispersion among young workers?

Wage inequality is examined for young males over the period 1980–1993. While wage inequality increased substantially for nonunion workers over this period, wage inequality increased only modestly for union workers. In part, this difference results from divergent trends in skill prices—returns to skill rose in the nonunion sector but contracted slightly in the union sector. In particular, returns to education increased sharply in the nonunion sector while remaining stagnant in the union sector. At least for young workers, these findings suggest that unions have been largely successful in resisting market pressures for greater wage inequality. We also uncover evidence suggesting that, as relative returns to education decline in the union sector, highly educated young workers become less likely to choose union employment. We acknowledge the helpful comments of Dek Terrell, Steve Trejo, and Carol Horton Tremblay.     

Employment-based retirement plan participation: geographic differences and trends, 2010

LATEST DATA: This Issue Brief examines the level of participation by workers in public- and private-sector employment-based pension or retirement plans, based on the U.S. Census Bureau's March 2011 Current Population Survey (CPS), the most recent data currently available (for year-end 2010). SPONSORSHIP RATE: Among all working-age (21-64) wage and salary employees, 54.2 percent worked for an employer or union that sponsored a retirement plan in 2010. Among full-time, full-year wage and salary workers ages 21-64 (those with the strongest connection to the work force), 61.6 percent worked for an employer or union that sponsors a plan. PARTICIPATION LEVEL: Among full-time, full-year wage and salary workers ages 21-64, 54.5 percent participated in a retirement plan. TREND: This is virtually unchanged from 54.4 percent in 2009. Participation trends increased significantly in the late 1990s, and decreased in 2001 and 2002. In 2003 and 2004, the participation trend flattened out. The retirement plan participation level subsequently declined in 2005 and 2006, before a significant increase in 2007. Slight declines occurred in 2008 and 2009, followed by a flattening out of the trend in 2010. AGE: Participation increased with age (61.4 percent for wage and salary workers ages 55-64, compared with 29.2 percent for those ages 21-24). GENDER: Among wage and salary workers ages 21-64, men had a higher participation level than women, but among full-time, full-year workers, women had a higher percentage participating than men (55.5 percent for women, compared with 53.8 percent for men). Female workers' lower probability of participation among wage and salary workers results from their overall lower earnings and lower rates of full-time work in comparison with males. RACE: Hispanic wage and salary workers were significantly less likely than both white and black workers to participate in a retirement plan. The gap between the percentages of black and white plan participants that exists overall narrows when compared across earnings levels. GEOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES: Wage and salary workers in the South and West had the lowest participation levels (Florida had the lowest percentage, at 43.7 percent) while the upper Midwest, Mid-Atlantic, and Northeast had the highest levels (West Virginia had the highest participation level, at 64.2 percent). OTHER FACTORS: White, more highly educated, higher-income, and married workers are more likely to participate than their counterparts.     

CONSEQUENCES OF OFFSHORING TO DEVELOPING NATIONS: LABOR-MARKET OUTCOMES,WELFARE, AND CORRECTIVE INTERVENTIONS

Our parsimonious two-country (developed country and developing country) model of offshoring provides nuanced results. These include cases where wages monotonically improve, as well as where wages exhibit an inverted-U relationship with offshoring cost reductions. We identify conditions under which these relationships hold. Since global welfare always rises with improvements in offshoring technology, we find that there is a role for a minimum wage (alternatively, wage tax) in the developing country. We derive such a policy's optimal level. There is also the possibility of a developed country optimal offshoring tax for extracting terms-of-trade benefits. We, finally, analyze the two-country Nash equilibrium in policies. (JEL F11, F13, F16, F66, O19, O24)