THE STATE OF THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY: FURTHER EVIDENCE

Simultaneous monetary and fiscal policy reaction functions are derived and estimated for the 1969:2–1984.3 period. The results suggest that the Reagan administration has abandoned fiscal policy as a stabilization tool. Furthermore, although the average money growth rate declined in the Reagan administration, variation in the rate of money growth indicates that monetary policy has been used to combat unemployment. Finally, monetary and fiscal policies were not coordinated during this period. Rather, monetary and fiscal policy appear to be set by a Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game. In a Nash equilibrium, the policy chosen by each authority maximizes its payoff, given the policy choice of the other authority.     

THE FISCAL FRAMEWORK OF MONETARY POLICY

This paper i11ustrates the importance of the fiscal framework for monetary analysis by discussing three separate issues. I begin by examining how the fiscal framework changes the macroeconomic equilibrium associated with different steady state rates of money growth. This includes a summary of research that I have presented elsewhere and comments on several additional aspects of the way in which the fiscal structure destroys the neutrality of monetary policy.
The second section deals with the short-run impact of changes in monetary policy. Here again the fiscal structure complicates the economy's response to monetary policy.
The final section looks at the effect of the fiscal structure on the central banks choice of monetary policies. Fiscal structures are likely to influence the policies adopted because they affect the costs and benefits of monetary policies.     

POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES IN THE NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL

This paper tests various political business cycle theories in a New Keynesian model with a monetary and fiscal policy mix. All the policy coefficients, the target levels of inflation and the budget deficit, the firms' frequency of price setting, and the standard deviations of the structural shocks are allowed to depend on “political” regimes: a preelection versus postelection regime, a regime that depends on whether the president (or the Fed chairman) is a Democrat or a Republican, and a regime under which the president and the Fed chairman share party affiliation in preelection quarters or not. The results provide evidence that several coefficients are influenced by political variables. The best‐fitting specification, in fact, is one that allows coefficients to vary according to a regime that depends on whether the economy is in the few quarters before a presidential election or not. Monetary policy becomes considerably more inertial before elections and fiscal policy deviations from a simple rule are more common. There is some evidence that policies become more expansionary before elections, but this evidence disappears for monetary policy in the post‐1985 sample. (JEL C11, D72, E32, E52, E58, E63)     

ELASTIC CAPITAL SUPPLY AND THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY

Existing analyses of the effects of fiscal policy in general equilibrium models have typically been conducted under the assumption that the long-run supply of capital is perfectly elastic at a fixed rate of time preference. These analyses have shown that the long-run response of the capital stock to changes in fiscal policy is crucial to generating the potential for “multiplier” effects in these models. In this paper we ask, what are the implications of relaxing the assumption of perfectly elastic capital supply for the analysis of fiscal policy? We show that with less than perfectly elastic capital supply, the potential for multipliers is actually enhanced. (JEL E62, D90)     

GROWTH, WELFARE, AND THE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT

Using an endogenous growth model in which government purchases directly affect aggregate productivity and utility, fiscal policy experiments conducted here indicate that the macroeconomic effects of changes in fiscal policy are at least as sensitive to the mix of spending cuts as they are to the mix of tax cuts. In fact, reducing the size of the government actually reduces growth and welfare freductions in government expenditures are heavily weighted towards reductions in public capital or if the proceeds are not used to reduce capital taxation. In addition, across-the-board spending cuts are not likely to significantly improve growth and welfare. ( JEL E62, 041)     

THE GROWTH OF THE FEDERAL DEFICIT AND THE ROLE OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES

How can the recent explosion in the fiscal deficit of the UnitedStates be reconciled with the well-known support of the Americanpublic for fiscal conservatism? It is first shown that the reputationfor fiscal conservatism is fully supported by public opinionpolls dating back over a period of four decades. Solid majoritieshave consistently opposed tax reductions that might producean unbalanced budget. Recently, however, the public has alsoshown strong opposition to increases in taxes to close the fiscalgap, which might appear to imply a new acquiescence to the deficit.But this opposition, too, is shown to have persisted for a longtime and to be not logically inconsistent with rejecting taxcuts resulting in deficit. Another fashionable explanation forthe deficit holds that the budget process in a democratic societyis biased toward deficit because the cost of higher taxes isimmediate while the cost of deficit is delayed. But it is inconsistentwith the fiscal history of the United States over the last 100years, which reveals no systematic bias toward deficits, atleast until recent years. The major explanation that emergesis that the administration succeeded in misleading the public(and perhaps even itself) into believing that the tax cut wouldnot result in deficit thanks to "supply" and "Laffer curve"effects.     

FORWARD GUIDANCE AND THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY

This paper analyzes forward guidance in a nonlinear model with a zero lower bound (ZLB) on the nominal interest rate. Forward guidance is modeled with news shocks to the monetary policy rule, which capture innovations in expectations from central bank communication about future policy rates. Whereas most studies use quasi‐linear models that disregard the expectational effects of hitting the ZLB, we show how the effectiveness of forward guidance nonlinearly depends on the state of the economy, the speed of the recovery, the degree of uncertainty, the policy shock size, and the forward guidance horizon when households account for the ZLB. (JEL E43, E58, E61)     

Assessing Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction in a Small Open Economy: the Case Republic of Macedonia

The aim of this paper is to analyze empirically the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy in a small open transition economies: the case the Republic of Macedonia. This paper employs SVAR methodology to examine jointly the impact monetary and fiscal policy on real GDP and prices. The result reveals that the monetary policy counteracts the effects of fiscal policy and persists until the effects of fiscal policy changes disappear. This causes a crowding out effect. In addition, the result shows that the best fiscal policy for stimulating the economy appears to be one of tax-cuts. The empirical research, in jointly analyzing fiscal and monetary policy also provides an additional, possibly interesting result. The sizes of the responses of real GDP and prices to monetary shock are not significantly reduced when fiscal shock is included into monetary SVAR.     

CENTRAL BANK REPUTATION AND THE MONETIZATION OF DEFICITS: THE 1981 ITALIAN MONETARY REFORM

In 1981 the Bank of Italy was freed from the obligation to purchase the unsold public debt at the Treasury auctions. Since then, the Bank of Italy has reduced debt monetization. The paper seeks to explain this policy shift by analyzing a game between the monetary and fiscal authorities. The fiscal authority is imperfectly informed about the central bank preferences. An equilibrium exists in which the central bank does not monetize, so as to establish a reputation of being independent. Monetization raises fiscal deficits and may raise public debt relative to a non-accommodative policy.     

MULTICOINTEGRATION AND SUSTAINABILITY OF FISCAL PRACTICES

Using multicointegration methodology, we develop criteria for testing sustainability of fiscal budgeting processes across all states of nature. Criteria are derived from the optimal control literature where levels and rates of change of a system of variables are determinants of policy response. The appropriate policy response mechanisms are outlined and linked to the multicointegration methodology. We then test government spending and revenue systems of 15 industrialized countries for the presence of such mechanisms. We find that only Norway and the United Kingdom exhibit policy responses that are consistent with our criteria.(JEL H6 , E62 , C22 )     

ON THE ESTIMATION OF REACTION FUNCTIONS FOR SEVERAL ECONOMIC POLICY MAKERS

When two policy authorities are exercising instruments to affect a common macroeconomic variable, this paper emphasizes the need for nonpolicy agents anticipating policy actions to identify a separate reaction function for each fully informed policy maker, based on observed equilibrium instrument settings. Estimation problems on reaction functions arise if the policy authorities have imperfect knowledge about the system they are attempting to control: if intercept errors occur in the system, long run policy may attain global equilibrium, but short run observed policy must be modelled as a disequilibrium process; if slope coefficient errors exist, even long run instrument settings may be biased due to asymptotic biases on coefficient estimation by authorities.     

MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY DESIGN AT THE ZERO LOWER BOUND: EVIDENCE FROM THE LAB

The global economic crisis of 2007–2008 has pushed many advanced economies into a liquidity trap. We design a laboratory experiment on the effectiveness of policy measures to avoid expectation‐driven liquidity traps. Monetary policy alone is not sufficient to avoid liquidity traps, even if it preventively cuts the interest rate when inflation falls below a threshold. However, monetary policy augmented with a fiscal switching rule succeeds in escaping liquidity trap episodes. We measure the effect of fiscal policy on expectations, and report larger‐than‐unity fiscal multipliers at the zero lower bound. Experimental results in different treatments are well explained by adaptive learning. (JEL E70, C92, D83, D84, E52, E62)     

EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AND FISCAL DISCIPLINE: THE ROLE OF CAPITAL CONTROLS

How do exchange rate regimes influence fiscal discipline? This important question has typically been addressed exploiting the classic dichotomy of fixed versus flexible exchange rate regimes assuming perfect capital mobility. However, the role of capital controls cannot be neglected, particularly in developing countries. This paper analyzes the effects of capital controls on fiscal performance by focusing on dual exchange rate regimes. In a model in which the fiscal policy is endogenously determined by a nonbenevolent fiscal authority, dual regimes induce politicians to have higher fiscal deficits than under fixed and flexible regimes operating under perfect capital mobility. The model also shows this effect increases as fiscal authorities become more impatient. Dynamic panel regressions confirm that dual regimes lead to higher fiscal deficits than fixed and flexible regimes operating under unified rates. Using a dummy for pre‐electoral year as an indicator of fiscal authorities' shortsightedness, we also confirm that dual exchange rate has a more adverse effect on fiscal deficits as the authorities become more impatient. (JEL E50, E60, F31, F41)     

WHO IS AFRAID OF THE FRIEDMAN RULE?

We explore the connection between optimal monetary policy and heterogeneity among agents in a standard monetary economy with two types of agents where the stationary distribution of money holdings is nondegenerate. Sans type-specific fiscal policy, we show that the zero-nominal-interest rate policy (the Friedman rule) does not maximize type-specific welfare; it may not maximize aggregate ex ante social welfare either. Indeed, one or, more surprisingly, both types may benefit if the central bank deviates from the Friedman rule. ( JEL E31, E51, E58)     

THE INTEREST ELASTICITY OF MONEY DEMAND, LIQUIDITY AND REVERSE CAUSATION

This paper employs theoretical neoclassical and Keynesian models which have been expanded to include near monies to demonstrate that the interest elasticity of money demand is a peripheral issue to more fundamental differences between monetarists and Keynesians. The analysis indicates that the money supply is endogenously determined by income in such models, i.e. the reverse causation argument applies, and money is therefore an inappropriate instrument of monetary policy. The analysis also reveals that necessary and sufficient conditions for fiscal policy to be impotent are that the interest elasticities of money demand, money supply and all near monies must be zero.     

WELFARE AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONALIZED PRODUCTION

I incorporate internationalized production, whereby firms hire domestic and foreign production factors, into the model of Corsetti and Pesenti (2001). In contrast to their conclusion, I find that an expansionary monetary shock can be beggar-thy-neighbor and a fiscal shock can improve national welfare. The transmission mechanism of public policy here is different from theirs. In particular, a fiscal shock can affect the short-run exchange rate and generate long-run welfare effects even if it is temporary. Results in this article offer another rationale for international retaliation and coordination. (JEL F30, F40 )     

THE LAGGED IMPACT OF STATE AND LOCAL TAXES ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

Politicians are frequently characterized as making fiscal decisions based on a shorter time horizon than is required for full taxpayer adjustment, thus generating near term benefits and relatively high tax rates. This argument requires a negative impact of taxes on economic activity distributed over a relatively long time period. Considerable empirical evidence suggests that state and local taxes do not significantly impact the geographic distribution of economic activity; this analysis, however, finds a significant negative distributed lag impact of such taxes on capital formation. The approach emphasizes interstate tax competition in formulating the cross-section time-series estimating equation.     

THE EFFICACY OF STATE MANDATED MINIMUM QUALITY CERTIFICATION: THE CASE OF USED VEHICLES

This paper investigates whether the quality certification required by certain state used vehicle disclosure laws has been effective. Metzger concluded from a theoretical investigation of non-market responses to the lemons problem, that such laws may or may not be effective. We have been unable to find evidence that the currently mandated disclosure requirements in Wisconsin (known defects provision) and Iowa (safety certification) are effective in increasing the number of good quality vehicles traded in those used markets. These disclosure requirements do not seem to decrease a prospective buyer's risk of purchasing a lemon.     

THE EFFECT OF FISCAL POLICY ON THE SHORT-RUN RELATION BETWEEN NOMINAL INTEREST RATES AND INFLATION

This paper presents a simple empirical model of the relation between the inflation rate and the nominal interest rate. We show that previous results found in the literature may be attributed to specification error and that there are natural explanations for the observed signs of previous Fisher equation estimates. Our results show that fiscal policy shocks may generate short run negative correlations between changes in inflation and changes in the nominal interest rates. These results illustrate the difficulty in discussing the relation between inflation and nominal interest rates without conditioning the analysis with specific assumptions on the course of the economy.     

THE IMPACT OF FISCAL POLICY ON PROFITS

This paper investigates the impact of fiscal policy on profits using panel data for 18 high‐income OECD countries during the period 1975–1999. We estimate a profit equation allowing a consistent treatment of the government budget constraint, and we try to disentangle the effects of different spending and taxation items. As far as public spending is concerned, our results strongly suggest that capital expenditures are associated with higher profits, while expenditures on goods and services and in particular on wages and salaries deteriorate profits. In general, “productive” expenditures seem to increase profits while the effect of “unproductive” expenditures is insignificant. Transport and communication expenditures seem to have a positive impact on profits. On the revenue side, we find that both direct and indirect taxation has a negative impact on profits. (JEL E62, H32, H54)