竞争环境下的以旧换新策略

企业通过对拥有旧产品的老消费者提供以旧换新补贴能够提升自身销量与利润。然而,面临竞争对手时企业的以旧换新决策是否会受到影响?本文求解了先后进入市场的双寡头竞争企业所面临的以旧换新与定价博弈均衡,并分析了竞争存在与否对于企业以旧换新策略产生的影响。研究结果表明,第一,面对竞争时企业的定价决策受到市场中老消费者比例、两家竞争企业各自新产品的创新提升水平、老产品的使用残值这四个因素的共同影响。第二,当老产品残值相对较低而市场中老消费者数量适中时,两企业均不提供以旧换新可能成为博弈均衡,而其他条件下,两企业均提供以旧换新为博弈均衡。第三,先进入的企业没有动机单独为消费者提供以旧换新补贴。第四,竞争对手的存在对于先进入企业自身的以旧换新决策与相应的定价策略都产生了显著的影响。     

Models for closed-loop supply chain with trade-ins

Three kinds of decision models for closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with trade-ins are developed in this paper, including the centralized collection (Model C), the retailer collection (Model R), and the manufacturer collection (Model M). By analyzing these models, we argue that there are three types of optimal collection strategies, namely, no collection, partial collection, and full collection. We provide conditions under which one of these three collection strategies is optimal for different supply chain models. By comparing the impact of trade-ins on these different supply chain models, we find that only when the direct net value of a used product derived from the trade-ins for the whole CLSC system including the consumers is high enough can trade-in strategy be adopted to stimulate consumer demand and improve the manufacturer׳s and retailer׳s profit. Based on the life-cycle assessment method, we find that when the marginal effect of the product on environment in the continue-to-use phase is more significant than in other phases, trade-ins can promote the environmental performance of the CLSC system. Further, by comparing the optimal solutions for the different models, we find that one collection model may dominate the others in terms of the economic performance of the involved parties. Specifically, Model M dominates Model R in terms of the profits of the manufacturer and the profits of the whole supply chain; Model R dominates Model M in terms of retailer׳s profit; and Model R dominates all other models in terms of environmental performance.     

焕新计划下考虑消费者细分的产品定价策略

焕新计划是生产商为提升自身竞争优势而推出的一种促销手段，加入焕新计划的消费者在第一阶段可以享受全方位服务，在第二阶段可以享受以旧换新抵扣优惠。消费者将权衡加入焕新计划的费用、服务水平以及抵扣力度等因素决策是否在第一阶段加入焕新计划。本文假设时尚型消费者每阶段都会购买最新产品，而节俭型消费者第一阶段购买产品后在第二阶段继续使用，针对这两类消费者在实施焕新计划和不实施焕新计划两种情况下，构建两阶段模型以决策产品的最优定价；运用解析方法分析了产品的生产成本等参数对最优定价的影响；运用解析方法和数值算例方法对两模型进行对比。     

消费者短视和以旧换新情形下设计架构与定价策略研究

耐用品的耐用性会抑制了新一代耐用品的销售,企业通常会采用以旧换新政策来激励新一代耐用品的销售。企业有两种产品设计架构策略:一体化架构策略与模块化架构策略,同时企业也有两种定价策略:静态定价策略和动态定价策略。在这种情况下,企业该如何确定产品设计架构和定价策略?在假定两期内消费者是短视情形下,论文建立了消费者与企业博弈模型分析和比较了三种情况。研究发现,无论是静态定价还是动态定价,无论是模块化架构还是一体化架构,购买了第一代产品的消费者都会整体更换成第二代产品;随着第二代核心系统的质量提升,以旧换新促使企业产品架构选择从一体化架构转变为选择模块化架构;当采用动态定价、第二代核心系统质量提升适中和折扣因子高时,企业会选择模块化架构;当企业采用模块化架构时,以旧换新政策会降低模块化产品第二代核心子系统和基础子系统之间的兼容性;如果两代产品之间的质量差距比较大,企业将会选择动态定价策略,反之会选择静态定价策略。     

Channel Strategies for Durable Goods: Coexistence of Selling and Leasing to Individual and Corporate Consumers

In durable goods markets, such as those for automobiles or computers, the coexistence of selling and leasing is common as is the existence of both corporate and individual consumers. Leases to corporate consumers affect the price of used goods on the second‐hand market which in turn affect the buying and leasing behavior of individual consumers. The setting of prices (or volumes) for sale and lease to individual and corporate consumers is a complicated problem for manufacturers. We consider a manufacturer who concurrently sells and leases a finitely durable good to both individual and corporate consumers. The interaction between the manufacturer and consumers is modeled as a dynamic sequential game, where each player seeks to maximize its own payoff over an infinite horizon. We study how the corporate channel substitutability of new goods and used goods and transaction costs in the second‐hand market affect the manufacturer's pricing decisions, consumer behavior, and social welfare in the retail market. Making a number of simplifying assumptions, including two‐period lifetime for the finitely durable goods, we consider Markov Perfect Equilibrium as the solution concept. We show that the manufacturer can maximize her profit by segmenting consumers according to their willingness to pay. Selling and leasing are the mechanisms used for price discrimination in the retail market. We show that as she leases a larger share of her production to the corporate consumer, (1) the manufacturer does not necessarily have to adjust the optimal selling price of new goods to individual consumers, and the volume of sales of new goods to individual consumers can stay the same; (2) the manufacturer does increase the retail lease price, and the number of individual leases decreases; (3) the net supply of used goods on the market increases, leading to a lower market price for used goods; and (4) more individual consumers are able to participate in the market, and their collective welfare or net utility improves. We also show that as production costs increase the manufacturer increases prices, reducing volumes across all channels. When transaction costs increase, the manufacturer reduces leasing in both corporate and retail channels.     

The Interplay between Information Acquisition and Quality Disclosure

This study investigates the interactions between a manufacturer's information acquisition and quality disclosure strategies in a supply chain setting in which the manufacturer privately knows his product quality but is uncertain about consumer preferences. We argue that the manufacturer should treat his information acquisition and quality disclosure decisions as an integrated process because these decisions can significantly influence a retailer's rational inferences about product quality and can have conflicting effects on his own profitability. Although information acquisition helps a manufacturer subsequently craft better pricing and quality disclosure strategies, it also leaks certain product information to the retailer, thus helping the retailer better estimate product quality. Therefore, in equilibrium, a manufacturer may choose not to acquire any consumer information, even when such acquisition is costless. Moreover, we find that this adverse effect of acquisition is highly dependent on the cost of disclosure and consumers’ preference differentiation. Increased consumer preference differentiation may have a non‐monotonic relationship with the manufacturer's profit, and information acquisition can become detrimental to the manufacturer once the disclosure cost is sufficiently high.     

Lifecycle Pricing for Installed Base Management with Constrained Capacity and Remanufacturing

Installed base management is the policy in which the manufacturer leases the product to consumers, and bundles repair and maintenance services along with the product. In this article, we investigate for the optimal leasing price and leasing duration decisions by a monopolist when the production and servicing capacity are constrained. The effect of diffusion of consumers in the installed base is considered, with the ownership of the product resting with the monopolist during the product lifecycle. The monopolist operating the installed base jointly optimizes the profits from leasing the product/service bundle along with maintenance revenues and remanufacturing savings. We formulate the manufacturer's problem as an optimal control problem and show that the optimal pricing strategy of the firm should be a skimming strategy. We also find that the effect of remanufacturing savings on the pricing decision and the length of the leasing duration changes significantly depending on the duration of the product's lifecycle. If the product lifecycle is long and remanufacturing savings are low, the firm should offer a shorter leasing duration, whereas if the remanufacturing savings are high, the firm should optimally offer a higher leasing duration. In contrast, if the time duration of the product lifecycle is low and remanufacturing savings are low, the firm prefers to offer a shorter leasing duration, whereas if the remanufacturing savings are high, the firm should optimally have a longer leasing duration. The article also shows that if the production capacity is small, the manufacturer increases the leasing duration. If the production capacity is very small, the manufacturer sets the leasing duration to be equal to the product lifecycle and does not use remanufacturing.     

考虑异质消费者的线下到线上供应链合作广告契约设计

本文针对一个拥有线上渠道的制造商和一个零售商组成的线下到线上(O2O)供应链,考虑渠道产品差异化策略下零售商为制造商线上渠道进行广告引流,刻画消费者对产品的异质性需求,分别设计对称信息和不对称信息下制造商的最优合作广告契约,通过对比两种情形中最优决策及利润的变化分析信息不对称的影响,并进一步探讨不对称信息下消费者渠道转换的麻烦成本、单位不匹配成本等重要参数对合作广告契约设计和供应链成员利润的影响。研究发现:不对称信息下,制造商可以策略性选择三种不同策略以最大化自身利润,其中不甄别零售商真实信息的混同均衡在某些条件下是制造商的最优策略;尽管信息不对称会给制造商带来利润损失,但制造商通过策略选择可缓和信息不对称的不利影响,某些条件下信息不对称并不损害供应链总体的利润;麻烦成本的变化会改变制造商不对称信息下最优合作广告契约的策略选择,某些条件下麻烦成本的增高对制造商利润反而存在正影响。最后,通过数值仿真对上述研究结果进行直观考察和说明。     

考虑策略性消费者的生鲜农产品定价和库存决策

消费者的策略性行为使零售商的生鲜农产品的定价和库存决策面临更大挑战。本文基于报童模型,综合考虑消费者的策略性行为,对生鲜农产品价值下降进行离散化处理。刻画策略性消费者的决策行为,构建零售商的单阶段和两阶段定价及库存决策模型,分析了产品价值剩余率对消费者行为、零售商最优定价、最优库存水平以及零售商利润的影响机理。研究发现,在单阶段模型中零售商最优价格和最优库存水平均随产品价值剩余率的递增而递增;而在两阶段模型中,第二阶段最优价格随价值剩余率的变化趋势可能存在阈值。     

CSR投入下产品质量决策与专利授权合同设计

良好的专利授权有助于激发企业持续创新的动力,实现专利技术的商业化和产业化,而产品质量则是决定企业能否取得市场竞争优势的关键。本文针对由专利持有企业和品牌企业组成的系统,考虑市场需求信息不对称以及品牌企业承担社会责任（Corporate social responsibility, CSR）,研究品牌企业产品质量决策和专利授权合同设计问题,进而分析CSR投入对各个企业利润、消费者剩余以及社会福利的影响。研究结果表明：不同市场条件下,专利持有企业会策略性地设计专利授权合同形式,即选择仅包含"一次性固定授权费"或者"一次性固定授权费+版税提成"的专利授权合同;品牌企业CSR投入并不会影响专利授权合同的形式,但会提高一次性固定授权费;CSR投入会促使品牌企业提高产品质量,但并不一定会导致产品销售价格的提高;CSR投入虽然会降低品牌企业利润,但能有效提升专利持有企业利润、消费者剩余和社会福利。     

制造商引入在线渠道的双渠道价格与服务竞争策略

为了削弱传统零售商在渠道博弈中的强势地位,制造商尝试引入直接在线渠道与传统零售商竞争。针对零售商价格领导权的渠道结构,本文在分析双渠道竞争时考虑了服务在战略决策中的价值,并将消费者区分为高服务偏好的消费者和低服务偏好的消费者。研究表明,仅当产品在线适合度足够高时,在零售商占主导权的渠道中,制造商引入在线渠道的战略效果才能实现,能导致制造商利润的增加,产品在线的适合度越高,利润提高越显著。当产品在线适合度足够高时,制造商引入在线渠道能够激励零售商提高服务质量,而且产品在线的适合度越高,服务质量提高越明显;在线渠道的引入能达到制造商和零售商双赢的效果;制造商利润和零售商利润都会随着高服务偏好消费者比例和服务的边际效用的提高而增加。     

产品质量设计与供应链渠道优化——基于策略消费者行为的视角

策略消费者持币观望的行为对零售商和生产商的盈利都会产品负面影响，本文在二级供应链中同时考虑策略消费者的行为和产品质量设计，研究批发价格契约下策略消费者行为对供应链不同渠道利润的影响。分析表明，当生产商决定产品质量时，分散供应链下的产品质量与供应链上下游的议价能力相关，生产商议价能力越强，产品质量越高；当生产商完全掌握确定产品质量和批发价格的权利时，策略消费者的行为加剧了生产商和零售商之间利润分配的不公平，生产商能获得更大比例的利润；面对策略消费者时，厂商承诺产品数量有限能够实现比集中供应链下更高的利润，存在合适的产品质量和批发价格，使得分散供应链能实现数量承诺下的最优利润，并实现提升质量和增加供应链整体利润的双赢。     

考虑市场细分的零售商自主以旧换新策略研究

在越来越多企业开始自主推行以旧换新业务的背景下,本文从供应链的视角出发,构建考虑市场细分和消费者效用的策略模型,研究零售商自主以旧换新策略选择及相应的供应链决策问题,着重分析市场细分和旧产品折旧程度对策略选择、决策和供应链效率的影响.研究发现:零售商的策略选择除了受产品制造成本影响外,还依赖于外部客户比例和旧产品折旧程度;当老客户占比和旧产品折旧度处于某区域时,自主以旧换新策略优于无以旧换新策略;在某些情况下,制造商的期望策略与零售商的最优策略相悖;供应链效率受客户比例和旧产品折旧度影响.此外,当老客户占比或旧产品折旧度高于某阈值时,老客户对主体的利润贡献大于新客户.本文的研究结论对企业在供应链环境下推行以旧换新政策有一定的理论指导意义.     

Production and pricing problems in make-to-order supply chain with cap-and-trade regulation

This paper studies the production and pricing problems in MTO (make-to-order) supply chain containing an upstream manufacturer who produces two products based on MTO production and a downstream retailer. The manufacturer is regulated by cap-and-trade regulation and determines the wholesale prices of the two products. To comply with the regulation, the manufacturer can buy or sell emission permits through an outside market. The retailer determines its order quantities to meet the price-sensitive demands. We derive the optimal total emissions and production quantities of the two products, and based on them, we analyze the impact of emission trading price on the optimal production decisions and the two firms’ optimal profits. The emission trading decisions follow a two-threshold policy and the optimal total emissions are increasing in the cap. However, contrary to intuition, the optimal production quantities of the two products may be decreasing in the cap. The manufacturer׳s optimal profit is decreasing (increasing) in the buying (selling) price of emission permits, and that the retailer׳s optimal profit is decreasing in the buying (selling) price of emission permits. The optimal total emissions are decreasing in buying or selling price of emission permits, however, the optimal production quantities of the two products may be increasing (decreasing) in the buying (selling) price of emission permits. Numerical examples are conducted to illustrate our findings and some managerial insights are presented.     

Closed-loop supply chain configuration for new and reconditioned products: An integrated optimization model

Closed-Loop Supply Chain Management (CLSCM) is considered as a strategic response to the call for corporate sustainability while further expanding the scope of value creation to include product reconstruction. The Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC) performance is directly related to the CLSC network design. The CLSC network design, with long-term and strategic connotations, involves selection of an integrated network of partner organizations to be engaged on one hand in the forward supply chain processes relevant to families of existing and new products and also involved in reverse supply chain activities relevant to reconstruction of the returned products. At the tactical level, Closed-Loop Supply Chain Configuration (CLSCC) attempts to address issues pertinent to launch of a new product and its reconstruction. The CLSC network design is well studied in the current literature, but addressing the CLSCC is neglected. To study the CLSCC problem we: (a) develop an integrated optimization model for problem; (b) present a real-world case study of a battery manufacturer; (c) based on the case study, we conduct a comprehensive set of computational experiments followed by a series of what-if analyses to compare profitability of the Forward Supply Chain Configuration (FSCC) versus the CLSCC; and (c) discuss the key observations and managerial implications drawn from the computational experiments, applicable to other real-world instances. The significant outcomes of the study suggest that: (i) performance of the firm׳s base case integrated CLSCC model is significantly better than the current supply chain model (ii) the sales-price ratio of new battery is found to be negatively related with the maximum acquiring price of used batteries; (iii) combination of sales price ratios of new and reconditioned batteries determines the total net profit for a given return rate. Finally, important managerial insights and scope for future research are discussed.     

制造商技术开放策略问题研究

在高新科技领域，制造商往往需要面对技术优势与需求优势的选择问题，技术策略（开放/封闭）逐渐成为选择的关键。在产品需求理论的框架内，研究了制造商的技术策略问题，通过构建制造商技术策略模型，分析产品的网络外部性、规模经济效应以及新制造商对于制造商不同技术策略下最优利润的影响，进而得出制造商的技术策略、新制造商的市场进入策略及相应的市场结果。最后，文章进行了拓展，分别研究了存在多个新制造商和市场进入成本两种情况下各方策略及市场结果的变化。研究发现：（1）制造商数量对于潜在市场总需求的影响系数越大，制造商越倾向于选择技术开放策略；（2）适中的网络外部性强度和规模经济效应强度有利于制造商选择技术开放策略；（3）当新制造商数量增加时，制造商技术策略的变化方向由其初始技术策略所决定；（4）市场进入成本不会影响制造商的技术策略，却会改变技术开放策略下新制造商的市场进入策略，进而使得市场结果发生分化；（5）专利授权费会激励制造商选择技术开放策略。     

产品责任、企业社会责任偏好与供应链中的质量-数量协调

在产品质量和产品数量（订货量）内生化的情形下，同时实现其质量和数量的协调将成为供应链管理的一个重要问题。进一步，在产品低质量对消费者造成伤害的情形下，制造商将面临着产品责任（表征制造商对消费者产品伤害的补偿），从而导致"产品责任如何影响供应链中的质量-数量协调"这一问题。最后，如果核心企业具有对消费者的企业社会责任（CSR）偏好，则这种CSR偏好又如何影响供应链中的质量-数量协调？针对这三个问题，首先，利用批发价合同构建了一个由上游制造商和下游零售商组成的两级供应链运作博弈模型；其次考察了制造商产品责任、CSR偏好程度和质量改进效率对其产品质量决策、批发价合同和相应的供应链节点企业利润的影响；最后，研究了供应链质量-数量协调问题。结果表明：（1）产品责任不影响产品质量、订货量、供应链节点企业经济利润和消费者剩余，但制造商批发价随产品责任的增加而增加；（2）随着CSR偏好程度的增加，产品质量、订货量、零售商经济利润、供应链系统经济利润和消费者剩余随之增加，而制造商经济利润随之减小；（3）质量改进效率的提高，有利于产品质量、订货量、零售商经济利润、供应链系统经济利润和消费者剩余的增加；（4）一个由数量折扣契约和质量改进成本分担契约共同构成的协调机制，可以有效的实现供应链系统的协调，其中，产品责任将促使数量折扣契约中产品批发价的增加和质量改进成本分担比例的减小，而CSR偏好程度的增加将促使数量折扣契约中产品批发价的减小，但不影响质量改进成本分担比例。     

Enhancing corporate social responsibility: Contract design under information asymmetry

We consider a two-stage supply chain in which a contract manufacturer (CM) sells products through a brand name retailer. The contract manufacturer can invest in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities to improve customer perception about the firm and increase demand, while the retailer can influence the demand by exerting marketing efforts. We design optimal contracts for such a supply chain, which faces information asymmetry. The wholesale price contract was developed as the base model to derive insight into the value of information sharing. We examine the impact of CSR cost on CSR commitment and profits. We find that CM׳s CSR cost impacts the CM׳s and the retailer׳s profits differently. Under certain conditions, the CM׳s profit will increase with cost, while that of the retailer is uncertain. We also propose two-part tariff contracts for both the symmetric and asymmetric cases with the aim of maximizing the retailer׳s profit and improving CM׳s commitment to CSR. Finally, numerical experiments are conducted to illustrate and validate the proposed models and provide managerial insights.     

The Perishability of Online Grocers*

In this article we explore the profitability of different operations models used by online grocers and develop a linear demand model in a competitive setting to better understand the trade‐offs made by two competing online grocers in choices for distribution strategy (leverage or direct) and product focus (perishable or nonperishable). We find that the results derived in the duopoly setting are different from those in a monopolistic setting. Specifically, we determine that there is a threshold value for the secondary competitive effects in the demand function that determines how the prices and profitability of an online grocer will be affected by the supply chain length of its competitor. There is also a threshold value for the ratio of supply chain lengths of the two competitors that determines whether product perishability increases or decreases profits. We demonstrate that the existence of this threshold is robust when considering capacity constraints. Further, we show, assuming that supply chain length can be optimized, how the relative size of the infrastructure change cost (when compared with that of the competitor) coupled with the perishability of the product determines the profitability of an investment leading to a shorter supply chain.     

Implications of Channel Structure and Operational Mode Upon a Manufacturer's Durability Choice

Motivated by the observation that durability ratings of automobile manufacturers are not necessarily linked to the proportion of leasing but tend to decrease with the density of their dealer networks, we explore the interactions between channel structure (direct interaction with consumers vs. through an intermediary(ies)) and mode of operations (leasing vs. selling) and their implications for a manufacturer's willingness to invest in making her product more durable. Using a manufacturer who leases her product directly to consumers as a point of reference, we find that an isolated change in either the channel structure (selling through an intermediary), or the operational mode (leasing to selling) can decrease the manufacturer's willingness to provide durability. However, if combined, these two changes together may strengthen the manufacturer's willingness to invest in durability. Specifically, the traditional result that a manufacturer who leases provides more durability than one who sells, can be reversed in a decentralized channel.