有限供应的现货市场与期权合约下的采购策略

在随机现货价格与随机需求相独立的情况下,当现货市场供应量有限时,本文采用期权组合合约建立两阶段采购风险管理模型,以期最大化零售商的期望利润.文中提供了甄别有效合约的算法,得到零售商的最优采购策略,并进一步用算例分析了现货市场的供应量、现货价格和客户需求的波动性对最优采购策略的影响,发现当现货市场的供应量增加时,零售商应...     

现货供应不确定下的优化采购策略研究

在现货市场和传统契约市场共存时,研究了现货供应的不确定性和销售商的风险规避态度对于销售商的采购策略的影响。首先,在现货供应充足和供应不确定两种情况下分析了实现供应链协调的最优订购量和退货价格,以及销售商的风险规避态度对于订购量的影响.然后,通过数值计算进行了分析和验证.结果表明,现货供应充足时的订购量总是低于现货供应不确定时的订购量;但现货供应充足时供应链的期望利润高于现货供应不确定的情况.现货市场存在下,风险厌恶因子对订购量的影响趋势与单纯契约市场下正好相反.     

An option contract pricing model of relief material supply chain

Relief material management which aims to reduce the impact of disaster and maintain social stability is of great importance for nonprofit organization (NPO) such as government, department of civil affair or Red Cross. However, the research of efficiency and performance on this field has long been ignored. In order to improve the efficiency and performance of the relief material management, we apply the supply chain management method into this field. Considering the relief material management system as a supply chain with one buyer and one supplier, we introduce the option contract mechanism into relief material supply chain management. With reasonable assumptions, we design an option contract with two delivery steps, and build an option pricing model with binominal lattice to estimate the different values of the same option contract for both members of supply chain. Furthermore, we analyze the impacts of the different parameters (such as the ratio of inventory, subjective probability of disaster, etc.), on the supply chain and its members in detail. The numerical example presented at last demonstrates that, with two delivery steps, there is a feasible price range of option contract which makes both members of relief material supply chain profitable and willing to conduct the transaction with option contract.     

Implementing coordination contracts in a manufacturer Stackelberg dual-channel supply chain

We examine a manufacturer's pricing strategies in a dual-channel supply chain, in which the manufacturer is a Stackelberg leader and the retailer is a follower. We show the conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer both prefer a dual-channel supply chain. We examine the coordination schemes for a dual-channel supply chain and find that a manufacturer's contract with a wholesale price and a price for the direct channel can coordinate the dual-channel supply channel, benefiting the retailer but not the manufacturer. We illustrate how such a contract with a complementary agreement, such as a two-part tariff or a profit-sharing agreement, can coordinate the dual-channel supply chain and enable both the manufacturer and the retailer to be a win-win.     

Electronic markets in support of procurement processes along the automotive supply chain

Since the introduction of the internet, firms have continued to seek ways to use these public networks to gain competitive advantage. The procurement function is beginning to take on greater strategic importance as these networks started providing firms wider opportunities such as choices of suppliers. This aims not only to reduce procurement costs, but also to build stronger relationships with suppliers to improve quality and flexibility in meeting customer demand. This type of linkage of firms with their suppliers when the product manufactured is complex and supply-chain is heavily tiered, such as the case of the automobile industry, creates challenges to any electronic market or exchange that is aiming to support such a system. Based on discussions with some key individuals in an automotive supply chain and an in-depth analysis of a supply-chain segment, this paper explores the role electronic markets may have to play, if they are to support the procurement processes of various agents along the supply chain.     

Impact of secondary market on consumer return policies and supply chain coordination

In this paper, we develop a unified model to study the inventory management problem of a product and the coordination of the associated supply chain consisting of a single supplier and considerably many retailers in the presence of a secondary market. Specifically, consumer returns are allowed in the initial sales. Then, we introduce a secondary market to salvage the returns and the leftovers from the initial sales. In this secondary market, a discount price will be offered to the consumers but no returns are accepted. Moreover, between the primary and the secondary market, there is an internal market where retailers can trade among themselves so that they are able to adjust their inventory levels to prepare for the sales in the secondary market. We study the retailers' and the supply chain's inventory decision in this case and highlight the impact of the secondary market on the sales as well as on the supply chain coordination contracts. We conclude that the secondary market helps us to increase the total wholesale volume. Numerical examples show that the total sales profit is also increased. However, the secondary market aggravates the incentive conflict between the retailers and the supply chain on deciding the optimal inventory levels and hence requires the supplier to offer more generous buyback or sales rebate contracts for coordination of the supply chain. Finally, we extend our analysis to more general cases and also show that our results are robust to some of the modeling assumptions.     

现货价格和需求关联时期权组合合约模式下采购风险管理策略

在现货价格和客户端需求关联的情形下,本文引用期权组合合约建立现货市场供应量有限时的两阶段采购风险管理模型,以期最大化零售商的期望收益。文中先用逆向归纳法列出零售商第二阶段的最优策略,采用标准扰动定理得出有效合约应满足的最优性条件,并将原模型转化为单调的最短路径问题,应用动态规划求解最优的采购策略。最后用算例分析了现货价格与需求的相关系数及现货市场的供应量对最优策略的影响,发现当供应量一定时,各有效合约的最优预订量及有效合约的总预订量都随着相关系数的增大而提高,并且有效合约受相关系数的影响大小取决于合约的灵活性;并且,当相关系数一定时,有效合约的总预订量及执行价格最低的有效合约的最优预订量都随着供应量的增加而单调减少。     

Single or dual sourcing: decision-making in the presence of supply chain disruption risks

The focus of this paper is placed on evaluating the impacts of supply disruption risks on the choice between the famous single and dual sourcing methods in a two-stage supply chain with a non-stationary and price-sensitive demand. The expected profit functions of the two sourcing modes in the presence of supply chain disruption risks are first obtained, and then compared so that the critical values of the key factors affecting the final choice are identified. Finally, the sensitivity of the buyer's expected profit to various input factors is examined through numerical examples, which provide guidelines for how to use each sourcing method.     

股指期货保证金水平设置比较研究—基于Hill及VaR-x估计法

在电子交易市场具有流动性约束的限制下,研究了供应链企业基于运作和投机的目的,签订期权合约和电子市场现货交易的最优策略。设计了由一个生产商、一个零售商和一个第三方B2B电子交易市场组成的供应链,以生产商为供应链主导,在产能不限和产能较小两种情况下,研究了生产商和零售商的均衡策略,并对现货价格和零售需求服从均匀分布情形做了进一步探讨。最后通过模型和算例,讨论了电子市场现货流动性对参与者行为和供应链均衡结果的影响。     

Outsourcing vs. in-house production: a comparison of supply chain contracts with effort dependent demand

We analyze the effort and pricing decisions in a two facility supply chain in which one of the parties can exert costly effort to increase demand. We consider an outsourcing model in which the supplier makes the effort decision and an in-house production model in which the manufacturer decides on the effort level and we compare these two models with each other. We analyze and compare several contracts for decentralized supply chain models and we aim to find which contracts are best to use in different cases. We find the optimal contract parameters in each case and perform extensive computational testing to compare the efficiencies of these contracts. We also analyze the effect of the powers of the parties in the system and the effect of system parameters on the performances of the contracts and on the optimal values of the model variables such as price, effort and demand.     

合同订购与现货市场混合交易下的双渠道供应链优化决策

为了更好地匹配需求与供应, 提高企业收益和服务水平, 本文研究了合同订购与现货市场交易结合下的双渠道供应链优化决策问题。首先分析了单纯批发价合同订购模式下的决策, 进一步考虑现货市场单向交易及双向交易的情形, 将供应链回购合同与数量柔性合同引入单向现货市场, 建立了这两类合同订购分别与现货市场补货、现货市场卖货相结合的订购模型, 以及批发价合同订购与现货市场买卖双向交易联合的决策模型。分析了不同模式下回购价格、缺货成本、补货成本、现货价格、现货价格波动及风险偏好对订购决策的影响, 并通过算例仿真, 分析了各类现货市场的使用对销售商收益的影响。结果表明, 合同订购与双向现货市场结合可以充分利用现货市场即时交易的优势, 提高供应链效益;而合同订购与单向现货市场结合, 虽然可以通过合同提高供货水平, 降低库存积压风险, 但该情形需要考虑供应商的回购或补货价格, 销售商仍有一定风险。不论单向或双向现货市场与合同订购的联合, 均可使供应链的利润优于单纯合同订购的情形。     

碳交易机制下供应链CCS投资时机研究

在碳交易机制下,碳价格不确定性对发电商的碳捕获与封存(Carbon Capture and Storage,CCS)投资时机具有重要影响。基于实物期权理论,考虑碳价格不确定性及CCS投资成本递减情况下CCS投资的期权价值,建立集碳捕获-运输-封存于一体的CCS投资时机决策基本模型。在此基础上,进一步构建考虑供应链内发电商与CCS运营商合作的CCS投资博弈模型,分析发电商与CCS运营商在收益转移比例与投资时机之间进行决策的均衡条件。基于上述模型,结合数值算例进一步分析了CCS投资时机的影响因素。结果表明:碳价格波动率、政府对CCS投资补贴系数、CCS技术学习效应以及供应链内部企业间的收益转移比例等都将对CCS投资门槛产生影响,供应链企业应综合考虑各因素的影响,科学选择投资时机与收益转移比例,以实现CO2减排的同时保证各方的经济利益,保障供应链的协调运行与CCS投资优化。     

基于长期或短期战略下的两期供应链合同分析

分析了1个供应商和1个零售商组成的系统,系统成员进行两期博弈;两期不确定性需求分布和需求实现值一样,系统成员可以通过观察第1期销售量,更新第2期不确定性需求分布.研究得出:首先,在集中系统中,系统最优策略为采用长期战略模式;其次,在分散系统中,系统成员之间的博弈均衡为,当单位产品的生产成本较低时,均采用长期战略模式,当单位产品的生产成本较高时,零售商采用短期战略模式、供应商采用长期战略模式;再者,在回购系统中,系统成员收益仅受零售商的战略模式影响,而与供应商的战略模式无关;最后,采用数值模拟方法分析了分散系统中系统成员的收益.     

不确定性环境下不同补货策略的供应链契约协调研究

针对产出和需求不确定性导致的残值或补货问题,考虑单个制造商和零售商所组成的双边随机供应链,双方采取事前订单形式,构建两种不同现货市场补货策略模型,研究随机环境下最优原材料投入量-成品订货量决策行为及供应链协调。研究表明：零售商自行补货时,收益共享合同不能分担上游产出不确定性风险,制造商为避免产出过剩会减小投入量导致合同失效,但融合了缺货惩罚-余货补偿双向机制的收益共享契约能够进行有效协调。当由制造商补货时,现货市场降低了产出不确定性风险且提高了系统产出投入比,并能重新使收益共享契约生效。此外,有效契约协调后的各方收益均为系统最优收益的仿射函数,并由协商后的收益共享比例控制着分配系数。理论分析和数值仿真说明了合同协调的有效性。算例分析还发现,设计的收益共享风险共担契约相比单一的收益共享契约能够更好地降低不确定性对收益的影响。     

供应链质量管理中的最优合同设计

本文研究在供应链质量管理过程中合同设计问题对供应商质量预防决策和制造商质量检测决策的影响.在合同设计过程中分析了各种行动隐匿情况下的道德风险问题,以及如何通过限定合同参数的取值来激励制造商和供应商的行动,在实现供应商和制造商利益最大化的同时,保证供应链整体质量收益(质量成本)的优化.     

On the Effects of Capacity Agent on Market Equilibrium

We consider a setting of two firms and one capacity agent. Each firm serves a primary market, and the capacity agent sustains a common market to draw demand for capacity from the external firms. The firms can partner with the capacity agent under her contract to serve the common market. When they use the common market mainly as an outlet for their unused capacities, the capacity agent will only specify a variable fee for each capacity unit deployed through her, and prefer to partner with one firm in most circumstances. When the firms adjust capacities to accommodate the businesses created by serving the common market, the capacity agent will specify a lump‐sum payment and a variable fee, and will be more likely to incentivize only one firm to partner with her, when the common market is sufficiently large or the demands in the common and primary markets are strongly correlated. She will always use a fixed fee to extract, while not necessarily all, the profit gains to the firms serving the common market, but will use a variable fee only when partnering with both firms. The key results are robust with respect to market configuration and contract type.     

Universal supplier selection via multi-dimensional auction mechanisms for two-way competition in oligopoly market of supply chain

Allocation of the tasks in competitive market conditions at each echelon of the supply chain is an important activity in the supply chain. The task allocation problem, referred to as supply chain formation process, normally faces information asymmetry in the supply chain. The information asymmetry is caused by rational and intelligent players trying to maximize their own profit rather than opt for the supply chain profit as a whole. Thus, the process of allocating tasks in such situations becomes difficult and will result in externalities in the supply chain trades. These externalities can be internalized with present methodologies in the literature. In this paper, the major internalization methods in different contexts are considered. Lagrange relaxation and Vickery Clarke Groves (VCG) auction mechanism are explored in order to form a supply chain. This paper proposes the multi-stage auction mechanism analyzing two-way competitions, a Bertrand and Cournot competition where price per unit and quantity are the underlying two parameters in a utility analysis. To analyze the problem in real life, the industry example of Indian Railway Catering and Tourism Corporation Ltd. (IRCTC) procurement process has been taken which demonstrates the usability of the proposed framework.     

Reference model for collaborative management in the automotive industry

Changes in the competitive environment require corporate restructuring, strengthening the relationship between the participants in a supply chain, implementing inter-organisational collaborative actions. Different strategies for collaborative actions render the subject relevant to researchers and managers. Integration, cooperation and partnership are essential to the success of this restructuring; the practices in this subject will be treated as Collaborative Management. The main objective is to analyse and synthesise the requirements of Collaborative Management in the automotive industry. The multicase study begins with an exploratory study to identify the theoretical elements that involve collaborative activity between companies, followed by a multiple case study in order to analyse the collaborative strategies used by companies. With the data collected a reference model will be produced using the Enterprise Knowledge Development methodology under a collaborative management approach. The data will enable the systematic and consistent representation of the collaboration between companies, helping to clarify the Collaborative role, and the integration relationship with the inter-organisational managing strategies.     

Risk Mitigation Benefit from Backup Suppliers in the Presence of the Horizontal Fairness Concern

The backup supply strategy is demonstrated as an effective approach to mitigating supply risk. We study a supply chain in which a leader manufacturer designs a contract to a potential backup supplier to mitigate the yield uncertainty of the primary supplier. In this context, the backup supplier may compare with the primary supplier and have horizontal fairness concerns. We model the contract design problem using a Stackelberg game and characterize the optimal decisions for the manufacturer and backup supplier, in both fairness and off‐fairness settings. The theoretical results show that the leader manufacturer must sacrifice his own payoff to balance the payoffs of both suppliers. As a result, using a self‐interested backup supplier is the dominating strategy, whereas using a fair‐minded backup supplier is only suggested when the reliability of the primary supplier is low and the fairness concern of the backup supplier is not strong. Additionally, the backup supplier only benefits from fairness concerns when the level is not exceeding a threshold value. With regard to high fairness levels beyond this threshold, fairness concern has negative effects on the monetary payoff and even might lead to loss of the business. By conducting laboratory experiments, we provide evidence of the horizontal fairness concern from the backup supplier. Further, we show that if the primary supplier also has horizontal fairness concerns, the leader manufacturer can conditionally benefit from a promoted yield reliability due to an extra effort from the primary supplier.     

Asymmetric Competition in B2B Spot Markets

We model strategic behavior of two types of suppliers in B2B spot markets: a supplier that has forward contracts and uses the spot market only for inventory liquidation, and a supplier that uses the spot market as its sole selling channel. We find that when the spot market demand is small, the supplier that has forward contracts has a higher incentive to invest in expanding the spot market. When the spot market demand exceeds a threshold size, this situation is reversed, and the supplier with no contracts benefits more from making the spot market more prevalent. We show that a supplier with forward contracts benefits from the existence of the spot market more than a supplier with no contracts and that this result holds with both negative and positive correlation between spot market demand and contracted demand. We find that suppliers producing only for the spot market gain from working in industries where contracted demand and spot market demand are positively correlated, whereas suppliers that have forward contracts benefit from working in industries with a negative correlation between demands, since it allows them to better manage risk. In addition, both total industry supply and spot market supply are higher in industries where demands are negatively correlated.