Information sharing in a supply chain with a make-to-stock manufacturer

We study ex ante information sharing in a supply chain consisting of a downstream retailer and a make-to-stock upstream manufacturer. The retailer has imperfect demand information and may choose to share it with the manufacturer. Based on the information sharing arrangement, the manufacturer makes the wholesale price and the stocking level decisions. Then the retailer decides the order quantity and the manufacturer fulfills the order up to the available stock level. We find that the retailer has an incentive to voluntarily share the information with the make-to-stock manufacturer if the magnitude of demand uncertainty is intermediate. This stands in sharp contrast with the existing studies which show that the retailer never shares information when the manufacturer is make-to-order. Our results highlight the interdependence between the retailer׳s incentive to share information and the manufacturer׳s operational and marketing decisions.     

Enhancing corporate social responsibility: Contract design under information asymmetry

We consider a two-stage supply chain in which a contract manufacturer (CM) sells products through a brand name retailer. The contract manufacturer can invest in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities to improve customer perception about the firm and increase demand, while the retailer can influence the demand by exerting marketing efforts. We design optimal contracts for such a supply chain, which faces information asymmetry. The wholesale price contract was developed as the base model to derive insight into the value of information sharing. We examine the impact of CSR cost on CSR commitment and profits. We find that CM׳s CSR cost impacts the CM׳s and the retailer׳s profits differently. Under certain conditions, the CM׳s profit will increase with cost, while that of the retailer is uncertain. We also propose two-part tariff contracts for both the symmetric and asymmetric cases with the aim of maximizing the retailer׳s profit and improving CM׳s commitment to CSR. Finally, numerical experiments are conducted to illustrate and validate the proposed models and provide managerial insights.     

Models for closed-loop supply chain with trade-ins

Three kinds of decision models for closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with trade-ins are developed in this paper, including the centralized collection (Model C), the retailer collection (Model R), and the manufacturer collection (Model M). By analyzing these models, we argue that there are three types of optimal collection strategies, namely, no collection, partial collection, and full collection. We provide conditions under which one of these three collection strategies is optimal for different supply chain models. By comparing the impact of trade-ins on these different supply chain models, we find that only when the direct net value of a used product derived from the trade-ins for the whole CLSC system including the consumers is high enough can trade-in strategy be adopted to stimulate consumer demand and improve the manufacturer׳s and retailer׳s profit. Based on the life-cycle assessment method, we find that when the marginal effect of the product on environment in the continue-to-use phase is more significant than in other phases, trade-ins can promote the environmental performance of the CLSC system. Further, by comparing the optimal solutions for the different models, we find that one collection model may dominate the others in terms of the economic performance of the involved parties. Specifically, Model M dominates Model R in terms of the profits of the manufacturer and the profits of the whole supply chain; Model R dominates Model M in terms of retailer׳s profit; and Model R dominates all other models in terms of environmental performance.     

Pricing Policy in a Supply Chain: Negotiation or Posted Pricing

This article examines the choice of pricing policy (posted pricing or negotiation) toward end customers in a supply chain. Many retailers actively decide whether or not to encourage negotiation on the shop floor. Of course, the retailer's pricing policy influences not only the retailer's profit, but also the profits of the manufacturers who sell through the retailer. However, little is known about the forces that shape the pricing policy when two self‐interested parties interact in a supply chain. We consider two alternative models depending on who has the power to decide the pricing policy: the manufacturer or the retailer. We find that an increase in the wholesale price weakens the retailer's ability to price discriminate through negotiation. Therefore, the retailer prefers negotiation at lower wholesale prices and posted pricing at higher wholesale prices. We also find that whenever the retailer prefers negotiation, the manufacturer does too. Therefore, the retailer's discretion over the pricing policy causes friction only when the retailer wants to use posted pricing, while the manufacturer wishes the retailer to use negotiation. We show that such friction arises only when product availability or the cost of negotiation is moderate. In this case, we show that the manufacturer may offer a substantial discount to persuade the retailer to negotiate. Surprisingly, in this region of friction, a decrease in the supply chain's capacity or an increase in negotiation costs (both of which are typically considered as worsening the retailer's business environment) translates into higher profit for the retailer.     

Strategic Information Sharing in Competing Channels

We investigate strategic information sharing in two competing channels. The retailer in a channel can ex post decide whether to share private demand information with his upstream manufacturer after the content of information becomes known. We find that a retailer discloses low demand and withholds high demand to induce lower wholesale prices from his manufacturer. We show that a retailer should share less information when the retail market becomes more competitive, but should disclose more information when his capability to acquire information improves. When a decentralized supply chain competes with an integrated channel, we show that firms in the supply chain benefit from the rival channel's effort to improve information capability, that the incentive for the retailer in the supply chain to improve his information capability increases with the intensity of competition and with the rival channel's information capability, and that the retailer may not want to pursue perfect information acquisition even when doing so is costless. Extensive numerical studies demonstrate that similar results also hold for two decentralized supply chains competing with each other.     

考虑异质消费者的线下到线上供应链合作广告契约设计

本文针对一个拥有线上渠道的制造商和一个零售商组成的线下到线上(O2O)供应链,考虑渠道产品差异化策略下零售商为制造商线上渠道进行广告引流,刻画消费者对产品的异质性需求,分别设计对称信息和不对称信息下制造商的最优合作广告契约,通过对比两种情形中最优决策及利润的变化分析信息不对称的影响,并进一步探讨不对称信息下消费者渠道转换的麻烦成本、单位不匹配成本等重要参数对合作广告契约设计和供应链成员利润的影响。研究发现:不对称信息下,制造商可以策略性选择三种不同策略以最大化自身利润,其中不甄别零售商真实信息的混同均衡在某些条件下是制造商的最优策略;尽管信息不对称会给制造商带来利润损失,但制造商通过策略选择可缓和信息不对称的不利影响,某些条件下信息不对称并不损害供应链总体的利润;麻烦成本的变化会改变制造商不对称信息下最优合作广告契约的策略选择,某些条件下麻烦成本的增高对制造商利润反而存在正影响。最后,通过数值仿真对上述研究结果进行直观考察和说明。     

The Effects of Sharing Upstream Information on Product Rollover

The process of introducing new and phasing out old products is called product rollover. This paper considers a periodic‐review inventory system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, where the manufacturer introduces new and improved products over an infinite planning horizon using the solo‐roll strategy. We consider two scenarios: (1) the manufacturer does not share the upstream information about new‐product introduction with the retailer and (2) the manufacturer shares the information. For each scenario, we first derive the decentralized ordering policy and the system‐optimal ordering policy with given cost parameters. We then devise an optimal supply chain contract that coordinates the inventory system. We demonstrate that when the inventory system is coordinated, information sharing improves the performance of both supply chain entities. However, this may not be true if the inventory system is not coordinated. We also show that under the optimal contract, the manufacturer has no incentive to mislead the retailer about new‐product information in the information‐sharing model. When demand variability increases, information sharing adds more benefits to the coordinated supply chain. Our research provides insights about coordinating product, financial, and information flows in supply chains with product rollover.     

网络外部性对双渠道供应链信息分享的影响

研究了网络外部性对双渠道供应链信息分享的影响。分别建立了存在网络外部性和不存在网络外部性下的双渠道供应链模型,通过比较零售商信息分享和不分享下其与制造商的期望利润。研究发现：当未考虑产品的网络外部性时,零售商不与制造商分享其市场需求信息,与已有研究一致。当考虑了产品网络外部性且网络外部性较小时,零售商仍不与制造商分享市场需求信息;然而,当网络外部性较大时,零售商与制造商分享其市场需求信息。此外,零售商与制造商共享其市场需求信息有助于增加制造商和供应链利润。     

Item‐Level RFID in the Retail Supply Chain

Analyzing the proliferation of item‐level RFID, recent studies have identified the cost sharing of the technology as a gating issue. Various qualitative studies have predicted that conflict will arise, in particular in decentralized supply chains, from the fact that the benefits and the costs resulting from item‐level RFID are not symmetrically distributed among supply chain partners. To contribute to a better understanding of this situation, we consider a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer. Within the context of this retail supply chain, we present analytic models of the benefits of item‐level RFID to both supply chain partners. We examine both the case of a dominant manufacturer as well as the case of a dominant retailer, and we analyze the results of an introduction of item‐level RFID to such a supply chain depending on these market power characteristics. Under each scenario, we show how the cost of item‐level RFID should be allocated among supply chain partners such that supply chain profit is optimized.     

Implementing coordination contracts in a manufacturer Stackelberg dual-channel supply chain

We examine a manufacturer's pricing strategies in a dual-channel supply chain, in which the manufacturer is a Stackelberg leader and the retailer is a follower. We show the conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer both prefer a dual-channel supply chain. We examine the coordination schemes for a dual-channel supply chain and find that a manufacturer's contract with a wholesale price and a price for the direct channel can coordinate the dual-channel supply channel, benefiting the retailer but not the manufacturer. We illustrate how such a contract with a complementary agreement, such as a two-part tariff or a profit-sharing agreement, can coordinate the dual-channel supply chain and enable both the manufacturer and the retailer to be a win-win.     

考虑制造商创新的供应链双向需求信息共享研究

本文考虑制造商创新,研究由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的两级供应链双向需求信息共享问题。制造商与零售商均拥有部分需求信息,且制造商进行成本降低创新,根据逆向分析求解方法分析制造商与零售商在均不共享、制造商单方共享、零售商单方共享、相互共享需求信息情形下的均衡决策,并分别通过求解制造商和零售商的事前利润来探讨制造商与零售商的需求信息共享价值。研究发现：制造商在四种需求信息共享情形下的创新投资增量均与获取的需求信息正相关,而与创新系数负相关。制造商的需求信息共享价值在制造商单方共享和互共享需求信息情形下总为负,在零售商单方共享情形下总为正。零售商的需求信息共享价值随着制造商创新能力的增强由负变正。本文在供应链双向需求信息共享的研究中引入制造商创新,拓展了相关研究,具有一定的理论价值和实践意义。     

不同渠道权力结构和信息结构下供应链定价和销售努力决策

本文针对零售商销售努力和销售价格影响需求情况下的制造商-零售商两级供应链,研究不同渠道权力结构和信息结构下供应链的分散决策。基于博弈理论和建模方法,对几种权力结构和信息结构情景建立相应模型,通过理论与数值分析对不同博弈均衡进行比较。研究表明,随着零售商势力逐步增强制造商利润会逐步恶化;但零售商势力增强能否带来更多利润,取决于需求对价格和销售努力的敏感度、销售努力成本以及信息结构。占优一方可以通过获取对方更多信息来改善自己处境。若占优零售商不得不依赖于对制造商成本先验分布进行决策,当估计的均值大于真实成本时,适度的方差对零售商更有利。最后,讨论了销售努力成本分担的合作机制,针对非合作博弈给出了帕累托改进的合约区间和 Nash讨价还价均衡。     

Production and pricing problems in make-to-order supply chain with cap-and-trade regulation

This paper studies the production and pricing problems in MTO (make-to-order) supply chain containing an upstream manufacturer who produces two products based on MTO production and a downstream retailer. The manufacturer is regulated by cap-and-trade regulation and determines the wholesale prices of the two products. To comply with the regulation, the manufacturer can buy or sell emission permits through an outside market. The retailer determines its order quantities to meet the price-sensitive demands. We derive the optimal total emissions and production quantities of the two products, and based on them, we analyze the impact of emission trading price on the optimal production decisions and the two firms’ optimal profits. The emission trading decisions follow a two-threshold policy and the optimal total emissions are increasing in the cap. However, contrary to intuition, the optimal production quantities of the two products may be decreasing in the cap. The manufacturer׳s optimal profit is decreasing (increasing) in the buying (selling) price of emission permits, and that the retailer׳s optimal profit is decreasing in the buying (selling) price of emission permits. The optimal total emissions are decreasing in buying or selling price of emission permits, however, the optimal production quantities of the two products may be increasing (decreasing) in the buying (selling) price of emission permits. Numerical examples are conducted to illustrate our findings and some managerial insights are presented.     

碳信息不对称下的供应链谎报决策与协调研究

低碳环境下,供应链上下游企业之间面临碳排放量及碳价格信息不对称带来的风险。针对该问题,文章在碳交易环境下,基于"基准法"的碳配额分配机制,构建以制造商为主导的两级供应链模型,在碳信息不对称下分析供应链成员的谎报行为及其对供应链绩效的影响,研究表明,若制造商拥有碳信息优势并在满足最优谎报方程的前提下采取谎报行动,制造商的利润没有得到实质的提升,且其谎报决策并不对供应链绩效产生影响;而当零售商拥有碳信息优势时,一定会为了提高自身利润而谎报碳信息,且在最优谎报方程下能提高零售商及供应链总利润,同时降低制造商的利润,但该谎报行为不能使供应链绩效达到最优。针对零售商的谎报行为,文章采用收益共享契约进行协调,使供应链绩效达到最优,并验证了该契约对激励零售商真实反馈碳信息的有效性。     

Contracting in a Supply Chain with Stochastic Demand and Substitute Products

Retailers often stock competing products from multiple manufacturers. When the retailer stocks out of a particular item, customers who prefer the item are likely, with some probability, to switch to a substitute product from another manufacturer at the same store. In such an event, a “lost sale” for the manufacturer is not a “lost sale” for the retailer. This exacerbates differences in manufacturer's and retailer's stockout costs for the item. Such differences in stockout cost influence the optimal contract between the manufacturer and the retailer and also impose agency costs on the channel. Such contracts, in turn, determine equilibrium inventory levels and fill rates. We study these issues in a single‐period supply chain, consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, under three different scenarios (when the two firms are integrated into a single entity, when the retailer makes stocking decisions, and when the manufacturer makes stocking decisions). We compare, and present a methodology for comparing, stocking quantities, manufacturer efforts, and supply chain profits across different scenarios. We find that VMI performs better when manufacturer effort is a substantial driver of consumer demand and when consumers are unlikely to substitute to another brand in case of a stockout. On the other hand, if non‐contractible manufacturer effort is unimportant, or when substitution is significant, VMI can exacerbate, rather than mitigate, channel inefficiencies, and can perform worse than traditional Retailer Managed Inventory.     

预测信息分享对制造商开通直销渠道的影响

研究了零售商预测信息分享对制造商渠道结构选择的影响.运用不完全信息动态博弈分别建立了单渠道和双渠道供应链决策模型,得到了贝叶斯均衡的渠道价格和各方最优期望利润.研究发现当零售商的需求预测精度比较低时,制造商应当开通直销渠道.零售商没有动机将预测信息与制造商分享.设计了一个信息分享补偿机制使得零售商能自愿分享其私有信息.在信息分享补偿机制下,虽然制造商为获取零售商预测信息付出了成本,但是依然有动机开通直销渠道.     

Equilibrium Financing in a Distribution Channel with Capital Constraint

There exist capital constraints in many distribution channels. We examine a channel consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, where the retailer is capital constrained. The retailer may fund its business by borrowing credit either from a competitive bank market or from the manufacturer, provided the latter is willing to lend. When only one credit type (either bank or trade credit) is viable, we show that trade credit financing generally charges a higher wholesale price and thus becomes less attractive than bank credit financing for the retailer. When both bank and trade credits are viable, the unique equilibrium is trade credit financing if production cost is relatively low but is bank credit financing otherwise. We also study the case where both the retailer and the manufacturer are capital constrained and demonstrate that, to improve the overall supply chain efficiency, the bank should finance the manufacturer if production cost is low but finance the retailer otherwise. Our analysis further suggests that the equilibrium region of trade credit financing shrinks as demand variability or the retailer's internal capital level increases.     

Designing Multi‐Attribute Procurement Mechanisms for Assortment Planning

This research investigates how to design procurement mechanisms for assortment planning. We consider that a retailer buys directly from a manufacturer who possesses private information about the per‐unit variable cost and per‐variety setup cost. We first develop a screening model to assist the retailer in integrating assortment planning into supply chain contracting processes when only one manufacturer is available. We demonstrate that the screening mechanism is optimal among all feasible procurement strategies. When there are multiple competing manufacturers, we propose a supply contract auctioning mechanism and evaluate its performance. In this mechanism, the retailer announces a contract menu and the manufacturer that bids the highest upfront fee paid to the retailer wins the auction. The winner then chooses and executes a contract from the contract menu. We show that when the retailer uses the optimal screening contract menu as the object of the auction, it achieves the optimal procurement outcome if the screening contract menu does not pay rent to any manufacturer type. This finding sheds light on the connection between screening and auction mechanisms when there exists multi‐dimensional private information.     

Value of and Interaction between Production Postponement and Information Sharing Strategies for Supply Chain Firms

We analyze the value of and interaction between production postponement and information sharing, which are two distinct strategies to reduce manufacturers’ uncertainty about demand. In both single‐level and two‐level supply chains, from the manufacturer's perspective, while information sharing is always valuable, production postponement can sometimes be detrimental. Furthermore, the value of production postponement is not merely driven by savings in inventory holding cost as postponement enables the manufacturer to avoid both excess and shortfall in production. We find that production postponement and information sharing strategies may substitute, complement, or conflict with each other, depending on the extent of the increase in the unit production cost when production is postponed. In a two‐level supply chain, from the retailer's perspective, information sharing and production postponement can be beneficial or detrimental. When information sharing is beneficial to the retailer, the retailer always shares her demand information with the manufacturer voluntarily. In addition, this voluntary information sharing is truthful because inflated or deflated demand information hurts the retailer through a higher wholesale price or a stock‐out. However, the retailer never shares her demand information voluntarily if the manufacturer has already adopted production postponement because production postponement and information sharing strategies always conflict with each other. Even when the retailer does not benefit from information sharing, we show that the manufacturer can always design an incentive mechanism to induce the retailer to share the demand information, irrespective of whether the manufacturer has already implemented production postponement or not. The above findings underscore the need for a careful assessment of demand uncertainty‐reduction strategies before the supply chain players embark upon them.     

信息共享对供应链合作广告影响的博弈分析

本文研究需求不确定环境下合作广告供应链中的信息共享对供应链上下游企业决策及绩效的影响。在此供应链中,上游制造商决定产品批发价格及地方性广告费用分担比例,下游零售商决定地方性广告费用的投入及产品售价。运用斯坦伯格博弈模型研究了不确定性对上下游定价和广告投入决策的影响,分析比较了有信息共享和无信息共享两种情况下供应链各成员及供应链利润。结果表明,对零售商而言,其广告水平,产品售价,及期望利润都随着广告效应的增大而增加;对制造商而言,当广告费用分担率较大时,较强的广告效应会导致零售商对广告的过度投入,从而损害制造商的利润。给定制造商广告分担率,信息共享可以提高制造商期望利润,却减少了零售商期望利润,并可能减少供应链的总体利润。给定批发价格的情况下,信息共享会提高制造商及供应链期望利润,而对零售商来讲无差别。