A note on “Coordinating a supply chain for deteriorating items with a revenue sharing and cooperative investment contract”

In this short note, we first improve the proof in Zhang et al. [1] to show the strict concavity of the unit time total profit of the whole supply chain with respect to preservation technology investment without approximation. We then generalize the model of Zhang et al. [1] to a broader class of market demand functions. Additionally, theoretical results are provided to illustrate the features of the proposed model.     

Supply chain coordination using revenue-dependent revenue sharing contracts

A typical single period revenue sharing contract specifies a priori a fixed fraction for the supply chain revenue to be shared among the supply chain players. Over the years, supply chains, especially in the movie industry, have adopted multi-period revenue sharing contracts that specify one fraction for each contract period. These revenue sharing contracts are of revenue-independent type such that the revenue sharing fractions are independent of the quantum of revenue generated. Motivated by the recent events in Bollywood – one of the popular arms of the Indian movie industry – in this paper we develop and analyze a game theoretic model for revenue-dependent revenue sharing contracts wherein the actual proportion in which the supply chain revenue is shared among the players depends on the quantum of revenue generated. Our aim is to understand why revenue-dependent revenue sharing contracts are (or not) preferred over revenue-independent contracts. We also examine if supply chains can be coordinated over multiple periods using both types of revenue sharing contracts. We build a two-period model characterizing supply chains in the movie industry and highlight the implications of the multi-period contractual setting for the supply chain coordinating revenue sharing contracts. We show that supply chains can be perfectly coordinated using both types of revenue sharing contracts; however, there exist situations in which revenue-dependent contracts outperform revenue-independent contracts. Using revenue-dependent revenue sharing contracts supply chains can be coordinated while providing positive surplus to the supply chain players that is otherwise not possible under certain situations in revenue-independent contracts. We also demonstrate how revenue-dependent contracts enhance supply chain coordination and highlight their significance when the drop in the revenue potential from one period to another is moderate.     

A delay-in-payment contract for Pareto improvement of a supply chain with stochastic demand

We consider a supply chain consisting of a single supplier and a single retailer with stochastic customer demand, which is operated over an infinite horizon. We propose a delay-in-payment contract to coordinate the supply chain. With this contract, the supplier allows the retailer to pay partial order cost at the ordering epoch, and to pay the remaining portion after a permissible number of periods. The system is formulated as a stochastic dynamic programming problem. It is shown that there exists a base-stock policy to be optimal. Compared with the traditional wholesale-price contract, the delay-in-payment contract with appropriate parameters can achieve a Pareto improvement (i.e., the performances of both the supplier and the retailer using the delay-in-payment contract are better than those using the wholesale-price contract). Numerical studies are performed to investigate both the effectiveness of the Pareto improvement, and the impact of the major parameters of the delay-in-payment contract on the system performance.     

Information sharing in a supply chain with a make-to-stock manufacturer

We study ex ante information sharing in a supply chain consisting of a downstream retailer and a make-to-stock upstream manufacturer. The retailer has imperfect demand information and may choose to share it with the manufacturer. Based on the information sharing arrangement, the manufacturer makes the wholesale price and the stocking level decisions. Then the retailer decides the order quantity and the manufacturer fulfills the order up to the available stock level. We find that the retailer has an incentive to voluntarily share the information with the make-to-stock manufacturer if the magnitude of demand uncertainty is intermediate. This stands in sharp contrast with the existing studies which show that the retailer never shares information when the manufacturer is make-to-order. Our results highlight the interdependence between the retailer׳s incentive to share information and the manufacturer׳s operational and marketing decisions.     

Coordinating contracts for a financially constrained supply chain

We consider a financially constrained supply chain in which a supplier (leader) sells products to a retailer (follower) who has no access to bank financing due to her low credit rating. However, the supplier can borrow from a bank and offer trade credit to the retailer to alleviate her financial constraint. Failure to pay off a bank loan or trade credit incurs a variable default cost. We analyze the centralized version of the supply chain to obtain new coordination requirements. We then examine whether revenue-sharing, buyback, and all-unit quantity discount contracts can coordinate our supply chain. We show that the all-unit quantity discount contract fails to coordinate. However, the revenue-sharing and buyback contracts can coordinate the supply chain, but only when the supply chain has a sufficient total working capital. Moreover, they cannot allocate profit flexibly unless the supplier has a large enough working capital. Finally, we design a generalized revenue-sharing contract that coordinates the supply chain with flexible profit allocation, and also show by numerical examples its superiority over the revenue-sharing and buyback contracts.     

Vertical cost information sharing in a supply chain with value-adding retailers

We consider a supply chain consisting of one supplier and two value-adding heterogeneous retailers. Each retailer has full knowledge about his own value-added cost structure that is unknown to the supplier and the other retailer. Assuming there is no horizontal information sharing between two retailers, we model the supply chain with a three-stage game-theoretic framework. In the first stage each retailer decides if he is willing to vertically disclose his private cost information to the supplier. In the second stage, given the information he has about the retailers, the supplier announces the wholesale price to the retailers. In response to the wholesale price, in the third stage, the retailers optimize their own retail prices and the values added to the product, respectively. Under certain conditions, we prove the existence of equilibrium prices and added values. Furthermore, we obtain the condition under which both retailers are unwilling to vertically share their private information with the supplier, as well as the conditions under which both retailers have incentives to reveal their cost information to the supplier, thus leading to a win–win situation for the whole supply chain.     

Coordinating a three level supply chain with flexible return policies

This paper studies the coordination issue of a three level supply chain selling short life cycle products in a single period model. The manufacturer first negotiates the trade contract with the retailer, then with the supplier. We construct the so-called flexible return policy by setting the rules of pricing while postponing the determination of the final contract prices. With return policies between each pair of adjacent firms, unsold products or used modules dissembled from the unsold products are returned level by level from the retailer to the upstream firms and each firm shares in the loss due to the overstock. We show that the three level supply chain can be fully coordinated with appropriate contracts and the total profit of the channel can be allocated with any specified ratios among the firms.     

Production and pricing problems in make-to-order supply chain with cap-and-trade regulation

This paper studies the production and pricing problems in MTO (make-to-order) supply chain containing an upstream manufacturer who produces two products based on MTO production and a downstream retailer. The manufacturer is regulated by cap-and-trade regulation and determines the wholesale prices of the two products. To comply with the regulation, the manufacturer can buy or sell emission permits through an outside market. The retailer determines its order quantities to meet the price-sensitive demands. We derive the optimal total emissions and production quantities of the two products, and based on them, we analyze the impact of emission trading price on the optimal production decisions and the two firms’ optimal profits. The emission trading decisions follow a two-threshold policy and the optimal total emissions are increasing in the cap. However, contrary to intuition, the optimal production quantities of the two products may be decreasing in the cap. The manufacturer׳s optimal profit is decreasing (increasing) in the buying (selling) price of emission permits, and that the retailer׳s optimal profit is decreasing in the buying (selling) price of emission permits. The optimal total emissions are decreasing in buying or selling price of emission permits, however, the optimal production quantities of the two products may be increasing (decreasing) in the buying (selling) price of emission permits. Numerical examples are conducted to illustrate our findings and some managerial insights are presented.     

碳交易机制下供应链CCS投资时机研究

在碳交易机制下,碳价格不确定性对发电商的碳捕获与封存(Carbon Capture and Storage,CCS)投资时机具有重要影响。基于实物期权理论,考虑碳价格不确定性及CCS投资成本递减情况下CCS投资的期权价值,建立集碳捕获-运输-封存于一体的CCS投资时机决策基本模型。在此基础上,进一步构建考虑供应链内发电商与CCS运营商合作的CCS投资博弈模型,分析发电商与CCS运营商在收益转移比例与投资时机之间进行决策的均衡条件。基于上述模型,结合数值算例进一步分析了CCS投资时机的影响因素。结果表明:碳价格波动率、政府对CCS投资补贴系数、CCS技术学习效应以及供应链内部企业间的收益转移比例等都将对CCS投资门槛产生影响,供应链企业应综合考虑各因素的影响,科学选择投资时机与收益转移比例,以实现CO2减排的同时保证各方的经济利益,保障供应链的协调运行与CCS投资优化。     

A production model for deteriorating items with stochastic preventive maintenance time and rework process with FIFO rule

Due to unreliable production facility and stochastic preventive maintenance, deriving an optimal production inventory decision in practice is very complicated. In this paper, we develop a production model for deteriorating items with stochastic preventive maintenance time and rework using the first in first out (FIFO) rule. From our literature search, no study has been done on the above problem. The problem is solved using a simple search procedure; this makes it more practical for use by industries. Two case examples using uniform and exponential distribution preventive maintenance time are applied. Examples and sensitivity analysis are conducted for each case. The results show that rework and preventive maintenance time have significant affected the total cost and the optimal production time. This provides helpful managerial insights to help management in making smart decisions.     

Implementing coordination contracts in a manufacturer Stackelberg dual-channel supply chain

We examine a manufacturer's pricing strategies in a dual-channel supply chain, in which the manufacturer is a Stackelberg leader and the retailer is a follower. We show the conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer both prefer a dual-channel supply chain. We examine the coordination schemes for a dual-channel supply chain and find that a manufacturer's contract with a wholesale price and a price for the direct channel can coordinate the dual-channel supply channel, benefiting the retailer but not the manufacturer. We illustrate how such a contract with a complementary agreement, such as a two-part tariff or a profit-sharing agreement, can coordinate the dual-channel supply chain and enable both the manufacturer and the retailer to be a win-win.     

Coordination in supply chains: an evaluation using fuzzy logic

Supply chain coordination (SCC) is an effective approach to improve supply chain (SC) performance. The coordination can be achieved when interdependent entities work together by sharing resources and information to achieve common objectives aligned to maximise customer value for the entire SC. There are a number of mechanisms by which the SC members can coordinate, e.g. contracts, information sharing, information technology and collaborative initiatives. To communicate frequently and effectively, the partners are required to have good information systems and capability to share information. To coordinate with each other the SC members are required to have capabilities to implement coordination mechanisms effectively. In this paper, a model is proposed to measure the effect of these mechanisms on the extent of coordination. Currently, there is no scale of measurement reported in the literature to measure the SCC. A fuzzy logic approach combined with the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) is proposed to evaluate the extent of coordination. The proposed methodology is demonstrated through a case study of an automotive parts manufacturer.     

风险厌恶零售商考虑信息预测成本的协调机制

在CVaR风险度量准则下,将信息预测成本作为运营成本之一,建立了风险厌恶的零售商的需求信息预测投入和订货量的联合决策随机模型,研究了风险态度对零售商最优决策的影响.通过分析得出在分散决策下,随着零售商风险厌恶程度的增加,零售商提高信息预测水平,以减小需求不确定风险.同时减少订货量,降低订货过量的风险.证明了在一定条件下,传统的收益共享契约能实现供应链协同,但适用范围较小.由信息预测成本分担与收益共享组成的联合契约可扩大供应链协同的范围,消除风险态度和双重边际对零售商决策行为的影响,使得零售商的需求预测水平和订货量同时达到系统风险中立环境下的最优水平.     

Fresh-product supply chain management with logistics outsourcing

We consider a supply chain in which a producer supplies a fresh product, through a third-party logistics (3PL) provider, to a distant market where a distributor purchases and sells it to end customers. The product is perishable, both the quantity and quality of which may deteriorate during the process of transportation. The market demand is random, sensitive to the selling price as well as the freshness of the product. We derive the optimal decisions for the three supply chain members, including the 3PL provider's transportation fee, the producer's shipping quantity and wholesale price, and the distributor's purchasing quantity and retail price. We find that the presence of the 3PL provider in the supply chain has a significant impact on its performance. We propose an incentive scheme to coordinate the supply chain. The scheme consists of two contracts, including a wholesale-market clearance (WMC) contract between the producer and the distributor, and a wholesale-price-discount sharing (WDS) contract between the producer and the 3PL provider. We show that the proposed contracts can eliminate the two sources of “double marginalization” that exist in the three-tier supply chain, and induce the three parties to act in a coordinated way.     

The value of VMI beyond information sharing in a single supplier multiple retailers supply chain under a non-stationary (Rn,Sn) policy

This study aims to determine the value of vendor-managed inventory (VMI) over independent decision making with information sharing (IS) under non-stationary stochastic demand with service-level constraints. For this purpose, we utilize mixed-integer linear programming formulations to quantify the benefits that can be accrued by a supplier, multiple retailers and the system as a whole by switching from IS to VMI. More specifically, we investigate the incremental value that VMI provides beyond IS in terms of expected cost savings, inventory reductions, and decrease in shipment sizes from the supplier to the retailers by conducting a large number of computational experiments. Results reveal that the decision transfer component of VMI improves these performance measures significantly when the supplier׳s setup cost is low and order issuing efficiency is high. The benefits offered by VMI are negligible under the problem settings where the supplier׳s order issuing efficiency is low and the production setup serves solely a single replenishment under IS.     

不同CSR分担模式下的闭环供应链销售努力与定价决策

本文研究考虑企业社会责任(CSR)闭环供应链的定价及销售努力问题,在制造商、零售商以及二者联合承担CSR三种模式下,分析了CSR行为对闭环供应链销售努力及定价策略的影响。研究表明,无论在何种CSR分担模式下,成员企业的CSR行为不仅有利于降低产品价格,提高零售商的销售努力水平、产品销量及废旧产品回收效果,还有效的增加了制造商的社会福利、第三方及系统的总利润。当制造商或零售商单独承担CSR时,第三方及闭环供应链整体的利润均相等且大于二者联合承担CSR时。当制造商和零售商联合承担CSR时,二者的社会福利均大于其单独承担CSR时,且主导零售商的社会福利较之制造商更大。     

A systematic approach for supply chain conflict detection with a hierarchical Petri Net extension

Coordinating and managing distributed entities in a supply chain is a challenging task due, in part, to conflicts present in such systems. If not handled effectively, the conflict can degrade the performance of the system as a whole due to the fact that each individual entity may be working towards goals that sub-optimize the integrated system. Therefore, the ability to discover conflicts would be a valuable asset, particularly if the discovery occurred proactively. This paper presents a methodology, extending the concept of basic Petri Nets, to discover supply chain conflict before they occur and cause detrimental effects to system performance. The approach involves linking hierarchical levels of the supply chain system and detecting conflicts occurring when the single entities, each optimized for it own operations, are combined together in a supply chain. These conflicts are not obvious or intuitive in examining the single entities of the supply chain, but when integrated the conflicts are discovered by the methodology. We applied the proposed methodology on a real-world supply chain to illustrate the validity of the tool. Although, further research is needed to fully explore this method of conflict detection, we believe that this research does indeed provide some much needed insight into the daunting task of conflict discovery and therefore proactive handling of these potentially negative occurrences in the supply chain.     

供应链中期权合约与混合合约决策选择

研究由单供应商和单零售商组成的二级供应链,面对不确定的市场需求,零售商可以通过期权合约或混合合约(期权合约与远期合约的组合)向供应商订购产品。通过建立 Stackelberg 博弈模型,求解两种合约形式下零售商的最优采购决策与供应商的最优定价决策。亦从供应商和零售商的不同视角比较了两种合约。结果显示,供应商倾向采用期权合约销售产品,即使在混合合约背景下,供应商也会通过提高远期合约价格来阻止零售商通过远期合约采购产品。而零售商通过期权合约采购时收益能否提升则会受到期权执行价格和产品残值的影响。     

考虑异质消费者的线下到线上供应链合作广告契约设计

本文针对一个拥有线上渠道的制造商和一个零售商组成的线下到线上(O2O)供应链,考虑渠道产品差异化策略下零售商为制造商线上渠道进行广告引流,刻画消费者对产品的异质性需求,分别设计对称信息和不对称信息下制造商的最优合作广告契约,通过对比两种情形中最优决策及利润的变化分析信息不对称的影响,并进一步探讨不对称信息下消费者渠道转换的麻烦成本、单位不匹配成本等重要参数对合作广告契约设计和供应链成员利润的影响。研究发现:不对称信息下,制造商可以策略性选择三种不同策略以最大化自身利润,其中不甄别零售商真实信息的混同均衡在某些条件下是制造商的最优策略;尽管信息不对称会给制造商带来利润损失,但制造商通过策略选择可缓和信息不对称的不利影响,某些条件下信息不对称并不损害供应链总体的利润;麻烦成本的变化会改变制造商不对称信息下最优合作广告契约的策略选择,某些条件下麻烦成本的增高对制造商利润反而存在正影响。最后,通过数值仿真对上述研究结果进行直观考察和说明。     

Economic analysis of demand uncertainty and delayed information sharing in a third-party managed supply chain

Designers and retailers in consumer products industry are faced with high demand volatility and potential loss of profit from design piracy. Many retailers rely on third-party supply chain managers (SCMs) to manage global supply chains. A SCM starts raw materials procurement and production process based on expected demand and takes financial risks associated with demand uncertainty. But a retailer often delays sharing product design information with SCM forcing it to expedite production and distribution processes incurring additional financial penalties. To analyse economic impact of delayed information sharing under uncertain demand, we develop a mathematical model. Our model indicates that higher demand volatility lessens the effect of penalty associated with delayed information sharing for retailers. The model also shows that for a given demand volatility, per-unit premium increases asymptotically for a retailer compared to marginal production cost increase for SCM. Such findings are not intuitive for SCMs or retailers.