社交媒体中企业分享奖励营销模式研究

社交媒体中用户之间的分享行为具有潜在的经济价值,因此越来越多的企业通过分享奖励模式开展社会化营销,以挖掘新用户。本文构建“嵌套”Stackelberg博弈模型,研究了企业的最优分享奖励机制设计,并对比分析了分享奖励营销模式与传统大众广告营销模式。主要研究发现,企业的最优奖励策略包括单独奖励新用户、单独奖励分享者以及同时奖励分享者和新用户三种。不同策略的选择受到价格以及用户之间社交关系的影响。当用户之间的社交关系较弱时,由打折奖励引起用户购买概率增加的“折扣作用”强于由分享奖励金引起的“推荐作用”,企业适合采用单独奖励新用户策略;当用户之间的社交关系较强时,“推荐作用”强于“折扣作用”,企业适合采用单独奖励分享者策略。同时,企业选择大众广告营销模式或者分享奖励模式受到市场渗透率和用户之间社交关系两个主要因素的影响。     

Competitive markdown timing for perishable and substitutable products

We model as a duopoly two firms selling their fixed stocks of two substitutable items over a selling season. Each firm starts with an initial price, and has the option to decrease the price once. The problem for each firm is to determine when to mark its price down in to maximize its revenue. We show that the existence and characterization of a pure-strategy equilibrium depend on the magnitude of the increase in the revenue rate of a firm when its competitor runs out of stock. When the increase is smaller than the change in the revenue rate of the price leader when both firms are in stock for all of the three possible scenarios, neither firm has the incentive to force its rival to run out of stock and if a firm marks its price down after the season starts, its inventory runs out precisely at the end of the season. When the increase is larger than the change of the price leader׳s revenue rate in one particular scenario, waiting until its rival runs out of inventory may be an equilibrium strategy for the larger firm even though this may lead to leftover inventory for itself. In other cases, there may be no pure-strategy equilibrium in the game. In certain regions of the parameter space, a firm׳s revenue may be decreasing in its starting inventory which shows that a firm may be better off if it can credibly salvage a portion of its inventory prior to the game. While most of our analysis is for open-loop strategies, in the final part of the paper, we show that the open-loop equilibrium survives as an equilibrium when we consider closed-loop strategies for an important subset of the parameter space.     

不对称双寡头企业技术创新投资决策研究

许多研究技术创新投资决策的期权博弈文献忽视了企业之间的投资成本和经营成本的不对称性,本文研究成本不对称双寡头企业技术创新投资决策问题。首先,导出企业投资收益函数和投资临界值。接着对存在的三种均衡,即抢占均衡、序列均衡和同时投资均衡进行了分析讨论,结果表明,成本不对称程度较小和先动优势不大情况下,企业将同时投资;当先动优势较大的情况下,低成本企业将先投资成为领先者;当企业成本不对称程度很大时,企业将序列执行投资期权。最后,结合案例进行数值计算,验证了理论分析结果。     

纵向差异下的连接外部性和网络结构分析

在寡头竞争的市场环境里,相互竞争的企业通常会与竞争对手建立连接,从而影响他们在产品市场上竞争的方式。本文我们建立两阶段博弈模型研究企业建立连接的激励以及由此而形成的网络结构形态。在博弈的第一期,具有纵向差异化的企业决定是否与其竞争对手建立连接;企业观察到连接结果后在第二期进行价格竞争。本文的分析显示均衡网络结构与连接效应、连接成本和消费者偏好有关,均衡网络可能仅是一个企业与其它所有企业建立连接的星型网络结构,也可能是没有任何企业建立连接的空网络结构。本文还分析了均衡网络和社会有效网络之间的关系,发现均衡网络和社会有效网络并不总是一致的,从社会计划者的角度看,企业建立连接可能存在激励不足,因此公共政策应该鼓励企业建立连接。     

Getting What You Pay For—Strategic Process Improvement Compensation and Profitability Impact

Profit‐maximizing firm owners who incentivize their managers with a bonus for process improvement create an intentional misalignment of their own objective and management attention. From the viewpoint of a single firm, such a local misalignment can never be profitable, but in this study we take a wider strategic perspective by investigating cost‐reducing process improvements of two firms competing in a Cournot market. We find that the use of a process improvement bonus (by firm A) can be profitable, by affecting the competitor's decision making. Informed about the reward structure at firm A, which provides an incentive for process improvement and thereby for increased production at that firm, the manager of the competing firm (B) is inclined to produce less if the owner of firm B only rewards profit. This leads to a higher profit for firm A. However, we also show that firm B's best strategy is to also offer a process improvement bonus, even if that firm is a cost laggard (with higher costs for process improvement), and that this leads to reduced profit for both firms in many situations unless one of them is sufficiently superior in its ability to improve processes. These results are robust for uncertain process improvement outcomes, multidimensional process improvement decisions, and information asymmetry in the owner–manager relationship.     

A Competitive Model of Customization with Lead‐Time Effects

In this article, we study the competitive interactions between a firm producing standard products and a firm producing custom products. Consumers with heterogeneous preferences choose between n standard products, which may not meet their preferences exactly but are available immediately, and a custom product, available only after a certain lead time l. Standard products incur a variety cost that increases with n and custom products incur a lead time cost that is decreasing in the lead time l. We consider a two‐stage game wherein at stage 1, the standard product firm chooses the variety and the custom firm chooses the lead time and then both firms set prices simultaneously. We characterize the subgame‐perfect Nash equilibrium of the game. We find that both firms can coexist in equilibrium, either sharing the market as local monopolists or in a price‐competitive mode. The standard product firm may offer significant or minimal variety depending on the equilibrium outcome. We provide several interesting insights on the variety, lead time, and prices of the products offered and on the impact of problem parameters on the equilibrium outcomes. For instance, we show that the profit margin and price of the custom product are likely to be higher than that of standard products in equilibrium under certain conditions. Also, custom firms are more likely to survive and succeed in product markets with larger potential market sizes. Another interesting insight is that increased consumer sensitivity to product fit may result in lower lead time for the custom product.     

创新能力不对称企业研发投资策略时机研究

本文运用不对称双寡头期权博弈模型,研究了创新能力差异和先动优势对企业研发投资策略时机的影响,分析了抢先均衡、序贯均衡和同时投资均衡出现的条件.研究表明,当抢先投资的先动优势足够大时,创新能力强的企业抢先创新能力弱的企业投资;当创新能力差异足够大时,两个企业序贯地投资;当创新能力差异较小且不存在明显的先动优势时,两个企业同时投资.在其它条件不变的情况下,创新能力越强,同时投资均衡和序贯均衡出现的可能性越小,抢先均衡出现的可能性越大.     

考虑消费者预期的电动汽车分时租赁市场价格竞争模型

分时租赁平台作为电动汽车推广的主要方式，其特征与打车软件类似，在风险资本的推动下极易引发价格战。各租车公司的市场需求量不仅与自己的定价有关，也与竞争对手的定价策略相关，目标都是各自利润的最大化。本文在考虑消费者预期的基础上，研究了需求函数为线性情形下的多人博弈，证明了此博弈是超模博弈以及Nash均衡的存在性和唯一性。并进一步揭示了降价幅度、交叉价格和价格敏感消费群体占比对均衡价格、均衡需求量和利润的影响关系，讨论了价格竞争过程中各租车公司的决策过程与利弊关系。结果表明：任意租车公司的降价行为都会引发整个市场的降价反应，且降价幅度随着博弈阶段的推进逐渐减小，最终收敛于均衡价格；动态定价博弈存在最优组合策略，市场竞争时应当把握好降价幅度，避免过度的价格竞争；均衡价格是关于消费者预期的单调减函数，价格敏感的消费群体占比越大，租车公司间价格竞争越激烈，降价幅度会越大，均衡价格越低；对于市场份额大的租车公司利润是关于价格敏感型消费者占比的单调增函数，但对中小租车公司而言则是单调减函数，价格敏感的消费者越多，对大公司有利，对中小公司不利。     

Risk Aversion and the Efficiency Wage Contract

Abstract. The efficiency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (American Economic Review 74: 433–444, 1984) has not always been confirmed by empirical investigations. This could be due to informational problems. Reformulating the Shapiro and Stiglitz model as a sequential game, this paper examines the relations between the terms of the efficiency wage contract offered by a firm and the responses of a worker, under incomplete information about the degree of risk aversion of the firm and the worker. It shows that under incomplete information about the degree of risk aversion of the worker, shirking can emerge as an equilibrium phenomenon. For any efficiency wage contract, a worker will shirk if the degree of risk aversion of the worker is less than that corresponding to the contract.     

IPO信息披露与监管的演化博弈分析

注册制下,信息披露是IPO的核心。本文构建以发行人、保荐人和监管者为主体的三方演化博弈模型,研究IPO信息披露过程中参与人的策略选择及其博弈均衡。结果表明：监管者强力监管所获得的激励、保荐人敷衍塞责所受到的惩罚和发行人虚假披露所受到的损失显著地影响博弈均衡;如果监管者强力监管所获得的激励足够充分,或者发行人虚假披露与保荐人失责所受到的惩罚足够严厉,那么发行人将会选择真实披露信息;此外,媒体曝光概率也显著地影响博弈均衡。因此,要提高IPO信息披露质量,就必须设计充分而有效的激励与惩罚机制。     

Strategic Decisions of New Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information: A Game‐Theoretic Model*

In this paper we explore strategic decision making in new technology adoption by using economic analysis. We show how asymmetric information affects firms' decisions to adopt the technology. We do so in a two‐stage game‐theoretic model where the first‐stage investment results in the acquisition of a new technology that, in the second stage, may give the firm a competitive advantage in the product market. We compare two information structures under which two competing firms have asymmetric information about the future performance (i.e., postadoption costs) of the new technology. We find that equilibrium strategies under asymmetric information are quite different from those under symmetric information. Information asymmetry leads to different incentives and strategic behaviors in the technology adoption game. In contrast to conventional wisdom, our model shows that market uncertainty may actually induce firms to act more aggressively under certain conditions. We also show that having better information is not always a good thing. These results illustrate a key departure from established decision theory.     

中国互联网低俗内容监管的博弈分析

近年来,我国互联网内容治理工作面临诸多挑战。本文在分析互联网低俗内容泛化的根源与危害性的基础上,运用博弈论的原理,在ICP(互联网内容提供商/Internet Content Provider)、IPP(互联网平台服务提供商/Internet Platform Provider)、互联网用户和以政府为主导的监管方之间建立了三个完全信息静态博弈模型。通过对模型均衡解的探讨,揭示了互联网低俗内容监管的关键,并给出了相应建议。     

面向网络营销企业的营销信号选择博弈分析

如何通过营销信号来降低电子市场逆向选择风险是影响网络营销企业业绩的重要因素.本文以两家企业垄断市场为例,建立了企业信号传递博弈模型.通过对分离均衡与混同均衡存在条件的分析,讨论了信号传递成本以及不同消费者群体所占比例对企业营销信号决策的影响.分析结果有助于网络营销企业在电子市场中选择营销信号.     

基于可持续性消费的企业质量价格决策研究

随着可持续性消费理念的普及,消费者愿意为可持续性生产的产品支付更高的价格,这种绿色商品溢价能快速传导到价值链上游,进而推动绿色产业升级。本文在信息非对称环境下建立了一个可持续性制造型企业及其消费者组成的供应链模型,研究可持续性消费者比例与可持续性偏好对企业质量价格决策的影响。研究结论如下：在完全信息下,当企业只服务可持续消费者时,企业的收益随可持续性消费者比例递增;在信息非对称时,可持续性消费者比例越大,企业分离时所付出的成本越高,因此可持续性投入高的企业越倾向于混同而不是分离。另外,消费者的可持续性偏好对企业来说总是有利的。但是信息非对称时,可持续性消费者比例越高,并不总是对企业有利。     

Optimal Pricing and Rebate Strategies in a Two‐Level Supply Chain

For many product categories, manufacturers and retailers often offer rebates to stimulate sales. Due to certain adverse effects, however, some manufacturers and retailers are contemplating the elimination of their rebate programs. This paper sheds light on the debate about the value of rebate programs by presenting a model for evaluating the conditions under which a firm should offer rebates in a competitive environment. Specifically, we consider a two‐level supply chain comprising one manufacturer and one retailer. Each firm makes three decisions: the regular (wholesale or retail) price, whether or not to offer rebates, and the rebate value should the firm decide to launch a rebate program. We determine the equilibrium of a vertical competition game between the manufacturer (leader) and the retailer (follower), and we provide insights about how competition affects the conditions under which a firm should offer rebates in equilibrium.     

审计合谋的一个博弈均衡分析框架

当前审计环境中,审计合谋现象普遍存在,双重审计制度可以看作是阻止审计合谋的一种制度设计.在分析审计合谋成因的基础上,建立了一个包括引入第二个审计师的概率因子、融合外部监督惩罚与激励机制的博弈模型,对阻止审计合谋的条件进行了均衡分析.研究结果显示,当外部监督惩罚力度强化后与适当的激励机制存在时,双重审计制度有利于降低对审计师的监督成本,从而为其实施提供了理论依据;从多期博弈角度看,这一制度还有利于削弱审计师的"合谋偏好",最终使双重审计回归到单一审计路线上来,节约对审计师的社会监督成本.     

基于博弈论的知识型企业激励问题研究

对于知识型企业来说,有效的激励是激发知识型员工积极性与创造性的重要措施之一。由于知识型企业的价值创造及其溢价分配分别存在信息的不对称,为此,本文分析了企业与知识型员工的Stackelberg博弈行为,借助于理想状态的Pareto有效的完全合作模式的渐进演化过程,讨论合作博弈的机理与溢价的分配问题。研究表明知识型企业的短期与长期激励具有很强的互补性,适当地调节两者可以使企业系统收益递增;揭示了风险态度和地位是影响激励机制的关键因素。     

资产收益序列相依下的多阶段投资博弈模型

现有投资组合优化研究普遍假设投资者之间相互独立,且假定标的资产在不同阶段的收益序列不具相关性.然而在实际投资过程中,投资者往往是相互影响,资产收益序列也存在相依特征.基于多阶段投资组合优化和纳什均衡理论,利用相对绩效来刻画投资者之间的博弈现象,以每个投资者的相对终端财富的期望效用水平为目标,构建多阶段投资组合博弈模型.在资产收益序列相依情形下,给出了纳什均衡投资策略和相应值函数的解析表达式,以及纳什均衡投资策略与传统策略的关系.采用累计经验分布函数和夏普比率等指标,对纳什均衡投资策略与传统策略进行仿真比较,分析了纳什均衡投资策略随投资者反应敏感系数的变化趋势.结果表明:相比于传统的投资策略,当考虑竞争对手的相对绩效时,纳什均衡策略投资者更愿意冒高风险去追求高收益;并且投资者的反应敏感系数越大,其对风险的偏好程度也越高.     

需求与提前期不确定下的生产—销售协调

考虑一个按订单生产企业,其需求同时取决于价格和提前期。在企业内部,销售部门进行定价决策,生产部门则进行订货和提前期的决策。文中将生产及销售部门之间的相互作用表示成一个Nash博弈模型,并证明了纯策略均衡的存在性和唯一性。此外,提出了一个能够协调生产和销售部门决策的机制。最后,通过数值分析讨论了各参数对部门均衡决策的影响以及企业不需要运用协调机制的条件。     

基于非排它性互换合约的管理层激励研究

管理者进行金融衍生品市场的非排它性股权互换交易会降低报酬合约的事后激励强度,并对企业价值和风险产生影响.本文在管理者可同时影响企业风险和企业价值的条件下,构建基于股权互换避险交易的管理者激励薪酬动态博弈模型.结果表明,当管理者投入产出效率高于某临界值时,互换避险的存在不会降低激励合约的强度;否则激励合约强度的减弱程度随...