Negative reciprocity and its relation to anger-like emotions in identity-homogeneous and -heterogeneous groups

Several studies have shown that social identity fosters the provision of public goods and enhances the willingness to reciprocate the cooperative behavior of group members. Nonetheless, the question of how social identity affects negative reciprocity in identity-homogeneous and -heterogeneous groups has only received little attention. Consequently, we seek to fill this gap by examining whether social identity affects individuals’ willingness to sanction deviating group members in a public good context. Moreover, we devote particular attention to the role of anger-like emotions in negative reciprocity. To test our hypotheses, we employ one-shot public good games in a strategy method with punishment opportunity and induced social identity. Our results indicate that members of identity-homogeneous groups are prone to reveal less negative reciprocity than identity-heterogeneous groups when they face contributions smaller than their own. We also find that anger-like emotions much more strongly influence punishment behavior when individuals are matched with members of different identities than in identity-homogenous groups. These findings contribute to an increased understanding of the nature of social identity and its impact on reciprocity, improving economists’ ability to predict behavior while taking emotions into consideration.     

Spouse Preferences of Never-Married,Divorced, and Cohabiting Americans

This research demonstrates that mate-selection preferences are patterned according to men's and women's prior experiences with marriage, divorce, and cohabitation. Compared with men and women who have never divorced or cohabited, men and women who have experienced one or both of these events express consistently different references in their willingness to marry others with particular personal traits. The research was based on a national sample of 2,536 unmarried individuals interviewed as part of the National Survey of Families and Households. The existence of patterned differences in mate-selection preferences is interpreted to imply the possible existence of different "marriage markets" for those who have and have not experienced divorce or cohabitation. The implications of the existence of such varied marriage markets for the cultural meaning of marriage are explored.     

Putting social preferences to work: Can revealed preferences predict real effort provision?

This paper presents a model of real effort provision in conjunction with rational social preference theory to predict how individuals exert effort to replace an exogenously determined “state of the world” with a preferred social outcome. Binary dictator games and real effort tasks are used to examine whether individuals exert effort in a manner that is consistent with their revealed preferences. The analysis of controlled laboratory experiments suggest that while individuals’ effort provisions are generally consistent with the theory, those who reveal relatively pro-social preferences fail to procure their “preferred” outcomes too frequently when the state of the world is highly inequitable in their favor. Consideration is given to alternative theories, namely ego depletion and cognitive dissonance, as potential explanations of social outcomes. There is evidence to suggest that dictators, on average, experience ego depletion which leads to a reduction in pro-social behavior through time.     

Procedural Control of the Bureaucracy, Peer Review, and Epistemic Drift

Regulatory peer review—in which independent scientistscomment on the technical underpinnings of proposed regulations—isa recently pursued form of political control of the bureaucracy.This article situates regulatory peer review in the contextof both the history of technical advice to government and theprincipal-agent perspective often used to explain the presenceof administrative procedures. Much of the academic discussionof attempts to influence bureaucratic decision making has utilizedprincipal-agent theory. We introduce two novel concepts to accommodateregulatory peer review into the principal-agent framework. Thefirst is "technocracy" where the preferences of technical expertsdisplace public preferences. The second is "epistemic drift,"a change in embodied knowledge that contributes to departuresfrom the policy intentions of an enacting coalition of policymakers. In addition to introducing these concepts, we arguethat regulatory peer review is more complex than other administrativeprocedures and that its efficacy critically depends on the detailsof its implementation. We hypothesize that regulatory peer reviewwill cause nongovernmental participants in regulatory conflictsto devote more effort to creating research and other epistemicresources. But we also hypothesize that, just as courts havebecome more politicized with their role in regulatory policy,peer review and regulatory science will become increasinglypoliticized as well.     

Does Mate Scarcity Affect Marital Choice and Family Formation? The Evidence for New and Classic Formulations of Sex Ratio Theory

Guttentag and Secord pioneered research on the social consequences of imbalances in the numbers of men and women—the sex ratio. Since then, sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, and even biologists have investigated its effects on marriage and reproduction. I review the three prevailing theories to explain why sex ratio should affect marriage and reproduction, along with the evidence that it does. I also review the growing evidence that sex ratio imbalances are associated with mate choice. Sex ratio reveals contradictory relationships with mate preferences and actual partner choice, however, raising a conundrum for future research. Overall, there is strong experimental and correlational support for the patterns of marriage and reproduction associated with sex ratio. What emerges is the necessity for future research to distinguish among the perspectives to explain why.     

Axiomatic foundations for fairness-motivated preferences

Much work in social choice theory takes individual preferences as uninvestigated inputs into aggregation functions designed to reflect considerations of fairness. Advances in experimental and behavioural economics show that fairness can also be an important motivation in the preferences of individuals themselves. A proper characterisation of how fairness concerns enter such preferences can enrich the informational basis of many social choice exercises. This paper proposes axiomatic foundations for individual fairness-motivated preferences that cover most of the models developed to rationalise observed behaviour in experiments. These models fall into two classes: Outcome-based models, which see preferences as defined only over distributive outcomes, and context-dependent models, which allow rankings over distributive outcomes to change systematically with non-outcome factors. I accommodate outcome-based and context-sensitive fairness concerns by modelling fairness-motivated preferences as a reference-dependent preference structure. I first present a set of axioms and two theorems that generate commonly used outcome-based models as special cases. I then generalise the axiomatic basis to allow for reference-dependence, and derive a simple functional form in which the weight on each person’s payoff depends on a reference vector of how much each person deserves.     

Relationship Effort,Satisfaction, and Stability: Differences Across Union Type

Relationship satisfaction and stability are two commonly studied outcomes in marriage and family research. Majority of studies address socio demographic variability and differences across union type in these outcomes. We extend this literature by addressing how the amount of effort one puts into their relationship is associated with stability and satisfaction. Specifically, we focus on how effort impacts these measures of quality in four union types: premarital cohabitation, first marriage, post‐divorce cohabitation, and second marriage following divorce. Furthermore, we make union type comparisons in the strength of effort's association with satisfaction and stability. Using data from 8,006 respondents in the Relationship Evaluation Survey, our results show that effort was strongly and positively associated with satisfaction and stability in all four unions. Although effort is more strongly associated with satisfaction in first marriage than cohabiting relationships, no union type differences in the role of effort on stability were observed. Clinical and research implications of these findings are discussed.     

Intertemporal decision making with present biased preferences

I study the behavior of individuals with present biased preferences who are involved in costly, long-run projects. By using generic cost and reward functions, I characterize the behaviors of the sophisticated, partial naive and naive types. It is shown that there may arise cases where naives needlessly put effort on projects they never complete. Moreover, in endogenous total cost projects, the naive types always end up completing projects of lesser quality than originally intended. By introducing a bonus motive, it is shown that agents with higher self-control problems should be given a higher bonus to prevent inefficient procrastination. I, then, characterize the behavior of partially naives who potentially learn self-preferences. It is found that without learning self-preferences, partial naives behave either like sophisticates or naives depending on the level of naivete; with learning, if the learning pace is fast enough, procrastination until the deadline does not occur.     

A SEMI-PARAMETRIC MODEL FOR ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH PLAN MARKETS

Two sources of asymmetric information in health markets are adverse selection where only individuals know their illness probability and their preventive effort to reduce illness probabilities. This effort is not observed by insurers, and thus individuals cannot be adequately compensated for their effort. I investigate whether asymmetric information plays a role in health care markets through a semi-parametric model that allows both adverse selection and preventive effort. I find that preventive effort plays a role in illness probabilities. If the United States implements universal health coverage, the currently uninsured population will exert less preventive effort, and their illness probabilities will increase. (JEL I11 , C14 )     

Status or Access? The Impact of Marriage on Lesbian,Gay, Bisexual,and Queer Community Change

Drawing on interview and survey research with 116 married and unmarried lesbian, gay, bisexual, and queer (LGBQ) individuals, this study offers the first systematic data on the relationship between legal marriage and LGBQ community life. The author distinguishes between marital status—being married—and marital access—gaining access to the institution of marriage—as distinct drivers of community change. In contrast to research with heterosexuals, the findings suggest that marital access plays a primary role in LGBQ community change. The different life course trajectories of LGBQ people and their prior experiences of social exclusion alter the relationship between marriage and community. The findings push family scholarship beyond a one‐model‐fits‐all approach to understanding the impact of marriage on community engagement. Taken together, they expand literature on marriage as greedy, the deinstitutionalization of marriage, and marriage and social inclusion as well as offer insights into how LGBQ people understand and enact marriage.     

Letters to Louis: Marital Dissolution Through the Social Construction of Lived Experience

This article examines the author's narrative within letters written to her husband over a span of several years. I examine how a marriage dissolves from the inside out, from the perspective of the lived experience of one member of the marriage. The primary research focus is how individuals living within troubled marriages construct their own marriage. Although we know much about what predicts divorce, little research considers the social construction of marriage from the perspective of the person living within that marriage. Drawing on symbolic interactionism, this autoethnographic analysis of my letters to Louis reveals an insider's view of how a marriage dissolves. Gottman's Oral History Interview coding is used as a tool of analysis throughout.     

Parental Marital Status and Young Adult Offspring's Attitudes About Marriage and Divorce

This study examined attitudes toward marriage and divorce among single young adults. Data were gathered from 310 traditional-aged college students regarding their perceived level of commitment to a future marriage and their likelihood to divorce should such a marriage become unsatisfying. Study results indicated that individuals who have experienced parental divorce reported lower levels of marital commitment and more prodivorce attitudes than their peers from intact families. These results suggest that attitudes toward marriage and divorce are partially preformulated beliefs individuals carry into their relationships. Implications for professionals working with young adults are discussed, along with directions for future research.     

What,exactly, are we measuring? Examining heteronormativity in relation to same‐gender marriage

Focusing on the relationship between same‐gender marriage and heteronormativity, my objectives in this paper are twofold. First, I examine the scholarly conversation examining same‐gender marriage as a practice that either reinforces or challenges heteronormativity. I agree with the arguments posed by contemporary sociologists that reducing same‐gender marriage to being purely supportive or disruptive of heteronormativity oversimplifies the issue. Next, I critically examine how challenges to heteronormativity are being measured in the context of same‐gender marriage. I argue that future scholarship would benefit from more thoroughly considering how challenges to heteronormativity manifest in different forms and impact the social system of heteronormativity in distinct and varied ways.     

A pedagogical proof of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

In this note I consider a simple proof of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (Arrow 1963). I start with the case of three individuals who have preferences on three alternatives. In this special case there are 13³=2197 possible combinations of the three individuals' rational preferences. However, by considering the subset of linear preferences, and employing the full strength of the IIA axiom, I reduce the number of cases necessary to completely describe the SWF to a small number, allowing an elementary proof suitable for most undergraduate students.  This special case conveys the nature of Arrow's result. It is well known that the restriction to three options is not really limiting (any larger set of alternatives can be broken down into triplets, and any inconsistency within a triplet implies an inconsistency on the larger set). However, the general case of n≥3 individuals can be easily considered in this framework, by building on the proof of the simpler case. I hope that a motivated student, having mastered the simple case of three individuals, will find this extension approachable and rewarding.  This approach can be compared with the traditional simple proofs of Barberà (1980); Blau (1972); Denicolò (1996); Fishburn (1970); Kelly (1988); Mueller (1989); Riker and Ordeshook (1973); Sen (1979, 1986); Suzumura (1988), and Taylor (1995). Received: 5 January 1999/Accepted: 10 December 1999     

Planning Until Death Do Us Part: Partnership Status and Financial Planning Horizon

Positive economic outcomes of marriage are often explained with a higher future orientation of married individuals who are assumed to plan their finances for a longer period than the nonmarried. Using data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey (2001–2014; N = 4,819 individuals), the authors provide the first longitudinal test of whether individuals change their financial planning horizons when they change their partnership status using fixed and random effects regressions. Results show that the financial planning horizon increases as individuals enter cohabitation. No further changes in financial planning horizons are found when they transition into marriage. Changes in horizons are similar for women and men. These results indicate that longer financial planning horizons and marriage are likely outcomes of couples' long‐term commitment, which develops during cohabitation. The symbolic and legal institution of marriage is not additionally associated with individual financial planning as a dimension of future orientation.     

Interpersonal risk assessment and social preferences: An experimental study

We investigate interpersonal risk assessment, that is how individuals use either their own or their partner’s monetary resources to offset the risk that affects them or their partner. The observed behavior is in line with the predictions of a simple piecewise linear model of social preferences. Overall, individuals opportunistically draw from others’ resources to offset risk; furthermore, they display higher levels of risk aversion when delegated to choose for others rather than when choosing for themselves. However, different social types differ in the assessment of interpersonal risk. Considering our results, we suggest that studies dealing with interpersonal risk assessment should not only focus on risk preferences, but also take into account social preferences.     

Placement preferences among children living in foster or kinship care: A cluster analysis

This research provides a longitudinal assessment regarding children's placement preferences, distinguishing between what children prefer to be permanent home situations and what children expect will be permanent situations. Cluster analysis was used in an effort to classify the responses of 1313 children, ages 6–14, in foster or kinship care, over a three year period, regarding placement preferences. Results of the cluster analyses indicate classification in the following four groups of permanency preferences: 1) I don't want to be here/going home; 2) I can stay here, but I don't want to/going home; 3) I can stay here and I want to, but no adoption; and 4) I can stay here and I want to, with adoption. Findings indicate that across waves of data collection, children express a sense of belonging in their foster homes. Older children were more agreeable to their current placements as long as there was no option of permanency/adoption. Also, White children were more likely to prefer and expect to go home. This research provides great utility in evaluative efforts that include listening to the voices of the children by encouraging their participation in case planning and service evaluation.     

Union Formation and Depression: Selection and Relationship Effects

Many studies have established that married people fare better than their never‐married counterparts in terms of psychological well‐being. It is still unclear, however, whether this advantage is due primarily to beneficial effects of marriage or to the selection of psychologically healthier individuals into marriage. This study employs data on young adults from both waves of the National Survey of Families and Households to test hypotheses based on both selection (N= 878) and relationship (N= 722) effects. Further, we differentiate union formation into cohabitation and marriage with and without prior cohabitation. Results indicate no evidence of selection of less depressed persons into either marriage or cohabitation, but a negative effect of entry into marriage on depression, particularly when marriage was not preceded by cohabitation.     

Do what (you think) the rich will do: Inequality and belief heterogeneity in public good provision

Beliefs about others’ cooperativeness are among the strongest determinants of cooperative behaviours. Beliefs about different others, however, are not necessarily uniform, nor necessarily related to past behaviours: Different expectations about different others might solely originate from differences in observed individual characteristics. Finally, not all such beliefs need drive conditional behaviour alike.In a public good game with heterogeneous endowments, I find that rich subjects are expected to cooperate more by both rich and poor individuals, and that behaviours of both the rich and poor correlate only with beliefs about the rich. An intervention aimed at increasing perceived group cohesion has no impact on beliefs and mixed impacts on cooperation. I conclude with implications for information dissemination about uncooperative behaviour in the mass media and avenues for further research.     

Will the possibility of divorce discourage marriage-specific investment?

Becker et al. (1977) argue that the possibility of divorce discourages the accumulation of marriage-specific capital. Their argument has been confirmed by empirical studies that assume labor supply and marriage-specific investment are negatively related. We argue that since it is possible for individuals to increase marriage-specific investment without changing labor supply simultaneously, the conventional approach using the change in labor supply to infer to the change in marriage-specific investment may lead to a biased conclusion. This paper incorporates dynamic and stochastic optimal control approach into a material-spiritual goods framework. The model disentangles marriage-specific investment form other marital effort, and demonstrates that only part of effort devoted to marriage is marriage-specific investment and only the individuals who have spiritual and emotional needs make marriage-specific investment. Marriage-specific investment is highest in marriages where individuals behave altruistically, lower in marriages where individuals behave selfishly, and zero in marriages where spiritual goods are not valued. The model also implies a result that is contrary to conventional wisdom: the possibility of divorce does not always discourage, and may even encourage, marriage-specific investment. Since the impact of the divorce risk on marriage-specific investment depends on three factors: time preference, the level of the risk and the correlation between the divorce risk and marriage-specific capital, it could be optimal for an individual to invest more under uncertainty than in the corresponding risk-free world if he or she can well understand and predict his or her partner's spiritual needs. The key factor in the decision process is the confidence in predicting the partner's spiritual needs.