Understanding population projections

This is a general introduction to how population projections are made and used for the consumers of this information. Population projections are computations of what future trends in fertility, mortality and migration of a population might be given set assumptions. They are not actual forecasts. Projections are used by planners in government and business for a clearer understanding of social changes. How to prepare projections, obtain base data, select starting and future levels of rates, variant series, and the mathematics involved are discussed. Assumptions must be carefully checked and chosen, since reliability of the projections depends on assumptions. There are 3 rules of thumb for reliability: 1) the shorter the projection period, the more reliable the projection; 2) the larger the geographic area being projected the more reliable the projection; 3) the lower the current fertility and the higher the current life expectancy, the lower the projection's margin of error. Major sources of data and projections on world, regional, national, subnational, and local areas and difficulties with data for developing countries are discussed. Available microcomputer programs for IBM PC compatible machines are listed and described briefly.     

Aids and population growth in sub-Saharan Africa: Assessing the sensitivity of projections

Despite different models to project the course of the AIDS pandemic and a scarcity of data to provide standard input parameters for those models, a limited consensus emerges from distinct sets of population projections. In sub-Saharan Africa, population growth rates are projected to remain positive in spite of the pandemic over the next few decades. To investigate this conclusion, alternative projections of an HIV/AIDS epidemic and its related mortality are first produced from different sets of input parameters and assumptions. Their incorporation into the population projections of a fast-growing country illustrates the robustness of projected population growth rates under very different scenarios of the future epidemic but with the common assumption that it will not affect the mortality of the uninfected population, fertility nor migration. This paper then shows that the projected growth rates are much less robust when interactions between the epidemic and the demographic regime are allowed and identifies several potential mechanisms for such interactions. In particular, it suggests that improving our confidence in the medium-term projections of the demographic impact of AIDS in the region requires less a refinement of the projections of the epidemic than a better understanding of its impact on the timing of the postulated fertility decline.     

Replacement Migration: A Questionable Tactic for Delaying the Inevitable Effects of Fertility Transition

This article critiques a recent U.N. Population Division report, Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations? The report explores the use of increased immigration to bolster future population size and change age distribution patterns in a group of developed countries. Fertility rate declines and lengthening life expectancies associated with demographic transition inevitably yield an aging population and a falling potential support ratio (PSR), a situation which some demographers and economists view with alarm. As the U.N. report itself suggests, replacement migration can only temporarily delay population aging and decline. These issues are ultimately better addressed through changes in retirement policy. Population projections should be used only with great caution in designing long-term demographic policy. In particular, some assumptions used to make the U.N. projections are questionable, and even minor changes in those assumptions would yield substantially different policy conclusions. Replacement migration also raises difficult environmental questions by moving large numbers of people from low to high per-capita consumption nations. Modest population decline, particularly in more developed countries, may have significant local and global environmental and climate policy benefits.

     

Comparative empirical evaluations of internal migration models in subnational population projections

While population forecasters place considerable emphasis on the selection of appropriate migration assumptions, surprisingly little attention has been given to the effects on projection outcomes of the way internal migration is handled within population projection models. This paper compares population projections for Australia's states and territories prepared using ten different internal migration models but with identical assumptions for fertility, mortality and international migration and with the internal migration model parameters held constant. It is shown that the choice of migration model generates large differences in total population, geographical distribution and age-sex composition. It is argued that model choice should be guided by balancing model reality with practical utility and model performance is examined against these criteria. Of the ten models evaluated the authors argue that the migration pool, biregional, and biregional with net constraints models offer a good compromise between conceptual rigour and practicality. If the projected origin-destination flows are required then one of the versions of the standard multiregional model with reduced data inputs is preferred. The large variation in projection outputs points to the need for a better understanding of the spatio-temporal structure of migration in Australia.     

Cohort Replacement and Homeostasis in World Population, 1950–2100

Using a simple empirical approach, we analyze world and regional‐level cohort replacement as determined by the key components of population dynamics, i.e. fertility, survival, and migration, for 1950–2010, using UN data. We define two kinds of homeostatic relationships among these components: fertility responses to mortality change (type I) and migration responses to changes in net reproduction (type II), and show that both can be observed to some degree in this period. We examine the extent of cohort replacement embodied in the medium‐variant UN population projections over 2010–2100 and consider how the international migration assumptions made in such projections would be affected by a homeostatic perspective.     

Population projections: states, 1995 - 2025

All states will have more people in the future, especially in the south and west, while population aging occurs as the baby boomers age. This report identifies population changes projected to affect the US's 50 states and District of Columbia during 1995-2015. Basic assumptions for state population projections are presented with regard to population, births, deaths, net international migration, and net internal migration. The methodology used to produce the report is also described. Total population and net change is presented in tabular format for each state over the period. These data are used as the basic input to many federal, state, and local projection models which produce detailed statistics on education, economic factors, labor force, health care, voting, and other subjects. State differentials in fertility and mortality are also projected to widen, reflecting the concentration of race and ethnic groups with high fertility in some states and differential migration patterns.     

Evaluating multi-regional population projections with Taylor’s law of mean–variance scaling and its generalisation

Organisations that develop demographic projections usually propose several variants with different demographic assumptions. Existing criteria for selecting a preferred projection are mostly based on retrospective comparisons with observations, and a prospective approach is needed. In this work, we use the mean–variance scaling (spatial variance function) of human population densities to select among alternative demographic projections. We test against observed and projected Norwegian county population density using two spatial variance functions, Taylor’s law (TL) and its quadratic generalisation, and compare each function’s parameters between the historical data and six demographic projections, at two different time scales (long term: 1978–2010 vs. 2011–2040; and short term: 2006–2010 vs. 2011–2015). We find that short-term projections selected by TL agree more accurately than the other projections with the recent county density data and reflect the current high rate of international migration to and from Norway. The variance function method implemented here provides an empirical test of an ex ante approach to evaluating short-term human population projections.     

Comparison of microcomputer programs for making population projections: an update

"There are many programs for making population projections now available for use with microcomputers. This article reviews six of approximately 15 microcomputer population projection programs. Each program is compared to a standard set of criteria relating to such items as hardware and software requirements, input data requirements and specification of assumptions, methodology and documentation, and summary output indicators. Numerical results from projections of six test data sets reflecting different assumptions about mortality, fertility, and migration are compared. Qualitative comments are included for describing special features and for making an overall assessment of each program." (SUMMARY IN FRE)     

Comparison of microcomputer programs for making population projections: An update

There are many programs for making population projections now available for use with microcomputers. This article reviews six of approximately 15 microcomputer population projection programs. Each program is compared to a standard set of criteria relating to such items as hardware and software requirements, input data requirements and specification of assumptions, methodology and documentation, and summary output indicators. Numerical results from projections of six test data sets reflecting different assumptions about mortality, fertility, and migration are compared. Qualitative comments are included for describing special features and for making an overall assessment of each program.     

Ethnic population projections for the UK, 2001–2051

This paper reports on projections of the United Kingdom’s ethnic group populations for 2001–2051. For the years 2001–2007 we estimate fertility rates, survival probabilities, internal migration probabilities and international migration flows for 16 ethnic groups and 355 UK areas. We make assumptions about future component rates, probabilities and flows and feed these into our projection model. This model is a cohort-component model specified for single years of age to 100+. To handle this large state space, we employed a bi-regional model. We implement four projections: (1) a benchmark projection that uses the component inputs for 2001; (2) a trend projection where assumptions beyond 2007 are adjusted to those in the UK 2008-based National Population Projections (NPP); (3) a projection that modifies the NPP assumptions and (4) a projection that uses a different emigration assumption. The projected UK population ranges between a low of 63 millions in 2051 under the first projection to a high of 79 million in the third projection. Under all projections ethnic composition continues to change: the White British, White Irish and Black Caribbean groups experience the slowest growth and lose population share; the Other White and Mixed groups to experience relative increases in share; South Asian groups grow strongly as do the Chinese and Other Ethnic groups. The ethnic minority share of the population increases from 13% (2001) to 25% in the trend projection but to only 20% under our modified emigration projection. However, what is certain is that the UK can look forward to be becoming a more diverse nation by mid-century.     

The United Nations on World Population in 2300

The Population Division of the United Nations biennially issues detailed population estimates and projections covering the period 1950–2050. The most recent revision of these estimates and projections, the 2002 assessment, was released in February 2003. At irregular intervals, the Population Division also publishes long‐range projections. The most recent of these, covering the period up to 2150, was issued in 2000, based on the 1998 assessment. On 9 December 2003, the Population Division released the preliminary report on a new set of long‐range projections, dovetailing with the 2002 assessment, that extend over a much longer time span: up to 2300 ( http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/longrange2/longrange2.htm ). Unlike previous long‐range projections, which, apart from China and In‐dia, were prepared for large regional groupings only, the new projections are elaborated separately for 192 countries. Given the enormous uncertainties of the character of demographic trends over such an extended period, the information content of these projections is somewhat elusive. However, they are expected to be used to provide the demographic input for long‐range models of global climate change. Long‐range population projections also serve to demonstrate the unsustainability of certain seemingly plausible assumptions as to the future course of particular demographic parameters. In the present case, for example, the high‐fertility projection, reflecting a sustained total fertility rate at the relatively modest level of 2.35, by 2300 would yield a population of some 32 billion in the countries now classified as less developed. Or, in a yet more extreme exercise 0/reductio ad absurdum, maintaining constant fertility at present rates would result in a population size of some 120 trillion in the countries now classified as least developed. Apart from the “high fertility” and “constant fertility” models just cited, the projections are calculated for three additional instructive variants: “low fertility,”“medium fertility,” and “zero growth.” Underlying each of the five variants is a single assumption on mortality change: expectation of life at birth creeping up, country‐by‐country, to a 2300 level ranging between 88 and 106 years. International migration is set at zero throughout the period 2050‐2300 in each variant. Thus the projections are unabashedly stylized and surprise‐free, providing a simple demonstration of the consequences, in terms of population size and age structure, of clearly stated assumptions on the future course of demographic variables. Reproduced below is the Executive Summary of the preliminary report on the UN long‐range projections presented to a UN technical working group on long‐range projections at its December 2003 meeting in New York and slightly revised afterward. A full final report on this topic by the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat will be published later in 2004.     

Long‐Range Population Projections Made Simple

Recent developments in mathematical demography offer a new, simple means of producing long‐range population projections. The well‐known extant such projections, produced by the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, rely on elaborate cohort‐component projection methods that require a large number of detailed assumptions and are difficult to replicate. Building upon recent results in the formal demography of nonstable populations, the authors show that analytic methods produce estimates of future population size very similar to those obtained through traditional methods. Simplicity is a virtue in making projections, allowing sensitivity tests of assumptions and avoiding the misleading impression of precision associated with more complicated methods. Cohort‐component methods should still be used for short‐ and medium‐term forecasts and projections. For the long term, however, analytic methods should supplement or even replace traditional projections.     

Population Futures for the Next Three Hundred Years: Soft Landing or Surprises to Come?

The long‐range population projections of the United Nations issued in 2003 span three centuries and are elaborated for all countries of the world according to the present‐day political map. This note discusses the merits and limitations of this ambitious enterprise. The numerical implications of various contrasting assumptions concerning fertility, in combination with single hypothetical future schedules of mortality and international migration, provide a valuable frame of reference for contemplating possible long‐range demographic trajectories. The dominant suggestion of these projections of a surprise‐free convergence to a stationary or slowly declining population is, however, questionable: with respect to global numbers, relative magnitudes of the constituting units of the global total, and the time pattern of change the demographic future is likely to be far less orderly.     

Lessons from stochastic small-area population projections: the case of Waikato subregions in New Zealand

Subnational population projections in New Zealand by means of the conventional deterministic cohort-component method have had a tendency to be conservative: underprojecting fast-growing populations and overprojecting slow-growing ones. In this paper we use a stochastic population projection method as an alternative. We generate population projections for five demographically distinct administrative areas within the Waikato region of New Zealand: Hamilton City, Franklin District, Thames-Coromandel District, Otorohanga District and South Waikato District. The results are compared to official subnational deterministic projections. The accuracy of subnational population projections in New Zealand is strongly affected by the instability of migration as a component of population change. Differently from the standard cohort-component method, in which net migration levels are projected, the key parameters of our method are age-gender-area specific probabilistic net migration rates. Generally, the identified and modelled uncertainty makes the traditional ‘mid-range’ scenario of subnational deterministic projections of limited use for policy analysis or planning beyond a relatively short projection horizon. We find that the projected range of rates of population growth is wider for smaller regions and/or regions more strongly affected by net migration. Directions for further development of the methodology are suggested.     

Accounting for migration in cohort-component projections of state and local populations

Migration is the most difficult component of state and local population growth to forecast accurately because it is more volatile than either births or deaths, and subject to much larger fluctuations within a short period of time. In addition, migration rates can be based on several different measures of migration and the base population. The choice of the appropriate base population has received little attention from demographic researchers, but can have a tremendous impact on population projections. In this article, I develop three different models for projecting migration, each using a different denominator for migration rates. Population projections for ten states are made, using identical data and cohort component techniques, except for the different formulations of migration rates. Differences among the three sets of projections are noted, and conclusions are drawn regarding their usefulness as forecasts of population growth.     

Some fundamental problems in population projection]

When family planning work in China developed, during the 1970's, the work of population projection also expanded. Population projections were done for China and its regions beginning in 1974 and remains a relatively new activity. Some question its validity, while others speculate about its methods and beleive only higher mathematics can be used, but this is all due to a lack of understanding of the nature of population forecasting. It is possible to predict population because if a current population situation and its changes are known, population of a particular future period can be projected e.g. for each year that is lived, a person will be 1 year older. And, population changes are primarily based on changes in births and deaths. These changes in turn are influenced by social and economic factors. Population projection is basically a forecasting of a certain period's total population, age and sex structure, the number of births and deaths, and migration. Different methods and formulas can be used to measure different population indicators, but all methods utilize comparisons. There are basically 2 methods for projecting total population: 1) the "direct method" regards total population as a quantity that itself changes and 2) the "separate factor method" breaks down total population into births, deaths, and migration. In the past, population projection has focused on the natural development of population which can be called "uncontrolled" because it makes "passive measurements" of possible population developments. In China, however, population projection is "controlled." Although it too measures future population developments, China's projections are not based on natural developments, but on definite population policies and estimates of results of family planning efforts.     

New household projections for the united states

This paper reviews the methods used to prepare the new household projections for the United States that were recently issued by the Bureau of the Census and examines the effect on the resulting number of households of the assumptions made about future marriages and future proportions of household heads in the population.One population projection series was used, since all series are identical for the adult population. Marriage assumptions were generated by assuming various outcomes of the marriage squeeze (defined as the excess of females relative to the number of males in the main ages at marriage in the next few years). Assumptions about proportions of household heads were generated by assuming, in varying degrees, continuation of recent trends in these proportions.Projected changes in marriage and in the proportions of household heads in the population account for one-fourth to one-third of the projected increase in the number of households; the remaining increase is attributable to projected changes in the size and structure of the adult population. Varying the assumed proportions of household heads produces greater differences in the projected total number of households than does varying the marriage assumptions used here. Nevertheless, the various possible outcomes of the marriage squeeze, as represented by the assumptions used, produce significantly different projections of increases in the number of young husband-wife households.The most striking finding is that by 1985, proportions of household heads among the population not "married, spouse present" may well rise to such a level that over the long term, the smaller the number of persons who marry, the larger will be the number of households.     

Demographic scenarios by age,sex and education corresponding to the SSP narratives

In this paper, we translate the five narratives as defined by the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) research community into five alternative demographic scenarios using projections by age, sex and level of education for 171 countries up to 2100. The scenarios represent a significant step beyond past population scenarios used in the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change context, which considered only population size. The definitions of the medium assumptions about future fertility, mortality, migration and education trends are taken from a major new projections effort by the Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital, while the assumptions for all the other scenarios were defined in interactions with other groups in the SSP community. Since a full data base with all country-specific results is available online, this paper can only highlight selected results.     

Population Scenarios Based on Probabilistic Projections: An Application for the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment

Probabilistic population forecasts offer a number of advantages to users. However, in some cases population is one component of a larger analysis that may take a different approach to uncertainty. For example, integrated assessments of environmental issues such as climate change or ecosystem degradation have typically used a small number of alternative scenarios to explore uncertainty in future environmental outcomes. In such cases, population projections that are provided only as probability distributions are difficult to use. I present a method of employing probabilistic population projections to derive individual, deterministic projections that can be used within scenarios for integrated assessments. The principal advantages of this approach are that (1) it provides a less ad hoc way of defining deterministic projections intended to be consistent with more comprehensive scenarios that describe, among other things, future socio-economic developments; (2) it provides more flexibility in specifying input assumptions for deterministic projections as compared to choosing off-the-shelf projections, allowing population assumptions to be tailored to the scenario; and (3) it provides a quantitative assessment of the uncertainty associated with any given deterministic projection. I describe the application of the method to the development of population projections used in integrated scenarios for the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, an international scientific effort to assess the current conditions of and future outlook for global ecosystem goods and services. Results show that the MA scenarios are each consistent with a relatively wide range of demographic outcomes. For some scenarios, ranges of plausible outcomes in some regions overlap substantially, indicating that particular population projections could be consistent with more than one scenario. In other cases, uncertainty ranges for different scenarios are distinct, indicating that a projection consistent with one scenario is unlikely to be also consistent with another. Comparing variances of the conditional projections also provides insight into how much different storylines constrain future demographic developments. The development of the MA projections points to important areas of future research on correlations among demographic rates and on uncertainty across scales. It also serves as an illustration of how probabilistic and alternative scenario-based approaches to uncertainty can be combined within a single integrated analysis.This revised version was published online in April 2005 with corrections to figures 1-3.