Demographic aspects of fertility in Thailand

Abstract Data from a national rural and urban sample survey are analysed in order to examine various demographic aspects of fertility in Thailand. Marital fertility rates found for Thailand are among the highest in Asia. Particularly noteworthy is the persistence of high fertility at older ages of childbearing for rural women. Cumulative fertility shows a pronounced relationship with age at marriage and current marital status. Women who marry at an older age or who experience disruption of their marriages are clearly more likely to have fewer children ever born. Differences in both current and cumulative fertility are strongly associated with residence. Rural women who constitute the vast majority of Thai women, experience the highest fertility, Bangkok-Thonburi women experience the lowest fertility and provincial urban women are characterized by an intermediate fertility level which is closer, however, to the experience of their counterparts in the capital than in the countryside. Rural-urban fertility differences are mitigated but by no means eliminated by differences in infant mortality. In both rural and urban areas a positive association between cumulative fertility and infant morality is evident. Breast-feeding, commonly practised for extended periods-among both rural and urban Thai women, undoubtedly serves to some extent as an intervening variable in this relationship. A comparison of current fertility with cumulative fertility strongly suggests that a decline in marital fertility has been under way recently among urban women, especially those residing in the capital, but not at all among rural women. Although it seems safe to assume that the urban fertility decline results in large part from an increasing use of contraception among urban women, those still in the reproductive ages who were using or had previously used birth control were characterized by higher cumulative fertility than women who had never practised contraception. Evidently couples resort to family planning only late in the family building process after they have already achieved or exceeded the number of children they wish to have.     

Exploring the influence of precipitation on fertility timing in rural Mexico

The influence of environmental conditions on fertility decision-making is becoming increasingly important in the context of contemporary climate change. Deforestation, land availability, and environmental quality may shape decisions regarding family size, particularly in regions with high levels of natural resource dependence. This research examines the relationship between fertility timing and precipitation in rural Mexico by linking household event-history data to municipal-level precipitation measures. Even after controlling for other factors that impact fertility, in historically dry areas, households are more likely to have a child following above average precipitation, using both 1-year and 2-year prior precipitation measures. Conversely, the relationship between precipitation and fertility timing in humid areas of rural Mexico is not statistically significant. Overall, the findings reveal that the fertility-environment connection is highly context-specific and differs across climate zones in Mexico, but that fertility timing is associated with recent rainfall patterns for households in dry areas of rural Mexico.     

Fertility decline in Scotland, England and Wales, and Ireland: comparisons from the 1911 census of fertility

Data on family size by year of marriage, age at marriage, and duration of marriage, from the 1911 Fertility Census, are compared between Scotland, England and Wales, Irish county boroughs, and the rest of Ireland. While means show significant inter-country differences, from the 1880s marked similarities are found across all the countries in the pattern of fertility decline, strongly suggesting significant fertility limitation in rural Ireland well before 1911. Noting the implications for the use of rural Ireland as a natural fertility population, the data are instead compared with the Coale-Trussell and Hinde-Woods schedules. The former provides more plausible results, which imply strong period rather than cohort effects in the fertility decline. Except in rural Ireland, little evidence is found for significant fertility limitation early in marriage among younger marrying couples, but many older marrying couples appear to have stopped childbearing at very low parities from an early date.     

The Effect of Urbanization on China’s Fertility

The relationship between urbanization and fertility decline is known to be inverse in developed countries. However, the nature of this relationship in developing countries that already have relatively low fertilities is not well-understood. This study aims to illustrate how much urbanization contributed to China’s fertility decline between 1982 and 2008 and forecasts how much it can contribute to future reductions in fertility. The study examines changes in the total fertility rate (TFR) at both the national and provincial levels, given regional differences in the urbanization rate. The results show that changes in rural fertility behavior accounted for most of the decline in the national TFR between 1982 and 2008. This finding suggests that official birth control policies were instrumental in curbing China’s population growth. However, urbanization was responsible for about 22% of the decrease in TFR during this period, and its effect was especially important during the latter years (2001–2008). In most provinces, urbanization associated with a decline in provincial-level fertility. The forecasts indicate that urbanization will become the primary factor behind future declines in national fertility. Given the negative effect of urbanization on the TFR, it is possible to relax the one-child policy without having adverse implications for population growth.     

Measuring Community Economic Resilience in Australia: Estimates of Recent Levels and Trends

We measure changes in community economic resilience (CER) across geo-locations in Australia between 2006 and 2011, a time span characterised by major natural and economic shocks. We build an index of potential CER that captures communities’ stocks of human, social, natural, physical and financial capitals, levels of economic diversity and accessibility to service centres. Using Census data and the ARIA index, we resort to principal component analysis to generate CER indexes at statistical area level 1, which is our community proxy. Our analysis of index values provides a number of useful insights. First, there was a statistically significant improvement over time in the overall CER index in all states and regions. Second, our CER measures improved at a different pace across regions and states while their rank remained mostly unchanged. Third, CER improved over time in social and physical capital and accessibility terms, but declined in human, natural, financial capital and diversity terms. Fourth, communities with a high economic diversity level reported higher capital stock except for natural capital, and communities with a low accessibility level had lower capital stock except for social and natural capital. Finally, CER has a long-term positive association with household income.     

Women's lives and rapid fertility decline: Some lessons from Bangladesh and Egypt

The recent experiences of Bangladesh and Egypt show thatfertility can sustain impressive declines even when women's lives remain severely constrained.Since the late 1970s, rural and urban areas in both countries have experienced steadydeclines in fertility, with recent declines in rural Bangladesh similar to those in ruralEgypt, despite lower levels of development and higher rates of poverty. This paperprovides an in-depth exploration of the demographic transition in these two societies andaddresses three basic questions: (1) have measurable improvements in economic opportunities forwomen been a factor in the fertility decline?; (2) can preexisting differences in gender systemsexplain the more rapid fertility decline in Bangladesh, despite the more modest economicachievements?; (3) can the development strategies adopted by the governments ofBangladesh and Egypt, be seen as additional factors in explaining the similar rural fertilitydeclines despite dissimilar economic circumstances? The paper concludes that neither gender systemsnor changes in women's opportunities appear to have contributed to declining fertility.Indeed, low levels of women's autonomy have posed no barrier to fertility decline in eithercountry. However, there is a case to be made that Bangladesh's distinct approach to development,with considerable emphasis on reaching the rural poor and women and a strong reliance onnongovernmental institutions, may have played a part in accelerating the transition in thatenvironment and in helping women to become more immediate beneficiaries of that process.

     

The uncertain lifetime and the timing of human capital investment

I examine the effects of mortality decline on fertility and human capital investment decision of parents taking into account the uncertainty about child survival. I propose a model, where parents decide on their fertility before the uncertainty is realized, but they choose to invest only in human capital of their surviving children. The model implies a positive relationship between mortality and fertility and a negative one between mortality and educational investment. It has been argued elsewhere that as, in reality, most of the mortality decline occurred in infancy, it should not affect the human capital investment decision, which comes later in life. Thus, increased survival chances should not promote growth by raising the human capital investment. This paper argues the contrary and proposes a mechanism where mortality decline at any age before the teen years can promote growth by raising human capital investment regardless of the timing of the educational investment.      

Fertility and development in Brazil

In the past, one of the concomitants of development has been a sustained reduction in fertility. As a result of this experience, demographers hypothesize that in a society in which fertility is lower in urban areas, among the upper socioeconomic status groups and the better-educated, fertility will decline to a moderate level as the country changes from a rural, agricultural socioeconomic structure, with low levels of living and education, to an urban, industrial structure, with rising levels of living and education.The data analyzed in this study indicate, however, that though substantial social and economic development (as measured by changes in industrial structure, per capita income, urbanization, and education) occurred in Brazil from at least 1920-40 to 1960, during which time fertility differentials of the kind indicated above existed, fertility has shown little or no tendency to decline. Between 1940 and 1960, in fact, the birth rate appears to have remained fairly constant around 43. With the death rate steadily dropping, the rate of natural increase and population growth (given a small net in-migration) has been accelerating. p ]From a theoretical point of view, these facts reinforce a growing realization, based on similar findings in some other developing countries, that the prevailing theoretical ideas concerning the relationship between development and fertility require modification, particularly in the direction of greater specificity. On the practical side, the question is raised whether Brazil's rate of economic development during the postwar period up to 1960 can be maintained, let alone increased, in the face of a population growth rate which will probably average 3.2-3.5 percent for the period 1960-70 and which, in the absence of a decline in fertility, is likely to accelerate further.     

The demography of words: The global decline in non-numeric fertility preferences, 1993–2011

This paper examines the decline in non-numeric responses to questions about fertility preferences among women in the developing world. These types of response—such as ‘don’t know’ or ‘it’s up to God’—have often been interpreted through the lens of fertility transition theory as an indication that reproduction has not yet entered women’s ‘calculus of conscious choice’. However, this has yet to be investigated cross-nationally and over time. Using 19?years of data from 32 countries, we find that non-numeric fertility preferences decline most substantially in the early stages of a country’s fertility transition. Using country-specific and multilevel models, we explore the individual- and contextual-level characteristics associated with women’s likelihood of providing a non-numeric response to questions about their fertility preferences. Non-numeric fertility preferences are influenced by a host of social factors, with educational attainment and knowledge of contraception being the most robust and consistent predictors.     

The role of intergenerational transfers,land, and education in fertility transition in rural Kenya: the case of Nyeri district

This qualitative study reveals how population pressures, land availability, inheritance norms, and educational opportunities intertwine to influence fertility decline in rural Kenya. Focus group discussions with men and women whose childbearing occurred both before and after the onset of rapid, unexpected fertility transition in Nyeri, Kenya allowed individuals who actually participated in, or witnessed, the fertility transition to “voice” their perceptions as to the mechanisms underlying the transition. Findings suggest that, since land inheritance is a cultural norm, land scarcity and diminishing farm size often influence fertility decision-making and behavior via preferences for fewer children. Further, education does not appear to be the driving cause of fertility behavior change, but rather is adopted as a substitute for land inheritance when land resources are scarce. These findings have implications for our understanding of fertility behavior as well as for improving predictions of fertility transition in other rural sub-Saharan African contexts.     

The influence of wives’ and husbands’ fertility preferences on progression to a third birth in Nepal, 1997–2009

As couples across the globe increasingly exercise conscious control over their reproduction, both spouses’ family-size preferences have the opportunity to influence their fertility. Using couple-level measures of rural Nepalese spouses’ family-size preferences and more than a decade of monthly panel data collected subsequently on fertility outcomes, we investigate how both spouses’ preferences influence progression to a third birth in a country where the widely professed ideal family size is two children. Contrary to expectations based on women's relative disadvantage, we find that it is wives’ preferences that drive couples’ progression to a third birth. We find also that the influence of wives’ preferences is not explained by contraceptive use but that this influence is moderated by couple communication about family planning. Wives’ preferences drive progression to a third birth among couples who had discussed how many children to have.     

Rural-urban fertility differentials in Western Nigeria

Abstract The paper attempts to glean some information on differential fertility from data obtained in a survey of selected urban and rural communities in Western Nigeria. The results show that the attitudes of rural women are far more favourable to high fertility than those of urban women, though for both groups the modal number of children preferred is five or six. The analysis also yields a total fertility of nearly six and an average family size of about five for both groups. No conclusive evidence of rural-urban fertility differentials has, however, been found. All that can be said on the basis of the available data is that the level of fertility in Western Nigeria is currently very high and that urban fertility is probably as high as rural fertility, though the probability of much larger errors in the rural than in the urban data may imply somewhat higher rural fertility.     

Asia's demographic future: the next 20 years

Even with the decline of fertility rates in most of Asia, the problem of population growth is still very serious. It is important to stress to Asian leaders and Western researchers that the problem is by no means solved just because fertility rates have declined. In many countries the number of young people is quite substantial and when they increase their numbers, certain problems will develop. Over the next 20 years, urban areas will see a marked increase in population and the resultant problems. Unemployment, increased pollution, and overcrowding will greatly decrease the quality of life for millions of people. This will happen because of natural increases and from the migration of the rural communities. In the rural areas, because of high fertility rates, population will continue to grow in spite of the large numbers of peoples moving to the city. Asia has some of the most densely populated agricultural communities and as their numbers increase, poverty and its associated problem will follow. The solutions to these problems include continued efforts in family planning, maternal and child health, and the improvement of the status of women.     

Natural population decrease in Iowa counties

As a follow-up on the studies by Dorn and Beale, this paper examines differences between Iowa counties with natural decrease and those with natural increase and analyzes the part that migration and fertility played in bringing about an excess of deaths over births in Iowa counties. The county groups are distinctly different in demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Out-migration as a mode of response adopted by the rural population in Iowa is by far the most dominant factor leading to natural decrease. Sustained net out-migration is more likely to touch off natural decrease in counties of comparatively low fertility than in those with higher fertility. Low fertility is, therefore, a contributing factor to the imbalance between births and deaths, but the amount of influence of fertility adjustment over the fertility differentials among county groups cannot be ascertained in this study because of the correlation between fertility and Catholic Church membership in counties. The data of this study were obtained from the population censuses and vital statistics.     

Interrelations between migration and fertility in Thailand

Based on special tabulations of 1960 census data on migration within Thailand, this analysis attempts to assess the role of migration in the urbanization process and the relation between migration and fertility. The importance of migration to urban growth is evidenced by the clearcut positive relationship between the percentage of persons classified as either lifetime or 5-year migrants and the urban character of their 1960 place of residence. Yet, the evidence also points to an increasing proportion of urban growth in recent decades attributable to natural increase. The specific relation between fertility and migration varies depending on the measure of migration used: Compared to nonmigrants in their place of destination, the fertility levels of lifetime migrants are not very different; but those of 5-year migrants are considerably lower. Regardless of migration status, however, fertility level is markedly lower for those living in urban places compared to those in rural places. This suggests the important role of both migration and urbanization in affecting fertility levels in Thailand.     

"发展-计划生育-生育率"的动态关系:中国省级数据再考察

顾宝昌在1987年利用省级数据考察了中国的生育率,通过路径分析得出社会经济发展和计划生育对中国生育率都有重要的直接影响的结论.李建民在2004年分析了我国低生育率的经济环境,提出1990年代我国生育率的下降应该主要是社会和经济发展的结果.基于这些结论或假设,本文利用中国省级数据,再次考察"发展-计划生育-生育率"关系,结果表明在过去30年里,计划生育的作用在下降,而社会经济发展的作用在增强.1970年代计划生育的作用是主导,1980年代计划生育与社会经济发展二者的作用基本达到了平衡,而1990年代社会经济发展的作用成为主导."发展-计划生育-生育率"关系呈献出一种动态平衡.     

Demographic Responses And Population Change

Most Western societies have gone through a process of population change during the past 100-150 years. One important aspect is the socalled demographic transition: the shift from high to low birth and death rates, and accelerated growth resulting from the lag between falling mortality and falling fertility, in national populations. Equally important has been the "rural-to-urban" transition, which involved the migration of millions of people from rural areas. It is hypothesized, following the suggestion of Davis (Theory of the Multi-Phasic Demographic Response), that the adjustment in reproductive behavior made by a community in response to a rising "strain," such as that resulting from higher natural increase, is likely to differ depending upon the ease with which the community can relieve the strain through out migration. Relationships among such characteristics of modernization as intensity of industrialization, speed of urbanization, structural changes in the agricultural system, and declining fertility are implied. Case studies of England and Sweden lend support to the hypothesis: more rapid urban-industrial development, larger-scale movement from rural areas, and a delayed decline in the rural birth rate distinguish the English transition.     

Bridges to nowhere: hosts, migrants, and the chimera of social capital in three African cities

Interest in migrant social networks and social capital has grown substantially over the past several decades. The relationship between “host” and “migrant” communities remains central to these scholarly debates. Recently urbanized cities in Africa, which include large numbers of “native-born” or internal migrants, challenge basic presumptions about host/migrant distinctions informing many of these discussions. Using comparable survey data from Johannesburg, Maputo, and Nairobi, we examine 1) the nature of social connectedness in terms of residence and nativity characteristics; and 2) the relationship between residence and nativity characteristics and three measures of trust within and across communities. Our findings suggest that the host/migrant distinction may not be particularly revealing in African cities where domestic mobility, social fragmentation and the absence of bridging institutions result in relatively low levels of trust both within and across communities. These findings underscore the need for new concepts to study “communities of strangers” and how people strategize their social mobility in urban contexts.     

Fertility in botswana: The recent decline and future prospects

Recent estimates of fertility in Botswana suggest a rapid decline of more than two births per woman between 1981 and 1988. This paper proposes that the baseline fertility was overestimated but that nonetheless fertility declined by about one birth per woman during the 1980s. The decline in fertility was linked to a deterioration in social and economic conditions caused by a major drought in the early 1980s and to the increased availability of family planning services in the same period. Fertility apparently began to rebound in the late 1980s in response to improved conditions, which came about as a result of a successful drought relief program. Future declines in fertility depend on the continued success of the family planning program, particularly in rural areas.     

An Analysis of Fertility Differentials by Religion in Kerala State: A Test of the Interaction Hypothesis

In a revelation of overall decline to below replacement fertility in the Kerala state of India, it was generally found that fertility among Muslims is higher and contraceptive prevalence lower than among Hindus and Christians. This paper examines the interaction between religion and other socioeconomic factors, that is, whether the effect of religion on fertility remains constant across other factors. The analysis is based on the data from the National Family Health Survey-1 in Kerala. The analysis found that large Hindu-Muslim fertility differences at a low level of education do not persist at higher levels. For contraceptive use, wider gaps are found at a middle level of education and at a medium level of standard of living than at lower and higher levels. This indicates that couples at different socioeconomic settings make different decisions in spite of belonging to the same religion. The fact that fertility of Muslims at higher levels of socioeconomic status is low, and not much different than the fertility of other religions, suggests that the observed fertility gap between Hindus/Christians and Muslims is a passing phenomenon.