Bridging the Relevance Gap: Aligning Stakeholders in the Future of Management Research

This report examines the relevance gap in management research. Its focus is the nature of knowledge created by research at the interface between business and academia in the context of major changes likely to affect the nature of demand for such knowledge. Management research has been accused of a lack of relevance to managerial practice and of too narrow a discipline base. The report examines the conditions giving rise to this criticism, in the UK and elsewhere, and identifies an important strategic need to increase the stakeholding of users in various aspects of the research and knowledge creation and dissemination process. The report concludes with recommendations concerning new forms of research partnership and research training that will address the relevance gap. However, bridging this gap does not only require changes in the academic mind-set. Managers and firms too need to rethink their involvement in the research process.     

物流外包的多阶段合约分析

分析了物流外包的动态特性,并建立了相应的模型,讨论物流运作在多阶段的情况下的最优合约设计.结果表明,物流外包合同是多阶段,第三方物流企业考虑到声誉,会积极执行合同,减少不合理的要求,以期下一阶段能继续合作.     

Bridging the Gap between Social Acceptance and Ethical Acceptability

New technology brings great benefits, but it can also create new and significant risks. When evaluating those risks in policymaking, there is a tendency to focus on social acceptance. By solely focusing on social acceptance, we could, however, overlook important ethical aspects of technological risk, particularly when we evaluate technologies with transnational and intergenerational risks. I argue that good governance of risky technology requires analyzing both social acceptance and ethical acceptability. Conceptually, these two notions are mostly complementary. Social acceptance studies are not capable of sufficiently capturing all the morally relevant features of risky technologies; ethical analyses do not typically include stakeholders’ opinions, and they therefore lack the relevant empirical input for a thorough ethical evaluation. Only when carried out in conjunction are these two types of analysis relevant to national and international governance of risky technology. I discuss the Rawlsian wide reflective equilibrium as a method for marrying social acceptance and ethical acceptability. Although the rationale of my argument is broadly applicable, I will examine the case of multinational nuclear waste repositories in particular. This example will show how ethical issues may be overlooked if we focus only on social acceptance, and will provide a test case for demonstrating how the wide reflective equilibrium can help to bridge the proverbial acceptance‐acceptability gap.     

作为研究者的管理者:链接理论与实践的重要桥梁

不仅理论本身的原因会导致理论与实践的脱节,管理者不愿意使用理论或者不正确使用理论也会造成理论与实践的脱节,因此对管理者实践逻辑本身的分析就非常必要。基于对管理者实践逻辑的分析,管理者不仅应作为研究对象进入研究过程,即对管理者的实践智慧进行研究、吸纳和提炼,而且应作为研究主体进入研究过程。弥合管理理论与实践的距离,不仅要基于实践的逻辑去构建理论,更要研究实践者如何才能成为一个高效的研究者。     

The Role of Contract Negotiation and Industry Structure in Production Outsourcing

Despite the spread of cost‐driven outsourcing practices, academic research cautions that suppliers' cost advantage may weaken manufacturers' bargaining positions in negotiating outsourcing agreements, thereby hurting their profitability. In this study, we attempt to further understand the strategic impact of low‐cost outsourcing on manufacturers' profitability by investigating the contractual form of outsourcing agreements and the industry structure of the upstream supply market. We consider a two‐tier supply chain system, consisting of two competing manufacturers, who have the option to produce in‐house or to outsource to an upstream supplier with lower cost. To reach an outsourcing agreement, each manufacturer engages in bilateral negotiation with her supplier, who may be an exclusive supplier or a common supplier serving both manufacturers. Our analysis shows that wholesale‐price contracts always mitigate the competition between manufacturers regardless of whether they compete with price or quantity. In contrast, two‐part tariffs intensify the competition when the manufacturers compete with quantity, but soften it when they compete with price. As a result, when outsourcing with two‐part tariffs, the manufacturers may earn lower profits than they would from in‐house production, although the suppliers are more cost efficient. This suggests that managers have to be wary about the downside of using coordinating contracts such as two‐part tariffs when pursuing low‐cost outsourcing strategies. Our analysis also sheds some light on the profitability of using an exclusive supplier for outsourcing. When outsourcing with wholesale‐price contracts, the competing manufacturers are better off outsourcing to an exclusive supplier. However, when outsourcing with two‐part tariffs, the manufacturers may earn higher profits by outsourcing to a common supplier than to an exclusive one when the manufacturers' bargaining power is sufficiently strong (weak) under quantity (price) competition.     

关系契约治理与外包合作绩效——对日离岸软件外包项目的实证研究

对日离岸软件外包项目具有典型的关系契约特性,现有文献对软件外包中的关系契约治理及对合作绩效的影响还缺乏系统的理论分析和实证研究。信任、交流和相互适应调整作为重要的关系规范,在对日软件外包关系契约治理中具有重要意义。本研究根据访谈和110个项目的数据实证检验了关系规范对离岸软件外包项目绩效的影响。通过结构方程模型方法发现,交流的有效性对于项目质量和供应商成本控制绩效有积极影响,相互适应调整对于成本控制绩效也有积极影响。这个发现有助于构建有效的关系契约治理机制,促进软件外包产业发展。     

Analysis of the Market‐Based Adjustable Outsourcing Contract under Uncertainties

The market‐based adjustable contract for customized goods or services has emerged in outsourcing practices. Its objective is to minimize the operational risks inherent in today's volatile environment of operations. Our research reveals several important properties of this contract through a continuous‐time analytical approach. Specifically, we consider the determination of this contract between two risk‐averse firms through a Nash bargaining process. We derive the optimal adjusting mechanism analytically and extensively analyze the application boundary of the market‐based adjustable outsourcing contract. We conclude by discussing implications for practice and research.     

网络时代的外包管理

本文比较分析了网络时代与工业时代外包管理的不同、网络时代制造业和服务业外包管理模型的区别,并从我国尚处于工业化后期、正在以国民经济信息化带动工业化加速发展这一现实出发,提出了可供我国企业选择的五种外包管理模式。     

化解管理理论与实践脱节的两种模式:串联型关联与并联型关联

理论与实践的关系应该是既分离,又关联的,典型的关联模式有串联型关联和并联型关联2种.当前管理学界的很多研究成果不属于这2种关联模式的任一种,它们属于管理理论与实践脱节.根据管理学的学科属性和发展阶段判断,未来可以借鉴或借助这2种关联模式,化解或缓解管理理论与实践脱节问题.     

业务外包委托代理模型中的风险补偿安排

外包活动中代理成本的高低直接影响到外包企业的核心竞争力,如何降低业务外包中的代理成本是本文的研究重点。本文首先从代理成本的机理分析入手,考虑到风险补偿在针对"代理问题"的激励契约设计中的重要性,对一个经典的最优激励契约模型进行改进,期望改进的模型能够有效降低代理成本。改进后的模型结果表明:在最优激励契约中加入风险补偿因素可以使得风险成本和激励成本下降,从而降低代理成本。本文的研究结果具有一定的普遍意义,适用于各种类型的业务外包活动,对外包企业最优激励契约的设计具有指导意义。     

Bridging Scholarship in Management: Epistemological Reflections

If the relevance gap in management research is to be narrowed, management scholars must identify and adopt processes of inquiry that simultaneously achieve high rigour and high relevance. Research approaches that strive for relevance emphasize the particular at the expense of the general and approaches that strive for rigour emphasize the general over the particular. Inquiry that attains both rigour and relevance can be found in approaches to knowledge that involve a reasoned relationship between the particular and the general. Prominent among these are the works of Ikujiro Nonaka and John Dewey. Their epistemological foundations indicate the potential for a philosophy of science and a process of inquiry that crosses epistemological lines by synthesizing the particular and the general and by utilizing experience and theory, the implicit and the explicit, and induction and deduction. These epistemologies point to characteristics of a bridging scholarship that is problem-initiated and rests on expanded standards of validity. The present epistemological reflections are in search of new communities of knowing toward the production of relevant and rigorous management knowledge.     

工程建设项目的合同管理

本文以房地产商的角度详细说明工程建设项目合同管理的程序、方法和技术.     

On the Advantage of Quantity Leadership When Outsourcing Production to a Competitive Contract Manufacturer

This study investigates a supply chain comprising an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a contract manufacturer (CM), in which the CM acts as both upstream partner and downstream competitor to the OEM. The two parties can engage in one of three Cournot competition games: a simultaneous game, a sequential game with the OEM as the Stackelberg leader, and a sequential game with the CM as the Stackelberg leader. On the basis of these three basic games, this study investigates the two parties' Stackelberg leadership/followership decisions. When the outsourcing quantity and wholesale price are exogenously given, either party may prefer Stackelberg leadership or followership. For example, when the wholesale price or the proportion of production outsourced to the CM is lower than a threshold value, both parties prefer Stackelberg leadership and, consequently, play a simultaneous game in the consumer market. When the outsourcing quantity and wholesale price are decision variables, the competitive CM sets a wholesale price sufficiently low to allow both parties to coexist in the market, and the OEM outsources its entire production to this CM. This study also examines the impact of the supply chain parties' bargaining power on contract outcomes by considering a wholesale price that is determined via the generalized Nash bargaining scheme, finding a Stackelberg equilibrium to be sustained when the CM's degree of bargaining power is great and the non‐competitive CM's wholesale price is high.     

The Role of Interdisciplinary Analysis in Bridging the Gap Between the Technical and Human Sides of Risk Assessment1

It is readily observable that there is a wide gulf between the manner by which the lay public and the manner by which technical experts assess the risks of complex technologies and assimilate these assessments in decisions regarding the acceptance or rejection of technological options. On the public side, this gap in methods and value assessments is a major source of distrust of technical experts and disaffection with the social management of technology. From the viewpoint of the technical experts who introduce or regulate technologies, this gap is both a cauldron of frustration and a perceived justification for paternalistic technocratic decision-making that further alienates important segments of the public. It is the author's belief that unless our society learns how to progress in bridging these gaps within the framework of a comparative mode of risk-cost-benefit analysis of options, the potential net benefits of certain technologies such as commercial nuclear power could well be lost to our society. Research on public risk perception, while potentially an important component in achieving this objective, needs to be restructured from its present static orientation to meet the needs of forward-looking decision-making that accommodates dynamic learning processes of both the public and technical experts as well as the “learning curves” of technological improvements historically accompanying successful innovations. Moreover, no less attention needs to be devoted to improved benefit assessment along with ethical and equity considerations in decision-making involving the reconciliation of conflict between individual and societal interests. This paper examines the vital importance of interdisciplinary analysis in fulfilling these needs.     

管理研究与实践脱节的原因以及应对策略

管理研究与管理实践脱节最近引起研究者的强烈关注。它是指管理研究所得出的发现,或发展出来的理论并没有在具体实践之中得到有效应用。论文将其归纳为无关型、超脱型、应用型、传递型、落后型五种类型的脱节,并对脱节的原因进行了深入分析。我们认为,建立合理的管理研究成果评价机制、进行以问题和变革驱动的情境化研究、综合运用多种研究范式、成立跨学科的研究机构、建立有效的科学研究共同体、建立学术知识转化机制、强化研究的规范性,将是弥合管理研究与实践距离的有效对策。     

企业研发外包的控制机制:信息泄露下的支付合同选择

采用委托代理模型的框架,通过分析研发项目特点、外包代理方的行为特征及其信息泄漏对研发外包支付合同的影响,提出了相应的支付合同选择机制。研究表明,在无信息泄漏的情况下,当研发机构的努力程度可观测时,研发委托方可以采用固定支付合同实现外包;反之,委托方需要与代理方分享利润,并且利润分享比例与代理方的风险规避度、市场的不确定性和研发机构的开发效率负相关。在存在信息泄露的情况下,利润分享比例与研发项目对委托企业的重要性程度及其项目本身的复杂性程度负相关,并且委托方还应根据研发机构获取市场能力的不同进行调整。     

供应链管理下物流外包的协作机制及其实现

对供应链管理下的物流外包双方间的协作进行了研究.借鉴界面管理的相关理论,将物流外包中的相互关系看作是一种界面.在对物流外包中的各种界面进行具体分析之后,阐述了界面之间的相互联系,并根据各自的特点给出了相应的管理方法和具体措施.根据物流外包的协作机制,构建了基于多代理技术的物流外包信息支持系统.用基于消息/对话的形式实现物流外包各参与方间的信息通讯,并分析和阐述了代理间的协调规则和各代理相互激活的流程.     

供应链质量管理中的最优合同设计

本文研究在供应链质量管理过程中合同设计问题对供应商质量预防决策和制造商质量检测决策的影响.在合同设计过程中分析了各种行动隐匿情况下的道德风险问题,以及如何通过限定合同参数的取值来激励制造商和供应商的行动,在实现供应商和制造商利益最大化的同时,保证供应链整体质量收益(质量成本)的优化.