Voting and Social Inclusion in Sweden

Three decades ago, Sweden extended municipal and provincial voting privileges to non‐citizen residents arguing that it would increase political influence, interest and self‐esteem among foreign citizens. The aim of this paper is to explore the act of voting as a measure of social inclusion by comparing voting propensities of immigrants (people born outside Sweden), their descendants (born in Sweden) and native Swedish citizens (those who have citizenship through jus sanguine) while controlling for a range of socio‐economic, demographic characteristics, contextual factors and a set of “hard” and “soft” social inclusion related variables. In particular we focus on the impact of citizenship acquisition ‐‐ does the symbolic act of attaining citizenship result in increased voting participation on the part of Swedish residents who are not citizens by birth. We use the Swedish 2006 electoral survey matched to registry data from Statistics Sweden to assess the correlates of voting by Swedish‐born and immigrant residents. Using instrumental variable regressions we estimate the impact of citizenship acquisition. We find that acquisition of citizenship makes a real difference to the probability of voting. Immigrants who naturalise are in general far more likely to vote than those who do not.     

Self-reports of information seeking: Is social desirability in play?

Social desirability, the likelihood of individuals to overreport behaviors they perceive to be approved by others, is often cited as a limitation in research but rarely controlled in a systematic manner. Social desirability can influence self-reported behaviors (e.g., voting behavior) and communication variables (e.g., argumentativeness). Information seeking may be susceptible to the effects of social desirability as knowledge and information are generally desired, and thus may be prone to overreporting. This article presents results from two online, information-seeking tracking studies investigating the influence of social desirability on self-reported information seeking. Participants indicated how much time they actually spent seeking information on a website. Unbeknownst to participants, their website use was being tracked using Google Analytics. This article compares actual time spent seeking information to reported information-seeking time. Results suggest that participants overreport information seeking in these two studies; social desirability may explain this result.     

CAMPAIGN SPENDING IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

Past research of the effects of campaign spending in Congressional elections has found, contrary to expectations, that incumbent spending lowers votes he or she receives. Our model simultaneously determines votes and spending and eliminates this anomaly. A measure comparing the incumbent's voting record to constituent preferences aids model identification. Using two-stage least squares, we find that both incumbent and challenger spending are signficant determinants of the popular vote received. Tenure and spending appear to have diminishing returns, and voters appear to punish incumbents who vote against their wishes.     

Implementation of Jefferson-d’Hondt rule in the formation of a parliamentary committee

Same parliaments, to form a committee of size $q$ , use a voting process like the following: every parliamentary member votes for one out of a fixed set of candidates, and those $q$ candidates receiving more votes are elected for the committee. Assuming total discipline of vote, this is a game form in which players are the parliamentary groups. We investigate, according to some natural hypotheses about preferences, the likely distribution of the members of this committee. The main results are: (a) when fractional votes are allowed, there is a complete agreement between the distribution among the groups of the elected candidates that are outcomes of a Nash equilibrium and the distribution that, according to the size of the groups, would compute the Jefferson-d’Hondt allocation rule, and (b) when fractional votes are not allowed, there is a near agreement for a majority of situations.     

Voting in professional associations: The case of the American sociological association revisited

Who votes in ASA elections? This article examines data on voter turnout from two recent presidential contests of the American Sociological Association in an analysis of the determinants of election participation. Extending the 1981 Ridgeway and Moore study of voting dynamics in the ASA, we hypothesize that intraorganizational networks and particular demongraphic characteristics link ASA members to the discipline in a manner analogous to the way such factors operate in the national electorate. On the basis of data compiled from 1985 and 1986 ASA election returns, we find that network factors are the most salient determinants of voting behavior. We conclude that those organizational ties that effectively link members, however directly or indirectly, to the larger Association are the most predictive of propensity to vote.     

The exact bias of the Banzhaf measure of power when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent

This paper discusses a numerical scheme for computing the Banzhaf swing probability when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent. Examples indicate a substantial bias in the Banzhaf measure of voting power if neither assumption is met. The analytical part derives the exact magnitude of the bias due to the common probability of an affirmative vote deviating from one half and due to common correlation in unweighted simple-majority games. The former bias is polynomial, the latter is linear. A modified square-root rule for two-tier voting systems that takes into account both the homogeneity and the size of constituencies is also provided.     

A law of large numbers for weighted plurality

Consider an election between $k$ candidates in which each voter votes randomly (but not necessarily independently) for a single candidate, and suppose that there is a single candidate that every voter prefers (in the sense that each voter is more likely to vote for this special candidate than any other candidate). Suppose we have a voting rule that takes all of the votes and produces a single outcome and suppose that each individual voter has little effect on the outcome of the voting rule. If the voting rule is a weighted plurality, then we show that with high probability, the preferred candidate will win the election. Conversely, we show that this statement fails for all other reasonable voting rules. This result is an extension of one by Häggström, Kalai and Mossel, who proved the above in the case $k=2$ .     

Multiple votes,ballot truncation and the two-party system: an experiment

Duverger’s law states that Plurality Voting tends to favor a two-party system. We conducted laboratory experiments to study whether voting procedures other than Plurality Voting could favor a two-party system as well. Plurality Voting is compared with Approval Voting and Dual Voting, both of which allow to vote for multiple candidates, but differ in whether voters are required to cast all their votes. We find that in most elections held under Plurality Voting and Approval Voting, at most two candidates are viable. By contrast, three candidates are viable in a sizable number of elections held under Dual Voting due to strategic voting. Our evidence suggests that Approval Voting may encourage a two-party system, whereas Dual Voting may encourage multipartism. The voters’ ability to truncate ballots (i.e., not cast all their votes) is essential for supporting the two-party system under Approval Voting.     

Why do states enfranchise citizens abroad? Comparative insights from Mexico,Italy and Belgium

Over the past two decades, sending states have greatly increased their interest in maintaining strong connections with their citizens abroad. The worldwide adoption of external voting – understood not only as an electoral procedure that allows some citizens to cast their vote outside the national territory but also as an acknowledgement that an emigrant status is compatible with polity membership – illustrates this phenomenon. Why do states enfranchise citizens abroad? In this article, I seek to answer this question by comparing the evolution of the debates on the extension of voting privileges to citizens residing abroad in Mexico, Italy and Belgium. My central argument is that a combination of variables shapes the development of external voting in different parts of the world, as well as the content of these laws. These include emigrant lobbying, home states' desires to stimulate emigrant loyalty for economic purposes and, most importantly, the evolution of domestic politics. In discussing these variables, I also shed light on how one can shape the adoption of external voting legislation to control the impact of votes cast abroad.     

Democratically Elected Aristocracies

The article suggests a formal model of a two-tier voting procedure, which unlike traditional voting systems does not presuppose that every vote counts the same. In deciding a particular issue voters are called in the first round to assign categories of their fellow-citizens with differential voting power (or weights) according to the special position or concern individuals are perceived to have with regard to that issue. In the second stage, voters vote on the issue itself according to their substantive view and their votes are counted in the light of the differential weights assigned in the first round. We analyze formal and philosophical reasons that support the model.     

Working-Class Authoritarianism und Die Wahl Rechtspopulistischer Parteien

May the often stated over-representation of workers in the electorates of right-wing populist parties in Western Europe be explained by the so-called “working-class authoritarianism”-thesis by S.M. Lipset? Following this thesis, there are specific socialisation and deprivation experiences in the social situation of the working-class, favouring the development of authoritarian traits and making class-members more susceptible to authoritarian parties. On the basis of the European Social Survey of 2002 the thesis is tested empirically by using the Goldthorpe class scheme and two measures of authoritarianism. It is shown that workers are more inclined to vote for right-wing populist parties and have higher levels of authoritarianism. Furthermore, persons with high levels of authoritarianism are more likely to vote for such parties. The authors conclude that disproportionately high shares of votes for right-wing populist parties from the working-class are, indeed, mediated by authoritarianism. In addition to this, class affiliation has an independent effect on voting behaviour. Finally, it is found that authoritarianism has an even stronger impact on the vote for right-wing populist parties in the service class and the class of routine non-manual workers, though being less frequent there.     

DOMESTIC CONTENT LEGISLATION: HOUSE VOTING AND THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF REGULATION

House voting on domestic content legislation provides a rare opportunity to examine the political economy of protectionism with respect to a particular issue rather than by using the traditional interindustry approach. The results indicate that a representative's vote in favor of the content legislation and the intensity of the legislator's preferences are positively related to the importance of the auto and steel industries in the representative's district, an increasing unemployment rate, campaign contributions from labor groups, affiliation with Democratic Party, and a liberal ideology. Despite ideology's statistical significance, the results suggest this variable can be disregarded because neither the predictive accuracy nor the explanatory power of the model is improved by its inclusion. The estimates also provide insights concerning the impact of changes in the independent variables upon voting patterns.     

The Strong No Show Paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences

The No Show Paradox (there is a voter who would rather not vote) is known to affect every Condorcet voting function. This paper analyses two strong versions of this paradox in the context of Condorcet voting correspondences. The first says that there is a voter whose favorite candidate loses the election if she votes honestly, but gets elected if she abstains. The second says that there is a voter whose least preferred candidate gets elected if she votes honestly, but loses the election if she abstains. All Condorcet correspondences satisfying some weak domination properties are shown to be affected by these strong forms of the paradox. On the other hand, with the exception of the Simpson-Cramer Minmax and the Young rule, all the Condorcet correspondences that (to the best of our knowledge) are proposed in the literature suffer from these two paradoxes. Received: 30 November 1999/Accepted: 27 March 2000     

First and second best voting rules in committees

A committee of people with common preferences but different abilities in identifying the best alternative (e.g., a jury) votes in order to decide between two alternatives. The first best voting rule is a weighted voting rule that takes the different individual competences into account, and is therefore not anonymous, i.e., the voters’ identities matter. Under this rule, it is rational for the committee members to vote according to their true opinions, or informatively. This is not necessarily true for an anonymous voting rule, under which members may have an incentive to vote non-informatively. Thus, strategic, sophisticated voters may vary their voting strategies according to the voting rule rather than naively voting informatively. This paper shows that the identity of the best anonymous and monotone (i.e., quota) voting rule does not depend on whether the committee members are strategic or naive or whether some are strategic and some are naive. One such rule, called the second best rule, affords the highest expected utility in all cases.

“Wasn’t he sweet?” said Yossarian. “Maybe they should give him three votes.” Joseph Heller, Catch-22

     

Sincere versus sophisticated voting when legislators vote sequentially

Elsewhere (Groseclose and Milyo 2010), we examine a game where each legislator has preferences over (i) the resulting policy and (ii) how he or she votes. The latter preferences are especially important when the legislator is not pivotal. We show that when the game follows the normal rules of legislatures—most important, that legislators can change their vote after seeing how their fellow legislators have voted—then the only possible equilibrium is one where all legislators ignore their policy preferences. That is, each legislator votes as if he or she is not pivotal. The result, consistent with empirical studies of Congress, suggests that legislators should tend to vote sincerely, rather than sophisticatedly. In this paper we examine how outcomes change if we change the rules for voting. Namely, instead of a simultaneous game, we consider a game where legislators vote sequentially in a pre-determined order. We show that, opposite to the simultaneous game, an alternative wins if and only if a majority of legislators’ policy preferences favor that alternative. Our results suggest that if Congress adopted this change in rules, then sophisticated voting would become frequent instead of rare.     

Banning Abortion:

This paper contrasts bimodal and unimodal issues, and identifies abortion as a bimodal issue. While unimodal issues exhibit continuous issue positions, a range of policy options, greater possibility of consensus, and often include financial proposals, bimodal issues are charcterized by dichotomous and mutually exclusive policy options, conflict, use of emotion-laden symbols, and often include civil liberties and soical issues. This paper examined two Senate votes on abortion in 1982 and 1983-the Helms proposal to restrict abortion and the Hatch human life amendment. Social variables were more important than political variables in explaining voting outcomes. When the impacts of constituency and Senators' characteristics were compared, those of constituencies were found to have greater impact. For abortion votes, social and constituency variables outweigh political and Senators' characteristics since public opinion is very intense and the issue is of high salience to constituents.     

Predictors of strike voting behavior: The case of university faculty

This study examines the impact of demographic characteristics, job variables, and attitudinal factors on the strike voting behavior of faculty members at a Canadian university. The results show that married faculty members and those from single-income households were more inclined to vote against the strike. Regarding the attitudinal factors, faculty members who were satisfied with existing research facilities and were loyal to the Faculty Association were likely to favor the strike, whereas faculty who were satisfied with working conditions and with the university administration were opposed to the strike. Beliefs about unions, however, did not appear to have an influence on voting behavior. The author thanks J. Dart, A. Dastmalchian, R. Long, D. Maki, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.     

TAXES, TORTS, AND THE TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY: CONGRESSIONAL VOTING ON INSTRUMENTS TO CONTROL POLLUTION

Theories of rational political ignorance and congressional voting imply that Congress members may take different interests into account when they vote on technical amendments than when they vote on a bill's final passage. This article uses votes on Superfund reauthorization to examine what factors influence politicians' support for different instruments to control pollution and how the interests Congress members take into account vary with the anticipated degree of electoral scrutiny. Controlling for a legislator's general support for environmental programs, a representative's votes on specific policy instruments in Superfund legislation depended on the district-level costs and benefits of the instruments.     

AN EXPRESSIVE VOTING THEORY OF STRIKES

Union members may vote for a strike even if they do not expect to thereby increase their wages. For under majority voting any one member's vote for a strike is unlikely to be decisive. A union member who obtains a non-infinitesimal emotional benefit from the act of voting for a strike may therefore vote in its favor. This hypothesis can explain the existence of strikes and the conditions which make strikes especially likely.     

Political support for minimum wage legislation

Conclusion Even if minimum wage laws reduce employment opportunities for some workers, other individuals may benefit from their enactment. In particular, union members and residents of states with high wage levels would be expected to encourage their senators to vote in favor of minimum wage legislation. Examination of senators’ votes on the 1966 and 1974 minimum wage bills indicates that senators favoring passage of these bills are likely to come from states with high union membership and, to a lesser extent, high wage levels. The equations explaining senators’ votes on these bills were disaggregated by political party affiliation and length of membership in the Senate. Democrats were more likely than Republicans to support minimum wage bills. Virtually no difference was observed between senators who voted on both the 1966 and 1974 measures and those who voted on only one. Perhaps the most encouraging result reported is the similarity of coefficients generally observed for corresponding 1966 and 1974 equations. This similarity suggests that the equations reported herein could be used to predict votes on future minimum wage bills. The results suggest also that the general mode of analysis can be fruitfully applied to other economic legislation.