DEMOCRATIC PEACE AND ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Democracies rarely engage in conflicts with one another, though they are not averse to fighting autocracies. We exploit the existence in many countries of executive term limits to show that electoral accountability is the key reason behind this “democratic peace” phenomenon. We construct a new dataset of term limits for a sample of 177 countries over the 1816–2001 period, and combine this information with a large dataset of interstate conflicts. Our empirical analysis shows that, although democracies are significantly less likely to fight each other, democracies with leaders who face binding term limits are as conflict prone as autocracies. The study of electoral calendars confirms the importance of re‐election incentives: in democracies with two‐term limits, conflicts are less likely to occur during the executive's first mandate than in the last one. Our findings support the Kantian idea that elections act as a discipline device, deterring leaders from engaging in costly conflicts.     

Tall claims? Sense and nonsense about the importance of height of US presidents

According to both the scientific literature and popular media, all one needs to win a US presidential election is to be taller than one's opponent. Yet, such claims are often based on an arbitrary selection of elections, and inadequate statistical analysis. Using data on all presidential elections, we show that height is indeed an important factor in the US presidential elections. Candidates that were taller than their opponents received more popular votes, although they were not significantly more likely to win the actual election. Taller presidents were also more likely to be reelected. In addition, presidents were, on average, much taller than men from the same birth cohort. The advantage of taller candidates is potentially explained by perceptions associated with height: taller presidents are rated by experts as ‘greater’, and having more leadership and communication skills. We conclude that height is an important characteristic in choosing and evaluating political leaders.     

Evolutionary leadership theory and economic voting: Warmth and competence impressions mediate the effect of economic perceptions on vote

Leaders' persona and the state of the economy are among the two most salient topics during election campaigns. Existing scholarship treats these as two independent or even competing factors. Economic perceptions are overlooked as cues for leader evaluations, while leader evaluations rarely enter considerations of the economic vote. This article builds on evolutionary leadership theory to bridge these distant literatures. It proposes that evaluating leaders' performance based on the resources available to group members may have improved followers' fitness ancestrally. Accordingly, it predicts that the effect of economic perceptions on vote choice is mediated by leaders' warmth and competence impressions in modern democracies. To test these predictions, the article first analyzes representative survey data from seventeen elections in three countries (USA, Australia and Denmark). Second, it relies on two original, well-powered manipulation-of-process experiments to test the validity of the causal claims.     

Islamic Rule and the Empowerment of the Poor and Pious

Does Islamic political control affect women's empowerment? Several countries have recently experienced Islamic parties coming to power through democratic elections. Due to strong support among religious conservatives, constituencies with Islamic rule often tend to exhibit poor women's rights. Whether this reflects a causal relationship or a spurious one has so far gone unexplored. I provide the first piece of evidence using a new and unique data set of Turkish municipalities. In 1994, an Islamic party won multiple municipal mayor seats across the country. Using a regression discontinuity (RD) design, I compare municipalities where this Islamic party barely won or lost elections. Despite negative raw correlations, the RD results reveal that, over a period of six years, Islamic rule increased female secular high school education. Corresponding effects for men are systematically smaller and less precise. In the longer run, the effect on female education remained persistent up to 17 years after, and also reduced adolescent marriages. An analysis of long‐run political effects of Islamic rule shows increased female political participation and an overall decrease in Islamic political preferences. The results are consistent with an explanation that emphasizes the Islamic party's effectiveness in overcoming barriers to female entry for the poor and pious.     

Combinatorial Voting

We study elections that simultaneously decide multiple issues, where voters have independent private values over bundles of issues. The innovation is in considering nonseparable preferences, where issues may be complements or substitutes. Voters face a political exposure problem: the optimal vote for a particular issue will depend on the resolution of the other issues. Moreover, the probabilities that the other issues will pass should be conditioned on being pivotal. We prove that equilibrium exists when distributions over values have full support or when issues are complements. We then study large elections with two issues. There exists a nonempty open set of distributions where the probability of either issue passing fails to converge to either 1 or 0 for all limit equilibria. Thus, the outcomes of large elections are not generically predictable with independent private values, despite the fact that there is no aggregate uncertainty regarding fundamentals. While the Condorcet winner is not necessarily the outcome of a multi‐issue election, we provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the implementation of the Condorcet winner.     

THE EQUALITY MULTIPLIER: HOW WAGE COMPRESSION AND WELFARE EMPOWERMENT INTERACT

We explore how more wage equality fuels the generosity of the welfare state via political competition in elections, and how a more generous welfare state fuels wage equality via empowerment of weak groups in the labor market. Together the two mechanisms may generate a cumulative process that explains how equality multiplies, and why countries with more equal distributions of market outcomes also have stronger welfare states. The complementarity between wage setting and welfare spending can explain why almost equally rich countries differ so much in economic and social equality among their citizens. (JEL: H53, I31, J31)     

Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates

In this paper we focus on strategic voting behavior when both an election and a signaling motivation affect voters' behavior. We analyze a model of elections with two candidates competing on a one‐dimensional policy space. Voters are privately and imperfectly informed about a common shock affecting the electorate's preferences. Candidates are assumed to choose policy in response to information gleaned from election results and according to exogenous factors that may lead to polarization in candidates' policy choices. We analyze a subset of symmetric equilibria in which strategies are symmetric to candidates' names and private signals (CSS equilibria). We show that signaling and election motivations pull voters to vote in different directions. We provide conditions that show the relation between the amount of information aggregated in the election and the motivation that influences voting behavior the most. Finally, we show that when candidates are responsive and polarized, all CSS equilibria are inefficient in the limit.     

The Influences of User Characteristics on Performance in a Logistics DSS Application

Decision Support Systems (DSS) are widely used in logistics decision applications, and a large number and variety of systems are commercially available. We investigate the contributions of user characteristics including experiences, data preferences, intuition, and effort to decision performance in a logistics DSS context. The study includes a laboratory experiment in which decision makers with varied experiences used a DSS to make facility network design decisions for problems of varying complexity. Two variants of the DSS are utilized in order to examine the interactions of a DSS decision aid with user characteristics. We find that intuition and effort are associated with decision-making performance. High analytic ability is not related to intuition, however. Education and previous experience are associated with performance. Yet these characteristics are also unrelated to intuition. Decision makers who highly value disaggregated data provided by the DSS tend to perform poorly. Also, the results suggest that the effects of users' experiences and preferences on performance are influenced by an analytical decision aid.     

Competitive Capabilities among Manufacturing Plants in Developing,Emerging, and Industrialized Countries: A Comparative Analysis

Competitive capabilities have been defined as a plant's actual performance relative to its competitors, with the most commonly investigated capabilities being quality, delivery, flexibility, and cost. However, most research in this realm has investigated capabilities within developed countries, and neglected the context of developing and emerging nations, which are increasingly becoming viable economic entities in global supply chains in their own right. The present study fills this gap and carries out a comparative analysis of competitive capabilities among plants in developing, emerging, and industrialized countries. Basing our arguments on the resource‐based view of the firm, we suggest that the influence of competitive capabilities on each other varies among plants in differentially industrialized regions. Specifically, we suggest that, on average, competitive capabilities tend to influence each other to a greater degree in plants in emerging and developing countries compared to industrialized countries. Along similar lines, we suggest that the influence of the four competitive capabilities on performance improvement is manifested more strongly among plants in emerging and developing countries than among plants in industrialized nations. We investigate these contentions with data from 1,211 plants in 21 countries. The results are particularly important for decision makers as they decide on the increasingly global location of their manufacturing operations or the configuration of their global supply chains.     

POLITICAL REPUTATIONS AND CAMPAIGN PROMISES

We analyze conditions under which candidates' reputations may affect voters' beliefs over what policy will be implemented by the winning candidate of an election. We develop a model of repeated elections with complete information in which candidates are purely ideological. We analyze an equilibrium in which voters' strategies involve a credible threat to punish candidates who renege on their campaign promises and in which all campaign promises are believed by voters and honored by candidates. We characterize the maximal credible campaign promises and find that the degree to which promises are credible in equilibrium is an increasing function of the value of a candidate's reputation. (JEL: D8)     

Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy?

Do political institutions shape economic policy? I argue that this question should naturally appeal to economists. Moreover, the answer is in the affirmative, both in theory and in practice. In particular, recent theoretical work predicts systematic effects of electoral rules and political regimes on the size and composition of government spending. Results from ongoing empirical work indicate that such effects are indeed present in the data. Some empirical results are consistent with theoretical predictions: presidential regimes have smaller governments and countries with majoritarian elections have smaller welfare‐state programs and less corruption. Other results present puzzles for future research: the adjustment to economic events appears highly institution‐dependent, as does the timing and nature of the electoral cycle.     

Political Economy of Mechanisms

We study the provision of dynamic incentives to self‐interested politicians who control the allocation of resources in the context of the standard neoclassical growth model. Citizens discipline politicians using elections. We show that the need to provide incentives to the politician in power creates political economy distortions in the structure of production, which resemble aggregate tax distortions. We provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in the long run. If the politicians are as patient as the citizens, the best subgame perfect equilibrium leads to an asymptotic allocation where the aggregate distortions arising from political economy disappear. In contrast, when politicians are less patient than the citizens, political economy distortions remain asymptotically and lead to positive aggregate labor and capital taxes.     

The shadow dance of political climate: Engagement in political behavior in local government authorities

In describing the processes of organizations as political acts, we are not making a moral judgment; we simply are making an observation about a process. Bacharach and Lawler, 1980, p. 2.This study focuses on the ways a perceived political climate influences engagement in political behavior during a national election period. By using social cognitive theory as a way to predict behavior in organizations, we study how managers' engagement in political behavior is shaped. A qualitative research methodology was used. Sixteen interviews with managers were conducted in various local authorities during the 2015 election campaign for Israel's parliament. Participants perceived an intensification of political climate during the pre-election period, which they attributed to a significant connection between electoral and intraorganizational politics. Additionally, a perceived organizational political climate intensifies engagement in a range of political behaviors throughout an organization and is connected with an administrative role. The findings suggest that managers use “political capital” that the election period provides to influence and manipulate their organization's future and their own.     

THE POLITICAL COLOR OF FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY

We propose a dynamic general equilibrium model that yields testable implications about the fiscal policy run by governments of different political color. Successive generations of voters choose taxation, expenditure, and government debt through repeated elections. Voters are heterogeneous by age and by the intensity of their preferences for public good provision. The political equilibrium switches stochastically between left‐ (pro‐public goods) and right‐leaning (pro‐private consumption) governments. A shift to the left (right) is associated with a fall (increase) in government debt, an increase (fall) in taxation, and an increase (fall) in government expenditures. However, left‐leaning governments engage in more debt accumulation during recessions. These predictions are shown to be consistent with the time‐series evidence for the United States in the postwar period, and also with the evidence for a panel of OECD countries. (JEL: D72, E62, H41, H62, H63)     

How Independent,Competent and Incentivized Should Non‐executive Directors Be? An Empirical Investigation of Good Governance Codes

There is a commonly held conviction among governance scholars and practitioners that increasing the number of non‐executive directors may have beneficial effects on board practices. This view has gained momentum after each wave of scandals. Given the relevance of the issue in governance studies and practices, the aim of this paper is to investigate how independent, competent and incentivized non‐executive directors should be according to governance scholars and board best practices. To answer this question, we conducted a review of the literature on non‐executive directors. We then collected corporate governance codes developed worldwide at the end of 2005, and made a comparative analysis of their recommendations about the independence, the competencies and the incentives of non‐executive directors. Our results show that (i) non‐executive directors' independence is a commonly recommended governance practice, the meaning of which differs widely among countries; (ii) non‐executive directors' competencies and incentives are not considered a governance issue to be regulated in detail; (iii) agency theory and the search for appropriate board demography tend to dominate the recommendations of governance literature and codes. Our findings have implications for both research and practice.     

PARTY CUES IN ELECTIONS UNDER MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM US STATES

In federal countries, voters’ ability to evaluate the performance of their leaders might be reduced when different levels of government shape policy outcomes. This can blur political accountability. In this article, we analyze how party cues (i.e., politicians’ party membership acting as a cue towards their characteristics) affect voters’ incomplete information in a federal setting. We theoretically show that party cues allow indirect inference regarding politicians using observed policy outcomes, and can alleviate the accountability problem. Empirical evidence from US presidential election results across all 50 US states over the period 1972–2008 supports this proposition. However, party cues also have a downside in that they may reduce politicians’ effort, particularly when politicians at different levels of government are from different parties.     

Dynamics of Corruption and Citizens’ Trust in Anti-Corruption Agencies in Three South Asian Countries

The comparative analyses of citizens’ trust in Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) in three countries’ (Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka) indicate that despite ACA’s low level of effectiveness in curbing corruption, trust level varies. The Nepalese ACA has higher level of trust than Bangladesh and Sri Lanka which is earned by targeting mainly lower level public officials. Though it fails to reduce the level of corruption in Nepal; citizens tend to trust ACA more. This is because of higher visibility of ACA’s activities. Such findings indicate about the methodological challenge to use ‘trust’ as a proxy to measure institutional performance.     

Pre‐Colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development

We investigate the role of deeply rooted pre‐colonial ethnic institutions in shaping comparative regional development within African countries. We combine information on the spatial distribution of ethnicities before colonization with regional variation in contemporary economic performance, as proxied by satellite images of light density at night. We document a strong association between pre‐colonial ethnic political centralization and regional development. This pattern is not driven by differences in local geographic features or by other observable ethnic‐specific cultural and economic variables. The strong positive association between pre‐colonial political complexity and contemporary development also holds within pairs of adjacent ethnic homelands with different legacies of pre‐colonial political institutions.     

Unfavorable Market Conditions,Institutional and Financial Development,and Exits of Foreign Subsidiaries

In this paper, we examine how market conditions in host countries affect the entry and exit decisions of multinational corporations' foreign subsidiaries. Taking the real options perspective, we expect that smaller investments will be associated with more flexible entries and exits. We also predict that better-established host countries with greater institutional and financial development will facilitate the exits of foreign subsidiaries with smaller investments under unfavorable market conditions. We run a Cox proportional hazard rate model with a dataset of Korean foreign direct investments, and find that when market conditions become more unfavorable, foreign subsidiaries making smaller investments that were endogenously chosen under the influence of market demand uncertainty are more likely to engage in earlier exits than subsidiaries making larger investments. We also find that strong institutional and financial development positively moderates small subsidiaries' exits under conditions of unfavorably resolved uncertainty.     

Constants and Variants in Political Exchange

ABSTRACT: The purpose of this article is to offer some clarification on developments in a number of European countries in the postwar period. The crux of the analysis are the relations between the huge, functional interest-group organizations and the political system and government, and in particular the trade unions. The intent is firstly to overcome the uncertain and often indistinct use of the concepts of political exchange and corporatism, then to offer an explanatory framework in which these modes, which have prevailed in Capitalist countries, can be grouped under the model of political exchange, in so much as the trade unions’representation of interest groups is affected by the factors and political advantages at stake. It then clariries the essential connotations of this model, which can be considered as constants compared to the variants within it, and also deals with the two types of political exchange predominant in the period and countries surveyed, namely pluralist and cor-poratist variants. Finally the author stresses the need for empirical studies in postwar Europe, to check the acceptability and realism of the model used and test the validity of the theses here outlined, that is, that there are several variants — or strategies — of political exchange between trade unions and the governments and political system.